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THE INFLUENCE OF FOLKLORE ON THE HISTORY OF RELIGION

BY

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Prior to the scientific investigation of popular tradition both in its spiritual and material aspects, and the anthropological approach to the discipline, the interest in the subject arose out of the Romantic Movement. Thus, in the first half of the nineteenth century various attempts were made to collect and classify the tales, songs, sayings and superstitions current among the people in northern Europe, following in the wake of John Aubrey's *Romaines of Gentilisme and Judaisme*, written in 1687, of Brand's *Observations on the Popular Antiquities of the British Isles* published in 1777, and of Hone's *Everyday Book* (1826). It was, however, the works of the brothers Grimm in Germany, notably *Kinder- und Hausmärchen* (1812) and *Deutsche Mythologie* (1835), that laid the foundations of the serious study of folk tales, though at first their influence was not strongly felt.

The Study of Popular Tradition.

In Norway Jorgen Max (1813-1882) and his son Moltke, systematically investigated the ancient stories, songs and legends that survived in the mountain valleys, while in Finland in 1835 the publication by Elias Lönnrot of the national epic under the title of *Kalevala*, based on a diverse mass of old popular songs which he had collected in eastern Finland, had a very considerable influence on the Finnish literary movement and gave the language a new prestige in Europe. Although the *Kalevala* was produced essentially as an epic rather than as a scientific work, it fostered an interest in traditional lore, and with the help of the Finnish Literary Society, founded in 1831, by the middle of the century Finland has taken the lead in this type of research, centred in its ancient history, language and culture, with its own method of approach. In Sweden, on the other hand, in the absence

of a national epic as a focus, inquiry at first was concentrated more on the material culture of the peasantry than on philological and literary research.

In England Max Müller (1823-1900), an Anglo-German orientalist and comparative philologist, endeavoured to discover the origin of folk tales in the solar myths of the ancestors of the Indo-European peoples by the interpretation of metaphorical expressions in the Rig-veda ¹). It only remained, however, for Tylor and Andrew Lang to show so far from being confined to the Aryan sphere mythology was of universal occurrence, to reveal the fallacy of the solar theory. In the light of the anthropological evidence it was now suggested that myths represented naïve attempts to explain the origin of the world and natural phenomena in fantastic terms as legacies from a former "mythopoeic age" prone to this type of thought ²). Meanwhile in Germany Wilhelm Mannhardt (1831-1880) maintained that rural rites, institutions, legends, customs and beliefs fell into the same category as relics of a primitive past that had persisted among the peasantry in civilized communities ³).

It was in 1846 that the term "folklore" was first used casually by W. J. Thoms in a letter to *The Athenaeum* to cover the unrecorded traditions of the people, hitherto described as "popular antiquities", which he urged should be systematically collected and recorded. As a result of this appeal in 1850 a publication, *Notes and Queries*, was established for the purpose, and eventually in 1879 a Folk-Lore Society was brought into being in London, under the presidency of Lord Verulam, to facilitate the publication of the data. In its first annual report the material with which it proposed to deal was said to include "all the culture of the people which had not been worked into the official religion and history, but which is and has always been of self-growth." So defined it differed little from the anthropology of civilized men, and Miss C. S. Burne maintained that "it covered everything which makes part of the mental equipment of the folk as distinguished from their technical skill" ⁴). But spiritual and material culture cannot be kept in complete isolation, and alike in folklore and the phenomeno-

1) *The Science of Mythology* (1897).

2) Lang, *Custom and Myth* (1884); *Modern Mythology* (1897).

3) *Der Baumkultus der Germanen und ihrer Nachbarstämme* (Berlin, 1875); *Germanische Mythen* (Berlin, 1858).

4) *Handbook of Folklore* (1890) p. 1.

logy of religion customs and belief, tales, songs, sayings, dances and drama in peasant societies, as in primitive communities in general, react the one on the other.

Again, it has been around certain crucial events, such as the creation of the world, the loss of immortality, the destiny of man, the sequence of the seasons and the struggle between good and evil, that oral tradition has accumulated in the form of folk stories, institutions, and cult practices, for a variety of purposes and occasions. The peasant like the primitive is a plain unsophisticated practical persons full of common sense but very much aware of the mystery and rhythm of life, often living under precarious conditions of climate and environment over which he has little if any control. Confronted with such perplexing and hazardous situations he has resorted to ritual techniques devised to meet the requirements of unpredictable occurrences, or to codify fundamental beliefs, to strengthen accepted lore, enforce ethical and pious evaluations by formulating reasons for the established order, and endow its sanctions with a greater value, prestige and significance. Therefore, folklore and its customs, cultus and institutions have acquired a religious, moral and social content which has had a profound influence on the history of religion and its phenomena, touching the deepest needs and desires of the human spirit, its hopes, fears, passions and sentiments, and acting as the consolidating dynamic in the maintenance of the social structure.

Having been born and nurtured in a traditional culture which colours the whole of life, the time-honoured accepted lore gives a sense of assurance amid all the chances and changes of everyday experience, and stability to the normal routine. Ploughing, seedtime and harvest, lambing and shearing, birth, marriage and death, each and all have their essential place in popular tradition and their function in producing "phatic communion", or *rapport*, between members of a closely-knit community, stimulated by common sacred utterances and actions transmitted from one generation to another in a prescribed pattern, giving order and consistency to collective effort at specified times of festivity or lamentation. From time before memory things have been ordained in this manner, and their repetition in act and word gives confidence in the right ordering of the seasons, the health and fertility of the flocks and herds, and the well-being of mankind. They control the unpredictable behaviour of nature and the human order in the stress of crisis. They

are the lore by which life is lived. By them society is strengthened and the most potent human emotions are regulated and directed into beneficent activities. Only when tradition ceases to be dynamic does it degenerate into *superstitio* devoid of any social, cultural and religious significance. Then folklore becomes merely the study of "curiosities" and "by-gones"- a palaeontology of human culture.

The folk-tale is essentially traditional because it has been handed down through the ages from one person to another, repeated as it has been received and remembered and retold, usually with very few additions or changes. Eventually it may be written down, and so acquire a permanently fixed form, remaining stable over a wide distribution as a stereotyped element in folk culture deeply rooted in oral tradition. Hence the remarkable uniformity in type and content of stories of this nature conforming to a specific pattern. Unlike legends, saga, aetiological or ritual myths, they are neither explanatory nor cultic in their purpose and content. Being a product of the unsophisticated section of society, "the folk", they are not "just so" stories explaining or affording a reason for cosmic phenomena and natural history with all the variations in theme this presupposes. Rather are they recited for the sheer delight in telling tales. Nearly always they are fictional in intent, like the snake episodes or Uncle Remus cycle, or they may be fables with a moral significance, as in those collected by the Ionian slave Aesop (c. 600 B.C.). But the motifs often are incorporated in literary or ritual myths and legends, and then they may acquire an aetiological or cultic character and function. Indeed, originally they had a more serious purpose, such as the promotion of the growth of the crops, and similar vital concerns connected with the seasons at which they were recited. Therefore, primarily they had a magico-religious content and purpose, and were an integral element in the religious, social and economic structure of the community.

The *märchen*, or fairy-tale, for example, although its hero and principal figures make no pretence of being historical characters, in origin it was essentially religious belonging for the most part to the ritual combat cycle. While the stories have now generally lost their original significance, the struggle between good and evil has survived as the dominant theme personified by the good fairy and an evil spirit of the Lucifer type, playing their respective rôles in relation to a prince and a peasant bride, bringing good out of evil, as in the Cinderella story.

The origin of the fairy concept is still in debate. The diminutive stature as a recurrent feature of these whimsical beings may suggest that it arose as a result of an ancient dwarfish race coming into contact with a taller people and lingering in mountains and caves ⁵). On the other hand, fairies in some instances may have arisen as semi-divine beings like the medieval *fées* and the German "white ladies" as spectral figures appearing in castles, reduced in stature and importance from their former estates as the gods of the dominant people, either as a survival of animistic spirits associated with natural phenomena, or people who refused to accept Christianity and so were connected with evil spiritual beings ⁶). Be this as it may, in the background lies the struggle between two opposed forces in their respective rôles.

If fairy-lore hardly can be reduced to a single source, nevertheless, the stories follow more or less identical motifs in their common tale-types, and the numerous variants conform to a particular pattern which originated in oral tradition long before its printed versions appeared in chap-books in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It played its part in medieval romance in the Arthurian cycle and Chaucer, and subsequently in Spencer and Shakespeare. In England in their present form they were introduced from Perrault's *Histoires ou Contes du Temps Passe* in the seventeenth century representing a blending of the Germanic dwarf-elf type and the Celtic *side* (fairy) lore ⁷). But although their purpose has been that of entertainment they have preserved in their themes, episodes and characters material derived from oral tradition which is of considerable interest for students of the history of religion.

This, however, is more apparent in myth, legend and saga. Thus, myth, for example, is not a product of the imagination in the sense of speculative thought or philosophizing about the origins of natural phenomena in the form of an aetiological tale invented to explain objects and events that arouse attention. It is not idealized history or allegorized philosophy, ethics or theology; still less is it an idle tale told for entertainment by skilled narrators, or symbolic representations of unconscious

5) MacCulloch, *Folk-Lore*, 1932, pp. 362 ff.

6) F. Curtin, *Tales of the Fairies* (1895) p. 42; J. Keighley, *Fairy Mythology* (1900) p. 432.

7) J. Rhys, *Celtic Folklore* (1901); cf. A. G. Krappe, *The Science of Folklore* (1930) pp. 41 ff., 87 f.

desires to be interpreted by psycho-analytical exegesis. All these may contain elements of the myth, but the myth itself is distinct from the fantasy, poetry, philosophy, psychology or folklore with which it has become associated in its many ramifications. The purpose of myth in the first instance has been to stabilize the established order in society, to confirm the accepted beliefs, institutions, and sanctions and to vouch for the efficacy of the cultus.

Since the stories told purport to afford a supernatural authoritative reason for things as they are by explaining what once happened in primeval times and has ever since shaped the course of events, they have an aetiological significance. But what occurred at the creation and in the golden age in the past has a practical importance because it has determined subsequent belief, custom and practice, and the structure of the universe and of society. In a variety of forms, records and interpretations of this course of events have survived in ritual myths, cult legends, folk-tales and folk drama. The transmission of this lore from age to age and culture to culture by oral tradition, ritual and dramatic representation, and in written versions, has been a very important element in the history of religion, safeguarding and preserving much that has been vital and of perennial significance in this field of inquiry.

It is unfortunate that the written documents in the form of the tablets and inscriptions on which the original texts of the ancient myths are inscribed in the original scripts often are very fragmentary and defective, and the decipherment and translation uncertain. Until the linguistic and philological experts are more agreed among themselves about each others interpretations of this literary material the available data have to be used with caution, especially as new documents constantly are being discovered and deciphered. The textual evidence, however, is only one source of information about the mythologies of the ancient world in their cradleland in Western Asia and the Fertile Crescent, and concerning oral tradition and folklore. It is supplemented by the less hazardous archaeological material which is becoming increasingly available, and by the more stable cult-legend and sacred drama which have survived throughout the ages.

Since the third millennium B.C. myths, legends and liturgies have taken shape in a cult drama in the Ancient Near East and the Eastern Mediterranean which has persisted and been transmitted in the entire

region in agricultural communities dependent upon the weather and the season for their subsistence and well-being. Under different designations the divine hero in the cult legend and its ritual enactment has remained a constant feature in the renewal of nature at its most vital centre symbolized by the death and revival of the year-god and his female partner, personified either as his spouse or mother. In the cult drama the liberation of the efficacious divine power vouched for in the legend was re-enacted and made accessible in the ritual performance for the good of the community as a collective experience. To this end the sacred had to possess a form, visibly and audibly, so that ritual and myth were, as they always have been, two facets of the same supra-mundane activity. Therefore, when ancient lore has found expression in a cultus and its ritual enactment it has acquired a permanent quality in the establishment of relations with the ultimate source of life, stability and equilibrium.

The desire to act discloses itself on the symbol so that ritual is at once a visual language and a vent of pent-up emotions and longings, hopes and fears. As in art a feeling or mood, an inner quality of life, an emotional impulse and interpretation of reality is externalized, so ritual gives visual and dramatic expression to the will to live, to the vital urge and rhythmic relations to life, in response to concrete situations and essential needs. In their earliest manifestations ritual, art and drama have been conjoined, and out of this triad folklore and its cultus have emerged and played a significant part in the history of religion by preserving to the present day, notably in peasant cultures, the beliefs and customs associated with the basic human needs dependent upon the regular rhythm of nature reflected in the seasonal sequence and its products. This has arrested the attention of mankind and called forth a cultic response, more intensively than any other phenomenon in the natural order, except perhaps the mystery of death and birth.

Our modern habit is to look at religion from the side of belief rather than from that of rites largely because in Judaism and Christianity ritual has been regarded as important only in connexion with its significance for belief and right ethical conduct. Even among anthropologists and folklorists belief has been held to be more fundamental than ritual because the *dromenon*, 'the thing done', has been thought to be but the expression in action of the *muthos*, 'the words spoken'. But, as

Robertson Smith pointed out, "the antique religions had for the most part no creed; they consisted entirely of institutions and practices." ⁸ The rites and customs were rigidly fixed while the meanings attached to them were extremely vague and in a state of flux, the same rite being explained by different people in different ways.

This applies equally to folk customs and dramas. Once they have become established institutions the time-honoured customs and rigidly observed ritual practices have required justification and explanation in terms of cult-legends and stories framed and developed to meet changing needs and circumstances, systematized and moralised as occasion has required. But the hidden reality—the desires, emotions, social necessities and religious beliefs—of an unrecorded past is embodied in the ritual and dramatic representations. Therefore, for the study of the history of religion these aspects of folklore are of considerable value and significance inasmuch as "the things done", even though they may sometimes be rendered in the manner of burlesque, throw a good deal of light on the vital functions they exercised in their original mode of operation in relation to the transcendental powers believed to control the universe and its processes and human destinies.

Thus, in the modern folk play discovered by Professor R. M. Dawkins in the Veza region of Thrace the ancient Dionysian death and resurrection ritual survived in the annual carnival when all the houses in the village were visited by men in goats' skins and masks carrying a cross-bow and a phallus, accompanied by two boys dressed as brides, a man in female attire and an old woman called Babo with a baby of unknown paternity in a *liknon*. The infant grows with phenomenal rapidity and has an enormous appetite. Demanding a wife one of the brides is caught and brought to it. A marriage ensues followed by a ritual combat between one of the goatmen and the bridegroom who is killed. He is then restored to life and the two brides are yoked to a plough which they drag round the village widdershins, the spectators crying "May wheat be ten piastres the bushel! Amen, O God, that the poor may eat! Yea, O God, that the poor folk may be filled." ⁹

8) *Religion of the Semites* (1929) p. 20.

9) *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, xxvi. 1906. pp. 191 ff.

A similar play has been recorded from Thessaly by A. B. Wace in which instead of the goatman assuming the rôle of the adversary, as in the Thracian version, the two characters are quite distinct. The resuscitation of the slain combatant is effected by a Doctor γιατρός and the play ends with an obscene pantomime between the bride and the bridegroom.¹⁰ But apart from these deviations the essential features in the two plays are the same, centred in the ritual combat, the killing and restoration of the hero, culminating in a marriage. The introduction of the plough in the Thracian version suggests that it was a spring folk drama based on the story of Dionysus, which was of Thracian origin. The bastard wonder-child born of the Earth-mother (Babo) was laid in a *liknon*, just as Dionysus was called *Liknites*, "he of the winnowing fan". His rapid growth to maturity, marriage, death and reanimation, followed by a nuptial union to facilitate the renewal of the crops and fertility "that the poor may eat", together with the phallic procession and obscene pantomime are all suggestive of the Dionysiac and its vegetation cultus.

The reminiscence of its more serious functions in the promotion of the food supply occurs in the cry "that the poor may be filled", but the modern folk play has degenerated into a pastime or seasonal revel for recreation and amusement though still retaining a few relics of the *ancien régime* connected with the vegetation cultus to promote the growth of the crops. This is apparent in the Mummers' plays still performed in the traditional manner in England at the folk festivals with the actors clad in fantastic garments, wearing masks or animal disguises, playing the rôles of St. George and his adversary Turkish Knight or Bold Slasher, defeated and slain by the hero (St. George) and restored by the proverbial Doctor, who, as he asserts, having come from "Italy, Sicily, Germany, France and Spain and been three times round the world and back again", all diseases could cure by his magic medicine.

While the various versions of the Mummers' plays have their own variations in their principal characters, incidents and dialogue they conform to the same pattern. As Tiddy says, "if we are justified in making any deductions from the folk plays that survive, we may take it as certain that the pagan ritual included a heroic figure who slew

10) *Annual of the British School at Athens*, xvi, 1909-10. p. 233.

his antagonist and his antagonist afterwards was revived.”¹¹ Moreover, there appears to be a connexion between the St. George Mummers and the Sword dancers with their mock death and restoration as its focal point.¹² The combat and its sequel inherent in the dance gives the clue to the original intention of the rite which from time immemorial has been an outstanding feature in seasonal ceremonial observances; the expression of *joie de vivre* in rhythmical activity and physical exuberance, as well as of the magico-religious control of the food supply. The dance, in fact, has found its place in all the principal celebrations in the annual cycle and of human life-initiation, puberty, marriage, death, planting, sewing, harvesting, the vintage and at the turn of the year at the solstices. As an integral part of these ritual observances communal dances also have afforded an opportunity for social intercourse, and as the secularization of the ancient sacred drama increased the plays and dances acquired a serio-comic character in which burlesque has tended to obscure their earlier purposes in the history of religion. But the setting of the dances and the plays is that of the ritual observances in which they arose.

Points of contact with the Dionysiac occur in the more elaborate Sword dances which as in the earliest and least corrupted English example preserved in a manuscript dated October 20th 1779, from Revesby in Lincolnshire, in which the Fool expresses his willingness to be decapitated by his sons, impersonated by six dancers for the good of them all. After making his will he is killed ritually by their swords but immediately rises from the floor explaining that he was not slain after all. The dance is repeated with the same results, concluding with his securing a bride called Ciceley¹³). As Dionysus was killed by the Titans while he was looking at his own reflection in a mirror, so the Fool before he dies at the hands of his sons sees his face in what is called “the Glass”. In both the Dionysiac and the Revesby dance the motif is a dramatic death and resurrection enactment, and this remains the constant theme in folk dances and sword dances of this type everywhere.

The closely related but much simpler and independent Morris Dance

11) R. J. E. Tiddy, *The Mummers' Play* (1923) p. 74.

12) E. K. Chambers, *The English Folk Play* (1933) p. 211.

13) Chambers, *op. cit.*, pp. 105-21.

has been kept alive in England to the present day by active teams of "Morris Men", especially in the Cotswold country and the Midlands, under the influence of Cecil Sharp and his successors, who have been mainly responsible for its revival in the present century. Formerly it was widespread in France, Spain, Italy, Flanders, Switzerland and Germany, and reached Britain originally from France as *Mauresque*, or from Spain as *Moresco*, perhaps by the troops of John of Gaunt, though the derivation of the names is very obscure¹⁴). It may have been a derivation of the Sword dance, the two so often occurring together at the same folk festivals. Swords or their substitutes occasionally feature in Morris dances, but a sacrificial victim is not a Morris characteristic feature. Both, however, seem to have been primarily concerned originally with the control of the natural order and its processes by supernatural forces and beings.

This is further illustrated by the introduction in the Morris dance of such characters as Robin Hood and his band, Maid Marian and Friar Tuck in Tudor times, associated with the Green Man, or Jack-in-the-Green, as the victim in the vegetationdrama, the prototype of the Fool garlanded with greenery¹⁵). This figure has a long history in agricultural festivals, widespread in the cult of the Al-Khider, or "green thing", in the Indus valley in India, in Palestine and Syria in relation to the Elijah story, in Mesopotamia and Western Asia in the Tammuz theme and its cultus, and later St. George of Cappadocia, the hero of the Perseus and Andromeda legend, until at length he became the St. or King George of the Mummers' play, and the personification of the Maypole on the village green.

In this context Robin Hood, Maid Marian and the merry men in Sherwood forest found a place with the Fool and the Hobby-horse in the Morris tradition in and after the fourteenth century. The earliest reference to Robin Hood is in Langland's *Piers Plowman* about 1377, and in the next century he became the patron of the cult of the long-bow¹⁶). As the central figure in the fertility drama he was struck by a chance flight of an arrow, and like Adonis bled to death, and then was restored to life, while Maid Marian assumed the rôle of the Man-

14) Chambers, *The Mediaeval Stage* (1935), vol. i. p. 199.

15) E. E. H. Welsford, *The Fool: His Social and Literary History* (1935).

16) W. H. Clawson, *The Gest of Robin Hood* (1909).

woman. Their names may have been introduced into the English version by the minstrels, the vegetation hero, the Robin-of-the-wood, having been confused with the robber of the rich on behalf of the poor, or the highly skilled archer of the ballad and romance, or the shepherd of the French *pastourelles* ¹⁷). Notwithstanding their affinities, as variations of the same seasonal ritual the Robin Hood and Morris teams never have been identical, though respective actors and dancers may often have been interchangeable.

Rustic festivals, however, were by no means confined to folk drama and its dances, and since they gave expression to the fundamental themes in the annual calendrical sequence on which life and the rhythm of nature depended, they have been brought into very close relation with the ecclesiastical feasts in the liturgical year, thereby bringing the calendar customs of the folk into conjunction with the worship of the Church at its focal points. Thus, when the Feast of the Nativity and that of the Epiphany were celebrated at the winter solstice, solar, Saturnalian and Yuletide observances were incorporated in the festivities borrowed from Roman, Iranian, Scandinavian and Germano-Celtic sources. The Christmas season ending with Candlemas, the ceremonial of which was derived from the pre-Christian Feast of Lights with its fire rites, Lent was ushered in with Shrovetide contests, originally designed to conquer the malign forces of evil at the approach of spring. So dangerous to life and limb and property did these local combats become that since the rapid growth in the population in the last century they have generally been forbidden and abandoned, though *mi-carême* (mid-Lent) carnivals still survive in France.

At the Easter Queen of Festivals ball games and less strenuous and destructive contests with eggs are of common occurrence symbolizing the new life of spring and the driving away of winter, sometimes interpreted in terms of the Easter victory over sin and death. The Spring Festival of the Magna Mater, Kybele, held originally on the Palatine hill in Rome on March 22nd, has provided the pattern of the May Day observances with the May Queen and the Green Man in the rôles of Kybele and Attis; the Maypole erected on village greens often being decorated with violets like the figure of Attis, sometimes with a doll fixed to it in a garland, reminiscent of the image of the god. The repre-

¹⁷) Chambers, *The Mediaeval Stage*. vol. i. p. 176.

sensation of the May Queen and the May King (or Green Man) as bride and bridegroom recalls the sacred marriage in the Magna Mater festival, and as Kybele was responsible for the flowering of the fields so the May Queen has been seated in an arbour wreathed with flowers, or in the porch of the church similarly adorned, like the Romano-Phrygian Mother-goddess in her temple on the Palatine hill where floral offerings were made to her by her votaries¹⁸).

The ancient Celtic custom of lighting bonfires at the beginning of May lingered on until the eighteenth century in the Beltane rites on hills to celebrate the approach of summer, and in the Samhain on November 1st. to drive away evil influences when the sun is waning. Both were cathartic and regenerative in intention, the Beltane rites reaching their climax in the Midsummer fire customs which were equated with the Feast of the Nativity of St. John the Baptist on June 24th., coinciding with the summer solstice. These annual renewals of the sun to stimulate its life-giving energy when it was at its height or in decline lent themselves to reinterpretation in Christian terms of the herald of the new era, St. John the Baptist, himself destined to decrease as his successor increased in his divine mission and vocation. Similarly, the Church in its liturgical year associated the ancient pastoral observances connected with Samhain at the commencement of the Celtic new year with its own Feast of All Saints on November 1st. followed by the Solemnity of All Souls. November with its falling leaves and shortening days having long been "the month of the dead", it was an easy transition to transform the pagan ceremonies into Christian ordinances in honour of the triumphant saints on All Hallows Day and the pious exercises on behalf of the faithful departed in their progress to the Beatific Vision.

If the tendency has been for Christianity to discountenance, and where practicable to suppress, the survival of pagan beliefs and practices, especially in Western Christendom since the sixteenth century, it has, nevertheless, created its own folk tradition. When the Church became the consolidating dynamic in the declining Roman Empire it inherited a firmly established traditional cultus and its institutions which it endeavoured to Christianize and adapt to its own requirements. Faced with a bewildering medley of popular superstitions, confused mytholo-

¹⁸) H. Graillot, *Le Culte du Cybèle* (Paris, 1912) p. 133.

gies and the trappings and imagery and lore of discredited Mystery cults, Caesar-worship and Graeco-Roman gods, in conjunction with its own martyrs, saints, holy places and liturgy, it created a tradition in line with yet fundamentally distinct from its pagan antecedents. It was in this process and context that current folk beliefs and customs were retained and re-evaluated, often little changed in their outward forms but transvaluated in their inward and spiritual meaning and significance.

Thus, folklore, again, was influential at a crucial turning point in the history of religion in preserving ancient traditional themes and patterns in a new *milieu*. While the Church, it is true, took a very definite stand against the old rites and customs, it made its own myth and ritual the living reality, affirmed once to have occurred in time and space and ever after to have influenced the world and human destinies. The urge of life has compelled the human race to seek ways and means of maintaining it at all costs and even to transcend death and extinction in the hope of an existence of some kind beyond the grave. This impulse has conditioned ritual behaviour throughout the ages. How deeply laid it has been in the heart of the folk is illustrated by the innumerable rites and stories everywhere centred in this theme and enacted dramatically in the seasonal drama with its death and resurrection ritual. Christianity took up the motif and reinterpreted it in terms of its own doctrine of redemption, and gave it ritual expression in its principal act of worship as the perpetual memorial of the supreme recreative event in history. Thus, in the framework of the liturgy the ecclesiastical sequence of events was brought into relation with the folk calendrical observances that coincided in time and theme with the age-long quest of ever renewing life. In this way a new significance was given to the ancient lore and its cultus. The events and characters portrayed were integral elements in a tradition that governed faith and controlled conduct by providing a spiritual authority, precedent and efficacy for the things done, believed and ordered.

Inasmuch as in the process of transition folklore and folk customs were incorporated in the Christian culture pattern, the transformation had a revitalizing effect on the indigenous tradition, preventing it from degenerating into decadent and meaningless superstition. As Maimonides observed in another connexion, "these things have a pagan and superstitious origin, but they must not be called superstitions, for their

origin no longer dominates the meaning attached to these ceremonies''. While folklore like religions and theologies, changes with the centuries and cultures in which it operates, only when in isolation from the life of the community it ceases to exercise its proper functions does it become merely an otiose survival, devoid of its original significance. Each age produces its own traditional behaviour and symbolic actions, particularly in connexion with the crops and the seasons in agricultural society, and when they are attached to recurring ancient ritual patterns they constantly acquire new values and renewed vitality. Thus, the lore of the folk and Christian faith and practice represent parallel growths under very similar conditions and influences. Neither of the two traditions has to any extent consciously borrowed from the other. Because both are expressions of certain fundamental attitudes to life and to the social structure and religious organization in which they have arisen, they have coalesced and reacted upon each other. A good deal of the more ephemeral, wanton and transitory elements in the pagan background and folk environment has been eliminated but in giving a new meaning and purpose to ancient beliefs and customs the dry bones of a moribund tradition have been clothed with flesh and sinews. The established feasts and fasts have been resuscitated as an integral part of a calendar that has entered into the daily life of the people particularly in peasant society, at every turn, providing them not only with spiritual sustenance, edification and discipline, but also with diversion, recreation, and social intercourse throughout the year, and supplying the supramundane dynamic which has held them together in a closely-knit community.

The connexion of folklore and religion, therefore, has been twofold: (1) a higher living religion like Christianity, Judaism, Islam or Hinduism, by incorporating folk material into its own faith and practice has given a new vigour, meaning, significance and function to popular beliefs and customs, and so enabled them to acquire a fresh survival value. (2) The basic themes and cultic patterns in oral tradition, documentary texts, tales and legends, myth and ritual, sacred drama and dance, have been preserved, evaluated and carried on from age to age, culture to culture, religion to religion. This has been most apparent in the case of the folk material that has collected round critical junctures in the universe, in nature and in human experience directing human energies, impulses and emotions into new activities by means of sym-

bols, rites and dances, and their underlying beliefs and concepts. By enabling man individually and collectively to meet his crises with confidence, trust and hope, allaying his fears and renewing his aspirations, the influence of folklore on the history and phenomenology of religion has been as valuable as it has been varied in the preservation and continuation of a living tradition representing a heritage extending back beyond the confines of history and written records.

QUETZALCOATL - MYTHOS UND GESCHICHTE

VON

GÜNTER LANCZKOWSKI

Die ihrem Namen nach bekannteste, aber in vielem seltsamste und rätselvollste Gestalt in der Religionsgeschichte Altamerikas, speziell der Azteken des alten Mexiko, ist zweifellos Quetzalcoatl. Wir wissen heute, dass nicht allein ein durch eine schillernde Vielfalt unterschiedlicher Aspekte gekennzeichnete und bis in die Epoche der Conquista von den Azteken verehrte Gott diesen Namen trug, sondern auch die menschliche Persönlichkeit eines historischen Kulturheros und Priesterkönigs, der in der toltekischen Periode Mexikos, die der Vorherrschaft der Azteken voranging, einen gegenüber späteren aztekischen Bräuchen weniger grausamen Gottesdienst, einen von Menschenopfern freien, humanen Kult vertrat. Die Vergöttlichung dieses Kulturheros und grossen Religiösen und seine Identifikation mit dem gleichnamigen Gotte Quetzalcoatl hatten früher zu einem rein mythischen Verständnis der Quetzalcoatl-Gestalt und zu einer teilweisen oder gänzlichen Verneinung zugrunde liegender historischer Fakten geführt¹⁾. Auf Grund neuerer Funde und vor allem der Kenntnisnahme umfangreicher literarischer Berichte in aztekischer Sprache sind die beiden Faktoren, der göttliche und der ursprünglich menschliche, die in der Quetzalcoatl-Gestalt der späteren aztekischen Zeit vereinigt sind, deutlich zu erkennen; aber auch die Art ihrer Verbindung und vor allem deren religiöse Folgen treten klarer zutage.

1) Eine natur- und astralmythologische Deutung vertrat noch der grosse Bahnbrecher der Altamerikanistik, Eduard Seler. Vgl. EDUARD SELER, Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur Amerikanischen Sprach- und Altertumskunde, Bd. III, Berlin 1908, Neudruck Graz 1960, S. 333: „... Quetzalcouatl, in dem sich die Toltekenfrage verkörpert, bleibt immer ein Gott, also ein Wesen, das wir für die Personifizierung irgendeiner Naturmacht ansehen müssen, und er hat mit dem Osten, dem Lande der Sonne, zu tun.“ Vgl. auch SELER, Ges. Abhandlungen V, Berlin 1915, Neudr. Graz 1961, S. 178-196: Die Sage von Quetzalcouatl und den Tolteken in den in neuerer Zeit bekannt gewordenen Quellen. Vgl. ferner. ROBERT LEHMANN-NITZSCHE, Tezcatlipoca und Quetzalcoatl, ihre ursprüngliche Sternnatur, in: Zeitschrift für Ethnologie 70, 1938, S. 67-82.

Quetzalcoatl, der Name des Gottes wie der jener geschichtlichen Persönlichkeit der toltekischen Zeit, setzt sich zusammen aus *coatl* ²⁾, „Schlange“, und *quetzalli*, welches die Feder des Quetzalvogels ³⁾ bedeutet, die grün ist. Quetzalcoatl ist also: „Die mit grünen Quetzalfedern bedeckte Schlange“ oder „Grüne Federschlange“ ⁴⁾. Diese grüne Federschlange ist — mit einer aztekischen Bezeichnung, die religionsgeschichtlich generell wichtig geworden ist — das *naualli* der Quetzalcoatl-Gestalt. Das Wort *naualli* bedeutet ursprünglich „Verkleidung, Maske“. Eine derartige Verkleidung ist, wie stets in religiösen Bereichen, nicht willkürlich, sondern bedeutungsvoll. Das Wort für „Verkleidung“ hatte daher den Sinn einer mystischen Simultanexistenz ⁵⁾. Von dem aztekischen Worte *naualli* in dieser Bedeutung einer mystischen Simultanexistenz leitet sich unser religionswissenschaftlicher Terminus Nagualismus ab ⁶⁾. Auch als religionsgeschichtliche Erscheinung ist der Nagualismus, der Glaube an eine individuelle Simultanexistenz mit einem fremden, meist tierischen Wesen, speziell aus Mesoamerika bekannt ⁷⁾.

Die Federschlange als Gewand des Quetzalcoatl ist also nicht Verkleidung oder Maske in profanem Sinne, sondern Identifikation und

2) Die graphischen Varianten (*couatl*, *cuoatl*) haben keine sachliche Relevanz. Ob sie, wie generell die uneinheitliche Orthographie des mit dem lateinischen Alphabet niedergeschriebenen Aztekischen, dialektische Unterschiede ausdrücken, bedarf noch der Untersuchung. Zu den Schwierigkeiten der phonetischen Wiedergabe des Aztekischen vgl. JAKOB SCHOEMBS, *Aztekische Schriftsprache*, Heidelberg 1949, S. 10.

3) *Pharomacus mocinno*, aztek. *quetzal-tototl*, vgl. SELER, *Ges. Abhandlungen* IV, Berlin 1923, Neudr. Graz 1961, S. 562 ff.

4) Die von THEODOR-WILHELM DANTZEL, *Mexiko I*, 3. Aufl., Hagen i. W. u. Darmstadt 1923, S. 32 erwogene Etymologisierung mit dem Verbum *quetza*, „aufrichten“, die zu der Bedeutung „die sich aufrichtende Schlange“ führt, ist sprachlich unwahrscheinlich und kann auf Grund der Funde bildlicher Darstellungen heute nicht mehr aufrecht erhalten werden.

5) Vgl. u.a. JOSEF HAEKEL, *Hochgott und Götter im alten Mexiko*, in: *Kairoi* 1959, S. 137.

6) Die Ableitung erfolgt über das spanische *nagual*. Durch die Schreibung mit *gu* wird offenbar weder ein Hörfehler dokumentiert noch eine bei der Übernahme des aztekischen Fremdworts erfolgte labiovelare Verschiebung zum Ausdruck gebracht; vielmehr scheint es sich, wie die entsprechende spanische Wiedergabe des arabischen Wāw nahelegt, um die graphische Wiedergabe eines dem englischen double u entsprechenden Phonems zu handeln.

7) Vgl. D. G. BRINTON, *Nagualism, a Study in American Folklore and History*, Philadelphia 1894.

Symbol. Das Symbol der gefiederten Schlange bedeutet in den ältesten Zeugnissen mexikanischer Religion, den archäologisch erschlossenen Überlieferungen der Teotihuacan-Kultur, das Wasser und die durch das himmlische Wasser, den Regen, hervorgebrachte Vegetation⁸⁾. Die gefiederte Schlange ist also Ausdruck einer wohlthätigen Macht, die lebenspendend und lebenerhaltend wirkt⁹⁾. In toltekischer Zeit war dann die Federschlange das allgemeine Himmelssymbol¹⁰⁾.

Bereits diese Beobachtungen über das *naualli* des Quetzalcoatl lassen Wesenszüge seiner Existenz als Gott deutlich werden. Die Funktion des Lebensspenders verweist auf eine Verwandtschaft zum obersten mexikanischen Himmels Gott¹¹⁾, der unter den Namen Tonacatecutli („Herr unseres Fleisches“) und Ometecutli („Herr der Zweierheit“) bekannt war und auch als *nelli teotl* („wahrer Gott“), *ipalnemoani* („durch den man lebt“), *icel teotl* („alleiniger Gott“), *tlalticpaque* („Herr der Welt“), *huehue teotl* („alter Gott“) und *tloque nauaque* („Herr der unmittelbaren Nachbarschaft“) verehrt wurde. Eine Schöpfungsfähigkeit, wie sie mit der lebenspendenden Kraft des obersten Gottes in Verbindung stand, wurde auch Quetzalcoatl zugeschrieben; die „Geschichte der Königreiche“ berichtet: „Und sie (die Alten) sagten: (aus) Asche machte sie (die ersten Menschen), schuf sie er, den sie ihren Gott nannten. Ihm schrieb man das zu, dem Quetzalcoatl“¹²⁾.

Auch die Funktion des Windgottes kann mit dem Prinzip der

8) Vgl. u.a. WALTER KRICKEBERG, *Altmexikanische Kulturen*, Berlin 1956, S. 193.

9) Generell ist die Schlange in Mesoamerika häufig Symbol wohlthätiger Gottheiten vgl. G. LANCZOWSKI, *Forschungen zum Gottesglauben in der Religions-ster i. W.* 1899, S. 36.

10) Andere mit dem Himmel in Zusammenhang stehende aztekische Schlangengötter sind die „Wolkenschlange“ (Mixcoatl) und die „Obsidianschlange“ (Itzcoatl), die den Blitz verkörperte. Dagegen ist Coatlicue („die mit dem Schlangenstein“) eine Erdgöttin. — Zum Übergang von Wassergottheiten zu Himmelsgottheiten vgl. G. LANCZOWSKI, *Forschungen zum Gottesglauben in der Religionsgeschichte*, in: *Saeculum* 8, 1957, S. 402 f.

11) Vgl. J. HAEKEL, a.a.O., S. 138; M. L. PORTILLA, *La Filosofia Nahuatl*, Mexico 1956, S. 172 f.

12) WALTER LEHMANN, *Die Geschichte der Königreiche von Colhuacan und Mexico* (Quellenwerke zur alten Geschichte Amerikas, Bd. I), Stuttgart und Berlin 1938, S. 60. Noch umfassender wird Quetzalcoatl's Schöpfungsfähigkeit beschrieben in dem Satz: „Uns machte, uns schuf, uns bildete er, dessen Geschöpfe wir sind, unser Prinz Quetzalcoatl, und er schuf Himmel, Sonne, Erde“; zitiert nach: *Geschichte der Königreiche*, S. 291 Anm. 1.

lebenspendenden Macht in Zusammenhang gebracht werden; denn es ist der Windgott, der den Weg freimacht für die Regengötter. In der äusserst komplexen Gestalt Quetzalcoatl kommen aber, wenn dieser gelegentlich als *ehecatl*, als „Wind“ bezeichnet wird, nicht Züge zum Ausdruck, die von seiner toltekischen Verehrung als oberstem Gott herzuleiten sind, sondern die, kulturgeschichtlich gesehen, ihren Ursprung bei den Huasteken haben ¹³).

Oft wird bei Quetzalcoatl die Vorstellung des Windes mit der des Nachthimmels verbunden. Quetzalcoatl heisst dann *yohualli ehec atl*, „Nacht und Wind“ ¹⁴), mit einer Bezeichnung, die, ebenso wie in der Anwendung auf seinen Antagonisten Tezcatlipoca, bei Quetzalcoatl wahrscheinlich nicht wörtlich zu verstehen ist, sondern das Prinzip des Unsichtbaren und Insubstantiellen zum Ausdruck bringen soll ¹⁵).

Gegenüber diesen auf eine transzendente Vorstellung Quetzalcoatl's deutenden Eigenschaften stehen aber ganz andere, die ihn als eine durchaus den Menschen nahe und dem irdischen Geschehen verhaftete, immanente Persönlichkeit kennzeichnen. Die Verbundenheit mit dem menschlichen Leben ist — bei aller sonstigen Verwandtschaft Quetzalcoatl's mit dem obersten Himmels-gott — doch der stärkste Unterschied zu diesem. Obwohl sich eine dem transzendenten Höchsten Wesen durchaus vergleichbare hohe Gottesanschauung mit Quetzalcoatl verbindet, sehen wir ihn als toltekischen Kulturheros und Priesterkönig doch mehr in der Rolle eines göttlichen Boten. Mit Quetzalcoatl verbindet sich die Idee eines Gottgesandten.

Eines der Epitheta für aussergewöhnliche und sakrale Personen ist in der aztekischen Sprache das Wort *pilli*, das wörtlich „Fürst“ und

13) KRICKEBERG, Altmexikanische Kulturen, S. 482; W. KRICKEBERG in: KRICKEBERG-TRIMBORN-W. MÜLLER-ZERRIES, Die Religionen des alten Amerika, Stuttgart 1961, S. 21.

14) KRICKEBERG in: Die Religionen des alten Amerika, S. 41.

15) GEORG HÖLTKE, Dvandva-ähnliche Wortkuppelung im Aztekischen, in: Wiener Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte und Linguistik, Bd. I, 1930, S. 349-358. — Nach den in diesem verdienstvollen Aufsatz angewandten Termini der Sanskrit-Grammatik könnte man allerdings den S. 355 auf die Zusammensetzung *yohualli ehec atl* angewandten Ausdruck „dvandva-ähnlich“ präziser als *samahāra-dvandva* definieren, da die Glieder dieses Kompositums auch im Aztekischen nicht kopulativ aufzulösen sind, sondern einen zusammenfassenden Begriff bilden; vgl. WILLIAM DWIGHT WHITNEY, Indische Grammatik, Leipzig 1879, S. 459 ff.; vgl. auch die identifizierenden Komposita im Quiché: JOHANNES FRIEDRICH, Kurze Grammatik der Quiché-Sprache im Popol Vuh (Mainzer Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, geistes- und sozialwiss. Kl. Jg. 1955, Nr. 4) S. 326.

„Prinz“ bedeutet ¹⁶⁾ und auf eine ursprüngliche Bedeutung „Sohn jemandes“ — im hervorhebenden, ehrenden Sinne — zurückgeht ¹⁷⁾. Die Reverenzialform dieses Wortes *pilli* ist *piltzintli*. Wenn Quetzalcoatl durchweg mit diesem Worte *piltzintli* bezeichnet wird, so kommt darin sein hoher Rang ebenso zum Ausdruck wie die Abhängigkeit von dem höchsten transzendenten Gott. Vor allem die Form „Unser Fürst Quetzalcoatl“ findet sich unendlich oft in den aztekischen Texten. Sie lautet unter Voranstellung der Possessivpartikel der 1. Person pluralis und mit dem dabei üblichen Abfall der Substantivendung ¹⁸⁾: *topiltzin Quetzalcoatl* ¹⁹⁾.

Die beiden in der aztekischen Religion zur Zeit der Conquista in personaler Einheit verbundenen Aspekte der Quetzalcoatl-Gestalt, derjenige eines Gottgesandten und derjenige eines transzendenten Gottes selbst, können nun heute, im Gegensatz zu früheren Deutungsversuchen, weder verstanden werden im Sinne eines teilweise zur Legende gewordenen Mythos noch im Sinne eines Euhemerismus, der als Grundlage allein eine menschliche, später mythologisierte Existenz annehmen würde. Vielmehr müssen zwei Bildungsfaktoren der späteren Quetzalcoatl-Gestalt, der göttliche und der menschliche eines historischen Toltekenherrschers, deutlich unterschieden werden. Und ihr Zusammenfließen in einer göttlichen Person, also die Aufnahme der Vita des Tolteken Quetzalcoatl in den Mythos, ist dann doch wohl nur auf einer Grundlage denkbar, die das Verständnis des Gottgesandten Quetzalcoatl im Sinne eines Deuters und Offenbarers des transzendenten Gottes, eines Realisators seines Willens zum Inhalt hatte.

Mehrere Faktoren verifizieren die für diese Deutung entscheidende und früher oft bestrittene Historizität der Vita des Tolteken Quetzalcoatl und lassen uns mit ihr „zum ersten Mal in der mesoamerikani-

16) Im allgemeinen bezeichnet *pilli* den ererbten Rang, im Gegensatz zu *tecutli*, das die Stellung des Inhabers eines hohen Amtes anzeigt.

17) Eine entsprechende Bedeutungsgeschichte weist die aus *hijo de algo* entstandene spanische Adelsbezeichnung *hidalgo* auf. Kulturgeschichtlich ist interessant, dass auch dem ägyptischen *s*; *s* dieselbe Vorstellung zugrunde liegt; vgl. u. a. auch *almehen* im Yukatekischen Maya.

18) Vgl. SCHOEMBS, a.a.O., § 30.

19) Bei der Verwendung von *topiltzin* für Quetzalcoatl tritt der Übergang von einer Rangbezeichnung zur Verwendung im Sinne eines Eigennamens besonders deutlich hervor in der Stelle: Geschichte der Königreiche, S. 70, wo es heisst *Quetzalcoatl yn tocyotilo topiltzin*, „Quetzalcoatl, der rühmend genannt wird Topiltzin“.

schen Geschichte die Umrisse einer grossen Persönlichkeit von zweifellos hohem geistigen Rang erkennen" ²⁰).

Die reale Existenz der historischen Basis für das Wirken Quetzalcoatl, das Toltekenreich und seine Metropole Tollan ²¹), sind häufig, nicht zuletzt auf Grund der idealisierenden Darstellungen in der aztekischen Literatur, verneint und in das Reich des Mythos verwiesen worden ²²). Durch die 1940 begonnenen Ausgrabungen in der Nähe der heutigen Stadt Tula im Staate Hidalgo, der Namensträgerin des alten Tollan ²³), ist aber die einstige Existenz der Hauptstadt des Toltekenreiches erwiesen, und zahlreiche sakrale Bauten, zum Teil mit dem Relief des Symbols der Federschlange geschmückt, sind freigelegt worden ²⁴). Darüber hinaus hat erst kürzlich Paul Kirchhoff das Toltekenreich genau lokalisiert und seiner Struktur nach als ein politisches Gebilde nachgewiesen, das entsprechend den kosmischen Vorstellungen Altamerikas in fünf Provinzen mit dem Mittelpunkt von Tollan gegliedert war ²⁵).

Weiterhin ist beweiskräftig, dass die Auswanderung aus Tollan, die den Priesterfürsten Quetzalcoatl nach dem Ende seiner Regierungszeit in das Gebiet der Maya führte, durch die Traditionen der Maya bestätigt wird, und es spricht durchaus nicht gegen diese Bestätigung, dass auch bei den Maya die Quetzalcoatl-Gestalt mit menschlichen wie mit göttlichen Aspekten erscheint. Vielmehr lässt sich gerade auch daraus schliessen, „dass Quetzalcoatl-Kukulcan eine bedeutende historische Persönlichkeit war" ²⁶).

Wesentlich hierfür ist zunächst die Bedeutungsgleichheit des mexikanischen mit dem Maya-Namen. Denn eine direkte Übersetzung

20) KRICKEBERG in: Die Religionen des alten Amerika, S. 30.

21) Die Stadt „beim Schilfrohr, bei den Binsen (*tollin*)".

22) Vgl. u.a. *Danzel*, a.a.O., S. 38.

23) 80 km nördlich von Mexico City gelegen.

24) Vgl. HANS DIETRICH DISSELHOFF, Geschichte der altamerikanischen Kulturen, München 1953, S. 78; KRICKEBERG, Altmexikanische Kulturen, S. 323.

25) PAUL KIRCHHOFF, Das Toltekenreich und sein Untergang, in: *Saeculum* 12, 1961, S. 248-265.

26) WALTER KRICKEBERG, Moctezuma II., in: *Saeculum* 3, 1952, S. 268; vgl. ferner: EDUARD SELER, Quetzalcouatl-Kukulcan in Yucatan, in: *Ges. Abhandlungen*, Bd. I, Berlin 1902, Neudr. Graz 1960, S. 668-705; *Sylvanus Griswold Morley*, The Ancient Maya, 3. Aufl. hrsg. von GEORGE W. BRAINERD, Stanford, California 1956, S. 81: „Kukulcan, The Feathered Serpent, was the Toltec culture hero (Quetzalcoatl in the Nahuatl language) and was an exiled king of Tula"; *Diego de Landa*, Relation des choses de Yucatan, Bd. I, Paris 1928, S. 62.

des Namens Quetzalcoatl in seiner Bedeutung „grüne Federschlange“ findet sich im Quiché der Maya in der Form K²ukumatz ²⁷⁾, bei den yukatekischen Maya in der Form Kukulcan ²⁸⁾.

Neben der Gleichheit der Namensbedeutungen ist diejenige der mit Quetzalcoatl verbundenen Vorstellungen aufschlussreich. Das Motiv des Auszugs aus seiner einstigen Heimat und der Wanderung bringt seine Maya-Bezeichnung als *yaqui vinak*, als „fortgezogener Mann“, zum Ausdruck; es ist wahrscheinlich, dass dem Worte *yaqui*, das später generell die Bedeutung „Tolteken“ gewann, die aztekische Form *yaque* in der Bedeutung „die Wegziehenden, die Auswandernden“ zugrunde liegt ²⁹⁾, und es ist aufschlussreich, dass diese Bezeichnung auf Grund des positiven Einflusses Quetzalcoatl bei den Maya zu einem ehrenden Prädikat wurde ³⁰⁾.

Auch für Quetzalcoatl typische Funktionen finden sich in der Tradition der Maya. Im Popol Vuh wird berichtet, dass er es war, von dem die Urväter der Quiché die Abzeichen ihrer Herrscherwürde empfangen ³¹⁾. Und er war ferner der „alleinige Rechtsprecher“ (*xa hu catoltzih*) ³²⁾.

Den Übergang von der menschlichen zur göttlichen Sphäre kennzeichnet der folgende Text des Popol Vuh ³³⁾: „In der Tat ein zauberhafter König war K²ukumatz: Alle sieben Tage pflegte er zum Himmel hinaufzusteigen, alle sieben Tage auf den Weg hinab in die Unterwelt sich aufzumachen. Sieben Tage konnte er dann ein Schlangenwesen (*kumatzil*) sein, war er wirklich eine Schlange (*kumatz*)“.

Quetzalcoatl's Beziehung zum Höchsten Wesen wird auch im Popol Vuh tradiert, indem dort K²ukumatz in Abhängigkeit dargestellt wird

27) *k²uk*, „grüne Feder des Quetzalvogels“, *kumatz*, „Schlange“.

28) *kuk*, „Quetzalfeder“, *can*, „Schlange“, vgl. *Ralph L. Roys*, *The Book of Chilam Balam of Chumayel*, Washington 1933, S. 121 Anm. 4.

29) *Ed. Seler*, *Der Fledermausgott der Maya-Stämme*, in: *Ges. Abhandlungen*, Bd. II, S. 644.

30) Im „Mann von Rabinal“ werden Waffen und kultische Musikinstrumente damit ausgezeichnet; vgl. *ERWIN WALTER PALM*, *Der Mann von Rabinal*, Frankfurt am Main 1961, S. 34. u.ö., S. 82.

31) *LEONHARD SCHULTZE JENA*, *Popol Vuh. Das heilige Buch der Quiché-Indianer von Guatemala* (Quellenwerke zur alten Geschichte Amerikas, Bd. II), Stuttgart u. Berlin 1944, S. 144/45. Wenn Quetzalcoatl hier mit dem Namen *Nacxit* genannt wird, so entspricht dies genau seinem mexikanischen Beinamen *Nacxitl*, „Vierfuss“.

32) a.a.O., S. 144 Ziele 22.

33) a.a.O., S. 154/55.

vom „Herz des Himmels“³⁴⁾. Eine direkte Vergöttlichung bedeutet die Identifikation mit dem Hochgott Tohil, bei dem der Aspekt des Regengottes im Vordergrund steht³⁵⁾. Im Popol Vuh wird darüber berichtet³⁶⁾: „Der da Tohil heisst, ist ein und derselbe Gott wie der des Yaquivolkes: Yolcuat Quitzalcuat war sein Name.“ Dass in dieser Textaussage Quitzalcuat dem aztekischen Quetzalcoatl entspricht, ist ohne weiteres deutlich. Sehr bemerkenswert aber ist das vorangestellte *yolcuat*, das den Aspekt des unsichtbaren Windgottes betonen würde, wenn es, was wahrscheinlich ist, die Maya-Wiedergabe des aztekischen *yohualli ehecatl* darstellt.

Für die Vita Quetzalcoatl's sind natürlich in erster Linie die aztekischen Texte aufschlussreich, deren Aussagen in ihrer Historizität durch die archäologischen Zeugnisse und durch die Traditionen der Maya erhärtet werden. Wir wissen heute, dass diesem *topiltzin Quetzalcoatl* als Priester des obersten Gottes, als Vertreter des theokratischen Königtums und als später vergöttlichtem Kulturheros eine historische Persönlichkeit zugrunde lag: der als 5. Toltekenherrscher in Tollan regierende „grosse König“³⁷⁾, der am Ende seiner Herrschaft sein Land

34) Der Bezeichnung *u gux cah* (Popol Vuh, S. 4 Schultze Jena), „Herz des Himmels“, entspricht sachlich das „Innere des Himmels“, *ylhuicatl yytic*, zu dem Quetzalcoatl (Geschichte der Königreiche, S. 76) in Verbindung gesetzt wird. Die wörtliche Wiedergabe der Maya-Bezeichnung *u gux cah* wäre im Aztekischen *ylhuicatl yyollo*; diese Formulierung findet sich in einem aztekischen Gesang als Epitheton des „alleinigen Gottes“ (*ycel teotl*), vgl. LEONHARD SCHULTZE JENA, Altaztekische Gesänge, hrsg. von GERDT KUTSCHER (Quellenwerke zur alten Geschichte Amerikas, Bd. VI), Stuttgart 1957, S. 259. Vielleicht spielt auch die Vorstellung des Hochgottes mit in der Relation Sahagúns (Historia general de las cosas de Nueva España, Buch 12, Kap. 1), in der berichtet wird, dass das erste der Conquista vorangehende unheimliche Vorzeichen (*tetzavítl*) bis „in das Herz des Himmels“ (*ylhuicaíollotitech*) reichte.

35) Vgl. KRICKEBERG in: Die Religionen des alten Amerika, S. 22, S. 82; für die Verbindung des Tohil mit dem Wasser ist bezeichnend, dass der „Mann von Rabinal“ die Ortsangabe der „Bäder von Tohil“ nennt, Vgl. PALM, a.a.O., S. 49 u.ö.

36) a.a.O., S. 122/23.

37) *huey tlahtohuani*; diese Bezeichnung findet sich bei Chimalpahin, vgl. WALTER LEHMANN und GERDT KUTSCHER, Chimalpahin, Das Memorial breve (Quellenwerke zur alten Geschichte Amerikas, Bd. VII), Stuttgart 1958, S. 127. Das hier gebrauchte Wort für „König“ — gewöhnlich *tlaatoani* geschrieben — ist neben *tlatecutli* eine der beiden Herrscherbezeichnungen Mexikos. Seine Ableitung von *tlaatoa*, „reden, sagen“, kann sowohl im politischen Sinne auf eine befehlende wie im Sinne des Sakralkönigtums auf die Verfügung über eine schöpferische Macht des Wortes hinweisen.

auf einer Reise nach dem Osten verliess. Er hiess nach seinem Geburtsjahr „Eins Rohr“ (*ce acatl*): „Unser Fürst Eins Rohr“ (*ce acatl topiltzin*). Er wurde als *tlamacazqui*, als „Priester“ schlechthin bezeichnet³⁸) und ausserdem häufig *Nacxitl* genannt³⁹). Als Oberpriester des Federschlangengottes trug er dessen Namen Quetzalcoatl als Titel⁴⁰).

Die Angaben über Lebenszeit und Regierungsdauer dieses Quetzalcoatl schwanken in den einzelnen Texten⁴¹); man wird die 52 Jahre von 947 bis 999 n. Chr. als ungefähre Dauer seines Lebens im toltekischen Reich annehmen und seine Einsetzung als Priesterkönig auf das Jahr 977 datieren können⁴²).

Legendäre Züge durchsetzen in den Texten die Vita Quetzalcoatl's. Neben Angaben über einen leiblichen Vater, der unter den Namen Mixcoatl, „Wolkenschlange“⁴³), und Totepeuh, „unser Berg“⁴⁴), erscheint, verbinden andere Berichte bereits mit seiner Geburt das Moment des Wunderbaren und Exzeptionellen. Bei Chimalpahin⁴⁵) heisst es: „(Es) ward geboren Topiltzin Acxitl Quetzalcoatl dort in Tollan. Aber nicht richtig ward er geboren: er ward nur gebracht, indem er dort zum Vorschein kam (*monextico*). Von woher er gebracht wurde, weiss man nicht recht, so wie es erzählen die alten Männer.“

Die „Geschichte der Königreiche“ hat eine genauere Angabe unter Verweis auf eine Jungfrauengeburt⁴⁶). Die Mutter Quetzalcoatl's wird

38) Das Wort *tlamacazqui* verweist auf die Funktion des Opfern's; das Verbum *tlamaca* bedeutet: Speise, Opfer darbringen.

39) „Vierfuss“; im sakralen Verständnis könnte Nacxitl den Gott bezeichnen, der in den vier Weltgegenden Fuss fasst (Vgl. Geschichte der Königreiche, S. 70 Anm. 3). Allerdings eröffnen die in Anm. 25 zitierten Forschungen von Paul Kirchhoff jetzt auch die Möglichkeit eines profanen, politischen Verständnisses im Sinne eines Herrschers, der von der Zentralprovinz aus Macht über die vier umliegenden Provinzen ausübt. Neben *Nacxitl* findet sich auch *Acxitl*, das als altertümliche Form für *ixcitl*, „Fuss“, zu verstehen ist.

40) DISSELHOFF, a.a.O., S. 79.

41) Vgl. Geschichte der Königreiche, S. 70, S. 93; CHIMALPAHIN, S. 9, S. 12, S. 49.

42) KRICKEBERG, Altmexikanische Kulturen, S. 291.

43) Geschichte der Königreiche, S. 351.

44) a.a.O., S. 69.

45) a.a.O., S. 9.

46) Eine solche wurde auch von dem Gotte Huitzilopochtli berichtet; zu anderen indianischen Parallelen vgl. PAUL EHRENREICH, Die Mythen und Legenden der Südamerikanischen Urvölker und ihre Beziehungen zu denen Nordamerikas und der alten Welt, in: Zeitschrift für Ethnologie 37, 1905, S. 47.

als Chimalman, „ruhender Schild“, bezeichnet, was im Sinne der als Scheibe vorgestellten Erde zu verstehen ist. Die entscheidende Aussage des Textes lautet ⁴⁷⁾: „Man erzählt, seine Mutter war (eine Frau) namens Chimalman. Und so ward es erzählt: in der Weise setzte sich Quetzalcoatl in den Leib seiner Mutter, (indem) diese einen grünen Edelstein verschluckte.“

Dem Regierungsantritt Quetzalcoatl's sind offenbar innere Auseinandersetzungen vorausgegangen. Jedenfalls berichten die Texte nicht von einer unmittelbaren Thronfolge nach dem Tode seines leiblichen Vaters, sondern von einer sechsjährigen Zwischenregierung ⁴⁸⁾. Und höchst bezeichnend ist es, dass Quetzalcoatl die Gebeine seines offenbar an unheiliger Stätte begrabenen Vaters sucht und dann im Tempel einer Schlangengöttin beisetzt ⁴⁹⁾. Den Herrschaftsantritt Quetzalcoatl's verzeichnet ebenfalls die „Geschichte der Königreiche“ ⁵⁰⁾: „(Es) holten die Tolteken ihn, den Quetzalcoatl, indem sie ihn zum König wählten dort in Tollan, und er war ihr Priester“ ^{50a)}. Mit dieser Stelle ist sehr deutlich die Verbindung des Königtums mit dem Priestertum in der Person Quetzalcoatl's, also sein Priesterkönigtum, zum Ausdruck gebracht.

Diese Regierungsform, die den Herrscher sakral legitimiert und ihm gleichzeitig kultische Verpflichtungen auferlegt, hat offenbar nach dem Fortgang Quetzalcoatl's im Toltekenreich nicht mehr allzu lange bestanden. Sie brach zusammen unter Huemac, der den Herrschernamen Atecpanecat'l („Der vom Wasserpalast“) führte ⁵¹⁾. Auf Grund unterschiedlicher chronologischer Angaben in den Texten ist es nicht eindeutig zu entscheiden, ob dieser Herrscher noch unmittelbar der Periode Quetzalcoatl's angehörte oder als 10. Toltekenkönig von 1098 bis 1174 regierte. Es wird berichtet, dass er sich versündigte, indem er „einen Dämon, der in Weibsgestalt auftrat“, heiratete, womit zweifellos religiöse Vergehen des Königs umschrieben sind. Darauf machten die Tolteken einen Priester namens Quauhtli („Adler“) zu ihrem Ober-

47) Geschichte der Königreiche, S. 72.

48) Geschichte der Königreiche, S. 69, S. 75.

49) a.a.O., S. 72 f.

50) a.a.O., S. 75.

50a) Mit der Aussage *ynteopixcauh catca* („und er war ihr Priester“) wird Quetzalcoatl als *teopixqui* bezeichnet; *teopixqui* ist neben *tlamacazqui* (vgl. Anm. 38) und *teohua* eine aztekische Priesterbezeichnung.

51) Geschichte der Königreiche, S. 97 f.

priester, indem sie ihn auf den Thron Quetzalcoatl's setzten. Die Titulatur des Oberpriesters als Quetzalcoatl ging damit auf Quauhtli über. Die Sätze ⁵²): „Da hörte er (Huemac) auf, Quetzalcoatl zu sein. Es wurde erzählt, dass nunmehr Quauhtli an seine Stelle trat“, kennzeichnen mit aller Deutlichkeit den Auseinanderfall des Priesterkönigtums in eine politische und eine geistliche Macht.

Demgegenüber stand die Regierungszeit Quetzalcoatl's völlig unter dem Aspekt des priesterlichen Herrschers ⁵³): „(Es) machte seine Fastenhäuser, seine Kultstätten, seine Andachtsstätten Topiltzin Ce Acatl Quetzalcoatl: Vierfach (waren) seine Häuser, die er gründete; sein Türkisbalkenhaus, sein rosarotes Muschelhaus, sein (weisses) Muschelhaus, sein Quetzalfederhaus, worin er betete, (der Gottheit) mit frommen Bussübungen diente und mit Fasten sein Leben zubrachte. Und noch um Mitternacht stieg er zum Wasser hinab nach einem Platze namens Atecpan amochco („Wasserpalast, Ort des Zinns“). Und seine Dornen (zur Kasteiung) legte er dort nieder auf dem (Berge) Xicocotl und dem Huitzco und dem Tzincoc und dem Nonohualca-Berge. Und zu seinen Dornen machte er grüne Jade, als seine grünen Fichtenzweige (nahm er) Quetzalfedern.“

Das Motiv der Selbstkasteiung, das in diesem Texte zum Ausdruck kommt, kehrt wieder bei bildlichen Darstellungen Quetzalcoatl's, wenn in seinem Hut ein Knochendolch als Symbol der priesterlichen Kasteiung abgebildet ist. Der Text fährt dann fort: „Und als Brandopfer verwendete er echte Türkise, Jade, rötliche Muschelschalen. Und sein Opfer bestand in Schlangen, Vögeln, Schmetterlingen, die er tötete. Und es heisst, man sagt: Zum Innern des Himmels (*ylhuicatl yytic*) betete er, richtete er seine Anbetung...“

Diese letzten Aussagen des Textes sind religionsgeschichtlich höchst bedeutsam. Sie verweisen auf einen verinnerlichten Gottesdienst und auf einen humanen Kult. Die Angabe, dass die kultischen Opfer Quetzalcoatl's in Schlangen, Vögeln und Schmetterlingen bestanden, grenzt diese Kultpraxis sehr deutlich ab von den späteren blutigen Menschenopfern der aztekischen Periode Mexikos ⁵⁴).

⁵²) a.a.O., S. 98.

⁵³) a.a.O., S. 75 f.

⁵⁴) Der Gegensatz zwischen den kultischen Bräuchen der aztekischen Periode zu jenen der toltekischen ist m.E. voll befriedigend als Erscheinung im Rahmen der indianischen Religionsgeschichte zu verstehen und bedarf nicht des Versuches

Noch entschiedener wird dies in einer anderen Textstelle ausgesprochen⁵⁵⁾: „Und es ward gesagt, erzählt, dass er vierfach seine Fastenhäuser gründete. Und man sagt, man erzählt: Zur Zeit als Quetzalcoatl lebte, wollten oftmals ihn die Dämonen⁵⁶⁾ durch Spott dazu verleiten, dass er mit Menschen sich entsühnen, dass er Menschen opfern sollte (*tlacamictiz*). Aber niemals wollte er das; (er sagte:) es soll nicht soweit kommen. — Denn sehr liebte er seine Untertanen, welches die Tolteken waren. Immer nur bestanden seine Darbringungen in Schlangen, Vögeln, Schmetterlingen, die er opferte. Und es heisst, man sagt, er (war) es, der deshalb ärgerte die Dämonen, so dass sie damit anfangen, sich über ihn lustig zu machen, ihn zu verspotten, indem sie wünschten, dass sie Quetzalcoatl ins Elend stürzten und ihn verjagten — wie das wirklich geschah.“

Offenbar wurden die Animosität und der Vernichtungsplan, den die als „Dämonen“ bezeichneten Gegner der Religiosität Quetzalcoatl hegten, verstärkt durch eine ihren eigenen Bestrebungen entgegenstehende hohe Wertschätzung, der sich Quetzalcoatl bei den Tolteken erfreute; den Sahagún überliefert die Aussage⁵⁷⁾: „Quetzalcoatl hielt man gleichsam für einen Gott, er wurde für einen Gott gehalten, als Gott angebetet, und zwar schon vor alter Zeit, in Tollan.“

Neben seinem priesterlichen Wirken erscheint Quetzalcoatl als Begründer der toltekischen Kultur. Bei Sahagún wird darüber berich-

eines — im übrigen stets nur hypothetischen — Nachweises einer Herkunft Quetzalcoatl aus nicht-amerikanischem Gebiet; vgl. hierzu neuestens: PIERRE HONORÉ, Ich fand den weissen Gott, Frankfurt am Main 1961. — Der Vergleich Quetzalcoatl mit Echnaton, dem ägyptischen Reformator von Amarna (vgl. hierzu: KRICKBERG, Altmexikanische Kulturen, S. 293), wäre nur dann gerechtfertigt, wenn Quetzalcoatl Religiosität als ephemere Erscheinung und nicht als vornehmster Ausdruck einer ganzen Strömung innerhalb der mexikanischen Religionsgeschichte aufzufassen wäre; das letztere scheint aber wahrscheinlicher zu sein. Viel eher wäre mit Echnaton Nezahualcoyotl („Der fastende Präriewolf“) zu vergleichen, der Herrscher von Tetzaco, der seinen monotheistischen Intentionen Ausdruck gab durch den Bau einer Tempelpyramide für *tlouque navaque* (vgl. W. KRICKBERG, Bauform und Weltbild im alten Mexiko, in: Mythe, Mensch und Umwelt, hrsg. von A. E. JENSEN [Paideuma 4, 1950], S. 301); denn seine religiöse Reform stand ganz im Gegensatz zu den zeitgenössischen aztekischen Vorstellungen (sein Sohn Nezahualpilli war Zeitgenosse Motecuzomas II.).

55) Geschichte der Königreiche, S. 78 f.

56) *tlatlacatecollo*, wörtlich „Menscheneulen“.

57) EDUARD SELER, Einige Kapitel aus dem Geschichtswerk des Fray Bernardino de Sahagún, Stuttgart 1927, S. 268.

tet⁵⁸⁾: „Die Tolteken, seine Untertanen, waren sehr kunstverständlich⁵⁹⁾, nichts war schwierig für sie. Sie schnitten die grünen Edelsteine und gossen Gold. Sehr verständig waren sie in Federarbeit. — Mit Quetzalcoatl begann, von ihm ging aus das gesamte Kunsthandwerk, das Sichverstehen darauf.“

Aber nicht nur die materielle Kultur brachte Quetzalcoatl den Tolteken; er gab ihnen auch Gesetze, und er prägte Haltung und Verpflichtungen ihres Priestertums. Auch hierüber berichtet Sahagún⁶⁰⁾: „Ihm ahmten die Räucherpriester und die (anderen) Priester nach. Das Leben dieses Quetzalcoatl, das nahmen die Priester als ihre Lebensweise an, das Gesetz von Tollan, das allgemein hier in Mexiko befolgt wurde.“

Aber diese positiven Züge im Wirken Quetzalcoatl's sind überschattet von einer echten Tragik. Bereits sein Leben in Tollan vollzieht sich in der Einsamkeit des priesterlichen Mittlers zwischen dem obersten Himmelsgott und den Menschen⁶¹⁾: „Zur Zeit, als er lebte, nicht zeigte er sich vor den Leuten. An einem ganz unzugänglichen Platz, im Innern des Hauses hielt er sich auf, ward er behütet. Und die ihn hüteten, (waren) seine Herolde; mit vielen Wällen war er umgeben. Und so viele Mauern ihn einschlossen, an so vielen Stellen befanden sich einzelne Scharen seiner Herolde. Und er befand sich auf einer Edelsteinmatte, einer Quetzalfedermatte, einer Edelmetallmatte.“

Ein weiteres Motiv im Leben Quetzalcoatl's muss von einer tragischen Bedeutung gewesen sein, wenn wir auch deren spezifischen Sinn wohl noch nicht befriedigend zu erkennen vermögen. Es handelt sich um die Erkenntnis seiner äusseren Hässlichkeit, vielleicht als Folge des Alterns, wie sie Quetzalcoatl durch einen Spiegel vermittelt wird⁶²⁾. Der Spiegel ist das Symbol des aztekischen Gottes Tezcatlipoca, des „rauchenden Spiegels“ — und nach einer Version ist es auch dieser Gott Tezcatlipoca, der Quetzalcoatl in feindlicher Absicht den Spiegel reicht⁶³⁾: „Und da sah sich Quetzalcoatl (im Spiegel). Sehr

58) a.a.O., S. 269.

59) Später gewann das Wort *toltecatl* die Nebenbedeutung von „Kunstfertiger“.

60) a.a.O., S. 271.

61) Geschichte der Königreiche, S. 78.

62) Der Spiegel (*tetzcatl*) war ein gebräuchliches Mittel zur Selbstprüfung; er wurde als solches auch bei der Erziehung der Jugend verwendet; vgl. KRICKBERG, Altmexikanische Kulturen, S. 93.

63) Geschichte der Königreiche, S. 82.

fürchtete er sich, er sagte: Wenn mich meine Untertanen erblicken, werden sie nicht etwa davonlaufen? — Denn die Augenlider sind sehr dick geschwollen, die Augenhöhlen tief eingesunken, überall ganz sackartig gedunsen sein Gesicht, nicht wie das eines Gesunden.”

Diese Version aus der „Geschichte der Königreiche“ steht im Zusammenhang der Berichte über die Bemühungen Tezcatlipocas und der Dämonen, Quetzalcoatl zum Verlassen seiner Stadt Tollan zu bewegen. Der entscheidende Anlass hierzu wird gegeben, als es seinen Widersachern gelingt, Quetzalcoatl und dessen hier erwähnte Schwester Quetzalpetlatl („Quetzalfedermatte“) zum Genuss des Pulque (aztek. *octli*) und im Zusammenhang damit zur Versäumnis ihrer Bussübungen zu verführen⁶⁴). Danach reift der Entschluss Quetzalcoatls, seine Stadt Tollan zu verlassen⁶⁵): „Und danach, da Quetzalcoatl (darüber) verwirrt und bekümmert war, denkt er daran, dass er seine Stadt Tollan verlassen soll. Darauf macht er sich bereit. Man sagt, dass er ganz sein goldenes und rotes Muschelhaus verbrannte und den anderen Toltekenschatz. Wunder-Herrlichkeiten, die Kostbarkeiten vergrub und verbarg er alle an schwer zugänglichen Orten, entweder im Innern der Berge oder in den Schluchten“⁶⁶). Die Tragik dieses Auszugs Quetzalcoatls kommt voll zum Ausdruck in den folgenden Worten Sahagúns, die den Rückblick auf seine von ihm verlassene Stadt schildern: „Darauf blickt Quetzalcoatl nach Tollan, und da weint er, wirr schluchzend weint er; — zwei Hagelschauer sind seine Tränen. Wo sie herabtropfen, durchlöchern sie den Stein.”

64) a.a.O., S. 85 ff. Die Azteken standen dem Genuss von Alkohol sehr ablehnend gegenüber; Trunksucht galt — neben übler Nachrede, Spieleidenschaft und Diebstahl — zu den schlimmsten Verfehlungen, und generell war Pulque-Genuss erst vom 70. Lebensjahr an erlaubt; vgl. KRICKEBERG, Altmexikanische Kulturen, S. 93, S. 98. Vgl. auch die Bestimmungen des in der „Historia Chichimeca“ des Ixtlilxochitl überlieferten Gesetzes Nezahualcoyotls: „Einem Trunkenbold schor man, wenn er zum ersten Male ertappt wurde und ein einfacher Mann war, auf öffentlichem Platz das Haar und zerstörte seine Hütte, da das Gesetz sagt, dass einer, der sich selbst seines Verstandes beraubt, nicht wert sei, ein Heim zu besitzen, sondern wie ein Tier im Felde leben müsse. Beim zweiten Male verfiel der Übeltäter dem Tode, eine Strafe, die über den Vornehmen schon beim ersten Male verhängt wurde“; zitiert nach: H. G. BONTE, Das Buch der Könige von Tezcuco, Leipzig 1930, S. 72 f.

65) *Sahagún* (bei SELER), S. 286 ff.

66) Bei der späteren Mythologisierung der Vita Quetzalcoatls verbindet sich hierdurch mit diesem Gott das Motiv der Zerstörung seines eignen Werkes; zu diesem Motiv vgl. VIKTOR PÖSCHL, Die grosse Maecenasode des Horaz (Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akad. d. Wiss., phil.-hist. Kl. 1961, 1), S. 27.

Man wird sicher in dem Bericht vom Auszug Quetzalcoatl aus Tollan nicht allein eine religiöse Umschreibung zu erblicken haben für das profanhistorische Faktum eines Zurückweichens der Tolteken gegenüber vorstossenden Gruppen einer indianischen Wanderung, deren letzte Welle in Mexiko die Azteken darstellten. Vielmehr sprechen die Berichte über die vorangehenden Auseinandersetzungen Quetzalcoatl mit numinosen Mächten — seien es Dämonen oder sein Antagonist Tezcatlipoca — eindeutig für religiöse Motive und zwar für eine in der Religionsgeschichte Mexikos entscheidende Auseinandersetzung. Denn Quetzalcoatl ist ein Feind der sakralen Menschenopfer und fällt damit aus dem Rahmen der späteren religiösen Bräuche der Mexikaner. Mit jenen Mächten aber, die ihn aus seiner Stadt vertreiben, vor allem mit Tezcatlipoca, ist der Ritus des Menschenopfers verbunden.

Der Weg Quetzalcoatl führt ihn bis zum Ostmeer. Über sein weiteres Verhalten gibt es zwei unterschiedliche Versionen. Nach der einen, die bereits Züge der Mythologisierung aufweist, suchte er die „Gegend des Sonnenaufgangs (*tonatiuh iquicayampa*)“ auf, „indem er dort in Rauch aufging, in Glut aufging“⁶⁷⁾, sich freiwillig auf einem Scheiterhaufen verbrannte, worauf sein Herz als Morgenstern an den Himmel ging.

Mehr historische Wahrscheinlichkeit — vor allem angesichts der Beobachtungen über sein Fortwirken im Bereich der Maya — hat die zweite Version. Nach ihr verlässt Quetzalcoatl den mexikanischen Boden und reist zu Schiff nach einem Lande, das in den Texten mit Tlapallan, „Land der Morgenröte“, bezeichnet wird⁶⁸⁾: „Und nachdem er an das Ufer (des Meeres) gekommen war, macht er die Schlangenhöhle. Nachdem man sie fertiggestellt, setzt er sich darauf; und das galt nun gleichsam als sein Schiff. Darauf ging er, wurde von dem Wasser fortgeführt, und niemand weiss mehr, wie er nach Tlapallan gelangte.“

Mit dem Auszug Quetzalcoatl aus Tollan hatte das toltekische Reich seinen Höhepunkt überschritten, und diese beiden in Verbindung miteinander stehenden Fakten sind offenbar von den Tolteken frühzeitig als Tragödie empfunden worden. Chimalpahin berichtet darüber⁶⁹⁾: „Nachdem sich Quetzalcoatl begeben hatte nach dem Auf-

67) CHIMALPAHIN, a.a.O., S. 52.

68) *Sahagún* (bei SELER), S. 292.

69) a.a.O., S. 12.

gang der Sonne (*yn iquiçayampa tonatiuh*), hatten nur noch Schattenkönige eingesetzt die Tolteken." Eine andere Stelle kennzeichnet das Unglück in noch grasserer Weise ⁷⁰): „(Es) begab sich geraden Weges fort Topiltzin Acxiti Quetzalcoatl, indem das Verderben gänzlich hereinbrach über das Staatswesen von Tollan."

Damit ist bereits eine, wenn auch keineswegs die einzige jener Folgen gekennzeichnet, die die Erscheinung Quetzalcoatl mit sich brachte. Auf weltanschaulichem Gebiet wurde die Tragödie, die das Wirken des grossen Priesterkönigs auf toltekischem Gebiet abschloss, zu einem Motiv des generell im mexikanischen Denken feststellbaren Pessimismus. In einem jener schwermütigen altaztekischen Gesänge findet dies Motiv klassischen Ausdruck ⁷¹): „In Tollan hat das Haus aus Balken gestanden, nur noch die Schlangensäulen liegen hingestreckt da. Fortgegangen ist Nacxiti, unser Fürst, eilig ist er von dannen gezogen. Sie wandern und wandern aus, unsere Edelleute, die tränenwerten. Er geht fort, geht seiner Vernichtung entgegen, dorthin in das Land der Morgenröte (*tlapallan*) ... Und sie wandern und wandern ab, die tränenwerten.

Wie Felsen brechen, so (herzzerbrechend) schluchze ich; wie Wassersand beharrlich den Stein schneidet, so schneidet es mir ins Herz, dass mein Gebieter fortgegangen ist ...

O nicht doch! nicht doch! Was soll nun aus Deinem Hause werden, dem schöngeschmückten? O was soll aus Deinen Tempeln werden, die Du verwaist zurückgelassen hast hier in Tollan und Nonohualco ⁷²)?...

Züchtigung mit Stein und Knüppel ist zweifach und plötzlich dort über Tollan verhängt worden, wo Du, Nacxiti, unser Fürst (*topiltzin*) zu herrschen gekommen warst. Nie wird Dein Name vergehen ⁷³). Siehe, weinen wird nun Dein Untertan.

70) CHIMALPAHIN, a.a.O., S. 11.

71) Alt-aztekische Gesänge, a.a.O., S. 138 ff.; vgl. WALTER LEHMANN, Ein Tolteken-Klagegesang, in: Festschrift Eduard Seler, Stuttgart 1922, S. 281-319.

72) Ort in der Nähe von Tollan.

73) Das Motiv des nachlebenden ruhmvollen Namens findet sich in klassischer Weise in den berühmten Worten Chimalpahins, die gewissermassen als aztekischer Schlusstrich unter den mit der Conquista verbundenen Verlust der Eigenstaatlichkeit gesetzt werden können:

*Yn quexquichcauh maniz
cemanahuatl ayc pollihuiz
yn itenyo yn itauhca
in Mexico Tenochtitlan*

Gerade hier hast Du doch das Haus der Türkise und die Schlangenhäuser errichtet, hier in Tollan, wohin Du zu herrschen gekommen warst, Nacxitl, unser Fürst."

Aber nicht allein zu einem Motiv des mexikanischen Pessimismus wurde die Gestalt Quetzalcoatl, sondern auch zur Grundlage der sakralen Legitimierung des späteren Herrschertums. Trotz der durchaus andersartigen Religiosität der aztekischen Epoche betrachteten sich doch deren Herrscher als Rechtsnachfolger des mythologisierten Quetzalcoatl. Mehrere Belege sprechen hierfür. Einmal wurde bei der Inthronisierung der aztekischen Könige die Formel gesprochen: „Seit heute, o Fürst, sitztest du auf dem Thron, den Ce Acatl Nacxitl Quetzalcoatl errichtete. In seinem Namen kam Huitzilopochtli ⁷⁴⁾, den Königssitz einzunehmen, und in seinem Namen war Acamapichtli der erste (aztekische) König" ⁷⁵⁾. Bei der Bestattung eines toten Königs trat ebenfalls die Bezugnahme auf Quetzalcoatl zutage. Die Azteken errichteten bei der Totenfeier eine Holzstatue, die sie in der Weise Quetzalcoatl schmückten und vor der sie opferten ⁷⁶⁾. Höchst aufschlussreich ist schliesslich, dass der drittletzte Herrscher der Azteken, Motecuçoma II., als er den Conquistador Cortés als zurückgekehrten Quetzalcoatl begrüsst, in seiner Ansprache zum Ausdruck bringt, dass er, als König der Azteken, ebenso wie seine Vorgänger den Thron nur stellvertretend für Quetzalcoatl innegehabt hätte ⁷⁷⁾.

Wie für das Königtum, so erlangte auch für das aztekische Priestertum die Gestalt Quetzalcoatl konstitutive Bedeutung. Obwohl sie im Dienste ganz anderer Götter standen, trugen in Mexico-Tenochtitlan die Oberpriester des Huitzilopochtli und des Regengottes Tlaloc den Namen Quetzalcoatl als Berufsbezeichnung und Titel ⁷⁸⁾. Unter dem

„Solange bestehen wird
die Welt, nie soll vergehen
der Ruhm, die Ehre
von Mexico Tenochtitlan"

(zitiert nach: Geschichte der Königreiche, S. III).

74) Der eigentliche aztekische Stammesgott, hinter dem vielleicht die historische Gestalt eines mythologisierten Volksheros stand; vgl. *Sahagún* (bei SELER), S. 1: „Huitzilopochtli war nur ein gewöhnlicher Mensch ..."

75) DISSELHOFF, a.a.O., S. 93; überliefert ist der Text in der „Mexikanischen Chronik" des Don Alonso Tezozoc.

76) KRICKEBERG, Altmexikanische Kulturen, S. 240.

77) *Sahagún* (bei SELER), S. 491 f.

78) KRICKEBERG, Altmexikanische Kulturen, S. 250 f.

Patronat des Gottes Quetzalcoatl stand auch das Priesterhaus (*calmecatl*) ⁷⁹⁾, während das Haus der Krieger (*telpochcalli*) ⁸⁰⁾ seinem Antagonisten Tezcatlipoca geweiht war.

Der weitaus positivste Aspekt des Gottes Quetzalcoatl aber war verbunden mit der Erwartung seiner einstigen Wiederkunft ⁸¹⁾: „In der folgenden Weise sprechen die alten Männer der fernen Zeit: Er selbst lebt und ist, der bis jetzt nicht stirbt, und wiederum wird er zurückkehren, der zu herrschen kommt.“ Aus einer anderen Textstelle bei Chimalpahin, wo es in bezug auf die Rückkehr Quetzalcoatl's heisst ⁸²⁾. „In Erwartung der sehr fernen Zeit lebte man“, ist völlig deutlich, dass seine Wiederkunft, die Wiedererrichtung seines Reiches, aber auch die Restauration seiner verinnerlichten und von Menschenopfern freien kultischen Verehrung eines transzendenten Gottes sehnlichst erhofft wurden, und diese Tatsache wirft bezeichnendes Licht auf die Selbsteinschätzung der aztekischen Periode und ihrer blutigen Riten.

Es ist bekannt, zu welchen tragischen Missverständnissen der Glaube an die Rückkehr Quetzalcoatl's bei der Ankunft der spanischen Conquistadoren führte ⁸³⁾. Wie später, und in historisch kleinerem Masstab, Kapitän Cook auf Hawai als wiedergekommener Gott Lono empfangen wurde ⁸⁴⁾, so hatte Motecucoma II. den Eroberer Cortés als Quetzalcoatl begrüsst; und sowohl Cortés wie die Conquista im allgemeinen hatten es vermieden, die prospanische Interpretation der ihre Bestrebungen fördernden Vorstellungen heidnischer Mythologie von einer Rückkehr Quetzalcoatl's zu zerstören.

Allerdings war die Haltung der Azteken ganz offensichtlich nicht durch eine tragische Verwechslung einerseits und andererseits ein jähes Erwachen gekennzeichnet. Die Tatsache, dass Sahagún im 12. Buch seiner Relationen die Geschehnisse der Conquista mit dem Be-

79) Das Wort, das sich aus *calli*, „Haus“, und *mecatl*, „Schnur“, zusammensetzt, bezeichnet sehr plastisch die an Korridoren aneinander gereihten Priestergemächer und kann gut mit „Kloster“ wiedergegeben werden.

80) Wörtlich: „Jünglingshaus“; das *telpochcalli* diente vornehmlich der Ausbildung zum Kriege.

81) CHIMALPAHIN, a.a.O., S. 128.

82) a.a.O., S. 36.

83) Vgl. G. LANCKOWSKI, Die Begegnung des Christentums mit der aztekischen Religion, in: Numen 5, 1958, S. 58-81.

84) HANS NEVERMANN, Götter der Südsee. Die Religion der Polynesier, Stuttgart 1947, S. 176.

richt über die ihnen vorangehenden unheilvollen Vorzeichen (*tetzavítl*) einleitet, kann nur dafür sprechen, dass die Azteken eine skeptische Haltung einnehmen mussten. Eine solche bestätigt ausdrücklich Chimalpahin⁸⁵): „Als sie (die Mexikaner) sie (die Spanier) gut und recht empfingen bei ihrer ersten Ankunft, ihrem Eintritt in Mexico Tenochtitlan, waren die Mexikaner im Zweifel darüber, ob er, der Kapitän Hernando Cortés, ob (in ihm) Quetzalcoatl angekommen wäre.“

Aber damit war die Geschichte Quetzalcoatl's noch nicht zu Ende. Seine Gestalt stand vielmehr im Hintergrund bei den ersten wirklichen missionarischen Versuchen in Mexiko, die von zwölf Franziskanern durchgeführt wurden, die im Auftrage Kaiser Karls V. ausgesandt waren und am 13. Mai 1524 in das Land kamen⁸⁶). Dort wagten sie zu einer Zeit, in der das Abendland von einer phobie de l'hérésie erschüttert wurde, eine religiöse Diskussion mit den Azteken, also mit heidnischen Gesprächspartnern⁸⁷).

Cortés und die Conquista hatten die prospanische Interpretation von der erwarteten Rückkehr Quetzalcoatl's gerechtfertigt durch die Annahme, dass der Apostel Thomas auch „West-Indien“ missioniert habe und in dessen Erinnerung als Quetzalcoatl fortlebe. Es kann nicht anders als ein bewusster Einspruch gegen diese Fiktion gedeutet werden, wenn die Franziskaner in ihrem Religionsgespräch mit den Azteken ausdrücklich erklärten⁸⁸): „Niemals zu euch gelangte der Hauch, das Wort des Herrn des Himmels und der Erden.“

Aber auch bei ihrer christologischen Verkündigung steht die Quetzalcoatl-Gestalt im Hintergrund. Denn nicht anders kann es verstanden werden, dass die Franziskaner sorgsam das Wort *piltzintli* vermeiden, obwohl es sich in vorzüglicher Weise zur gleichzeitigen Wiedergabe der beiden messianischen Titel ἰδὲ τοῦ θεοῦ und κβριος eignete. Das Wort war eben inneraztekisch für eine christliche Verkündigung unverwendbar, weil mit ihm *topiltzin* Quetzalcoatl bezeichnet wurde.

Zu der Gefahr eines Synkretismus mit der Quetzalcoatl-Gestalt muss schliesslich auch das begründet gesehen werden, was der Text dieses

85) CHIMALPAHIN, a.a.O., S. 12.

86) ROBERT RICARD, La „conquête spirituelle“ du Mexique, Paris 1933, S. 32 f.

87) Der Text dieser Diskussion ist erhalten und ediert: WALTER LEHMANN, Sterbende Götter und christliche Heilsbotschaft, Wechselreden indianischer Vornehmer und spanischer Glaubensapostel in Mexiko 1524, hrsg. von GERDT KUTSCHER (Quellenwerke zur alten Geschichte Amerikas, Bd. III), Stuttgart 1949.

88) a.a.O., S. 109.

Religionsgesprächs verschweigt, nämlich jede marianische Äusserung. Im Gegensatz zu den Conquistadoren, die die Marienverehrung fördern wollten⁸⁹⁾, standen die Ordensleute ganz offensichtlich mit kritischer Aufmerksamkeit der Tatsache gegenüber, dass die Azteken die Vorstellung von der Jungfrauengeburt mit Quetzalcoatl verbanden.

89) Vgl. CORTÉS in seiner 2. Relation an Kaiser Karl V.: „Ich aber liess die Bilder unserer lieben Frau und anderer Heiligen aufstellen“; Zitiert nach: Die Eroberung von Mexiko. Drei eigenhändige Berichte von FERDINAND CORTEZ an Kaiser Karl V., bearb. von E. SCHULTZE, Hamburg 1907, S. 174 f.

„NOTHING“ IN ZEN

IN COMPARISON WITH CHRISTIAN ESCHATOLOGY AND “NOTHING” IN
EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY

BY

ROKUSABURŌ NIEDA

1. *Logical Construction of Zen*

Zen, a kind of Mahayana Buddhism, has a unique specificity which can be seen in the following proposition: “Zen is a different teaching outside canonical sutras.” Common Buddhist teaching, on the other hand, depends upon the sutras which have been handed down from Buddha and propagated by his followers. Yet these sutras are only books which have been written or printed with words. In short the common teaching has been by means of written words, carried on in the history of Buddhism.

On the other side, Zen, in the strictly original sense, ignores and annihilates such a medium of teaching. In the purely essential realm of Zen, there should be no verbal expression, and “no” in this sentence means nothing but “nothing”. Such teaching is called esoteric teaching. Sutra and the Bible have been the important media of communication between God and man, annihilating the distance between them. Especially distance of time can be covered by these documents. It might possibly be conceded that such a medium is an important factor for the development of the history of religion, though such an opinion would be a short-sighted dogmatism. Even at the risk of seeming subjective, permit me to assert that, in and through this historical process, we can see the origin and eschatology of religion. In the contents of religious thought, for instance, theology and doctrine are the same as I have mentioned. From such a point of view, we can explain the meaning of the origin of religion and of eschatology in religion. Zen, on the contrary, has quite an opposite character. In it we shall see the original peculiar nature of the construction of Zen

logic. Zen, in its original sense, prohibits any kind of medium. Therefore there can be no origin and eschatology in Zen. Zen, because it ignores grammar and logic, sometimes is quite indifferent to logical consistency and contradiction. But perhaps one might ask—"How can such a religion be taught to disciples and believers by means of ignoring canonical sutras?" In answer to this question, I should like to state that the true essence and the truth of Zen should be perceived only by the face-to-face method. In such a case, or on such an occasion, priest and disciple speak nothing. This "nothing" may be thought of as a kind of "nothing" in Zen.

In so far as Zen is a religion, to perceive its truth epistemologically is by no means sufficient. It must unite and must blend us together, and finally it must change and become as ourselves. In this meaning, by the esoteric way, every possible expression is prohibited as clearly stated in the phrase "without verbal expression", which is the fundamental principle of Zen. And this "without" in the above sentence might be thought as "nothing".

On the contrary, in European philosophy verbal expression is essentially presupposed. I shall quote here the philosophy of professor Heidegger as an example. He says in his "Über den Humanismus", the following:

"Im Denken das Sein zur Sprache kommt. In ihrer Behausung wohnt der Mensch. Die Denkenden und Dichtenden sind die Wächter dieser Behausung. Ihr Wachen ist das Vorbringen der Offenbarung des Seins insofern sie diese durch ihr Sagen zur Sprache bringen und in der Sprache aufbewahren... (p. 5).

According to these propositions, language should inevitably be the element for thought and existence. Language is the place in which existence dwells. Language and existence are thus important data for his philosophy.

In Zen, as already stated, all expressions and use of language should be ignored. It seems to me the concept "Sein" is always coherent to Professor Heidegger.

But when we turn our glance toward the realm of Zen, we will see that all existence and language have been put aside from our consideration. Moreover, Zen emphasizes the vanity of all existence. Consequently, Zen has never been coherent to the nature of things which exist. From such a point of view, Zen prefers not to emphasize the essential value of all things and existence. The earthly and com-

mon truth is usually negated and annihilated. For instance, "Stone is stone, but it is not stone." This may sound to you somewhat contradictory and ridiculous, but, as already stated, logical contradiction and consequence usually cannot be the main concern. And this annihilation of standard and common logic may be thought of as "nothing". Here we see a profile of the logic of "nothing". Then furthermore, I should like to quote another proposition: "The broad way has no gate." The "no" in the above sentence, means "nothing". There is a vivid difference between eastern and western thought. These negative thoughts and negative expressions of Zen are rooted in the original intention of Zen, which is to perceive the truth itself (i.e. Buddha), and to become itself as well as to be beyond all kind of relativities. But all this must be achieved only by the esoteric way. Such status is usually called "highest perception", or in Japanese "Satori".

2. The religious meaning of "nothing" in Zen

As mentioned above, the concept "nothing" plays a very important role throughout Zen. I must explain it a little more. Usually the conception "nothing" belongs to nihilism, and nihilism is regarded as an antipode to all religions. Zen, however, has a unique nature in comparison with so-called nihilism, and Zen claims that it is a religion. Zen started from the religious and philosophical perception of the vanity of all existence in the universe. Dogen, who was one of the top-ranking Zen priests, said that existence and time are equal. Time is already existence. All existence is time. ("Shō-bō-gen-zō"). But what he meant by these propositions differs from the meaning of Professor Heidegger's ontology. He affirms "Sein" and "das Seiende", and in accordance with them, the conception of "Nichts". On the contrary, Dogen said that the world is vacant vacuity. And this vacuity is a kind of "nothing". Nevertheless, I should like to add one more comment in order to prevent a misunderstanding about "nothing". It is different not only from Professor Heidegger's concept, but also from the so-called western idea of nihilism. Zen is neither pure philosophy nor literature. It is purely a religion.

In accord with examples I have mentioned already, we can by no means define the "nothing" of Zen as an entity or a substance. Terminological definition would separate us from the freshness of the truth of Zen. To perceive and unite us with this freshness, all verbal

expressions are annihilated and therefore all scientific or logical methodology is ignored. For that purpose the Zen believers are requested to undergo various kinds of training. For instance, Zazen, (a kind of religious meditation) is to sit down on a mat or on a stone, keeping that posture in silence with *ἐποχή* (i.e. suspension of judgement) and wandering to and fro just like a "floating cloud and a flowing stream". Through this religious training one can perceive "nothing" and approach the fresh truth of Buddha through "nothing" and one can release oneself from the crowded world of earth, and be open to expand oneself toward the infinitely broad sky. The idea of "nothing" will emancipate us from the frustrations of all kinds of desires. Therefore the "nothing" of Zen is thought to bear rich fruit for mental hygiene. Here we see the religious meaning of the "nothing" of Zen.

3. *Zen and eschatology*

Let us turn to Christianity. In the Christian religion, origin and eschatology are sometimes emphasized. "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth", as it is written in "Genesis" of the Old Testament. And it is written also, "In the beginning was the word (logos) and the word was with God and the word was God". (John 1.1. New Testament), and "I am Alpha and Omega." (Rev. 1.8). These phrases in the Bible mean that in Christianity, the concept of "origin" plays a very important role. And they mean at the same time that the world (kosmos) could not have been created by natural law but by the divine. The "eschata" can be seen in various places in the Bible. For instance "And this is the Father's will which hath sent me that of all which he hath given me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day." (John 6.39) From these examples in the Bible, we can easily see the meaning of Christian eschatology and we note that the "last day" has a very deep significance in it. Then through such beginning and end, Jesus Christ exists with his believers. So Christ says: "I am with you always, even unto the end of the world." (Matthew 26.2).

In Buddhism there are also eschatological ideas — for instance, his "last teaching". It is the teaching which remained after the death of Buddha. In the time of Buddha it was perfect, but after his death, in the course of time, human beings caused it to degenerate until now. We

see a similar case in the doctrine of "De Civitate Dei" of St. Augustine.

On the contrary, however, though Zen is a kind of Buddhism, it is different from such eschatology, because Zen is "different teaching outside canonical sutras", and such teaching of Zen is usually esoteric. And originally time is to be negated by being thrown into "nothing". Therefore there is neither origin nor eschatology in Zen. Dogen said: "The consciousness in past, present and future is incomprehensible". This proposition may sound very sceptical and negative. Nevertheless such scepticism might be only a mere phenomenal product from pursuing the highest perception, i.e. "Satori", by the esoteric way. "Past, present and future, these three tenses are all incomprehensible"—this is the most outstanding enunciation of Zen. This means the negation of time in general. So that in Zen, there would be neither creator nor judge originally. But here I must add one note. There are two sides to Zen. They appear as if they contradict each other. As already indicated, Zen annihilates all expressions and time, so there can be no eternal existence. But in fact, Zen depends upon the written codes, though they are not orthodox sutras. Their contents are full of speeches and deeds of past great high-ranking Zen priests. For instance, "Rin-zai-roku", "Heki-gan-roku", "Mu-mon-kan" and "Shō-bō-gen-zō", and other similar documents. They are all traditional Zen canons. And in addition, their historical and personal relations are very strict and complicated. In these records, we cannot find even a slight nuance of "without verbal expression". So these two sides contradict the original and essential realm of Zen, and run parallel with each other. On one side, the purely esoteric teaching exists in the pure theological and metaphysical realm; on the other side, non-esoteric relations are dominant, being derived from the inevitable methodology for the attainment to the highest preception and "nothing". In Zen, such contradiction has never been easily related. Rather, it seems as it were quite indifferent to it, because its metaphysics and its practice ignore all kind of logic. In this regard, we are able to see an interesting aspect and profile of "nothing" of Zen.

4. *Let us contrast Professor Heidegger's "Nichts"*

It is a little remarkable that the concept of "nothing" has been taken up in recent European philosophy. Here I should like to con-

sider Professor Heidegger's philosophy and compare it with the "nothing" of Zen. He asserts that "Das Fragen nach dem Nichts — was und wie es, das Nichts, sei — verkehrt das Befragte in sein Gegenteil." In this proposition, especially "verkehrt", we feel that to ask the nature of "nothing" should be to ask anything contrary to "nothing". This "Verkehren" leads us to the realm where the common and Aristotelian logic can have no validity. And he says in his "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" as follows:

"Die Frage nach dem Wesen der Wahrheit ist die Wahrheit des Wesens."
(p. 26)

Here we see also "verkehren" is just the same that mentioned above. From this manner of approach, I would like to pose the following two questions. The first is: Why had he to face such "verkehren"?; and the second is: Does the question about "Nichts" lead us to the non-logical realm? To the first question, I would answer that "verkehren" is a logical result derived from seeking the nature of "Nichts". To the second question, that this trend becomes so important as to serve as a corner stone by which his philosophy projects itself into the category of feeling which is, according to his terminology "Gefühl". Yet we must ask the origin of his question about the nature of "Nichts", which according to his opinion, derives from his own main interest in the problem of "Sein". His "Sein", as he says, is mainly connected with human existence. He says:

"Der Mensch allein existiert? Der Fels ist, aber existiert nicht."

"Der Name 'Existenz' ist in 'Sein und Zeit' ausschliesslich als Beziehung des Seins des Menschen gebraucht." (Was ist Metaphysik? 14)

From these phrases one can see his own interest and it is connected with human existence i.e. "das Seiende". And he asserts:

"Der menschliche Dasein kann sich nur zu Seienden verhalten, wenn es sich in das Nichts hineinhält." — "Die Metaphysik gehört zur Natur des Menschen."

And at the same time, contrary to such metaphysical ontology, he develops the psychological aspect. It is "Gefühl" as already mentioned. From this point of view, he introduces the concept "Angst" which is a necessary accompaniment to "Sein" and "Nichts", and travels far from the boundary of logic in general. According to him, "Angst" is something different from "Furcht". "Angst" comes from uncertain and indefinite objects, because it is a product of "Nichts". But at

the same time, on the other hand, he writes: "Die Angst offenbart das Nichts." (ibid., p. 32). On this account existence and "nothing" would seem to be the same. Also "verkehren" is to be seen in the field of "Gefühl". We have already seen the similar trend in his "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit".

Now we must turn back to Zen again. As already stated, Zen differs from western ontology and defines human existence as just like "a floating cloud and flowing stream". Consequently human nature and existence do not have as much emphasis as in Professor Heidegger. On this account, Zen cannot possibly agree with him. His fundamental viewpoint mainly depends upon "Sein" or "das Seiende" which is in the main human existence. As a further result, through "Kehre" he arrived at the problem of "Nichts". From the beginning his own peculiar logical consistency has been kept. In his "Von Wesen des Grundes", we feel the nuance of the traditional ontological proposition: "omne ens habet rationem". But such a kind of western rationalism in him, seems, as it were to become gradually weaker and weaker.

In Zen even from the beginning, existence and "nothing" have been just one and the same. And there is no difference between beginning and end. In general Zen does not radically emphasize human existence and consequently can never be homocentric. Professor Heidegger has distinguished "Sein" from "Seiende" and human existence from "Fels". On the contrary in original Zen, all existences both human and natural are equally the same. Therefore existence and "nothing" can never be defined substantially or substantively. Here we see also the necessary status of esoteric teaching of Zen.

Thus on the one side, Zen, starting from the indifference to all definitions and logic, is always "Verkehren". The Zen priest usually says as if in apathy: "Stone is stone but it is not stone". So if the Zen priest employs the same example as Professor Heidegger's, then he would probably say, looking at a floating cloud or flowing stream: "Man is man but it is not man. Rock is rock but it is not rock." As is stated in the second section of this thesis, Zen priest and believers have to undergo Zazen with *ἐποχή*. In Zen, "nothing" is never "offenbart Angst". At any rate, there is no room for "Angst" in Zen. Rather, through Zen, one can attain to the realm of absolute peace both in mind and in body and can be free from any kind of frustration and so-called libido or neurosis—as it is generally called.

In short, we see the point of intersection in Zen and in Professor Heidegger. And this point might be regarded as the concept "nothing". However if Professor Heidegger, according to his own peculiar "Denkweise" and terminology, were not so eager on the problem of his "Sein", then he would not enter into the realm of "Nichts" and would not be compelled to face the concept "verkehren" and would not connect human existence with "Angst". Otherwise he would have used his concept "Nichts" from the very beginning. In fact, I think, it is more necessary and far better to discuss the ontologies of G. Marcel and St. Thomas who did not touch (so actively as Professor Heidegger) the problem of "nothing".

Finally, I should like to repeat the original character of "nothing" of Zen and its religious meaning which on the one side distinguishes itself from mere metaphysics and so-called pure philosophy. It has been my intention in this thesis to write from the viewpoint of philosophy of religion. I have here treated Zen as an object of my research into the philosophy of religion. And I may be permitted to express the view that there are some differences between my opinion and that of Zen priests or of Zen theologians who believe in Zen Buddhism. I should like to explain these differences in detail on another occasion.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF KUAN YIN: CHINESE GODDESS OF MERCY

BY

JOHN H. CHAMBERLAYNE

Great attention is given in books on Chinese religion to the patriarchal organization of Chinese Society and to the important part played by the head of the household. The male members of the family share with him in ceremonies to the ancestors, when such rites need to be observed. Hence all families have a passionate longing to have sons, because "three things are unfilial and having no sons is the worst", according to Mencius¹). Male heirs are needed to continue the succession and the family worship.

This male emphasis has caused the women members of the family to play a passive part in family worship. Sometimes, the women stand at the back of the room whilst the male members go forward to bow to the tablets. On other occasions, the women will approach the ancestral tablets and bow low at the beginning of the ceremony, then they will retire and leave the men to carry out the main ceremony. "The women take no part in the worship, at least officially, as this is not sanctioned by the rites. In families of the lower class, the above rule is less strictly maintained." ²) The god of wealth, the kitchen god and the gods of happiness are concerned only with men.

The women of the family have, however, their own divinities, from whom they request the boon, deemed by Chinese women to be the supreme boon of their existence, namely children, if possible boys. The great protectress of women is called in general fashion the Holy Mother, *Sheng-mu* or the Lady Giver of Children, *Sung-tzu niang-niang*. Her worship differs little from one end of China to the other, though the personages who receive these names differ from place to place.

1) Mencius, Bk iv. Pt. i. chap. xxvi (trans. Giles L.).

2) Doré, *Chinese Superstitions* Vol. v. p. 622. (Eng. Tr. Shanghai, 1914).

In Canton and the South of China, the Holy Mother is Hariti, the Mother of Demons. Elsewhere she is known as *Kuei-tzu-mu*, the devouring ogress of children and mother of five hundred demons of infantile ills, whom Buddha converted and made protectress of women. But, she is most frequently found as the Taoist Princess of the Streaked Clouds or as the feminine form of the Buddhist Avalokitesvara, Kuan-Yin.

The Princess of the Streaked Clouds or the Lady Nai-nai is the daughter of the Great Emperor of the Eastern Peak. The Great Emperor presides over destiny and life in general, whilst the daughter has the particular care of births and in particular, confinements. She has two assistants, one of which carries of newly born child and the other holds a large eye and acts as the healer of the eye-ailments of children. She also has six other attendants who are goddesses who assist the child at various stages, for example, at the beginning of delivery, at the time of lactation, as well as in time of disease (small-pox), etc. She wears a distinctive head-dress, in which there are three birds with wings unfurled. (The great Taoist divinity, Hsi-wang-mu, also wears this head-dress).

In many families, however, the women lavish their worship and affection on Kuan Yin, the Chinese goddess of mercy. In some places, a month after marriage the young bride receives from her parents an image of the Goddess with a censer and a pair of candlesticks. This image comes to be, for her, a centre of affectionate regard—an object to which she can turn for help, for strength and for consolation. It is of interest to consider her origin, her history and her present functions.

Kuan Yin is the most popular deity of Northern Buddhism and has received great attention from many scholars. Doré devoted 100 pages of Vol. vi (pp. 134-234) of his "Researches into Chinese Superstitions" to the legends and problems concerning her. Similarly Edkins³⁾, Hackmann⁴⁾ Getty⁵⁾ and Williams⁶⁾ have drawn attention to her influence. European and Chinese scholars regard her as a manifestation of Avalokitesvara, a Buddhist deity symbolizing

3) Edkins, *Chinese Buddhism* 171.

4) Hackmann, *Buddhism as a Religion*, 210.

5) Getty, *Gods of Northern Buddhism*, 78.

6) Williams, *Buddhism*, 489.

"compassion". The Buddhist deity originated as an Indo-Tibetan divinity, which was introduced into China about the 5th century, A.D. 7). In her early images in China, she is represented with male attributes, but later on is found in female form. This has led to much controversy with regard to the reason for the change of sex 8). However, a powerful cause for this change of sex was the romantic legend of the Chinese princess Miao-shan. This legend was written by a mystic monk with the intent to give Kuan Yin a Chinese origin.

Doré considers that she was "at first and Indo-Tibetan divinity (Avalokitesvara), upon which a Chinese native god was afterwards grafted" 9). Her origin is certainly closely linked with India. "There is no historical proof that a Goddess of Mercy existed there (in China) prior to the introduction of Indian Buddhism" 10). Eitel considers that there may have been one 11). Edkins considers that the evidence is insufficient to warrant this assumption 12). In any case, no documents show that Kuan Yin is a development of Miao-shan or that the latter was earlier than Buddhism in China 13). Despite all the Chinese legends, "Kuan-yin is essentially Indian in origin and form" and "remains thoroughly Indian". 14)

Her name "Kuan Yin" or "Kuan-shih-yin" means "she who hears the sounds (prayers) of mortals; she who looks down upon the world and hears its cries" 15). Kumerajiva, who entered China in the fifth century, was the first to render the Hindu name Avalokitesvara by its Chinese Equivalent "Kuan-shih-yin", when she was introduced by the Mahayana School into China in the fifth century A.D. Edkins thinks that she may have been worshipped there in the Han dynasty, i.e. third century A.D., but this is historically not proved 16). It is however, noteworthy that the Chinese name became popular, so that "despite all their efforts, the Indian Buddhist monks were unable to

7) Doré, vi, xviii.

8) Ibid., 200-15.

9) Doré, vi, 134, Note 1 (cf. iv, 418, note 3).

10) Ibid., 215.

11) *Sanskrit-Chinese Dictionary* 19-20.

12) Edkins, *ibid.*, 415.

13) Getty, *The Gods of Northern Buddhism*, 69.

14) Doré, vi, 204; 216.

15) Doré, *ibid.*, 204, note 2.

16) Edkins, *Chinese Buddhism*, 382.

impose the Sanscrit name of the god on the Chinese" 17). Kuan Yin is the Chinese female counterpart, or Sakti, of Avalokitesvara and the reason for the change of sex remains a moot question. Various suggestions have been made to account for this change 18). She may have been introduced in a female form; her quality of Mercy appealed more as female than as male; she resembled the Taoist goddess "Queen of Heaven, Holy Mother", (*T'ien-hou sheng-mu*) and later intercourse with India may have influenced the change, confounding her with Hariti 19), then worshipped in Northern India as giver of children. Above all the romantic story of Miao-shan, written in the twelfth century (in 1102 A.D.) by the monk P'u-ming, greatly helped by its popularity to establish the belief that Kuan Yin was a female 20). The transformation may also be due to the popularity of the pilgrimage to P'u-t'o island, which is "above all frequented by women who have asked for or have obtained children" 21). She appears in female form about the seventh or eighth century and this becomes general from the twelfth century, from which period until now, she is known as a goddess.

Historically, she has developed from the Hindu god Avalokitesvara, who personifies "Mercy" as the "Lord who looks down from on high, he who has pity on all beings, the All pitying". Edkins holds that he is a form of Gautama Buddha, one who has entered the world in a lower status, i.e. as a Bodhisattva, so that he may more effectively instruct and save the ignorant 22). His name is found for the first time in a Sutra contemporary with the Christian era. As the "Lord of Mercy", his work is to relieve souls who are in distress and lead them to Amitabha's paradise. He is known in Tibet, which he entered about 640 A.D., by the name of Padmapani or the Lotus-Bearer 23). The transformation to a female form, as already indicated, was hastened by the legend of the princess Miao-shan, "a religious fairy tale based on Buddhist ideas and Taoist lore". The legend is given in full by Doré 24).

17) Doré, *ibid.*, 201.

18) *Ibid.*, 202-3.

19) Getty, *ibid.*, 75.

20) Johnston, *Buddhist China*, 281.

21) H. Maspero, *Les Religions Chinoises*, p. 237.

22) Edkins, *ibid.*, 384.

23) Getty, *ibid.*, 58 (Padmapani); Doré, *vi*, 199.

24) Doré, *vi*, 134-196.

The legend of the princess Miao-shan may be briefly outlined. She is said to have been the daughter of a great king, P'o-chia, who ruled over the Western regions Hsi-yu. She was born a few years after her father ascended the throne in B.C. 2587, or according to others B.C. 696. Her father was not a believer in Buddha and was highly incensed that he had three daughters and no sons. She was the third. When the time came for her to marry, she refused, preferring instead to live a life of seclusion to attain Buddhahood. At the age of nineteen, she entered a nunnery, and there, on her father's irate instructions, performed the most menial tasks, such as collecting firewood, picking the fruit, and cooking for the community. But she was helped in her petty tasks by heavenly spirits. Despite the advice of the abbess, she continued the most rigid abstinences and hardships. Then there came a rumour that she had been immorally associating with the young abbot of a neighbouring monastery and that she had given birth to a child. The monastery was attacked and razed to the ground. The daughter remained obdurate to her father's will and so was first condemned to be beheaded (but the executioner's sword broke into a thousand pieces), then to be strangled. When this happened, a golden image immediately appeared on the spot and her body was borne away by a tiger to a dark forest where the God of the Soil kept watch over it. Her soul went to purgatory, but her presence there caused such commotion that Yama (ruler of Hades) hastened to return her to the world above. She returned to her body and then went back to the monastery near her father's capital, after spending nine years of quiet retreat on P'u-to-shan. This is a rocky island in the Chusan Archipelago and is the chief seat of her worship. She learned that her father was afflicted with terrible ulcers and that he could only be healed by the eye and arm of a blood relative mixed with medicine. The king offered his realm to his two elder daughters for these members. They were willing but their husbands were not. The monks urged the king in penance to restore the monastery and then one day these members were found hanging on an altar there. These were boiled and mixed with medicine and the father recovered. The father's penitence was now exceedingly increased when he learned that they were given in filial piety by the daughter whom he had used so ill. He was converted to Buddhism and erected a statue to her honour "with arms and eyes complete". The sculptor mistook the command and made the image

"with one thousand arms and eyes". Then the whole family were converted to the Buddhist faith and finally were canonized by the Pearly Emperor Yu-huang, the supreme Taoist god. "We have here a Buddhist saint canonized by the supreme Taoist god" ²⁵). The daughter became Kuan Yin.

The writer includes in his narrative the fundamental practices and doctrines of Buddhism; the doctrine of merit and demerit, abstinence from animal food, Hades and the Western Paradise (Nirvana), and finally the apotheosis of Buddha who is called the "Great Ruler of the Universe". ²⁶) But he also includes the local God of the Soil (*T'u-ti lao-yeh*), who is dear to the hearts of the common people. This god is requested, on several occasions, to help the princess in her trials. The father requests the Pearly Emperor to give him a son and this same Taoist god appears from time to time in the story. Confucian filial piety is also prominent. Thus the legend has drawn together various strands to give a Chinese origin to Kuan Yin, though there is no proven development of Kuan Yin from Miao-shan ²⁷).

Her present functions are very diverse. "In Northern Buddhism, no divinity holds so large a place in popular worship as Kuanyin. It may even be said that she has eclipsed Buddha himself, and the other great Bodhisattvas. This is principally due to the mysterious and merciful functions which she fulfils in the Buddhist world". ²⁸) She is associated with Amitabha, (*O-mi-t'o-fu*), and the Sakhavati or Western Paradise (*Hsi-t'ien*), the land of supreme bliss for all Buddhists of China and Japan. Sometimes the journey to this land of heart's desire is represented as a sea voyage, whereon boat-loads of worshippers sail under the captaincy of Kuan Yin. Thus, she is Saviour and Deliverer, and is worshipped as the Universal Saviour of all living beings. The Lotus of the Good Law (Chapter 24) informs us that by invoking her name, all those in suffering may be delivered "be it from fire, sharp swords, raging torrents, thunder and lightning, venomous snakes, wild beasts, prison, robbers, enemies and demons of all kinds" ²⁹).

²⁵) Doré, vi, xx, note 2.

²⁶) *ibid.*, xix.

²⁷) Doré, vi, xx.

²⁸) *Ibid.*, xxi, 205.

²⁹) Beal, *A Catena of Buddhist Scriptures from the Chinese*, 390.

She is also a sea-goddess, perhaps because of her connection with the "Bark of Salvation" ³⁰⁾ which conveys souls to the Western Paradise. She presides over the element water and has control of the sea. This function is also part of the work of the Taoist goddess, Queen of Heaven (*T'ien-hou*), who similarly saves from perils of the sea and the function may have been borrowed for the use of Kuan Yin. As a goddess of the sea, she is represented in temples with the curling waves of the sea and with rocks about her. Sailors, when starting on a voyage, pray to her for protection, while those who have escaped shipwreck, make thank-offerings at her altar. She is especially worshipped on P'u-t'o island, as a sea-goddess. Perhaps because of her connection with water, as well as her general beneficence, she is invoked for rain. When drought in the village persists, the statue of the Goddess of Mercy, Kuan-Yin, or of a Goddess of Children, is taken (in place of the dragon-king) from some celebrated or popular temple and carried in procession.

Her most invoked function is as a giver of children, a belief founded on a passage in the Lotus of the Good-Law, Saddharma-pundarika: "If there be a woman who desires a male child, and prays to Kwan-yin the goddess will cause her to become the mother of a well-endowed and highly-gifted child; or if she desires a female child, she shall become the mother of one extremely beautiful, endowed with every gift, and beloved of all". ³¹⁾ This function may have been influenced by Hariti and the Taoist goddess, Queen of Heaven. Many are the deities which are invoked to obtain children, but Kuan Yin is foremost among them.

Images of Kuan Yin which are found in Chinese homes differ according to the devotion and wealth of the home. Poorer homes have images of clay, daubed in bright colours, whilst a home with greater means has an image in porcelain or bronze, silver or gold. She is normally represented with a child in her arms. On the first and fifteenth days of the month, sticks of incense are lighted in the family censer in her honour. Candles, sacrificial rice, choice fruits and flowers are also placed before her image when her principal festivals take place. These fall on the nineteenth day of the second month, which is considered to be her birthday; on the nineteenth day of the sixth month, which is the day on which she was canonized and on the nine-

³⁰⁾ Johnston, *Buddhist China*, 269.

³¹⁾ Beal, *ibid.*, 391.

teenth day of the ninth month, when she is reputed to have died or "ascended to heaven". 32).

The images which represent her as the Lady Giver of children alternate with those which represent her as the Bodhisattva figure of P'u-t'o island fame. These latter represent her, seated on a rock or on a wave. Sometimes, nearby a branch of the willow-tree is in a long-necked bottle. There are also found near her, her two helpers, 'the Young Man of Excellent Wealth', (*Shan-ts'ai t'ung-tzu*), and 'the Daughter of the Dragon King' (*Lung-wang nu-tzu*). She is believed to have converted these two who assist her in her work. She is also frequently represented seated on a lotus-bud.

In Northern India, Avalokitesvara is represented, in early forms, as holding in his left hand a full-blown lotus-flower, symbol of his creative power. The lotus-flower (*lien-huo*) is sacred and "represents the evolution of Buddhist worlds from eternal cosmic matter". 33) Hence Amitabha, (*O-mi-t'o-fo*) is sometimes pictured emerging from a lotus blossom or seated on a pedestal of lotus leaves. It is believed that Kuan Yin was wafted on the waters of the Eastern Sea, seated on a lotus-flower. When the time comes for Buddhist believers to depart this life, "they are placed in the heart of a lotus and borne to the Western Paradise." 34)

Among her worshippers are numbered not only women, but also their husbands. If the longed-for son is not given, it is common to see men attending her festivals, especially in popular temples, and they do obeisance to her to obtain this boon. The people in general place implicit confidence in her powerful protection. However, her type may differ and her names may vary, her work remains the same—to protect women and to send children. Among overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, she is also prominent and important.

Moreover, whatever may be the worship of the father of the family, the mother and daughter will often be seen carrying out their duties in the home and in the local earth-shrine. It is in fact frequently the devotion of the women that prompts and encourages the male members of the family in their acts of worship. The women's influence plays a large part in deciding and continuing the customs which form part of family worship.

32) Doré, vi, 232.

33) Beal, *ibid.*, 11.

34) Johnston, *ibid.*, 104; Doré, v, 723, n. 3.

LEIPZIG UND DIE RELIGIONSWISSENSCHAFT¹⁾

VON

KURT RUDOLPH

Als 1959 die 550-Jahrfeier der Alma mater Lipsiensis heranrückte und im gleichen Jahr mein verehrter Lehrer Professor Walter Baetke seinen 75. Geburtstag beging, hatte ich mich daran gemacht, einmal etwas Näheres über die Geschichte der Religionswissenschaft in Leipzig zu erfahren und sie in einem Beitrag darzustellen. Wie erstaunt war ich aber, als ich im Universitätsarchiv an Hand alter Akten und Vorlesungsverzeichnisse bald merkte, daß in Leipzig die Religionswissenschaft bzw. Religionsgeschichte viel älter war, als man bisher wußte, und eine bemerkenswerte Vergangenheit hat. Diese ihre Vergangenheit machte sie mir besonders geeignet als ein Beispiel für die ganze Problematik der Disziplin als solcher in ihrer bisherigen Entwicklung. So wurde aus einem ursprünglich geplanten Aufsatz eine größere Arbeit, die unter dem Titel „Die Religionsgeschichte an der Leipziger Universität und die Entwicklung der Religionswissenschaft. Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte und zum Problem der Religionswissenschaft“ von der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zum Druck in ihren Sitzungsberichten angenommen wurde und noch in diesem Jahr dort erscheinen wird. Über diese meine Untersuchungen möchte ich kurz berichten. Dabei wird mein Bemühen darauf gerichtet sein, den besonderen Charakter der Leipziger Religionswissenschaft zu verdeutlichen, der ihr bis heute das Gepräge gibt. Außerdem — und darauf möchte ich besonderen Wert legen — können wir an Hand der Leipziger Verhältnisse sehr gut eines der Grundprobleme der Religionswissenschaft, nämlich ihre Stellung zur Theologie, studieren. Diesem Punkt schenke ich besondere Aufmerksamkeit.

¹⁾ Vortrag auf der 8. Religionswissenschaftlichen Jahrestagung des Deutschen Zweiges der Internationalen Gesellschaft für Religionsgeschichte in Bonn/Rhein 26.-28. Juli 1961.

Die Geschichte der Leipziger Religionswissenschaft läßt sich deutlich in zwei Perioden einteilen: die Zeit vor der Gründung des Religionsgeschichtlichen Seminars und Lehrstuhls im Jahre 1912 und die daran anschließende Zeit.

Wenden wir uns also zunächst der Periode vor 1912 zu, die sich fast ausschließlich im Bereich der Philosophischen Fakultät abspielt. Am Ende des 18. und Anfang des 19. Jh., um damit zu beginnen, beherrschen noch weithin die „mythologischen“ Lehrveranstaltungen verschiedener Art, philogischer und philosophischer, das Feld. Männer wie Christian August CRUSIUS (1715-1775), Christian August CLODIUS, Friedrich August CARUS, der seit 1795 über „Weltgeschichte der Religion“ liest, dann der bedeutendste Philosoph Leipzigs am Anfang des 19. Jh., Christian Hermann WEISSE (1801-66), und der große Gegner CREUZERS und Lehrer Max MÜLLERS, Gottfried HERMANN (1772-1848) wirkten in diesem Sinne.

Es war dem ersten Ägyptologen in Leipzig, Gustav SEYFFARTH (1796-1885) vorbehalten, erstmalig im Wintersemester 1841/42 über „Allgemeine Religionsgeschichte“ zu lesen und dieses Kolleg im jährlichen Turnus zu wiederholen. Bereits im Sommersemester 1832 hatte er angekündigt „Geschichte der alten Religionen, besonders der Ägypter, Griechen, Italiker, Phönizier, Perser, Inder u.a.“. Seyffarth stellt allerdings kein rühmliches Beispiel religionshistorischer Forschung dar, da er noch völlig unkritisch und von konfusen theologisch-biblischen Auffassungen beherrscht ist. Einige Ideen machen ihn gewissermaßen zum Vorläufer der Theorie vom Urmonotheismus und der Astralmythologie. Als Ägyptologe hat er die traurige Rolle gespielt, die Entzifferungen Champollions fanatisch abzulehnen und bis an sein Lebensende in New York, wohin er 1865 ausgewandert war, zu bekämpfen.

Wird so die Religionsgeschichte anfangs auch recht unvollkommen vertreten, so ist es mit dem nächsten Vertreter dieser jungen Disziplin schon ganz anders. Diesmal ist es ein Philosoph: Karl Rudolf SEYDEL (1835-1892), ein Schüler Christian Hermann WEISSES. Seit dem Wintersemester 1865/6 beginnt dieser wieder, in der Philosophischen Fakultät, neben seinen philosophischen Kolleges, über „Allgemeine Religionsgeschichte“ zu lesen. Von dem Inhalt dieser Vorlesung, die er regelmäßig wiederholte, können wir uns ein Bild machen durch das Buch von SEYDEL: „Die Religion und die Religionen“, Leipzig

1872. Es ist eine für breitere Kreise bestimmte Einführung in die Religionsgeschichte. Als Philosoph beansprucht Seydel, eine Zusammenfassung des durch die Spezialwissenschaften allenthalben Gewonnenen zu geben. Zu dieser philosophisch-systematischen Durchdringung des Stoffes tritt der theologische Gedanke, daß das Christentum Ziel der religionsgeschichtlichen Entwicklung sei; das vollkommene Religionsideal sei der „vollendete Gottmensch“ (S. 142 u. 163 f.). „Die Religion Jesu ergibt sich so als die letzte, höchste Einheit, in welcher all das in der vorchristlichen Geschichte Getrennte endlich zusammenströmt“ (140). Seydel ist hierbei über seinen Lehrer Weiße von der idealistischen Philosophie und von romantischen Ideen abhängig. (WEISSES spekulativ-theosophischem „Theismus“ war er zeitlebens verpflichtet). Trotzdem merkt man bei SEYDEL auf Schritt und Tritt, daß er sehr gut über die einzelnen Religionen orientiert ist und die damalig neuste Spezialliteratur berücksichtigt hat. Gegenüber den orthodox-theologischen und unhistorischen Auffassungen vertritt er eine freimütige Kritik und geschichtliche Betrachtung der biblischen Schriften. Er hat dazu selbst einen bedeutsamen Beitrag geleistet und seine religionsgeschichtlichen Kenntnisse für die neutestamentliche Forschung fruchtbar gemacht, indem er Einflüsse der Buddhalegende auf das „Urevangelium“ annahm und in mehreren Schriften seit 1882 zu begründen versuchte. Damit hatte er erstmalig ein Thema angerührt und wissenschaftlich behandelt, das bis in unsere Tage die Forschung beschäftigt hat.

Die Tradition SEYDELS in der Pflege der allgemeinen Religionsgeschichte setzt noch zu dessen Lebzeiten der Iranist Bruno LINDNER (1853-1930) fort. Mit ihm tritt uns nun ein erstklassig geschulter Philologe entgegen, der seine Ausbildung bei WINDISCH, ROTH, LESKIEN und HÜBSCHMANN erhalten hatte. 1887 erhielt LINDNER eine außerordentliche Professur für „arische Sprachen und Religionsgeschichte“, die er bis zu seiner Emeritierung 1919 inne hatte. Neben diesen seinem speziellen Fachgebiet hat LINDNER von 1882/83 bis 1912 regelmäßig über „Allgemeine Religionsgeschichte“ oder „Einführung in die allgemeine Religionsgeschichte“ (erstmalig Wintersemester 1885/86) Kolleg gehalten. In einem Gutachten der Philosophischen Fakultät heißt es darüber: „Für diesen Gegenstand ist es ihm gelungen, in einer Privatvorlesung bis zu 16, in öffentlichen Vorlesungen bis zu 60 und 75 Zuhörer zu gewinnen“. LINDNER hat nicht viel veröffent-

licht; ein schweres Augenleiden, das schließlich zur völligen Blindheit führte, hat seine Arbeit sehr gehemmt. Das Ergebnis seiner religionsgeschichtlichen Studien hat er in einem Beitrag zur 3. Auflage (1890) des von Otto ZOECKLER herausgegebenen „Handbuches der theologischen Wissenschaften“ unter dem Titel „Grundzüge der allgemeinen Religionswissenschaft auf geschichtlicher Grundlage“ niedergelegt. Diese Darstellung ist heute noch lesenwert und zeichnet sich durch eine besonnene Zurückhaltung gegenüber unsicheren Theorien und durch kritische Vorsicht wohltuend aus. Aber auch LINDNER hat es nicht vermieden, seine sonst sachliche und in Einzelheiten heute noch gültige Darlegung mit theologischen Auffassungen zu belasten. So spricht er vom „Gottesbewußtsein“ als der Grundlage der Religion und stellt das Christentum als „vollkommene Religion“ hin. Er bemerkt aber trotzdem, daß die Religionswissenschaft nicht entscheiden kann, „ob der Anspruch auf besondere göttliche Offenbarung berechtigt ist oder nicht“ (S. 578). LINDNER betont ferner ausdrücklich den selbständigen Charakter der Religionswissenschaft und fordert ein Spezialstudium für jeden Religionshistoriker, „da die Geschichte der Religion erst dann völlig verständlich wird, wenn sie im Zusammenhang mit der gesamten Kulturentwicklung betrachtet wird“ (S. 570). Gemeinschaft, Tradition und Kult sind wesentliche Elemente der Religion (s. bes. S. 586). Das unfruchtbare Spekulieren und Suchen nach dem Ursprung der Religion hält er für zwecklos, da, wie er sagt, „keine geschichtliche Forschung bis in die Anfänge der Entwicklung hinauf reicht“ (S. 572). „Alle Geschichte“, bemerkt LINDNER, „hat es zu thun mit der in Völker geteilten Menschheit, nicht mit einzelnen Individuen: eine Zeit, die jenseits der Trennung der Menschen in einzelne Völker oder Stämme liegt, liegt auch jenseits aller Geschichte“ (ib.).

Es wäre jedoch falsch zu meinen, daß die religionsgeschichtliche Arbeit im 19. Jh. nur auf den beiden Hauptvertretern, SEYDEL und LINDNER, geruht hätte. Wir müssen die außerordentlich fruchtbare Tätigkeit der Einzelforschung in dieser Zeit mit hinzunehmen. Besonders auf dem Gebiet der mächtig aufstrebenden orientalischen Disziplinen haben bedeutende Lehrer der Leipziger Alma mater nicht nur in der Forschung, sondern auch in der Lehre religionsgeschichtliche Themen behandelt. Aus der älteren Generation sind hier der große Arabist Heinrich Leberecht FLEISCHER und der ebenso bedeutsame Indologe Hermann BROCKHAUS zu nennen. In der folgenden

Generation ist es der Bahnbrecher der Assyriologie FRIEDRICH DELITZSCH, der mehrfach in Lehrveranstaltungen das „Alte Testament im Lichte der Keilinschriften“ interpretierte. Noch stärker schaltete sich sein Schüler und Nachfolger Heinrich ZIMMERN in diese religionsgeschichtliche Arbeit ein. Auch August FISCHER behandelte in fakultativen Vorlesungen den Islam. In gleicher Weise wirkte ERNST WINDISCH auf indologischem, speziell buddhologischem Gebiete. Der Vertreter der ostasiatischen Philologie, August CONRADY, hielt wiederholt Übungen über die Religionsgeschichte Chinas ab. Auf dem lange Zeit die Religionswissenschaft bestimmenden Feld der klassischen Altertumskunde war Leipzig durch Otto JAHN und Johann Adolf OVERBECK Zentrum der sogenannten „Kunstmythologie“. Erst Theodor SCHREIBER und Erich BETHE haben hier mit einer religionshistorischen Betrachtungsweise begonnen. Aber auch im Bereich der in Leipzig stets gepflegten nordischen Philologie haben Gelehrte, wie Theodor MÖBIUS und besonders Eugen MOGK, sich der Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte gewidmet. Schließlich muß Wilhelm WUNDT (1832-1920) in diesem Zusammenhang genannt werden; er wirkte seit 1875 in Leipzig. Im Wintersemester 1883/84 las er zum ersten Male über Völkerpsychologie und zwei Jahre später (Wintersemester 1885/86) über „Psychologie der Sprache, des Mythos und der Sitte“, ein Kolleg, das er mehrfach wiederholt hat. Wundt hat durch seine völkerpsychologische Betrachtungsweise die Erkenntnis von dem geschichtlich-gesellschaftlichen Charakter der Religion entscheidend gefördert.

Die bisherige Übersicht lehrt, daß im 19. Jh. die Philosophische Fakultät, besonders in ihren philologischen Fächern, Hort der religionsgeschichtlichen Forschung und Lehre gewesen ist. In der Theologischen Fakultät ist demgegenüber, bis auf eine Ausnahme, in dieser Zeit keine religionsgeschichtliche Vorlesung gehalten worden. Die Ausnahme betrifft den Privatdozenten David Johann Heinrich GOLDHORN, der im Wintersemester 1837/38 einmal „Allgemeine Religionsgeschichte“ angekündigt hat. Näheres habe ich nicht ermitteln können, da das Archiv der Theologischen Fakultät fast restlos vernichtet ist. Die feste orthodoxe Tradition, die in Leipzig besonders zu Hause war, wurde erst gegen Ende des 19. Jh. gebrochen. Franz DELITZSCH (1813-1890) machte Leipzig wieder zum Hauptsitz alttestamentlicher und rabbinischer Studien. Es ist erstaunlich, welche Fülle von später be-

deutenden Theologen sich in den 70er und 80er Jahren in Leipzig habilitiert haben: Wolf Graf BAUDISSIN, H. F. MÜHLAU, Emil KAUTZSCH, Bernard STADE, Heinrich GUTHE, Rudolf KITTEL, K. V. RYSEL, Friedrich Georg HEINRICI, C. R. GREGORY, Gustav DALMAN, Friedrich LOOFS, Viktor SCHULTZE, Adolf HARNACK. Letzterer behandelte 1874/75 die Gnosis, ein Jahr darauf die Jüdische Apokalytik, und im Sommersemester 1877 folgte erstmalig eine Vorlesung über „Dogmengeschichte“. Das Verdienst jedoch, die *allgemeine* Religionsgeschichte zu einem festen Bestandteil des Lehrplans der Theologischen Fakultät gemacht zu haben, gebührt allein Alfred JEREMIAS (1864-1935). Dieser hat seit 1906 ein reichhaltiges religionsgeschichtliches Vorlesungsprogramm bestritten und die bis heute gepflegte Einrichtung des „Religionsgeschichtlichen Übung“ begründet. Erst nach 15jähriger Privatdozententätigkeit wurde JEREMIAS 1921 zum außerordentlichen (nicht-beamteten) Professor für Religionsgeschichte, insbesondere semitische Religionsgeschichte, ernannt. Seine Stellung in der Religionswissenschaft war schon zu seinen Lebzeiten umstritten, da er als Hauptvertreter des sogen. „Panbabylonismus“ und der damit verbundenen Astralmythologie gilt. Trotz der Übertreibungen und Einseitigkeiten, die immer stärker in seinen Arbeiten zum Ausdruck kommen, sind seine Verdienste nicht zu übersehen. Er kann als Ahn der sog. „Pattern“-Forschung betrachtet werden und als derjenige, der erstmalig die Motivforschung (JEREMIAS spricht selbst von „Symbolforschung“) für die vergleichende Religionswissenschaft fruchtbar gemacht hat. Auch als geistiger Vater der modernen Auffassung vom Sakralkönigtum hat man ihn bezeichnet (C. M. EDSMAN). Die von JEREMIAS und seinen Anhängern energisch betriebene Interpretation des Alten Testaments mit Hilfe des Keilschriftmaterials hat dasselbe jedenfalls aus seiner unhistorischen Isolierung befreit und einem religionsgeschichtlichen Verständnis zugeführt.

Obwohl JEREMIAS durch seine assyriologische Ausbildung bei Friedrich DELITZSCH eine streng philologische Religionsforschung vertrat, hat er auch die theologischen Belange in seiner Arbeit berücksichtigen wollen. Die Beschäftigung mit der Religionsgeschichte dient nach ihm dazu, das, „was ihm praktisch durch eigenes religiöses Erleben gewiß geworden ist, die Absolutheit des Christentums“, zu bestätigen. Damit wird von ihm doch einer theologischen Religionswissenschaft das Wort geredet, die durch die unsachgemäße Auseinanderreißung von Gefühl

und Ausdruck auch die Objektivität ihrer Aussagen sichern möchte.

In die Zeit der Wirksamkeit von JEREMIAS fällt nun auch das wichtigste Ereignis der Leipziger Religionswissenschaft: die Gründung des Religionsgeschichtlichen Seminars und die Errichtung eines Lehrstuhls für Religionsgeschichte. Die Ereignisse, die zu diesen beiden Einrichtungen führten, kann ich hier nur kurz streifen und muß auf meine genannte ausführliche Darstellung verweisen. Das „Religionsgeschichtliche Seminar“, wie sein alter Name lautet, ist im Rahmen der von Karl LAMPRECHT gegründeten kulturhistorischen Forschungsinstitute 1912 entstanden. Es ist nun interessant, daß dieses Institut, trotz der alten religionsgeschichtlichen Tradition in der Philosophischen Fakultät, nicht dieser Fakultät, sondern der Theologischen zugesprochen wurde, und zwar, wie es ausdrücklich heißt, aus „praktischen Gründen“. Damit ist gemeint, daß das Religionsgeschichtliche Institut dem alt- und neutestamentlichen Seminar angeschlossen werden sollte, um deren Arbeit auf dem Gebiet der orientalischen und spätantiken Religionsgeschichte zu unterstützen. Ein Ordinarius der Philosophischen Fakultät sollte jedoch hinzugezogen werden. Jedenfalls ist von einer apologetisch-theologischen Zwecksetzung dabei nirgends die Rede. (Auch äußerlich war das neue Institut bis 1927 im Gebäude des Kulturhistorischen Instituts untergebracht, nicht bei den theologischen Instituten). Wir besitzen ein Schreiben der Philosophischen Fakultät aus dem Jahre 1912, in dem gegen die Berufung eines Professors für Religionsgeschichte in die Theologische Fakultät protestiert und darauf verwiesen wird, daß die „Philosophische Fakultät in erster Linie als die berufene Trägerin religionswissenschaftlicher Forschung zu gelten hat“, was, wie ich gezeigt habe, durchaus berechtigt ist. Es blieb jedoch dabei, daß der religionsgeschichtliche Lehrstuhl der Theologischen Fakultät zugesprochen wurde.

Der erste Inhaber der neugegründeten Professur und damit zugleich der erste Direktor des Religionsgeschichtlichen Seminars wurde Nathan SÖDERBLOM (1866-1931). Er wirkte nur drei Semester in Leipzig, um 1914 als Erzbischof der schwedischen lutherischen Kirche nach Upsala zurückzukehren. Trotzdem ist die Leipziger Zeit für Söderblom von besonderer Bedeutung gewesen. Er hat hier, neben seiner akademischen Tätigkeit, zwei seiner bekanntesten Arbeiten verfaßt: „Das Werden des Gottesglaubens“ (Gudstrons uppkomst, Stockholin 1914; dt. von Prof. Dr. R. Stübe-Leipzig, 1916 und 1926²) und den

Beitrag „Natürliche Theologie und Allgemeine Religionsgeschichte“ (in den „Beiträgen zur Religionswissenschaft“ Band 1, 1913/14, Heft 1). Wir brauchen an dieser Stelle nicht näher auf Söderblom eingehen, da seine Stellung und Bedeutung zu bekannt sind. Für ihn gehörte die Religionsgeschichte zur Theologie und hatte ihr zu dienen als neuartige *theologia naturalis*; sie stand so im Dienste der Apologie des Christentums, wie besonders sein letztes Werk, die Gifford Lectures über den „Lebendigen Gott im Zeugnis der Religionsgeschichte“, eindrücklich lehrt. In Leipzig hat Söderblom keine Schule hinterlassen.

Söderbloms Nachfolger wurde Hans HAAS (1868-1934), der als ausgewiesener Fachmann für die ostasiatische Religionsgeschichte 1915 sein neues Amt antrat. HAAS hat in seiner 20jährigen Tätigkeit sehr viel für die Religionswissenschaft in und außerhalb Leipzigs getan. Ich brauche bloß an seinen heute noch einzig dastehenden „Bildersatlas zur Religionsgeschichte“ zu erinnern, ein Unternehmen übrigens, das auf einen Forschungsauftrag des Staatlichen Forschungsinstituts für vergleichende Religionsgeschichte zu Leipzig zurückgeht. HAAS erstrebte damit, wie er sich ausdrückte, ein „Musée Guimet in Bildern“. Außerdem hat HAAS zusammen mit Edvard LEHMANN das bekannte „Textbuch zur Religionsgeschichte“ geschaffen, an dem vor allem auch Leipziger Gelehrte mitgearbeitet haben. Ferner muß an seine Betreuung der „Veröffentlichungen des Staatlichen Forschungsinstituts für vergleichende Religionsgeschichte an der Universität Leipzig“ gedacht werden. Von 1910 bis 1931 hat HAAS auch die „Zeitschrift für Missions- und Religionswissenschaft“ herausgegeben. In seiner Lehr- und Forschungstätigkeit hat HAAS speziell sein engeres Fachgebiet gepflegt. Allgemeine religionswissenschaftliche Probleme hat er nur am Rande berührt und im Gegensatz z.B. zur Marburger Schule religionsphilosophische und theologische Fragestellungen in seinen Arbeiten vermieden. Seine wissenschaftliche Redlichkeit und Skepsis hat er in einem seiner originellen Gedichte „Was ist Wahrheit?“ folgendermaßen zum Ausdruck gebracht:

„Was man uns einstens vordoziert,
 Als ich noch war Scholar,
 Das gilt — man hat mich angeschmiert —
 Jetzt längst nicht mehr als wahr.
 Und manchmal, nun ich selber heut

Verzapfe Wissenschaft,
Wie mich da jach die Angst bedräut,
Ob mich nicht Lügen straft
Des Wissens dann erreichter Stand,
Wenn bald an meiner Statt
Zum Ordinarius ernannt,
N.N. den Lehrstuhl hat?" (Ein Korb Fallobst, S. 11)

Theologisch gesehen steht HAAS in der liberalen Tradition, war er doch auch Mitarbeiter des „Allgemeinen Evangelischen Protestantischen Missionsvereins“ (der späteren „Ostasienmission“) gewesen. Die Religionsgeschichte gilt ihm im Sinne P. DE LAGARDES als „Korrektiv der Theologie hinsichtlich ihres herkömmlichen, dogmatischen Wissenschaftsbetriebes.“ Er trat für eine gegenseitige Ergänzung und Harmonisierung der Religionen ein, also für eine tolerante Haltung. Er hat dafür in seinen Arbeiten „Idee und Ideal der Feindesliebe in der außerchristlichen Welt“ (1927) und „Rechte und schlechte Apologetik in der allgemeinen Religionswissenschaft“ (ZMR 41, 1926) Beispiele gegeben. Er sagt über sich selbst in seinem autobiographischen Gedicht „Rückschau“ (Ein Korb Fallobst, S. 21):

„Daß ich in ihrem eignen Land
Kung, Laotse und den Buddha fand
Und, früh geklärt durch Lessings Geist,
An ihrer Weisheit mich gespeist;
Auch Marko stünd im Geist vor mir:
Ein Hund nur! aber — was ein Tier!“

So ist es nicht zu verwundern, wenn HAAS in einem Schreiben aus dem Jahre 1927 bemerkt, daß sein Fach besser in der Philosophischen Fakultät aufgehoben wäre als in der Theologischen, und kurz vor seinem Tode hat er, gegenüber einem Vertreter des Ministeriums, die Überweisung des religionsgeschichtlichen Lehrstuhles an die Philosophische Fakultät erwogen.

Neben HAAS muß aus der Theologischen Fakultät besonders noch Johannes LEIPOLDT erwähnt werden, der stark religionsgeschichtlich orientiert ist und zu den besten Kennern der spätantiken Religionsgeschichte gehört. Vielen unbekannt wird sein, daß LEIPOLDT 1922 ein (leider unvollendetes) „Handbuch der Religionswissenschaft“ bei Voss in Berlin herausgebracht hat und das Archiv für neutestament-

liche Zeitgeschichte und Kulturkunde „Angelos“ begründete (1925-1932). Am Rande sei auch in Erinnerung gebracht, daß der bekannte Religions- und Kulturphilosoph Paul TILICH von 1927-1929 in der Theologischen Fakultät eine Honorarprofessur innehatte.

Blicken wir zur Philosophischen Fakultät, so treten uns auch in dieser Zeit eine Fülle von Gelehrten entgegen, die Maßgebliches für das Fortschreiten der religionsgeschichtlichen Einzelforschung geleistet haben und gemäß dem alten Leipziger Herkommen die Religionsgeschichte in ihre Lehrtätigkeit aufnahmen. Ich nenne etwa die Indologen Johannes HERTEL und Friedrich WELLER (der sich 1922 für Chinesisch und ostasiatische Religionsgeschichte in Leipzig habilitiert hatte), den Orientalisten Richard HARTMANN und den Sinologen Eduard ERKES, den Ägyptologen Hermann KEES und den Assyriologen Benno LANDSBERGER, den Arabisten BRÄUNLICH, den Rabbinisten Lazar GULKOWITSCH und den klassischen Philologen August KÖRTE, sowie die Germanisten bzw. Nordisten Helmut DE BOOR, Julius SCHWIETERING und Konstantin REICHARDT. Hans LEISEGANG wirkte in den 20er Jahren ebenfalls in Leipzig.

Ein besonderes Ereignis war es für die Philosophische Fakultät, als sich im Jahre 1924 Joachim WACH als erster für das Fach Religionswissenschaft habilitierte. WACH, der, außer in München (bei Friedrich HEILER) und Berlin (bei Ernst TROELTSCH), vor allem in Leipzig studiert hat (bei HAAS, FISCHER, ZIMMERN, FREYER und VOLKELT), hatte bereits in Leipzig 1922 mit einer Arbeit über die „Grundzüge einer Phänomenologie des Erlösungsgedankens“ promoviert. Mit ihm besaß Leipzig erstmalig einen Dozenten für Religionswissenschaft in der Philosophischen Fakultät, und zwar im Institut für „Kultur- und Universalgeschichte“. 1927 erhielt Wach einen Lehrauftrag für „Religionssoziologie“, ein Fach, das er ja besonders gefördert hat. Zwei Jahre später wurde er zum außerordentlichen Professor für Religionswissenschaft ernannt. Wach hat in dieser seiner Eigenschaft eine außerordentlich fruchtbare und erfolgreiche Lehr- und Forschungstätigkeit entfaltet. Diese vielversprechende Laufbahn wurde jedoch bald unterbrochen, als die nationalsozialistische Barbarei 1935 WACH zusammen mit Benno LANDSBERGER und einigen anderen Gelehrten die Lehrbefugnis entzog. Es sei an diesem Ort ausdrücklich vermerkt, daß aus einem erhaltenen Protokoll hervorgeht, daß mehrere Professoren der Philosophischen Fakultät in einer Fakultätssitzung gegen dieses schänd-

liche Vorgehen Einspruch erhoben haben; leider ohne Erfolg. Es waren dies vor allem die Naturwissenschaftler VAN DER WAERDEN, HUND, HEISENBERG und der Archäologe Bernhard SCHWEITZER, WACH selbst hatte in dieser Zeit gerade eine Einladung an die Brown-University in Providence-Rhode Island (USA) zu Gastvorlesungen erhalten. Diese Lehrstätte über dem Ozean wurde ihm daher gleich zur zweiten Heimat.

WACHS Bedeutung für die Religionswissenschaft ist zu bekannt, als daß wir hier ausführlich darauf eingehen müßten. Er hat in seiner Habilitationsschrift „Religionswissenschaft“ eine theoretische und methodische Grundlegung dieser jungen Disziplin vorgelegt, worin er besonders ihre Eigenständigkeit gegenüber Theologie und Philosophie herausarbeitet. Diese von ihm intendierte Trennung von Religionswissenschaft und Theologie hat er jedoch selbst nicht immer streng eingehalten, besonders in seinen letzten Arbeiten. Er steht letztlich doch noch in der liberaltheologischen Tradition, wie sie ihm von HAAS und TROELTSCH vermittelt wurde. Besonders barg seine methodische Einstellung (im Anschluß an DILTHEY) die Gefahr des Irrationalismus und die Vernachlässigung des historisch-kritischen Geschäftes. Die Orientierung WACHS am Erlebnis oder der „religiösen Erfahrung“ hat seine Schwächen, da sie zu sehr am religiösen Subjekt verhaftet ist und immer wieder in theologisierende oder psychologisierende Auffassungen abgeleitet. Denn: Die Religion ist nicht Quelle, sondern Objekt der religionswissenschaftlichen Forschung! Trotz dieser Kritik an WACHS Position —die in meiner eingangs genannten Arbeit des Näheren begründet wird —gehören seine Arbeiten zu den vorzüglichsten auf dem Gebiet der vergleichenden Religionswissenschaft und der Religionssoziologie; das gilt besonders für die von WACH mit Meisterschaft gehandhabte Typologie.

Die Lücke, die durch WACHS unfreiwilligen Abgang entstanden war, konnte bald wieder geschlossen werden, und zwar durch den Ethnologen Friedrich Rudolf LEHMANN, dessen Lehrbefugnis für Ethnologie 1935 auf Religionswissenschaft erweitert wurde. LEHMANN hatte bereits vorher, seit 1931 im Rahmen des Völkerkunde-Institutes religionswissenschaftliche Vorlesungen abgehalten. 1937 wurde er zum außerordentlichen Professor für Religionswissenschaft und Völkerkunde ernannt. LEHMANN ist besonders durch zwei Arbeiten bekannt geworden, einmal durch seine Dissertation über den Manabegriff bei den

Südseevölkern (1915, erschienen 1922) und zum anderen durch das umfangreiche Werk über die polynesischen Tabusitten, mit dem er sich 1930 habilitiert hatte. Als Schüler von SÖDERBLOM, HAAS und WEULE haben ihn vornehmlich religionsethnologische Probleme beschäftigt. In seiner Antrittsvorlesung 1937 hat er sehr instruktiv den „Beitrag der Völkerkunde zur Religionswissenschaft“ mit kritischem Verständnis geschildert. Hauptkennzeichen seiner Arbeitsweise und Methode ist, daß er Theorien und Tatsachen konfrontiert und auseinander zu halten bemüht ist, wie er es vorbildlich und in heute noch gültiger Form in den zwei genannten Arbeiten getan hat. Ich finde, daß die darin niedergelegten Ergebnisse einer umfassenden Forschung, wenn auch keiner Feldforschung, noch keinesfalls von allen Religionswissenschaftlern beherzigt worden sind. Das gilt besonders hinsichtlich des arg strapazierten Manabegriffs, dessen falsche Verwendung in der Gestalt der sogen. Machttheorie noch heute in weitverbreiteten religionsgeschichtlichen Werken greifbar ist. Auch in der Tabuarbeit hat LEHMANN gezeigt, daß „der Tabubegriff nicht ohne weiteres identisch mit ‘heilig’ ist, wie das ja so vielfach behauptet wird“ (281). LEHMANN wendet sich auch gegen eine überstarke und einseitige Betonung des Gefühlsmomentes in der Religionsgeschichte und tritt stattdessen dafür ein, daß die Objektbezogenheit, das religiöse Vorstellungsmoment, wieder stärker berücksichtigt wird.

LEHMANN'S Wirksamkeit in Leipzig wurde 1939 durch den Krieg unterbrochen, da er sich gerade auf einer Forschungsreise in Afrika befand und so in Pretoria interniert wurde.

Wir haben nun noch die Aufgabe vor uns, die Neubesetzung des theologischen Lehrstuhls für Religionsgeschichte nach HAAS Tode im Jahre 1934 zu behandeln. Die Theologische Fakultät stand hierbei vor einer besonders schwierigen Aufgabe, da die Tätigkeit der vom Nationalsozialismus geförderten „Deutschen Glaubensbewegung“ gerade den Lehrstuhl für Religionsgeschichte in aktuelle Wirren hineinzog. In dem zwischen der Fakultät und dem Dresdner Volksbindungsministerium hin- und hergehenden Kampf um die Berufung eines neuen Religionshistorikers siegte schließlich erstere und setzte die Ernennung des Germanisten Walter BAETKE zum Professor für Religionsgeschichte durch. In BAETKE hatte die Fakultät — und das war einer der Hauptgründe seiner Berufung gewesen — einen erstklassigen Philologen auf dem Gebiet der germanischen Religionsgeschichte gewon-

nen, der auch eine fachmännisch genaue Kenntnis der reichen Welt der Religionen besaß. Damit blieb, wie der damalige Dekan Horst STEPHAN bemerkte, die „streng methodisch wissenschaftliche Tradition des Leipziger Lehrstuhls“ gewahrt. Von besonderer Bedeutung war außerdem, daß BAETKE ein Gegner des von der „Deutschen Glaubensbewegung“ und dem nationalsozialistischen „Mythus“ inszenierten Germanen- und Arierkults und eben deshalb am besten imstande war, die jungen Theologen über die Verfälschung der germanischen Altertumskunde aufzuklären. In dieser Weise hat Walter BAETKE als Lehrer und Forscher, unter wiederholten Zusammenstößen mit den damaligen Regierungsorganen, unentwegt bis zum Zusammenbruch des Naziregimes gewirkt und dazu beigetragen, junge Menschen gegen das Gift nazistischer Irrlehren immun zu machen.

Wie sein Vorgänger Hans HAAS hat sich BAETKE vornehmlich auf sein Spezialgebiet konzentriert und hier, besonders in den letzten Jahren, Grundlegendes geleistet. Wir können in diesem Zusammenhang nicht darauf eingehen. Seine Wahl in die Sächsische Akademie der Wissenschaften als erster Leipziger Religionshistoriker ist vor allem auf diese seine Verdienste zurückzuführen. Es sei nur bemerkt, daß BAETKE, in diesen quellenkritischen Untersuchungen die religionsgeschichtliche Fragestellung nie außer Acht gelassen hat. Der Ausgangspunkt der von ihm eingeführten Kritik der altnordischen Sagas war die Frage, ob und in welchem Umfang denn die herkömmlichen Quellen zur germanischen Religionsgeschichte überhaupt als Zeugnisse für die vorchristliche Zeit verwendet werden können.

Beschränken wir uns auf BAETKES Position in der Religionswissenschaft. Er hat — und das ist für uns in Leipzig sein unbestreitbares Verdienst — einen konsequenten Kampf gegen alle religionsphilosophischen und theologischen Deutungen des religionsgeschichtlichen Tatsachenmaterials geführt. Wir haben in ihm einen Fortsetzer der besten Tradition der deutschen philologisch-historisch orientierten Religionsgeschichtsforschung, die gerade in Leipzig alte Wurzeln hat, wie ich zu zeigen versuchte. Besonders aufschlußreich ist dafür seine Auseinandersetzung mit Rudolf OTTO, die in der Einleitung zu seinem Buch „Das Heilige im Germanischen“ (1942) niedergelegt ist, ursprünglich aber als selbständige Schrift geplant war.

Die zwei Haupteinwände, die er gegen OTTO im Grunde theologische Konzeption des Heiligen macht, sind einmal dessen Verkennung

des Gemeinschaftscharakters der Religion, zum anderen die einseitig subjektivistisch-psychologistische Ausrichtung, das falsche Ausgehen von Erlebnis und Gefühl, mit dem Ziel, das „Numinose“ oder „Göttliche“ gleichsam empirisch zu erfassen. Die tragenden Pfeiler jeder Religion sind für BAETKE Gemeinschaft, Tradition und Kult, in ihrem Bereich wurzelt der Glaube des Einzelnen. Diese Betonung des objektiv-soziologischen Momentes macht es BAETKE unmöglich, die Religionsgeschichte mit einem „Urerlebnis“, einer „numinosen Regung“ o.ä. beginnen zu lassen und in diesem Sinne zu interpretieren. Die Religionsgeschichte fängt nicht mit einem numinosen „Urgefühl“ an, sondern mit der geschichtlichen Religion, soweit wir sie an Hand der Quellen überall zurückverfolgen können. BAETKE lehnt daher jede Art von heterogener Entwicklung und des damit verbundenen unhistorischen Evolutionismus ab. An diesem Punkte wird deutlich, daß er den streng *historischen*, empirischen Charakter der Religionswissenschaft gewahrt wissen will, gegenüber einem Abgleiten in religionsphilosophisch-metaphysische und theologische Fragestellungen, wie sie die ganze bisherige, von SCHLEIERMACHER bestimmte Problematik des Ursprungs der Religion nach sich zieht. Dieser Problemkreis ist nach BAETKE grundsätzlich aus der Religionsgeschichte auszuklammern und der Theologie oder Religionsphilosophie bzw. Metaphysik zu überlassen, deren Einfluß auf die Religionswissenschaft seit SCHLEIERMACHER bis zu OTTO verhängnisvoll gewesen ist. (Ich habe dies des Näheren im 2. Abschnitt meiner mehrfach genannten Arbeit dargestellt.)

„Eine Religionswissenschaft“, sagt BAETKE, „die die Religion von der Gefühls- und Denkweise ihrer Anhänger, ihrer religiösen Anlage oder dem Typ ihres religiösen Erlebens unter Absehung von dem Gegenstand ihres Glaubens her begreifen will, baut in die Luft“ (Geist und Erbe Thules, S. 5). Deshalb lehnt er die OTTO'sche Auffassung des „Heiligen“ ab. Es ist für ihn ein objektiver Begriff, der an die Gemeinschaft und ihre Tradition gebunden und ohne diese nicht verstehbar ist. Was heilig ist, bestimmt nicht der Einzelne, sondern die Gemeinschaft bzw. deren Tradition. „Heilig“ ist alles, was von den Göttern oder überirdischen Mächten stammt und mit ihnen in Verbindung steht, in erster Linie der Kult. Die zentrale Rolle des letzteren hat BAETKE immer wieder hervorgehoben. Religionsgemeinde ist zugleich Kultgemeinde. Nur im Bereich eines lebendigen Kultes und Glaubens kann deshalb von Religion die Rede sein. Auch die *religiöse* Bedeutung

eines Mythos hängt von seiner Beziehung zum Kult ab. BAETKE trennt daher streng zwischen Religion und Mythologie, eine Scheidung, die noch heute vielfach vergessen oder nicht genügend durchgeführt wird.

Ferner hat BAETKE verschiedentlich die enge Beziehung von Religion und Ethos (Sitte) hervorgehoben. Ein Heiliges oder „Numinoses“ ohne sittliche Momente ist für ihn ein „reines Gedankenbilde, ohne jede reale Grundlage“. „Das Heilige“, sagt er, „hat immer zugleich einen ethischen, verpflichtenden Aspekt, andernfalls ist es nur ein ‘Edelspuk’“ (Das Heilige, S. 44).

Alle diese Erkenntnisse, die durch weitere fruchtbare Gedanken ergänzt werden können (ich verweise dafür wieder auf meine angeführte Arbeit), hat Walter BAETKE aus dem Studium der *Geschichte* der Religionen gewonnen, nicht aus der Spekulation oder Theorie. Er hat daher in Männern, wie Geo WIDENGREN, C. M. EDSMAN, H. RINGREN, Paul RADIN, W. HAVERS u.a. Mitstreiter gefunden. Er hat Ernst gemacht mit dem historischen und gesellschaftlichen Charakter der Religion und es ist ihm dadurch gelungen, eine wirklich selbständige *Religionswissenschaft* gegenüber der Theologie und Religionsphilosophie zu vertreten und auszubauen. Er überführte aus diesem Grunde auch 1946 den religionsgeschichtlichen Lehrstuhl und das Religionsgeschichtliche Seminar (seit 1950 Institut) in die Philosophische Fakultät und verwirklichte damit das ursprüngliche Programm Karl LAMPRECHTS und die geheime Absicht seines Vorgängers.

BAETKE verdankt das heutige Institut den Neuaufbau seiner 1943 restlos vernichteten Bibliothek, die einst von SÖDERBLOM und dann besonders von HAAS eingerichtet worden war.

Bevor wir zum Abschluß kommen, sei noch kurz die Nachkriegszeit gestreift. Es ist hier neben BAETKE besonders Siegfried MORENZ zu nennen, der sich 1946 für ägyptische und hellenistische Religionsgeschichte habilitierte und bis heute eng mit der religionsgeschichtlichen Arbeit in Leipzig verbunden ist. Im Rahmen des Religionsgeschichtlichen Institutes haben ferner der Sinologe Eduard ERKES, der Althistoriker Wilhelm SCHUBART, der Tibetologe Johannes SCHUBERT, die Völkerkundlerin Eva LIPS, der Afrikanist Ernst DAMMANN und der Mediävist Ernst WERNER Lehrveranstaltungen abgehalten und so dazu beigetragen, Leipzig wieder zu einem Zentrum religionsgeschichtlicher Lehre und Forschung in der DDR zu machen. Der Verfasser, der seit 1953 Assistent und Lehrbeauftragter an genannten Institut ist,

hat mit der Emeritierung Professor BAETKES 1959 die kommissarische Leitung inne und konnte sich im vergangenen Jahr für „Allgemeine und Vergleichende Religionsgeschichte“ habilitieren.

Wenn ich zum Schluß kurz zum Ausdruck bringen darf, was mir als der wichtigste Beitrag der Leipziger Religionswissenschaft erscheint, so ist es der unüberhörbare Ruf: „Zu den Quellen“ der Religionsgeschichte, zur exakten empirisch-historischen und philologischen Forschung, vor allem aber auch die Mahnung, religionsphilosophische, theologische und irrationalistische Auffassungen von ihr fernzuhalten.

„WHAT SOCIAL SCIENCE HAS DONE TO RELIGION”¹⁾

BY

D. H. RHOADES

INTRODUCTION

Social forces have been doing things to religion from the very beginnings of human society, and that was long before it occurred to anyone that religion might be a distinctive element in the social complex. For uncounted centuries, to be religious, and to deal collectively with the concerns of human groups, were one and the same thing. Then, here and there, the scarcely differentiated unity of the life-situation began to develop differences. Naive magic, and unquestioned kinship between the human and the non-human, gave way to more sophisticated practices and life-relations. A man no longer *was* a kangaroo or a rain-cloud; he self-consciously imitated them. He began to see himself as somewhat of an individual, within his group but distinguishable from it. And his group felt the need of doing things about its otherness from its natural-supernatural environment. It was still a long time before religious *aspects* of social practice became distinct religious rites and institutions, but eventually it happened.

Of course, each part of living continued to influence each other part. Even with a growing division of labor and distinction of official privileges and duties, it was still, basically, the same groups and the same individuals doing many things. Each part was responsible to the whole, and depended upon it for survival. (Fanciful speculations about religions' being the nefarious inventions of priests, have scarcely come to terms with the facts of social viability. Whatever the possibilities of professional tinkering, religious beliefs and practices will either speak to and for men as they really feel themselves to be — will lapse into irrelevance.)

As a matter of course, religion, and every other expression of men's concerns, continued to do things to each other. To come quickly within

¹⁾ Paper read at a Conference on Science and Religion held at Claremont, California, May 1961.

the limits of well-known history, in the rebuilding of the Roman west after the Germanic invasions, the resulting feudal system was a fusion of military and ecclesiastical orders, and it was largely by influence of the Church, that Roman Law predominated over Germanic.

In the Middle Ages, religion had a part in determining commercial practices, and a few centuries later did its best to dictate the bounds of scientific truth. The science of Isaac Newton buttressed the divine determinism of Calvinism, and again it was the commercial ethic, of contractual and reciprocal obligations, that challenged and broke the Calvinist's absolutist values. Constitutional government led to federalism in the theology of God's governance of the universe, putting the emphasis on the well-being of creation, rather than the solitary glory of the creator. The conflicts of science and theology over the evolutionary hypothesis are now a familiar part of our recent history.

For some generations, it was the natural sciences which seemed to challenge theology and the philosophy of religion. Geology, with its questions of the origin and age of the earth, took over where astronomy had left off, and in turn subsided before the dominance of biological evolution. But the proper concern of this discussion is the *social sciences*: primarily anthropology, sociology, and psychology. Economics, history, political theory, and some philosophy of the arts, might well claim a share of attention, did not time forbid.

I — THE VARIED SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES FOR RELIGION

It is obvious at a glance that the concerns of the social sciences are closer to those of religion than are the concerns of the natural sciences. The dramatic conflict of Galileo with the Church has tended to obscure the fact that the centrality of the earth in the cosmos was of religious importance only by reason of deceptively propositional Scriptural statements from a by-gone day, and a natural but hardly revealed assumption that centrality in space was essential to the dignity of the stage for the drama of salvation. It is the social sciences which share with religion a concern for man as man, a concern for his successes and failures, despairs and hopes; for the conditions and techniques of his search for the good life. The significance of groups and institutions, of moral values, faith, loyalty, ideals of personal well-being, these are of common interest.

Perhaps *because* they share more common ground with religionists, the social scientists are more likely to be critical of religious teachings and practices than are the natural scientists. A long generation ago, Leuba's rather over-simple questionnaire revealed that proportionately fewer social scientists accepted certain orthodox beliefs than did the natural scientists. The closer the discipline to the study of human personality, the less inclination there was to accept traditional religious ideas. And a follow-up study by David Riggs, some twenty-five years later, substantially confirmed Leuba's findings.

To some, this situation may seem odd. Why should those closer in interest and subject-matter be more inclined to be hostile or indifferent toward religious ideology? A second thought will certainly suggest that, whereas the specialization of the natural scientist is quite unrelated to the specifics of religion, having little tendency to keep the latter up to date, the concerns of the social scientist involve constant attention to much data shared with the religionist. And where there is continuous concern, there are bound to be new ideas, criticisms, alternative interpretations and evaluations.

The physicist is scarcely tempted to consider his discipline, or its governing principles, as possible substitutes for religious items. It is much easier for the sociologist or psychologist to believe that he has a better version of the truth clumsily and obscurely expressed by religion. And few would deny that he has strategic perspectives for assessing the human effects of religion. Hence, it is not surprising that conflicts between religious and social science views can take on all the bitterness of a family wrangle.

On the other hand, social scientists give honest recognition to religion as a social fact, a fact for better or for worse, of real importance. One hears less than formerly of an almost exclusively economic interpretation of society, and more of analysis of the nature of community. And religious loyalties and institutions do make a difference in the character of a community.

II — DYNAMIC UNDERSTANDING OF RELIGION AS EXPERIENCE AND PRAXIS

From anthropology, sociology, and psychology have come a less formally logical and more dynamic understanding of religion. F. M. Cornford, Shailer Mathews, and Mircea Eliade, to name only three

writers, of varying orientation, have presented religious practices, symbols, and concepts, as rooted in the common consciousness of the social community, and have noted how the former tend to be modified by variations in the latter.

Long before the question: "Who am I?" comes the anxiety-relieving affirmation, variously symbolized, and saying in effect: "I am *here*; I *belong* with you and you and you; I am somehow kin to these and these forms of life and natural forces." One needs to feel that his essential oneness with what appears significant is not *really* called in question by the unexpected and the threatening. And this is perhaps most true of the more drastic changes in his own life-course. At puberty, an initiation attests and formulates a being born again. With marriage, his (or her) group relations may be sharply changed; his belongingness is different. Whatever the shift in his life-pattern, it is by religious expressions that his secure place in some inclusive pattern is re-confirmed; by placing and patterning, the threats of chaos, indefiniteness, and panic are kept at bay.

As self-consciousness becomes more and more acute, the religious ordering of things becomes more complex and differentiated. More and more the need is felt to spell out the nature of the less known, in order that men may continue to be confident that the "more," the "outside," the "mysterious," are really still kin to what is best known, most familiar, to what is adequately manageable.

We do not have to take as the whole truth Cornford's claim, that men's first ideas of order were derived from the experienced facts of social organization. But we must give a high priority to clan-structure and city-building as focussing men's first notions of a "world." Geographical location, kinship relations, and lines of authority, are always at least *among* the primary determinants of his picture of a "world" or, later, a "universe." Patriarchal societies and patriarchal gods go together; likewise, matriarchy in the one tends to be reflected in the other. Where the divine is feminine, at least at the top, time tends to be spatialized, bent round in a circle, and the cosmic cycles of ages write large the smaller recurrences of vegetation, moon, sun, and human life set in the ongoing of the race. Where the ultimate creator and orderer is a masculine deity, the non-repeating succession of deliberate purpose-realizations is projected as a likewise linear, non-repeating succession of fulfillments of age-long projects. Which is ultimate, sameness or

difference? The answer begins where men express the primary life-values of what is close at hand, the common consciousness in the midst of which their life-feeling and life-perspective have been formed. In general, men do tend, to use D. C. Macintosh's phrases, "to believe what they must in order to live" most effectively "as they" feel they "ought" to live. (And what I feel I *ought* to do is most often basically shared with the group, the group in which I have come to know "oughtness.") The picture determines the frame that will most enhance it.

The patriarchal and matriarchal variants of social and cosmic organization also emphasize different primary self-feelings, different relations with peers and superiors, different priorities in virtues and vices. As Ian Suttie has reminded us (*The Origins of Love and Hate*), the patriarchal, with its emphasis on disciplined purpose, aggressiveness, acquisitiveness, and even on properly directed hostility, actually stresses, as its *first* virtue, obedience, and as its primary vice, precocity or insubordinate challenge to authority. The disobedience in the Garden of Eden is the classical paradygm of sin in a patriarchal order.

Correspondingly, the paradygm of sin in matriarchal terms is Cain's murder of his younger brother, Abel. (And let us not be disturbed by finding this old motif included in the strongly patriarchal context of the Old Testament, or used to make a different point, relating to religio-cultural conflicts in the Hebrew infiltration of Palestine. It is as Cain and Abel that elder and younger brother are most familiar to us.) So far as he represents the universal theme, Cain committed the sin of regressive jealousy. For an order stressing nurturance, common welfare, and group tradition, regression is a far greater danger than is failure to submit to particular authorities. The baby, rather than the chief, becomes the envied one, and dependency, rather than arrogance, becomes the great temptation.

And to the social code is assigned the sanctions of the gods. The universe is seen as one's society writ large.

To speak thus need not involve the social scientist in pronouncements on the ultimate validity of such derived, analogical, at least partially projected configurations of reality. It should be for him sufficient to point out the aparent proximate sources of the images, patterns, dramatic motifs, and whatever else men use in giving an intelligible and value-ordered character to their life-situation. As to *why* certain symbols or phrases are used, the revelationist should be content to speak

ultimately; the psychologist should remain within the limits of man-oriented explanation.

Another group of profitable insights into the acts and concepts of religion comes to us from psychological observation and theory of personality more individually considered. And we include here both so-called "normal" psychology and so-called "abnormal" psychology. Since William James' classic *Varieties of Religious Experience*, it is quite generally accepted that the differences between "normal" and "abnormal" behavior are not either-or differences, but rather matters of more or less, of parameters of acceptable variation from accepted norms. Abnormal acts and attitudes are but over-extensions, or too exclusive monopolies, by otherwise normal ones.

Contemporary personality is to say the least, strongly influenced by depth-psychology. And depth-psychology is largely the product—much less the basis—of what may be termed broadly psychoanalysis. Stemming from Freud, Jung, Adler, Rank, and from the ever-lengthening roster of revisionists, heretics, and independents, personality analysis in depth has come more recently to exploit the resources of other than basically medical approaches to the human equation. It considers not only the social sciences generally so-named, but philology, comparative religion, myth and culture, communication, literature (especially poetry and drama), the arts, etc. One recent development looks toward one or another form of Existentialism as a basic life-orientation and ideology.

Common to most or all versions of depth-analysis is the recognition that people are much less logical and much more emotional than some of us like to admit. And this emotionality or drive-orientedness, this irrationality, if you will, is ours, not by default or defect, but as a proper and normal aspect of our nature. As to the nature of the irrational part or aspect, whether it be fundamentally deterministic, or be possessed of an unfolding entelechy, or have some degree of spontaneity and initiative—on this, the doctors disagree. But there is little disagreement on the proposition that we are only in part rationally and deliberately self-directing.

If we speak now of "the Conscious" and "the Unconscious," we should not be understood as personifying some sort of independent beings, somehow inhabiting the personality, but only as pointing to significantly different groups of functions, operations, etc., of the total personality, these groups being, the one ordinarily within, and the other

ordinarily outside of, the field of consciousness. So, for the sake of brevity, we shall use "the Conscious" and "the Unconscious" without further apology.

There are several operational contrasts, between the Conscious and the Unconscious, which are of real significance for the understanding of religion, and its theology. We shall confine ourselves to two such contrasts, relating to (1) communication, or expression to and for consciousness, and (2) the kind of moral or other value-judgments made or implied. Consciousness communicates, or otherwise expresses itself, largely by means of an elaborate language, stressing names, concepts, propositions, and logical relations. The emphasis may run the gamut from precision to comprehensiveness, and is always in fact some sort of compromise, but definiteness is usually at a premium. In poetry and drama, it makes large concessions to analogy and suggestiveness, for the sake of eliciting awarenesses which it cannot force into more strict categories. And, of course, we may deliberately invite the emergence into awareness of responses from the Unconscious, on almost any terms.

The Unconscious, on the other hand, appears to operate by rather primitive forms of association, such association being largely determined by emotional rather than by logical equivalences. This emotional association produces, among other things, what we call "Complexes," that is, constellations of ideas, or better, references to entities and experiences having the same or similar significance in the emotional economy of the person involved. The characteristic expression to Consciousness is the "Symbol." This symbol may be a gesture, a sound, a behavior pattern such as a tick or an inhibition; it may be a visible image. Whereas logical expression is linear and piece-meal, symbolic expression is, at least by contrast, all-at-once. Its sought conclusion is not Q.E.D., but a total response expressible as "This is it!!"

Symbols express, all at once, diverging and logically incompatible possibilities, incompatibles which logic can only save from damning as "contradictions" by rebaptizing them as "paradoxes." Their truth is truth-for-life, and surely truth-for-life does have its claims as clearly as does truth-for-logic. Properly taken, even such a series of propositions as the Apostles' Creed, or the Nicene Creed, is a symbol, as the term, "Nicene Symbol" indicates. Its purpose is not, at least primarily, to define, but rather to present, as nearly all at once as is verbally possible, the focal minimum of the normative faith of a confessional

group. Likewise, such logically intractible items as the "three persons" in "one Godhead" of Christian orthodoxy are first of all presented *more symbolico*, as a symbolic expression, and only secondarily as logical propositions. Thus, we need not be surprised if some choose to retain certain religious statements despite logical embarrassment. And, for the one within the group tradition, the symbolic meaning is not something hidden, but is in every way as overt a meaning as is the logical. Symbols, as distinguished from substituted signs, express what cannot otherwise be expressed at all, or which cannot be expressed so dramatically, or so all-at-once.

It is of the essence of sophisticated theological or philosophical criticism, that it take seriously the psychological function of religious symbolism, and not confine itself to the norms of a more pedestrian logic.

The second contrast, between conscious and unconscious operations, lies in their respective types of moral and other value-judgments. The Conscious evaluates in terms amenable to social, or, as we generally say, "ethical" application. Reciprocity, reasonableness, proportion, — even relativism, — have large place. There is little or no traffic in absolute goods or absolute evils. Certainly, the Conscious sees no human being as wholly good or wholly bad, though it may judge that someone is so predominantly bad, dangerous, or "impossible" as an example, that society is justified in refusing to tolerate his further existence.

The Unconscious deals regularly in absolutes, which a partially aware consciousness readily confuses with infinities. For the Unconscious, a value or disvalue is simply and absolutely what it is, without comparison, without extenuation, without qualification. And the proper consequences, as the Unconscious feels them, are, by the standards of the Conscious, extreme. As judge, the Unconscious is a hanging judge, and one easily satisfied by circumstantial evidence.

In view of this contrast, social science has done something very significant for religion's understanding of itself. It has made it possible for the religionist to ask of his formal theological propositions: Is this a rational judgment of consciousness, or is it a symbolic presentation of judgments by the Unconscious? Is it a refinement of the best examined insights, or does it try to deal with residues inherited out of thin dim past — residues which definitely need working over, but which need even more not to be ignored by any religion or theology, which attempts to speak to the whole man *as he is*?

Take, for example, the venerable doctrines of "Total Depravity," or of your or my implication in the sin of Adam and Eve in the Garden. Certainly, the more absolutist reading of "total" as being infinite, as well as "in every part," does not correspond to even the most rigorous conscious value-judgment. But, in terms of the Unconscious, it is not in the least odd. And, in so far as I am in a state of emotional isolation, without benefit of the comparison and relativities of friends, or even of enemies, "Total Depravity" does express symbolically, the judgment I feel being passed upon me. "It speaks to my condition," and that is no small recommendation. As for my complicity in the sin of Adam, it seems to make little practical difference whether I sincerely and believably repent of my part in his sin, or depth analysis enables me to rediscover and disavow a repressed murderous hatred for my father, dating from my childhood. So long as the symbol is taken seriously, and the repentance is emotionally adequate, the result is in substance the same, though the extent of its reference may indeed vary.

Historically, ethical and rational liberalism has never quite known what to do with the less rational aspects of human nature. On the other hand, high Calvinism, for example, could speak to the condition of a man groaning under the condemnation of his unconscious guilts, and ineffectually trying to account for them consciously. Once he had a radical conversion, he was no longer under the domination of at least the *same* unconscious elements, and he was no longer emotionally isolated from his fellow men. Only by a tragic distortion of his conscious, social, ethical sensibilities, could he continue to affirm, someone with savage consistency, the absolutes which had once symbolized *a truth* about himself.

The social scientist will want to know, of any religious or theological formulation, whether he is actually dealing with a rational and social judgment of consciousness, or with a symbol, which, however extreme or gruesome, may express unconscious realities demanding integration into the totality of awareness.

The social scientist is concerned with the ways in which different religious formulations, worship-forms, and group selectivities; relate to differences in people, — people as individuals, and as socially differentiated group members. Some people do in fact prefer a rational, basically educational type of religious expression. Others choose a way more suited to the free expression of strong or refined emotions. For

still others, real religion, as over against empty forms and arid intellectualism, is serene contemplation. And then there are those for whom religion must find them through the aesthetic, through a well-ordered appeal to their senses. For some, the focus of religion is "out there." for others it is within.

Carl Jung has found personality types, paralleling these preferences and their combinations. Some people are always oriented to what is "out there," whether their response is activistic or merely perceptive, while for others the real meaning of any perception is known only as it is assimilated and made a part of their inner frame of reference. The predominance of thinking, feeling, intuition, or sensation, characterizes the personality generally, in all its expressions. Other parallels between religious and personality typologies might be added, but perhaps one example is enough.

From the social science point of view, essential religion must be so defined as to allow its full and free expression by the thinker, the contemplator, the feeling-oriented, the man for whom reality is most compelling in sensation. It must meet the needs of both the extravert and the introvert. Can this condition be met by any one existing religion, or does it demand more than one? How far can we carry the apparent implications of Toynbee's contrast between the extraverted feeling orientation of Christianity and the introverted intuitionism of Buddhism? This is a large question, too large for us to do more than raise it here, but the social scientist will look to see it placed alongside any appeal to revelational orthodoxy. For in whatever way religious truth may be said to be *from God*, it must at least be *for real people*.

What social science may do to religion, when a theologian comes through the study of the whole sweep of its disciplines, and has taught widely throughout, is at least sampled by the writings of Paul Tillich. History, sociology, comparative religions, psychotherapy, literature and the arts, as well as formal philosophy — all have entered into his analysis of his own Christian tradition.

For example, scanning the almost two thousand years of history of which the Christian movement has been a part, Tillich finds significant shifts of emphasis, each in response to a problem which expressed itself in many ways, and corresponding to the three major forms of basic human anxiety. In the early centuries, the great problem, not only for those within the Church, but for the culture generally, was

anxiety in the face of finitude and its extreme expression: death. To this concern, the Church offered a *Kyrios*, a once dead and now risen Lord, by mystical or sacramental identification with whom, men could share in his overcoming of this finitude and its attendant anxiety.

In the later Middle Ages and through the time of the Reformation, the prevalent anxiety was that of guilt and its extreme: damnation. To this, the Church, and not least the Reformers, brought the atoning sacrifice of Christ, by which, through the grace of God, one's guilt might be forgiven.

Tillich finds the contemporary form of anxiety to be that of emptiness and meaninglessness, and he finds this especially true for secular society. Indeed, the more fanatical the devotion to some narrow and preemptive meaning, the more eloquent the confession of inner emptiness. To this mood is offered, somewhat less clearly than in the previous instances, religious existentialism of several brands. Whether this is really Christian is often uncertain; sometimes the approach is clearly religious and other than Christian; and again, some forms could be called religious only by the broadest and thinnest of definitions.

According to Tillich, and others have expressed it similarly, Existentialism is what you have when all the values and disvalues which you have projected onto the social order, and onto metaphysical superstructures, suffer the collapse of whatever has supported them, and they all come tumbling back about your ears. There is no longer any alternative to immediacy, or qualification of it. The lines of demarcation between the religious and the secular break down, and the sensitive may find both in the most unlikely places.

CONCLUSION

What Has Social Science Done to Religion?

It would be better to ask: "What has social science done *for* religion?" As an impact from the outside, social science has made no more than a modest effect on religion. But as a refining of the religionist's understanding of himself and the society in which he lives, social science has made possible invaluable insights into the fact of religion itself. Without claiming to adjudicate the meta-physical or cosmic validity of religious claims, it has put the emphasis on basic dynamic realities, and shown the properly second-place character of outward

forms. Nor does social science, as against the strictures of impatient amateurs, rule out the values of particular forms and structures. It knows that universals enter existence only in terms of *some* particulars. One may choose from them, but one cannot reject all.

Perhaps the chief contribution made by social science is a new realization of the multi-level complexity of religious expressions. Against this background, one may indeed be more critical of religion as he finds it. But he will no longer reject it out of hand, or indulge in sweeping and naive generalizations, and he will take religion seriously, as seriously as he takes the social life of man.

MIGRATION OVER SEA

BY

MAARTJE DRAAK

What happens to the religious concepts and observances of peoples migrating over sea? A Sky-god—if they have one—travels with them; a Sea-god—if they have one—bears them across. But an Earth-goddess? She stays behind because her realm ends at the seashore. Therefore it would seem to me that an oversea-migration must have important religious consequences for tribes with an Earthgoddess-cult.

All over the world it is known that deep water is bottomless, and that the land *stops* at the seacoast (as it does at the lakeside, and sometimes at the riverbank). That is why every island is a new earth, where anything (different and improbable) may happen. Consequently to leave the known and sheltering Earth, to cross a wide expanse of water and in doing so to lose sight of the coastline, for many tribes must be a desperate venture, to be contemplated and to be undertaken only in direst necessity. Driven by hopeless hunger, for instance.

I would suggest that roaming over a huge Continent has not such a psychological, such a religious effect, as the loss of every link with the very Earth that oversea-migration causes. A great dread must be experienced when even the eye cannot reach the shore any longer. Exploring the sea by hugging a coastline, progressing along a string of small islands is nothing to it. This is because an island near the coast, or a string of small islands, can always be imagined and interpreted as having been part of the known Earth 'long ago'. And then again: I do not talk about fishing, trading, exploring and the like—all these are more or less individual enterprises, and there always is the intention of *going back*. I talk about tribal migration over sea, which is a *leaving*, which is a definite loss and severance.

When a tribe has reached its New Earth, religious complications arise. How can the new Earth-goddess be propitiated? What does she want? What is her history, i.e. her disposition and character; how does she wish to be worshipped? Here it is of prime importance whether

the new Earth already is inhabited, shows only remains of former habitation, or is still virgin soil. In the first two instances the tribe may find it easier to gather information about the goddess, but on the other hand there is then every possibility that a safe relationship cannot be achieved. There is a danger that she does not become "their own goddess", that she remains "the goddess of those Others". And in each case the old religious pattern is broken.

I keep thinking that some of these perplexities must have beset the Celtic tribes migrating to Ireland between the fourth and the first centuries B.C.

Our study of Celtic mythology is continually hampered by the disparity of our source-material. From the Continent we have archaeological evidence and rather unsatisfactory data from classical writers, from Ireland are available epic texts written down long after the introduction of Christianity. The religious information remains elusive, and much of it does not blend; therefore mythologists usually try to interpret or to amplify the Continental data by means of the Insular, and the Insular by means of the Continental. When they do so they gratuitously adopt as an axiom (or they feel justified to infer?) that the Irish epic texts have been tampered with, and that the old Gods, the priestly cult and the pagan rites have been eradicated by the Christian scribes. They probably reason as follows. The Continental Celts had Gods, they had priests and they made sacrifice; the Roman writers allude to human sacrifices on a rather large scale, and not all of it can be explained away as hostile propaganda. So if the Irish texts do not mention sacrifices or priestly rites, they must have been expurgated. And likewise on other crucial points.

A very real stale-mate has been reached in this manner, as it cripples our material still further, and as mythologists—deep-down—keep on harbouring the suspicion that they do not actually *know* about the Irish texts.

Here, in my opinion, A. G. van Hamel in his "Aspects of Celtic Mythology" (1934)¹) and in the articles stemming from that publi-

1) The Sir John Rhys Memorial Lecture — British Academy. Published in Volume XX of the Proceedings of the British Academy (and also separately).

cation (e.g. "The Conception of Fate in Early Teutonic and Celtic Religion" ²⁾, 1936) has shown us a promising 'next move'. His method was/is to listen to the Insular texts, to let them speak, to try and not to know better when one starts to read them. If they do not mention priestly rites, perhaps there were no priestly rites; if they do not mention sacrifices, perhaps there were no sacrifices. If one studies and listens long enough an understandable religious pattern may emerge. For the texts are not reticent at all, they tell quite a lot about "other sides of early Celtic religion". ³⁾

On the surface this does not seem such a startling procedure, but the startling thing is that so few investigators have followed it. People are not content to sit back and listen for a while. Apart from collections of material—like Zwicker's "Fontes Historiae Religionis Celticae" ⁴⁾—, the only new approach comes from Van Hamel and from Marie-Louise Sjoestedt in her "Dieux et Héros des Celtes" ⁵⁾.

The books by J. A. MacCulloch are of the old school, and T. F. O'Rahilly's "Early Irish History and Mythology" of 1946 ⁶⁾ has—in its mythological implications—a distinct nineteenth-century flavour. It fairly bristles with sun-gods, and too many discrepancies in the material are got rid of by a method we all know only too well: the method of *hineininterpretieren*. A few quotations—chosen at random—will be sufficient to prove my point. On p. 49: "Thus it is quite as artificial to make Dáire 'son of Bolg' as it is to make Cú Roí 'son of Dáire', for the god Bolg was merely Dáire under another aspect, and Cú Roí and Dáire are ultimately one and the same"; on p. 79: "The 'death' of Cú Roí was avenged, we are told, by Congachnes mac Dedad, nominally his uncle, but really Cú Roí *redivivus*"; on p. 102: "In the pedigree Labraid is made grandson of Loegaire Lorc; but we need not doubt that both names are ultimately designations of one and the same personage"; on p. 110: "Now *Craiphtine*, as I have argued elsewhere, is merely a later form of *Sraiphtine*, 'sulphur-fire', a name for the Otherworld-god in his capacity of god

2) In Saga-Book, vol. XI; the Viking Society for Northern Research.

3) Aspects of Celtic Mythology, p. 6.

4) In three parts: Berolini 1934, Bonnae 1935, 1936.

5) Paris 1940; there is an English translation by Myles Dillon: Gods and Heroes of the Celts, London 1949.

6) Published by the Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies.

of lightning; consequently Labraid and Craiphtine are ultimately one and the same deity". May I confess to a thorough dislike for those (old-fashioned) books on mythology (or folk-lore, or medieval literature) in which everybody *ultimately* is the same as everybody else, and something *of course* always means something different? I consider them to be products of woolly reasoning and wishful thinking. Moreover I am convinced that in story-patterns motifs are much more important than names.

Van Hamel found in Ireland hardly any gods (: "gods are rare in our sources of Irish paganism" ⁷); "the Irish texts themselves use the word for 'a god' practically only in the oath" ⁸); in the 1936 article mentioned above he was even more emphatic: "from our sources not one single instance of a mediating god can be adduced" ⁹)), he identified a hierarchy of beings with magical energy: kings, exemplary heroes, spirits of the land and divine magicians, he saw magical practices, but no cult or worship; he recognized in the "Celtic pagan thinking" "always a religious undercurrent, which, through many branches, tends towards the central notion of the preservation and protection of the land, both from inside and outside". ¹⁰)

I myself—in my inaugural address "Betovering voor een etmaal" ¹¹)—have tried to work out indications for an 'inside' protection of the land (i.e. Ireland) by magical formulas which had to be repeated or renewed for every 24 hours.

The present study is a solution to a problem I stated in the summary on Sacral Kingship in Ireland. ¹²) I wrote that the (pagan) Irish "seem to have lived without 'gods'", but that "they knew a great many supernatural beings. There is, however, an unmistakable difference between a supernatural being and a god. A god can be approached by prayer and by sacrifice. A supernatural being holds aloof—only occasionally and as by accident he (or she) takes an interest in human

7) Aspects of Celtic Mythology, p. 6.

8) Aspects of Celtic Mythology, p. 7.

9) Conception of Fate (see note 2), p. 8 (of the off-print).

10) Aspects of Celtic Mythology, p. 18.

11) Amsterdam 1955.

12) The Sacral Kingship; Contributions to the central theme of the VIIIth International Congress for the History of Religions (Rome, April 1955), Leiden 1959; pp. 651-663.

affairs". Then I continued: "Is it normal or perhaps even characteristic of migrating peoples to lose religious concepts *en route*? After all one would imagine that the Irish Celts—as Indo-Europeans—ought to have had gods!"¹³)

As I already have hinted at above (p. 82), I now hold that *migration over sea* changed the religious pattern of the Celtic tribes in Ireland, and made them 'lose' some of their Continental gods. In giving my arguments below I am fully aware that I am developing a theory, and that the value of this theory hovers above a network of hypotheses and observations.

a. In Ireland the original speakers of the surviving native language and the later recorders of the Celtic tradition historically are known as the 'Goidels'. Linguistically they are Q-Celts (as against the P-Celts whose languages are known from Britain).¹⁴) Now whether one accepts the old view that the 'Goidelic' invasion of Ireland was the only Celtic one and occurred very early (before 600 B.C.), or the modern view that at least two invasions of P-Celts came first, and that the Goidelic migration is the last one, not earlier than the second century B.C., in each case the Celts found in Ireland at least traces of former habitation. Archaeologists agree that the many megalithic tombs still to be seen, the large burial mounds, the stone alignments and the stone circles belong to a much earlier age, and are pre-Celtic. Of the tombs and tumuli I shall have to speak below. Seán P. Ó. Ríordáin in his "Antiquities of the Irish Countryside" observes: "There are at least a thousand chambered tombs extant in Ireland; countless others have

13) On p. 652 and note 3 there.

14) "The Celtic languages form one group of the Indo-European family of languages. . . . The various Celtic dialects may be divided as follows: — (1) Gaulish; (2) Goidelic, including Irish, Scottish Gaelic, and Manx; (3) Brythonic, including Welsh, Breton and Cornish. Gaulish and Brythonic, like Oscan and Umbrian among the Italic dialects, change the I. E. labialized velar guttural *qv* to *p*, whilst the Goidelic dialects retain the *qv* which later gives up the labial element and becomes *k*, e.g. Gaulish *petor*-, "four", Ir. *cethir*, Welsh *petguar*, Breton *pevar*, Lat. *quattuor*; . . ." from the after so many years still admirable article "Celt" in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th ed., vol. V (1910) by E. C. Quiggin.

Perhaps this quotation makes it understandable that Celtists refer to the speakers of (2) as "Q-Celts" and to the speakers of (3) as "P-Celts". (One has to keep in mind that in Celtic languages a *c-spelling* always represents a *k-sound*.)

been destroyed in the course of time, the stones of which they were built having been robbed for various purposes. In spite of much recent work—and few problems in archaeology attract such attention as do the megalithic tombs—the total number of such structures is not accurately known; some still remain unrecorded and, in the absence of detailed surveys, the typology of many known examples is yet unclear.”¹⁵)

b. Tradition has it, and historians as well as linguists accept, that the ‘Goidels’ reached Ireland directly from the Continent. Therefore the expanse of water they had to cross can be said to be wide enough indeed.

c. Is there enough evidence from Continental sources of a Celtic preoccupation with earth-goddesses (or perhaps ‘spirits of the land’)? Here I will borrow the observations of Madame Sjoestedt. “Ces divinités féminines tiennent une grande place dans le monde religieux gaulois. On peut les classer en deux séries: l’une est celle des déesses tutélaires, associées au sol même et aux accidents remarquables de ce sol, sources ou forêts, ou encore aux espèces animales qui le peuplent, et présidant à la fécondité de ce sol, comme l’indique la corne d’abondance qui est un de leurs attributs: telles les *matres* et Epona, et les déesses des eaux (Sirona dans l’Est de la Gaule, Brixia, parèdre de Luxovius, dieu des eaux de Luxeuil) ou des forêts, comme la Dea Arduina des Ardennes.”¹⁶)

“Plusieurs de ces déesses apparaissent fréquemment comme parèdres d’un dieu. Nous venons de citer Brixia et Luxovius; de même Sirona est associée d’ordinaire à Grannos, et parfois à Apollon; ...”¹⁷) Here they are, those protecting goddesses “associées au sol même”, and let us keep in mind how we encounter them: solitary, or as one of a ‘divine couple’ (male and female), or in a triadic (female) representation. In this last instance I believe them to be portrayed in their ideal ‘plural group’-form (three being the first ‘real’ plural number after the dual).

Having considered a., b. and c. it does not seem unwarranted to

15) O.c., third edition, (London 1953), p. 57.

16) Dieux et héros des Celtes (see note 5), pp. 26-7.

17) Dieux et héros des Celtes, p. 27.

examine the 'supernatural beings' of some Irish texts, or some 'supernatural beings' of the Irish texts: it is impossible to include all and everything.

Generally speaking: they look like human people, only more beautiful; they are rich in treasures, in cattle; they know and practice magic; their time is different; they can make themselves invisible (often they travel in bird-form); they live in "síd"s, i.e. in fairy hills or mounds. Much has been written about them by modern investigators; according to one of the 'conservative' viewpoints they represent the old Irish gods, though faded and 'expurgated'—in Christian times shorn of their former power. Or they represent the dead—living as they do in what must be the old megalithic tombs and burial mounds. However, one aspect has not had (in my opinion) the attention and reflection it so richly deserves, namely the remarkable fact how *alien* the texts portray these beings, how un-related to the world of the humans. If they are the dead, they are *not* the dead of the 'Goidels'; if they are the old gods of Ireland the 'Goidels' never achieved a safe relationship.

To keep track of the great mass of anonymous medieval Irish literature Celtic scholars have divided the epic tales into various "cycles".¹⁸) One of these is the "mythological cycle" to which of course belong the stories about the 'supernatural beings'. Yet the group has not been happily chosen; it has no real unity and no clear boundaries, though it is only small. The fact is that one may encounter supernatural beings in any tale of the other cycles, and that the only criterion by which a story has been included into the "mythological cycle" is the *preponderance* of supernatural beings. Still it is best to start from this group.

The most important text of the mythological cycle, *Cath Maige Tured* (The—second—Battle of Moytura),¹⁹) is useless for my pur-

18) The Ulster or Conchobor-Cuchulinn Cycle; the Fenian or Ossianic Cycle; the Mythological Cycle; the Historical Cycle (or: the Cycles of the Kings); the Adventures; the Voyages. For a general survey see: Myles Dillon, *Early Irish Literature*, Chicago 1948.

19) The Irish title only represents: the battle of Moytura. Technically two different stories go by that name, nowadays differentiated as The First Battle of Moytura, and The Second Battle of Moytura. The Second Battle-story is the most important tale of the Mythological Cycle.

pose, because this long and rambling story only deals with the supernaturals themselves in their enmities and rivalries, their accomplishments, etc. Humans do not occur at all. Therefore there is no meeting, no interplay between the two different worlds.²⁰⁾

Much more can be gathered from the third part of *Tochmarc Étaíne* (The Wooing of Étaín).²¹⁾ Here an elven being, Midir of Brí Léith (i.e. Midir who lives in the Hill of the Grey Man), succeeds in winning back the lovely Étaín (his wife a thousand years ago) who has been reborn as a human and now is the consort of the Irish King Eochaid Airem. Midir plays on Eochaid's greed and puts him off his guard by letting him win several times in a game of skill for high stakes. When at last Midir wins he names as *his* stake: to put his arms around Étaín. Eochaid does not foresee that his opponent can disappear with Étaín from the middle of a guarded hall by bearing "her away through the skylight of the house", but that is what happens. Then "the hosts rose up in shame around the king. They beheld two swans in flight round Tara. And the way they went was to Síd ar Femuin, . . ." ²²⁾

So far we have a charming fairy-story and not much else. But it maintains a few archaic and very interesting motifs that are of importance for the present investigation.

In the first place there is Midir's evident power over the soil, as appears from the heavy tasks Eochaid (when he is still winning!) imposes upon him: "dichlochad Midhi, luachair tar Tethbai, tochar tar Moin Lamraide, fid tar Bréifne", i.e. to clear Meath of stones (literally: the un-stoning of Meath), (to put) rushes over Tethba, a causeway over Móin Lámraige, (and) a wood over Bréifne.²³⁾

We may have here part of an aetiological tradition; it certainly is true that the Middle of Ireland (Meath) is much less stony than

20) We still have to rely on the edition (with translation) by Whitley Stokes in *Revue Celtique*, vol. XII, 1891. Stokes left out some rhetorical passages, which have been supplemented by R. Thurneysen (without translation) in *Zeitschrift für Celtische Philologie*, vol. XII, 1918. There is a new study and translation by G. Lehmacher: *Die Zweite Schlacht von Mag Tured und die keltische Götterlehre*, in *Anthropos*, vol. XXVI, 1931.

21) Edited by Osborn Bergin and R. I. Best in *Ériu*, vol. XII, 1938, pp. 137-196 (with translation).

22) *Ériu*, XII, p. 185.

23) *Ériu*, XII, pp. 176/7.

are the coastal districts (where in modern times the foreigner becomes obsessed by the idea that the fields yield a crop of boulders). Accordingly in medieval times "Tethba" must have been famous (or notorious) for its rushes, and "Bréifne" for its woods. I even think that an ancient (pre-Celtic?) causeway across the bog (*móin*) of Lámraige may be an archaeological fact, as the construction-material mentioned in our story rings true. Incidentally — the making of the causeway by Midir's people is the only one of the four "hardships" imposed on him that is told in any detail.

Midir has stipulated that during the night (in which the tasks will be completed) "no man or woman be out of doors until sunrise", but the king "commanded his steward to watch the effort they put forth in making the causeway". Now follow the construction-methods, from which the king learns a better way to put a yoke upon oxen, and a rhetorical passage (incantation or *heave ho?*) that was "on the lips" of "the folk of the elfmounds" as they were working. Because of the spying the causeway remains imperfect: there are gaps in it.

So much for Midir's power over the soil. The second motif of the story to serve my purpose here is the aggressive manner in which the king tries to recapture Étaín.

After the two swans have disappeared in the direction of Síd ar Femuin (*vide* p. 88 *supra*), Eochaid follows "with the flower of the men of Ireland around him", and he and his men are determined "to dig up every elfmound (that was) in Ireland until his wife should come to him (out of them)." ²⁴ (So the humans have some understandable means of retaliation.)

First of all the Irish attack (dig at) Síd ar Femuin, but they are told (by one of the inhabitants) that Midir and Étaín are not there. Moreover their informant advises them to advance on Síd Brí Léith, Midir's "rígdún" (royal stronghold). The Irish, however, cannot dig

24) *Ériu*, XII, pp. 184/5. Early investigations of the text had to stop at this crucial point, as the manuscript (*Lebor na Huidre*, c. 1100) "breaks off, owing to lacuna" (*Ériu*, XII, p. 184, note 17). But as recently as 1930(!) "another copy . . . , happily perfect, came to light in a section of the Yellow Book of Lecan, which had lain all unsuspected among the Irish manuscripts in the Phillipps collection at Thirlestaine House, Cheltenham . . ." (*Ériu*, XII, p. 137). In *Ériu*, XII, this copy was edited for the first time. So the text has been available only since 1938, and the last part has not been studied much yet.

up Síd Brí Léith; though they work and dig for a year and three months “what they would dig up today would be complete (whole, restored) on the morrow”. Back to Síd ar Femuin go the Irish, and they start once again to dig it up. Now I quote (the translation ²⁵) of) the next passage in full: “Someone comes out of it towards them again and said to them: ‘What hast thou against us, Eochaid’, said he. We have not taken thy wife. No injury has been done thee. Beware of aught that may be harmful for a king to say’. ‘I will not go away from you’, said Eochaid, ‘till ye tell me how I may reach my wife’. ‘Take blind whelps with thee, and blind cats, and leave them. That is the work thou must do every day’. He turns away then, and that is done by them.” (Eochaid and his men are now so successful in razing Síd Brí Léith, that Midir appears and starts negotiations.)

If at this point a reader feels at a total loss to understand the trend of the story, this is what is implied here: the inhabitants of the elfmounds do not front the humans in serried ranks; they have their different provinces, tribes and loyalties—exactly as the humans have. When Síd ar Femuin is threatened ‘they’ inform against Midir. The first information Eochaid receives (that Midir and Étaín are not in Síd ar Femuin but in Síd Brí Léith) could have been taken for a stratagem ²⁶), but the second certainly (is) not. ‘They’ of Síd ar Femuin feel injured: they have had no part in the king’s loss of Étaín, and—as they seem to lack Midir’s superior power in protecting his royal stronghold—they greatly fear the king’s attack and (the magical power of *the truth* of) the king’s words (: ‘Beware of aught that may be harmful for a king to say’). Therefore, when Eochaid *says*: ‘I will not go away from you till ye tell me how I may reach my wife’, this utterance has the acting power of literal and—as such—‘fatal’ truth. That is why ‘they’ tell him.

As for the ‘power’ radiating from the presence of very young cats and dogs we shall have to reason something like this. The people of the elfmounds may not be spied upon; they ‘work’ in the dark, unseen by human beings (*vide* the construction of the causeway, p. 89 *supra*). The young animals here belong to the folklore-categories of

25) I generally quote the translation by Best and Bergin, but here and there I deviate a little on my own responsibility (and at my own peril!). I aim at a still greater literalness.

26) Either by Eochaid or by us.

the betwixt and between, the not this and not that, the paradoxical circumstances or 'tasks'.²⁷⁾ They do not spy because they cannot (yet) see; (they have not been blinded: that would mar the paradox); they are not human beings, but they belong to the ordinary world of mortals. Their being left at Síd Brí Léith at night makes it impossible for Midir to restore his "dún". He has to come and plan something else.

What he plans is superior trickery, part of it verbal trickery. He promises Eochaid with a binding formula that his wife will come to him at his home and at a certain hour. Then he asks Eochaid not to injure (oppress) him again "madh slán do menma lat don chur sa uaim" (if thy mind is contented this time with/by me). Eochaid accepts formally.

At the fixed hour there come "fifty women all of like form and in like dress (or: outward appearance) as Étaín" . . . and an old grey-haired hag. She says to Eochaid: "Choose thy wife this time, or tell one of the women to stay with thee."²⁸⁾ And Eochaid finally chooses, though he is not perfectly sure and has to take counsel with "the men of Ireland" in the end. The other women then leave, and it seems quite possible to me that the old grey-haired hag was the real Étaín in disguise.²⁹⁾

For Eochaid has chosen the wrong person, and afterwards Midir taunts him that he has taken to himself his own daughter. That Étaín was pregnant when she was taken away, that she bore a daughter:

27) For instance tasks like "coming neither on nor off the road"; "coming neither on horse nor on foot"; "coming neither naked nor clad"; "coming neither by day nor by night", that are set the heroine in the folk-tale of The Clever Peasant Girl (Aarne-Thompson nr. 875).

28) *Ériu*, XII, pp. 186/7. In addition I have made use of the observations by R. Thurneysen in *Zeitschr. f. Celtische Philologie*, vol. XXII, 1941, p. 22.

29) One can argue, of course, that Étaín was hidden as one of the fifty, because we know enough "Märchen" where the prince has to recognize his bride among three, or seven, or more princesses who are exactly alike. But it seems to me very probable that in this instance we meet with a typically Irish (over)stressing of a motif, a 'turn of the screw'. Irish story-tellers have an uncanny skill for that sort of thing.

Midir has promised Eochaid: 'Thy wife will come to thee at the third hour tomorrow'. What could more cunningly put Eochaid off his guard than such a presentation of the problem that he does not even see where it lies? Moreover, the story-pattern in which a 'real King' is tested by giving him the choice or the opportunity to kiss (—mate with—) a loathly hag (who afterwards turns into a beautiful woman) is well-known in Ireland.

"and it is she who is near thee. Thy wife, further, is with me, and it has befallen thee that thou hast let her go from thee a second time." Eochaid, nevertheless, does not dare to dig an elfmound of Midir's again "for there was a bond against him" (*ar boi arach fris*).

What is the binding agreement against Eochaid? What hinders his revenge? During their conversation, and before he has revealed what really has happened, Midir has asked whether Eochaid's mind is contented, and Eochaid has said yes . . .

In Midir's strategy there is not one grain of benevolence towards the human king; he is an adversary pure and simple. If the tales about the Síd-people teach some lesson, it is that of driving a bargain, of wording an agreement.³⁰ For Midir's 'trickery' is of a perfectly legal nature: he keeps his word—always. And 'truth', verbal 'truth' has its own 'fatal' power, even as far away and as late as the ambiguous oath in 'Tristan and Isold'.

The next tale of the Mythological Cycle to reward our scrutiny is *Aislinge Oenguso* (the Dream of Oengus).³¹ It is rather short, but it bears a close resemblance to the stories about Étaín, both in atmosphere and in motifs. The interplay of humans and supernatural beings is slighter—most of the persons involved are 'elves'—, but some humans come in, and we meet them (together with the elves) in a situation we already know about: at the attacking of a Síd to force its owner/inhabitant.

This is what happens. Oengus, a very important elf-personality, who lives at Bruig na Bóinne (or, as we of the 20th-century say: in the tumulus of Newgrange, Co. Meath) and who is the son of 'the Dagda' and Boann (i.e. the river Boyne), falls in love with an unknown

30) Compare for instance the story Van Hamel analyses at the beginning of his "Aspects of Celtic Mythology" (see my note 1 and *passim*). It is the tale of Finn and the three sons of the King of Iruath. In it Finn bargains with 'them' about a wonderful hound 'they' have. "They pledge the sun and the moon, the land and the sea, that they will never bring it alive out of Ireland. *Then they kill it* and take the body with them on their way north" (*Aspects*, p. 7; the italics are mine).

It would be interesting to investigate bargaining technique(s) in Celtic stories.

31) There is an edition with translation of the text by E. Müller in *Revue Celtique*, vol. III, 1876/8. I have used the new edition (without translation) by Francis Shaw, Dublin 1934.

girl whom he sees in recurring dreams. He gets ill, and at the advice of a famous physician (how modern it sounds!) first his mother, and afterwards his father try to locate the girl. To 'the Dagda' the physician says: "Thou art the king of the elf-mounds of Ireland; and let somebody go from you to Bodb, the king of the elf-mounds of Munster, [because] his knowledge is famous throughout all Ireland." ³²⁾

Bodb (the master of *Síd ar Femuin*) ³³⁾ after a year-long search actually locates the girl and gets to know who she is, but he has no power to help Oengus as the girl lives at (belongs to) a *Síd* in Connacht. (Here again we observe the territorial divisions and the discontinuity of the *Síd*-world.) It is at this point that 'the Dagda' seeks the aid of Ailill and Medb, the *human* king and queen of Connacht. They too declare themselves powerless to arrange matters, but they summon the girl's father. However, he knows what it is all about, and refuses to come. "After that arises the household (palace-guard) of Ailill and the following of the Dagda towards the *Síd*. They overrun the whole *Síd*. They bring sixty heads out of it [of slain *Síd*-folk!] and the king [the girl's father], so that he was in *Crúachan* [the residence of Ailill and Medb] in captivity." ³⁴⁾

Even this does not help Oengus much, as the prisoner reveals that his daughter has greater (magical) power than he himself, and that he cannot coerce her. He gives information, though, where she is to be found at a given time. Meeting her there Oengus persuades her to go away with him; all ends well.

The details of essential importance for this investigation are: family-relations in the *Síd*-world are like those among humans; *Síd*-folk can be killed; humans can interfere in the *Síd*-world if they are influential enough (if they have 'mana'?) and if they are asked to; the initiative lies with the 'elves'.

In The Dream of Oengus 'the Dagda' asks help from Ailill and Medb; I can cite other instances where the elves invite humans if they need them for some purpose. E.g.: in this wise the great hero Cuchulinn is summoned by 'them' to fight a battle against a great host of enemies

32) Edition Shaw (see note 31), p. 50.

33) We know this *Síd* from *Tochmarc Étaíne*, but there Bodb's name is not mentioned.

34) Edition Shaw (see note 31), pp. 58/9.

in their Sid-country (motif of *Serg-lige Conculainn*—Cuchulinn's Wasting-sickness); Conchobor, his sister (or daughter) and his nobles are lured to an elven-district to be present (and to assist?) at the birth of a future hero, and to accept the newborn child for fosterage (in *Compert Conculainn*—Conception of Cuchulinn).

In other stories some humans are admitted for other reasons: kings to be acknowledged and to receive their regalia ³⁵), or individual persons are invited through the affection of a Síd-woman, as in *Echtra Conli* (the Adventure of Conle), or *Immram Brain* (the Voyage of Bran) . . . But in all of the many Irish tales in which humans enter the Sid-world, the summons come from the other side. Though the Síd-folk are known to be rich, the human who wants some of their wealth never finds his way to their territory on his own and unaided.

Of course, someone like Fróech, the protagonist of *Táin Bó Fraích* (the Driving-away of Fróech's Cattle) ³⁶), who has an elf-mother, can expect to get (fairy-)cattle from the Síd, and he may venture to ask for gifts and wonderful garments to go and win a princess. Another exception to the rule is Mongán, a personality of evident elven-connections, who can send a poor student of poetry to fetch riches (in *Scél Mongán*—Story about Mongán ³⁷)).

Scél Mongán is an artlessly simple story, but I think it has some remarkable details. Mongán wants to help a poor young man and at the same time he wants to test him. Therefore he sends him to the Síd of Lethet Oidne to fetch a (precious) stone—for Mongán—and a weight of silver that he is allowed to keep for himself. Moreover he must bring a weight of gold from the river near Lethet Oidne. His road is pointed out to him; it leads over two other Síd's (where he apparently is meant to stay during the night). In the (three) Síd's

35) I have sketched part of those stories in my survey: Some Aspects of Kingship in Pagan Ireland (in *The Sacral Kingship*, see m, note 12 *supra*), pp. 658-660.

36) Edited by Mary E. Byrne and Myles Dillon, Dublin 1933. There is a translation in *Études celtiques*, vol. II, 1937, pp. 1-13, and one by James Carney in his *Studies in Irish Literature and History*, Dublin 1955 (pp. 1-14).

37) Edited (with a translation) by Kuno Meyer in: *The Voyage of Bran son of Febal*, vol. I, Appendix III, London 1895. An edition after a different MS. has been published by Vernam Hull (without translation) in *Zeitschr. f. Celtische Philologie*, vol. XVIII, 1930, pp. 418/9. I have pointed out the special interest of the story in my inaugural address: *Aes Side* (Amsterdam 1949).

live 'couples' (*lánamain*, pl. *lánamnai*: husbands and wives) who welcome Mongán's messenger. At the Síð of his destination the student strictly carries out his instructions: he enters a sort of treasure-room (to which the third 'couple' entrust him with a key), but he does not take out anything he is not meant to have. He returns to Mongán, worthy of his trust.

What interests me in this little tale are the treasure-room and the 'couples', those lonely(?) and nameless inhabitants of some remote elfmounds. What are we to think of them? Are they on their own and independent, or are they here the servants or stewards of more exalted beings? Does the Síð-world again merely mirror that of the humans? Or is there a special reason why the Goidels, why the Irish imagine 'couples' living in the mounds? These questions now impose themselves because I have come to an end with my listing of (what I consider to be the) relevant data.³⁸) I could analyse passages from more tales, I could bring together more incidents, but they would not be different in kind, they would only be variations on a theme. (With the possible exception of *Serglige Conculainn* I have kept to the oldest stratum of Irish texts known to us.)³⁹)

So once again: who and what are the Síð-folk? The old (Continental) Celtic Gods in their Irish eco-types? From the stories I have referred to I can piece together some sort of 'description' of their person and characteristics.

They are cleverer, richer, handsomer than humans; in fact they are vastly superior were it not that they seem very much wrapped up in their own affairs. However, their aloofness may merely follow from their feeling of 'status'. They certainly have no regard for human beings, though they may have a reluctant admiration for people with 'mana'—royal persons and exceptional hero's—and may love and desire an individual (*vide supra*: Fróech, who has an elf-mother).

38) For instance I do not judge it to be important whether the Síð is on an island or not, and so whether the invited human has to cross over by boat or not. From the opening of my paper it can be inferred that I consider the crossing of water such a 'natural' way of reaching an 'other world', that inversely the entering of other-ness *not* by crossing water has greater significance.

39) Van Hamel in his "Aspects" (see my note 1 and *passim*) has not strictly done so. Neither has Madame Sjoestedt (see my note 5). Authorities disagree about the date of *Serglige Conculainn*.

If they want something or someone from the human world they enter into relations—very businesslike—; otherwise they are not interested. In their bargaining they are as hard as a stone. They have great magical powers, and mostly feel very safe wielding them, but they are not immortal.

Do they present themselves as Gods? No—because the humans have no means to ‘win’ them, to approach them. Humans can only try ‘not to offend’.

Then do they present themselves as ‘the dead’? After all they live in tumuli, and the Goidels appear to have known that (most of) the elfmounds were old burying-places. The treasure-room of the third Síd in *Scél Mongán* is very suggestive, and moreover we find instances that the body of a dead hero is brought to a Síd. However, that may have started as a kind of coming-home, told of somebody of elven-descent. For example, after Fróech has been defeated and killed by Cuchulinn in one of the famous single combats of the *Táin Bó Cúailnge* (the Cattle-Raid of Cooley, the most important tale of the Ulster Cycle),⁴⁰ the text has: “The whole camp [*i.e.* of the people of Connacht] laments him, Fróech. Then they saw a group of women in green tunics near the body of Fróech son of Idad [Idad is the name of Fróech’s father]. They carry him off from them [*i.e.* from the Connachters] into a Síd. The Síd of Fróech is the name of that Síd afterwards.”⁴¹)

On the other hand, against the theory that the Síd-folk must be ‘the dead’ speaks a remarkable circumstance that—to my knowledge—never has been brought forward. I observe that, whether a human enters the Síd-country, or whether groups or individuals of the Síd-country enter the human world, *the Síd-folk never are recognized* (*i.e.* recognized as being human persons who have died). And the *recognition* of former friends and relatives is probably the surest sign—and as such always made use of even in epical story—that

40) See note 19. *Serglige Conculainn*, *Compert Conculainn* and *Táin Bó Fraích* have been put into that Cycle too; *Echtra Conli* belongs to ‘the Adventures’ and *Immram Brain* to ‘the Voyages’. But I have said on p. 87 how modern (and arbitrary!) these divisions are.

41) The *Táin Bó Cúailnge* from the Yellow Book of Lecan, with variant readings from the *Lebor na Huidre*, ed. by J. Strachan and J. G. O’Keeffe (Dublin n.d.), p. 29.

one has entered the realm of the dead, or that one has come into contact with the dead.

In religious tales, either pagan, or Christian, or Buddhist, etc., this recognition has become such a standard-motif that it makes possible all sorts of moral and political comment or propaganda. A 'sinner' is found and described in distress, a good person in a state of comparative delight, and inversely people are criticised by their fate and after that fashion differentiated into 'saints' and 'sinners'. (Accounts of Buddhist 'Hells' are particularly instructive.)

Nothing of all this in our Síd-stories. There is no recognition, there is only other-ness. (Of course moral judgment does not come into it at all.)

In the last resort: should we mix both theories and postulate 'ancestors during the process of deification'? But then never the ancestors of the Goidels! And so I have come full circle to my initial hypothesis: the breakdown of the religious pattern of the Goidels resulting from their migration over sea.

If the immigrating Goidels could accept 'those others of the elf-mounds' as powers to be respected, but alien—therefore tricky—and un-related—therefore unapproachable—, it must hinge on the preponderantly *Ge-ic* (as against *Chthon-ic*)⁴² character of their original Gods, those Gods they had to leave behind. In this way they could understand that the Síd-world was interwoven with the human world, that it touched in many points, with the elfmounds as so many doors which were kept shut. The Goidels could not expect help from the 'elves', they could try to walk warily on the newly found soil and not to anger the 'powers'. So perhaps they originated a ritual not of doing but of avoiding, and they decided to practice magic to keep that other magic in check.

Then the modern investigator does not need to be surprised at the many difficult names, unrelated to the Continental pantheon: Oengus, Midir, Bodb, etc. He follows the hierarchy from the important Síd's with their splendid inhabitants, large households and vast resources grading downwards to the remote Síd's with their lonely 'couple', the

42) The distinction is worked out by H. J. Rose, *Numen*, vol. I., pp. 216/7.

alien counterpart on the lowest grade of the Gaulish 'god-and-his-companion' or 'goddess-and-her-companion'.

One last principle of method ought to be discussed. It regards the value of epical texts for our information on the religious beliefs and practices of a people, even if we have nothing else left to guide us. There are investigators who do not set store by them at all. For instance Gerard Murphy, who was very much opposed to Van Hamel's views, wrote as follows: "In tales of the Irish Mythological cycle we may therefore expect to find much of the mythology of the primitive Celts. It is to be noted, however, that mythology, largely the creation of poets and storytellers, gives little information concerning the essential elements of a people's religion. From what Homer tells us of the loves and enmities of the Olympians ruled over by Zeus we could, for instance, learn but little of religious rites such as the Eleusinian mysteries and of the various feasts and sacrifices by which the Athenian citizen in the fifth century B.C. hoped to ensure the well-being of himself and his city."⁴³) This is true and not true.

For I do not get my real information from Homer when he sings about the Gods on Olympus, when they feast, love or quarrel among themselves. (For that reason I have on p. 87/88 *supra* excluded the Irish tale of The Second Battle of Moytura.) But when I read no further than line 260 of the second book of the Odyssey, I find something the equivalent of which I never find in an Irish epic text: "In the meantime Telemachus sought the solitude of the seabeach, where he washed his hands in the grey surf and lifted them in prayer to Athene: 'Hear me, you that in your godhead came yesterday to my house.' . . . etc." (I quote the admirable translation by E. V. Rieu).

If we had nothing else left, we could find a lot of information in Homer. And we would have to. In the same way we can—nay: we *must*—make use of the Irish epical texts.

And so, sifting my evidence from those texts, I arrive at the opinion that the religious pattern of the pagan Irish was broken by their migration over sea, centuries before the coming of Christianity made a new caesura.

⁴³) G. Murphy, *Saga and Myth in Ancient Ireland*, Dublin 1955 (or 1961), p. 16.

NERO'S ECCENTRICITIES BEFORE THE FIRE (TAC. *ANN.* 15.37)

BY

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Suetonius begins a paragraph about Nero's religious interests in this way (*Nero* 56): Religionum usque quaque contemptor, praeter unius Deae Syriae, hanc mox ita sprexit ut... Our intention here, nevertheless, is to suggest that certain religious elements may form the basis for Tacitus' otherwise inexplicably outrageous narrative in *Ann.* 15.37. We shall also adduce a somewhat similar episode from the reign of Claudius.

Tigellinus' Banquet

As the incident preceding the emperor's marriage to Pythagoras (to be discussed presently), Tacitus describes a banquet (*epulae*)¹⁾ conducted by Tigellinus, at which Nero's guests, dining on a sumptuous luxury-raft, amused themselves by gazing at scenes of unbridled license along the shores of the lake²⁾. Nero, having abandoned his plan

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1) Although Tacitus uses the word *epulae* to refer to ordinary meals of private persons (*Ann.* 3.9.3, 15.55.5) as well as to the festivities of Germans and Parthians (*Ann.* 1.50.4, 2.2.5), he most frequently employs *epulae* to denote formal banquets associated with members of the imperial house (*Ann.* 13.1.3, 14.3.6, 15.52.1). This meaning is supported by *Thesaurus Ling. Lat.* 5.2.699 f., s.v. „epulae”.

2) *Ann.* 15.37.1-7: Ipse quo fidem acquireret nihil usquam perinde laetum sibi, publicis locis struere convivia totaque urbe quasi domo uti. Et celeberrimae luxu famae epulae fuere quas a Tigellino paratas ut exemplum referam, ne saepius eadem prodigientia narranda sit. Igitur in stagno Agrippae fabricatus est ratem cui superpositum convivium navium aliarum tractu moveretur. Naves auro et ebore distinctae, remigesque exoleti per aetates et scientiam libidinum componebantur. Volucris et feras diversis e terris et animalia maris Oceano abusque petiverat. Crepidinibus stagni lupanaria adstabant inlustribus feminis completa

of a foreign tour because of popular displeasure (*Ann.* 15.36), staged this event as openly as possible in order to demonstrate his delight in using the entire city as his private home ³).

Modern scholars have accepted Tacitus' interpretation of this incident as an example of Nero's immorality and utter shamelessness ⁴). Yet these scenes along the lake shore show a marked similarity to ancient accounts of the various Hellenistic rites in which temple gardens played an important role; and Nero, inclining towards the esthetic potentialities of traditional festivals, seems to have adjusted the manner and rites of celebrations to his own preference and to that of Tigellinus and Petronius ⁵). Thus it may be that Tacitus is really reporting the emperor's personal interpretation of some public festival, possibly the *Floralia*, which were normally celebrated each year from April 28 through May 3 ⁶).

Tacitus has used Tigellinus' banquet to help to establish the idea that Nero was hopelessly debauched. He has carefully fostered our notion of Nero's character by descriptions of the emperor's licentiousness, arriving at this sequence of Tigellinus' banquet, Nero's marriage to Pythagoras, and the great fire of Rome ⁷).

et contra scorta visebantur nudis corporibus. Iam gestus motusque obsceni; et postquam tenebrae incedebant, quantum iuxta nemoris et circumiecta tecta consonare cantu et luminibus clarescere.

3) Nero, who seldom appeared publicly (*Ann.* 15.53.1), now showed himself in order to assuage popular fears; at the same time he provided entertainments in public in order to amuse the mob. Under the Empire qualifications of social rank for admission to banquets and spectacles had been greatly relaxed: J. Marquardt-G. Wissowa, *Römische Staatsverwaltung* ³ (Darmstadt 1957) 3.491; G. Bloch, „Epulones”, *Daremberg-Saglio* 2.1.743.

4) E.g., B. W. Henderson, *The Life and Principate of the Emperor Nero* (London 1905) 236 f.

5) P. Grimal, *Les jardins romains à la fin de la république et aux deux premiers siècles de l'empire* (Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, fasc. 155, Paris, 1943) 464 f. Nero's reliance on the rival personal tastes of Tigellinus and Petronius is found in *Ann.* 16.18.4 f.: Dein [i.e., Petronius] revolutus ad vitia seu vitiorum imitatione inter paucos familiarium Neroni adsumptus est elegantiae arbiter, dum nihil amoenum et molle adfluentia putat nisi quod ei Petronius adprobavisset. Unde invidia Tigellini quasi adversus aemulum et scientia voluptatum potioem.

6) For the *Floralia* see the articles cited below, note 8. An excellent account is given by W. W. Fowler, *The Roman Festivals of the Period of the Republic* (London 1899) 91-5.

7) *Ann.* 13.47, 14.14-16, 15.37-41. Dio Cassius' interpretation of this affair

Some traditional Roman festivals were characterized by licentious behavior. The *Floralia* were particularly noted for the laxity which accompanied them ⁸⁾, and Roman courtesans observed this as their special feast-day. The games (*ludi*) included theatrical exhibitions, all continued at night by torch-light. During this celebration animals were loosed in the Circus Maximus, and we are told that actresses (*mimae*) were accustomed to strip themselves and to indulge in highly improper gestures.

This celebration offers many similarities to the picture Tacitus has painted of Tigellinus' banquet. Tacitus has carefully noted that women of good family stood on one shore and courtesans on the other, an image which, despite Tacitus' lurid description, suggests the separation of the stage from the audience. He has further observed that festivities were continued by artificial light after dark, and that there were obscene gestures. He specifically mentions the presence of wild beasts, birds and sea animals ⁹⁾.

In addition it must be noted that Nero was fond of Greek customs and that his love of the stage was notorious ¹⁰⁾. Thus in an age when

(*Epit.* 62.15) seems to be a combination of the description of the festival of the *Juvenalia* (*Ann.* 14.15) with the account of Tigellinus' banquet, abridged into one passage. That Nero frequently conducted lavish banquets is indicated not only by Tacitus (*Ann.* 15.37.1 f.) but also by Suetonius (*Nero* 27.2 f.), who adds that Nero had his friends give similar feasts.

8) The following remarks on the *Floralia* are taken from G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer* ² (Munich 1912) 197 f.; J.-A. Hild, „*Floralia*“, *Daremberg-Saglio* 2.2.1190 f. The licentiousness characteristic of the *Floralia* was known not only to pagan authors (Martial 1.35.8 f.):

Quis *Floralia* vestit et stolatum
Permittit meretricibus pudorem?

but also to the Christian Fathers (Lactantius *Inst.* 1.20 [Migne P. L. 6.220]):
Celebrantur ergo illi ludi cum omni lascivia, convenienter memoriae meretricis.
Nam praeter verborum licentiam, quibus obscenitas omnis effunditur, exuuntur etiam vestibus populo flagitante meretrices, quae tunc mimarum funguntur officio, et in conspectu populi usque ad satietatem impudicorum luminum cum pudendis motibus detinentur.

9) On the use of animals in the *Floralia*, see G. Jennison, *Animals for Show and Pleasure in Ancient Rome* (Manchester, Eng., 1937) 42. Among the means employed by Nero to amuse the Roman mob was that of staging unusual and exotic animal shows (*ibid.* 70-72).

10) *Ann.* 14.14.2, 14.15.6, 14.20.1. By the middle of the first century A. D. many rites of Greek festivals and of Eastern cults had taken hold in Rome (*Ann.* 11.15.1). In general, on the spread of Eastern rites in the Roman Empire, see F. Cumont, *The Oriental Religions in Roman Paganism* (Chicago 1911); S. Dill,

Rome was rapidly becoming Hellenized and Orientalized and under a ruler noted for his Greek tendencies, it would indeed be unusual if traditional Roman activities did not become flavored with a non-Roman character. When to this is added the known extravagance of an emperor who delighted in making use of every opportunity to indulge his esthetic taste, a *Floralia* exaggerated almost beyond recognition should not prove surprising.

If this festival were really the *Floralia*, then how can we account for the fact that it was not celebrated at the temple of Flora? ¹¹⁾ The emperor had precedents for such actions, as in earlier days there had been festivals celebrated at other places than consecrated temples. The Secular Games under Augustus, for example, were held partly on the banks of the Tiber in a wooden theater constructed for this explicit purpose ¹²⁾. An even older Roman festival, and one equally as notorious as the *Floralia*, that of Anna Perenna, was normally commemorated on the Tiber's banks, along which the populace built small huts of boughs, which may be similar to the structures described by Tacitus as placed along the lake shores ¹³⁾ The groves themselves were particularly adaptable at this time for the holding of theatrical exhibitions because of the custom of arranging them to present *tableaux de „nature“* in the form of artificial *mises en scène* ¹⁴⁾. That

Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius (London 1905) Book 4. Under Nero there even seems to have been a temple to the Syrian Goddess erected across the Tiber: F. Cumont, „Syria Dea“, *Daremberg-Saglio* 4.2.1592.

¹¹⁾ Tacitus locates Tigellinus' banquet in the *stagnum Agrippae*. Dio Cass. *Epit.* 62.15 informs us that it occurred in τὸ θέατρον, which could be readily flooded and drained. Another place in Rome that held water and that was both sufficiently large for this occasion and surrounded by an ample grove was the *naumachia* in the *nemus Caesarum* located across the Tiber: *Ann.* 14.15; Augustus *Res Gestae* 23; Grimal (above, note 5) 122, n. 6. This would offer a parallel to Nero's holding the *Juvenalia* in the same place. Suet. *Nero* 27.2 mentions that Nero was accustomed to hold banquets in the *naumachia* as well as in the Circus Maximus and in the Campus Martius: ...cenitabatque nonnumquam et in publico, naumachia praeclusa vel Martio campo vel circo maximo, inter scortorum totius urbis et ambubaiarum ministeria. Without further evidence, however, Tacitus' statement that the event was staged in the *stagnum Agrippae* must be accepted.

¹²⁾ *Corpus Inscr. Lat.* 6.32323.108, 153 f.

¹³⁾ W. W. Fowler, *The Religious Experience of the Roman People* (London 1911) 473-7. Another festival which would seem to fit Tacitus' description was the *Neptunalia*, but its date of celebration (July 23) causes its rejection as the occasion of Tigellinus' banquet.

¹⁴⁾ Grimal (above, note 5) 464.

Nero had a special penchant for using lakes and their surrounding groves is shown by his choice of the *naumachia* in the *nemus Caesarum* for his *Juvenalia*, a festival similarly accompanied by theatrical scenes (*Ann.* 14.15).

Although no date is assigned for Tigellinus' banquet, Tacitus includes it among the events of the year 64 A. D., noting that Nero's marriage to Pythagoras took place a few days later. At the beginning of *Ann.* 15.38 he states that the great fire of Rome „follows” (*sequitur*) this infamous ceremony, and later observes that the fire began on July 19. Although a regular use of *sequor* is in relation to time, Tacitus has used the word loosely in other places¹⁵). It seems that here he intends causality instead of mere temporal sequence, i.e., the great fire was brought on by the infamy of the emperor. It therefore appears possible that the banquet could have been held some time prior to the outbreak of the fire.

Nero, as early as the year 51, was coöpted into all the priesthoods (*collegia*). As emperor he naturally was a member of the Arval Brethren, a college that took part in the *Floralia* and that was especially concerned with the imperial house¹⁶). He was of course one of the *quindecimviri sacris faciundis* and one of the *septemviri epulones*, *collegia* that also participated in the giving of public banquets (*epulae*) and in performing religious rites¹⁷). As *quindecimvir sacris faciundis* Nero would be particularly able to exercise his taste for foreign religions, as one of the duties of this body was the supervision of non-Roman rites.

Tacitus expressly says that the banquet was presented by Tigellinus, and Dio Cassius observes that Tigellinus had been appointed director¹⁸) of the banquet. In this respect we are hindered by lack of information on Tigellinus, for we do not know whether he was a member of any religious college or not. We do know, however, that the em-

15) *Ann.* 12.69, 14.19, 14.22.6, 15.60.3.

16) E. Groag-A. Stein, *Prosopographia Imp. Rom. Saec. I. II. III*², 3, p. 36. For the Arval Brethren: G. Wissowa, „Arvales fratres”, *RE* 2 (1896) 1463-86; C. de la Berge, „Arvales Fratres”, *Daremberg-Saglio* 1.1.449-53.

17) G. Bloch, „Duumviri, Decemviri, Quindecimviri sacris faciundis”, *Daremberg-Saglio* 2.1.426-42; G. Bloch, „Epulones”, *Daremberg-Saglio* 2.1.738-43.

18) Dio Cass. *Epit.* 62.15 uses the word ἐστιάτωρ to refer to Tigellinus and his management of Nero's banquet, a word which in the lexicon means „host”, but sometimes in such specialized ways that it is possible to suggest that ἐστιάτωρ was a technical term used to designate an official capacity.

peror usually delegated his official religious duties to someone else ¹⁹⁾ and that Tigellinus prided himself on his ability to provide elegant entertainment (*Ann.* 16.18.4). This is possibly the case with the event under consideration, and the banquet may belong to a festival of the nature of *Floralia*.

Nero's Marriage to Pythagoras

Few of Tacitus' indignant descriptions of court conduct in the *Annals* are as damaging to imperial respectability as the account of Nero's „marriage” to a man, Pythagoras, „one of that band of polluted followers” ²⁰⁾. The ceremony, as Tacitus tells it ²¹⁾, was celebrated *in modum sollemnium coniugiorum*, with Nero dressed as a bride, and culminated with „everything exposed to view that, even in the case of a woman, has the cover of darkness”. A comparison of this passage, however, with popular religious rites of the period and with similar accounts in other authors reveals the similarity of Nero's scandalous „marriage” to a Mithraic initiation. We are interested only in this similarity, without attempting to redeem Nero from Tacitus' condemnation.

The rites of Mithraism, possibly introduced to Italy after Pompey's war with the pirates, and propagated principally by the Roman legions ²²⁾, included a purificatory baptism ²³⁾ and seven grades, each with an initiation ceremony appropriate to its title. Jerome lists the grades as Corax, Nymphus, Miles, Leo, Perses, Heliodromus, and

19) G. Bloch, „Duumviri, Decemviri, Quindecimviri sacris faciundis”, *Daremberg-Saglio* 2.1.431.

20) In H. Furneaux-H. F. Pelham-C. D. Fisher, *The Annals of Tacitus* 2² (Oxford 1907) 362, n., there is cited the parallel about Cleopatra's associates in Horace *Carm.* 1.37.9 f.:

contaminato cum grege turpium
morbo virorum...

Tacitus' phrase *contaminatorum grege* might also possibly suggest a foreign religious group. Cicero uses *contaminata superstitione* (*Cluent.* 68.194) to refer to exotic cults, and *grex* of a philosophical group (*De or.* 1.42). Suet. *Dom.* 8 also employs *contaminare* in a religious sense.

21) *Ann.* 15.37.8 f.: Ipse per licita atque illicita foedatus nihil flagitii reliquerat quo corruptior ageret, nisi paucos post dies uni ex illo contaminatorum grege (nomen Pythagorae fuit) in modum sollemnium coniugiorum denupsisset. Inditum imperatori flammeum, missi auspices, dos et genialis torus et faces nuptiales, cuncta denique spectata quae etiam in femina nox operit.

22) F. Cumont, „Mithra”, *Daremberg-Saglio* 3.2.1945; Plutarch *Pomp.* 24.

23) Cumont (above, note 22) 3.2.1949.

Pater 24). On the basis of two inscriptions, however, the reading *nymphus* was emended to *cryphius*, a conjecture more favorable in the light of Cumont's observation that Mithraism excluded women 25). More recently, on the other hand, epigraphical evidence 26) has confirmed the original reading, and has thereby suggested that Mithraism, like certain other mystery religions 27), prescribed ritual marriage as symbolic of union with the deity. Apuleius, moreover, describes a religious procession in which a man appears in the garments of a woman 28). In a discussion of a similar marriage described in Juvenal's second satire, furthermore, Colin has argued that the initiatory rites of several mystery sects approximated marriage customs, even to the point of contract, dowry, and wedding garments 29).

Nero's interest in Mithraism is not unlikely in view of history's portrait of his religious attitude 30). Tacitus describes the wicked emperor as abandoning a voyage to Greece because of superstitious fear (*Ann.* 15.36), and astrology played an important role in his accession and in the policies of his reign 31). The Egyptian syncretist, Chaeremon, who used Alexandrian sacerdotal traditions to illustrate Stoic

24) St. Jerome *Epist. ad Laetam* 107.2; cf. M. J. Vermaseren, *Corpus Inscriptionum et Monumentorum Religionis Mithriacae* (The Hague 1956) 352.

25) B. M. Metzger, "St. Jerome's Testimony Concerning the Second Grade of Mithraic Initiation", *Am. Journ. Philol.* 66 (1945) 225-33.

26) *Ibid.*; cf. Vermaseren (above, note 24) nos. 63 and 480, 6: in 63, discovered at Dura-Europus, *νύμφος* occurs sixteen times; 480, 6 is a painting in a Mithraeum on the Aventine of a walking person with a long yellow *velum* over his head. In his covered hands he carries a burning lamp. The inscription (*dipinto*) contains the word *Nymphis*.

27) S. Angus, *The Mystery-Religions and Christianity* (New York 1925) 112-7.

28) Apuleius *Metam.* 11.8, although this procession supposedly occurs at a performance of the rites of Isis.

29) J. Colin, "Juvénal et le mariage mystique de Gracchus", *Atti della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, Classe di Scienze morali, storiche e filologiche* 90 (1955/56) 114-216; rev. by E. N. O'Neil, *Class. Philol.* 53 (1958) 54-6. Colin equates the mystic's veil with the bridal *flammeum*, and the *δεξιωνσις* with the *dextrarum iunctio* of legal marriage (p. 207); other parallels are found in the dowry or initiation fee, the similarity of the initiate's contract to the marriage contract, a banquet, like the marriage feast, for new initiates, and, as the culmination of the ceremony, the unveiling of the initiate.

30) M. A. Levi, *Nerone e i suoi tempi* (Milan 1949) 219 f.; Henderson (above, note 4) 414 f.

31) F. H. Cramer, *Astrology in Roman Law and Politics* (Memoirs Amer. Philosoph. Soc. 37, Philadelphia 1954) 126, 128.

theories, served, with Seneca, as Nero's tutor ³²). The *dea Syria*, furthermore, although soon spurned in a discreditable fashion, had evoked a transitory fervor in the emperor (Suet. *Nero* 56). Cumont, in fact, not only has offered evidence for the likelihood of Nero's interest in Mithra, but has further suggested that Tiridates of Armenia, while in Rome for his investiture in 66 A. D., fêted the Roman emperor at a Mithraic (Mazdean) initiation banquet ³³). (Tacitus, of course, places the marriage with Pythagoras among the events of 64 A. D.).

If, moreover, other events in the life of Nero bear the likeness of ceremonies appropriate to Mithraic grades other than that of Nymphus, the resemblance of the Pythagoras marriage to a Mithraic initiation becomes even more striking. Mithraic baptismal rites are possibly suggested by Nero's swimming in the source (*fons*) of the Marcian aqueduct, to which Tacitus objects as a violation of the *potus sacros et caerimoniam loci* ³⁴). Likewise, in Suetonius and Dio, the description of Nero dressed in the skin of a wild beast, emerging from a cave and attacking helpless victims, is perhaps suggestive of an extravagant initiation into the grade of Leo ³⁵). The emperor's taking Sporus to wife as Pythagoras had led Nero in marriage, moreover, may be interpreted as the eunuch's initiation, under imperial sponsorship, to the grade of Nymphus ³⁶). Suetonius, to be sure, suggests that the Sporus marriage

³²) F. Cumont, *The Oriental Religions in Roman Paganism* (Chicago 1911) 87; Cramer (above, note 31) 116.

³³) F. Cumont, „L'iniziazione di Nerone da parte di Tiridate d'Armenia", *Rivista di filologia* 61 (1933) 145-54. Cumont cites Tiridates' Mithraic address to Nero in Dio Cass. *Epit.* 63(62).5.2; and Pliny *H. N.* 30.17 (where Tiridates is the subject, and Nero the object): *Magos secum adduxerat, magicis etiam cenis eum initiaverat*. Levi (above, note 30) *loc. cit.* rejects Cumont's thesis on grounds that Nero would have experienced difficulty in joining a sect not previously introduced to Rome. The references in footnote 22 indicate that Mithraism may have entered Italy over 100 years before Nero's reign, and, although the earliest Mithraic inscription in Rome dates only from the Flavian era (*Corpus Inscr. Lat.* 6.732), second century inscriptions and places of worship imply an earlier popularity.

³⁴) *Ann.* 14.22.6, although this pollution might be contrary to Mithraic doctrine. While it would be difficult to picture Nero as a dedicated devotee, it may be worth while to propose the hypothesis that the precarious state of Nero's health following immersion may rather have been due to the privations imposed upon initiates than to Tacitus' *iram deum*: cf. Angus (above, note 27) 88 f. on the privations, and Cumont (above, note 22) 3.2.1949 on the baptism.

³⁵) Suet. *Nero* 29; Dio Cass. *Epit.* 63(62).13.1 f.

³⁶) Suet. *Nero* 28 f. calls Pythagoras Doryphorus, which, as Colin (*loc. cit.*) indicates, is probably a generic, rather than a personal, noun.

and the bestial behavior preceded the marriage to Pythagoras, but Dio's chronology places the events in the sequence prescribed by the order of Mithraic grades ³⁷).

The evidence, therefore, suggests that Nero's interest in Mithra, unlike his fascination with the *dea Syria*, lasted long enough for him to undergo baptism and assume three grades at least: that of Nymphus, the most liable to misinterpretation and derogation; that of Leo, the most frequent ³⁸); and, with the sponsorship of Tiridates, a higher grade, perhaps that of Perses ³⁹). Tacitus, on the other hand, has apparently omitted all mention, in as much of his text as we possess, of the Leo ceremony, the Sporus marriage, and the religious nature of the Tiridates banquet, with the result that he emphasizes, through literal accounts of the baptism (?) and the Pythagoras „marriage”, Nero's disdain for Roman *mores*, his complete abandonment of virility, and a disregard for the moral order.

Nor are parallels lacking in other authors. In his vitriolic *Second Philippic*, for example, Cicero compares Antony to a harlot taken in wedlock by Curio ⁴⁰, although there was surely no religious element involved. More apposite is Juvenal who, in the passage Colin discusses, attaches immoral significance to an act of religious symbolism ⁴¹). We may also mention Martial who, in a derisive vein, notes that the bearded Callistratus has married a man in the manner of a maiden ⁴²).

Messalina's Marriage to Silius

The „marriage” of Nero and Pythagoras is less startling if we turn

37) Dio Cass. *Epit.* 62.28.2 f., 63(62).13.1 f.

38) Angus (above, note 27) 88.

39) Cumont (above, note 22) 3.2.1949. The grades of both Leo and Perses purified themselves with honey, and, following Mazdean traditions, partook of a mystic banquet believed to produce supernatural effects. Cf. F. Cumont, *Textes et monuments figurés relatifs aux mystères de Mithra* (Brussels 1896/1899) 1.320 f.

40) *Philip.* 2.18.44: Sumpsisti virilem, quam statim muliebre togam reddidisti. Primo volgare scortum; certa flagiti merces, nec ea parva; sed cito Curio intervenit qui te a meretricio quaestu abduxit et, tamquam stolam dedisset, in matrimonio stabili et certo conlocavit.

41) Colin (above, note 29) 188-91 also discusses the Pythagoras marriage and concludes that it is an initiation into a mystery cult, but he omits Cumont's contributions and does not specify that the closest resemblance is to Mithraism rather than to Mâ-Bellona, Cybele, or other cults.

42) Martial 12.42:

our attention to the bigamous marriage of Messalina, Claudius' empress, to C. Silius in 48 A. D. Messalina and Silius by their marriage are said to have aimed at a *coup d'état* (*Ann.* 11.26.2, 5). Narcissus, Claudius' freedman, informed the emperor, who was then at Ostia, and warned him to make haste or Silius would be in command of the city (11.30.5). Messalina and Silius were subsequently celebrating a vintage revel in which each played a leading role in Bacchic garb, presumably as Dionysus and Ariadne⁴³). At the approach of Claudius the guests scattered; they were later apprehended and a good many of them were executed (11.32.1-3; 11.35.4-7). Narcissus, after preventing Messalina from achieving a hearing, gave the order for her death (11.37.3).

J. Colin has suggested a useful interpretation of Tacitus' account of the affair⁴⁴). Colin believes that the marriage and the revel were just one event, not two occurrences separated in time. Colin further believes that Messalina and Silius, although guilty of scandalous conduct, were never truly married. He reminds us that the Bacchic rites included on occasion a ritual or mystical wedding which was, in certain respects, strikingly similar to a real marriage. The imperial freedman, who feared and distrusted Messalina after she had succeeded in destroying one of his colleagues (Dio Cass. 60.31.2), had decided to effect her ruin. Narcissus hastened to misrepresent this vintage revel⁴⁵) to Claudius as an actual marriage, aimed at revolution. Then,

Barbatus rigido nupsit Callistratus Afro
 Hac qua lege viro nubere virgo solet.
 Praeluxere faces, velarunt flammea vultus,
 Nec tua defuerunt verba, Talasse, tibi.
 Dos etiam dicta est. Nondum tibi, Roma, videtur
 Hoc satis? expectas numquid ut et pariat?

43) Furneaux (above, note 20) 45, n.

44) J. Colin, „Les vendanges dionysiaques et la légende de Messaline (48 ap. J.-C.): Tacite, *Annales*, XI, 25-38”, *Études Class.* 24 (1956) 25-39.

45) Colin assigns the revel to August 19, the date of the *Vinalia Rustica*, a festival in honor of Jupiter (Fowler [above, note 6] 204-6) and hardly appropriate for a rite which was clearly in honor of Bacchus. In ancient Italy the vintage usually began near the end of September and lasted through October (Varro *De re rust.* 1.34.2; Pliny *H. N.* 18.318). Tacitus' phrase, *adulto autumnno* (11.31.4), seems then to refer to a time in October, probably in the middle of the month. Mommsen assigns to October 15 a vintage festival in honor of Liber: *Corpus Inscr. Lat.* 1, p. 332.

when Claudius hesitated, Narcissus himself saw to Messalina's execution.

Conclusion

We are confident that we have contributed some pertinent sources of illumination for the background of these notorious Neronian episodes in the *Annals*, although we regard the absence of certainty as manifest in dealing with elusive concepts and extraordinary historical personages. Professor H. Wagenvoort from the University of Utrecht when consulted about this matter has sagaciously reminded us by letter, for example, that one could with profit stress the sentence in Suet. *Nero* 27.3, where it is observed that Nero was regularly provided on shores or banks with arrangements similar to those at Tigellinus' banquet as often as the emperor was cruising down the Tiber or in the Gulf of Baiae, occasions when it was not Nero's purpose to attract public attention to his love of Rome, as it was in the instance of Tigellinus' banquet.

THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN THE ISLAMIC AND ROMAN EMPIRES

BY

W. MONTGOMERY WATT

1. *The Problem*

The following reflections ¹⁾ are those of an Islamist who has been concerned to show the integrating function of religion in Islamic civilization, and who has then looked farther afield and noticed another great civilization, the Roman, in which religion apparently played little part. If religion has an important function in one civilization, then there is a presumption that it has a comparable function in other civilizations. On the other hand, if it can be shown that religion has little relevance to the growth of one civilization, then perhaps scholars are mistaken in ascribing great importance to it in others. In short, if Roman civilization is a civilization without religion, can religion be of central importance in Islamic civilization?

Before considering this question in itself, let us examine the terms in which it is stated. In particular is it justifiable to take Islamic and Roman civilizations—or the Islamic and Roman empires—as comparable entities? Arnold Toynbee has taught us to think of the Roman empire as a single phase of Hellenic civilization, and it might therefore seem that it was not a proper object of comparison with Islamic civilization, which itself contains many phases. Yet other perspectives than Toynbee's are possible, and there seem to be suffi-

1) This paper was read to the British Section of the International Association for the History of Religion on Sept. 28th, 1961. An earlier version was given at the Study Centre in Toulouse of the Little Brothers of Jesus on April 21st, 1961 under the title "Quelques aperçus sur la fonction de la religion dans les civilisations romaine et musulmane". The material was also used in a lecture in the Faculty of Arts, University of Edinburgh, on Feb. 9, 1962. The author gratefully acknowledges help from Dr. T. J. Cadoux, Senior Lecturer in Ancient History, Edinburgh, which has enabled him to correct several inaccuracies. Dr. Cadoux is, of course, in no way responsible either for the general view adopted or for points of detail.

cient parallels between the Islamic and Roman empires to justify attempting a comparison of the function of religion in the two.

The *prima facie* parallelism might be briefly stated as follows. The Arabs were a relatively primitive people living on the fringe of lands of higher civilization, who conquered these lands and incorporated them in an empire. To this empire they gave the religion which was the binding element, while at the same time they themselves adopted the higher civilization of the peoples they had conquered. In the case of Rome also, after a different early development, there was a conquest of lands of higher civilization—first the Etruscans and the Greeks of Italy, then the Greek and Hellenistic cities of the eastern Mediterranean; and this was followed by Rome's adoption of Hellenism. To this empire the binding element was contributed by Rome. Here, however, there appears to be a fundamental difference, for the binding element in the Roman empire, it is commonly thought, was not religion but a form of political administration, at first republican and then autocratic. This is a feature which will have to be looked at more closely. Meanwhile, what has been said shows that the special relationship of Roman civilization to Greek does not preclude a comparison with Islamic civilization.

It must be admitted, however, that the influence of Rome on the lands of higher civilization which it conquered was far less than that of the Arabs on the comparable lands they conquered. Iraq became thoroughly Muslim, but Athens remained more Greek than Roman. Consequently, when Roman civilization is spoken of in what follows, the emphasis will be on those parts of the Graeco-Roman world where the distinctive Roman contribution was and is dominant, that is, roughly speaking, the Western Roman Empire. Moreover, though Roman civilization persisted as such for many centuries, and still in some measure continues in Western Europe, the old Roman religion was replaced by Christianity about 300 A.D. A study of the place of religion in the Roman empire must therefore be confined to the period before 300 A.D., even if the student's judgement is influenced by what he knows of the later flowering of Roman civilization. Indeed the most profitable period for study is the formative period down to the time of Augustus.

With these remarks to give an indication of the general orientation of the discussion, I pass on to elaborate another of the ambiguous

terms used in the first formulation of the problem — “integration”. In what sense can religion be said to perform an integrating function in Islamic civilization?

2. *The Place of Religion in the Islamic empire* ²⁾

The remarkable series of conquests by the Arabs in the twenty years after Muhammad's death made them masters of Syria, Egypt, Iraq and, at least potentially, of Persia. The first three were lands of ancient civilization which had after the conquests of Alexander acquired a veneer of Hellenism. In these lands the Muslim Arabs constituted themselves a ruling aristocracy. The material aspects of this civilization were quickly adopted, and much of the older intellectual tradition was, as it were, taken into the body of the Islamic community in the measure that the bearers of that tradition became Muslims. By 800, under the Abbasid caliphs of Bagdad, men from a great variety of racial and cultural backgrounds had become Muslims. Though they were now far too numerous to be called an aristocracy, they constituted a class of superior or full citizens in contrast to the inferior status of non-Muslims. In the course of centuries a high degree of homogeneity developed in this class of full citizens, together with a sense of brotherhood and of belonging to a community. I shall try to show how this came about by considering various aspects separately.

(1) *The social aspect* — meaning by “social” ethical and legal. Already in the Qur'an there was a certain ethical and legal framework. In essence this may be described as an adaptation of the ethics of Arabian nomads to the conditions of life in towns such as Mecca and Medina. Only the points where change was necessary were mentioned; for the rest it was assumed that local customs would continue. The transition from the small city-state of Muhammad, with only some three thousand fighting men at first, to the mighty empire of the caliph of Bagdad took place more easily than might have been supposed. The various communities of non-Muslims—Christians, Jews and others—which were allowed to remain within the empire were given almost complete internal autonomy. Thus the Islamic

²⁾ This section is based on my *Islam and the Integration of Society*, London, 1961.

system of ethics and law applied only to the Muslims, and for most of the seventh century A.D. these were merely the comparatively small number of Arabs in the occupying armies.

The numerous conversions to Islam in the eighth century made it desirable to undertake a more thoroughgoing adaptation of the Islamic legal system to the needs of settled and urban populations. In the course of making this adaptation increasing reliance came to be placed on Traditions, i.e. anecdotes about what Muhammad had said or done on particular occasions. Sound Tradition, indeed, came to be recognized as a form of scripture, almost on the same level as the Qur'an. Muslim scholars, however, soon realized that Traditions were being forged, and worked out criteria for distinguishing sound from dubious or false Traditions. Despite this Western scholars are practically unanimous in holding that much that is not authentic is included in the so-called "sound" Traditions. What is to be specially noted in the present context, however, is that by this process of inventing Traditions—whether accepted as "sound" by Muslim scholars or not—converts to Islam who had been bearers of the old culture of Iraq and other lands brought with them something of their heritage. One well-known Tradition, occurring in many forms, repeats the phrase of *Genesis* about God creating Adam in his image; while another puts most of the Lord's Prayer into Muhammad's mouth.³)

All this is interesting and the kind of thing that might be expected. What surprises the student of these matters when he examines the facts closely is that the vast expenditure of time and effort in elaborating Islamic law on the basis of Qur'an and Tradition cannot be justified by the practical requirements of the law-courts. The Shari'ah—what we call "Islamic Law"—is essentially an ideal system. Even its strictly legal parts (in our sense of "legal") are not applied by a Muslim judge or court except when the political sovereign has given instructions to this effect. Apart from this large sections deal with liturgical matters, such as postures in the formal prayers, which the Westerner does not regard as coming within the scope of law, and which were not enforced by Muslim courts. I have therefore

3) For the former cf. Montgomery Watt, "Created in His Image", *Transactions of the Glasgow University Oriental Society*, xix. (Glasgow, 1961); for the latter cf. I. Goldziher, *Muhammedanische Studien*, ii. 386, and Louis Massignon in RHR, cxxiii. 57-62.

put forward the view that this extensive activity on the Shari'ah is due to the belief that the existence, even in theory, of such a system of ethical and legal principles was a sign that the Islamic community was a charismatic community, that is, one where membership of the community conferred salvation on a man. The Shari'ah or revealed law was the mark that the Islamic community had been founded by God and given its distinctive way of life by him. To know this revealed way of life in detail and to devote oneself to systematizing and elaborating it was clearly one of the worthiest occupations a man could have.

(2) *The intellectual aspect.* The development of the intellectual side of Islam—its theology—is not unlike that of Christianity. Both possess scriptures—the Qur'an and the New Testament—in which their central ideas find expression, but not in any systematic form. In the course of internal sectarian controversies and of apologetic and polemic with external rivals both had to formulate their essential doctrines clearly and precisely. Both had to come to terms with the higher secular learning of the day—Greek philosophy—and did so in roughly similar ways. The final result in the Islamic world was an amalgam of Islamic and Greek thought—or, more exactly, and with a different metaphor—a superstructure of Islamic dogma on a foundation of Greek logic. This was the intellectual house in which all educated Muslims lived after about the twelfth century. There was indeed a minority which hesitated about accepting Greek logic; and the common people were attracted by mystical movements, some of which tended to heresy. Nevertheless for most of the period from 1100 to 1800 the Islamic world, especially in its higher cultural levels, has been dominated by a single intellectual tradition, primarily Islamic but incorporating something of Greek learning. This has been an important factor in producing the homogeneity of Islamic civilization.

(3) *The political aspect.* Although Islam has the reputation of being a political religion, politics is the field in which the principles of the Qur'an and the Shari'ah have had least effect. From the advent of the Abbasid dynasty in 750 the central administration of the caliphate was chiefly in accordance with the Persian imperial tradition; and this continued to be so when, about 950, power passed from the caliphs

to various dynasties of war-lords or military leaders, often called sultans. The reason for the adoption of Persian precedents in politics was that the Islamic religion could not detach itself from the example of Muhammad; and on the political side what had been appropriate to Muhammad's modest principality was not appropriate to the larger and more sophisticated states of later times. Consequently the great Islamic states came to have central administrations based on principles that were not linked to those of the Qur'an.

Yet primitive Islam left one important legacy in the political field — the conception of the Muslims as constituting a community analogous to a nomadic tribe. This conception continued to govern the relation of Muslim administrations to non-Muslim groups. Just as a strong desert tribe gave protection to a weak tribe in return for a payment, so the tribe of Muslims protected groups of Christians or Jews who submitted and paid tribute. The conception of the Islamic community as a tribe and the conception of it as charismatic are also linked; for in many cases the pre-Islamic Arabs had thought of themselves as receiving all that was of value in their lives from membership of their tribe. If they were noble, honourable and — according to their lights — virtuous, that was because they came from a tribe that was noble, honourable and virtuous. It is as certain as most things can be in this field that those Arabs who thought of their tribe in this way, later — on becoming Muslims — thought of the Islamic community in much the same way. So from another side we come to the conception of the charismatic community.

(4) *The aspect of corporate unity.* The appearance of a rift within the community is usually traced to the events surrounding the assassination of Uthman and accession of Ali. Among Ali's supporters, and those of his descendants after him, were some who regarded the family as having a hereditary charisma which made them divinely-inspired leaders; out of these people grew the sect of the Shi'ites. Opposed to them were the Kharijites who did not believe in the existence of charismatic leaders of this kind but who looked for salvation to membership of the "saving sect" — the charismatic community. A certain exclusiveness in the Kharijites led to their being regarded as heretics, but out of their movement came the dominant faction in Islam in later times — the Sunnites. When we speak of Islam we are usually

thinking mainly of Sunnite Islam. Apart from the Shi'ites, who are themselves divided, there are no important sectaries in Islam — only small pockets of nearly-extinct sects in remote areas. The great majority of Muslims are Sunnites. It is chiefly Sunnism that has given Islam its homogeneity, and at the heart of Sunnism is the conception of the charismatic community. It has already been noticed how this conception inspired the activity leading to the elaboration of the Shari'ah. The essence of the Shari'ah is following the *sunnah* or "beaten track" of Muhammad, which finds expression in the sound Traditions; and it is precisely from this *sunnah* that the name Sunnite (*Sunnī*) is derived. Thus the most important source of the unity in Islam is this conception of the charismatic community.

3. *The Place of Religion in the Roman Empire*

Before comparing Roman religion with Islam in respect of the four aspects mentioned, it will be useful to glance at the various phases in the development and decline of Roman religion.⁴)

The earliest phase is that of a peasant religion, suited to the needs of the peasants of the plain of Latium and its hills. These peasants seem to have regarded all the powers that might help, hinder or harm them, as they went about the business of keeping alive, as being in some sense divine. The powers were conceived as impersonal and were not in any way personified. This is the common outlook of the primitive peasant, aware of the precarious character of his existence and of his puniness over against the mighty forces of nature. (Etruscan and Italian influences are traced by the experts at an early period, but, since they do not much alter the general picture, they may be neglected here).

The second phase is the founding of a state religion. This followed

4) Books about Roman religion which have been consulted include: K. Latte, *Römische Religionsgeschichte*, Munich, 1960; H. J. Rose, *Ancient Roman Religion*, London, 1949; Cyril Bailey, *Phases in the Religion of Ancient Rome*, Oxford, 1932; H. Wagenvoort, *Roman Dynamism*, Oxford, 1947. It was only in the course of the discussion at London that my attention was called to the numerous works of Georges Dumézil. My impression, for what it is worth, is that he has found some weaknesses in the arguments of the dominant school, but that his own views have not yet been generally accepted. In any case the differences hardly affect the line of thought of this study which is concerned not with religious origins but with certain sociological features of religious change in a developing society.

on the establishment of Rome as a city, that is, as a centre of government for a wider area than the inhabited hills and the neighbouring fields and farms. The existence of a state religion and various official cults did not, of course, mean the end of the peasant religion — for centuries the peasants retained their beliefs and rites with little change, though in some cases attitudes may have been modified by the state cult. Thus Jupiter, originally a weather god, became among other things the god of military decision.⁵⁾ In essence the official religion was a development of that of the peasants, brought about by regarding the whole state as a “household”. One notable example of this is the importance of the state cult of Vesta, a deity who is none other than the power present in the domestic hearth. The temple of Vesta thus becomes the hearth of the city-state.⁶⁾ This official religion attained great complexity, and the complexity meant that in order to carry out ceremonies with the appropriate forms much knowledge was required. This requirement led to the appearance of a class of religious intellectuals. The chief of these was the Pontifex Maximus, who had many *pontifices* and *flamines* directly subordinate to him, though the Augurs, the Haruspices and the Decemvirs for the Sibylline books were independent.

This official religion presided over by the Pontifex Maximus was at first closely linked with the privileges of the patricians. Some of the offices in the state religion remained exclusive to patricians. In course of time the patricians had to admit to a share in political power and to many of the priesthoods that section of the Roman citizenry know as the plebeians; yet this did not mean an abolition of privilege, but only the widening of the privileged group. As Roman power expanded there was an increasing number of Roman subjects who had not the privileges of full citizens. From the religious standpoint this meant that there was still a close link between official religion and the privileged class.

The chief factor leading to the decadence of Roman religion would appear to be the control of religious observances and institutions by members of the privileged class, and the exercise of this control in the interests of their own class. They indeed paid some attention to the

5) Latte, p. 21.

6) Ibid. 19.

needs of many of the citizens of the state. The old cults were mostly retained, but these were primarily peasant cults, and ceased to meet the needs of town-dwellers as the latter became increasingly cut off from the countryside. Some of the new cults introduced from Greece about the 3rd century B.C. went a little way towards meeting the needs of the urban population, or at least of certain sections; cults of Hercules and Mercury had special interest for merchants, that of Minerva for artisans, that of Diana for slaves.⁷⁾ Because of the class alignment of the religious intellectuals, however, the full range of popular aspiration was either hidden from them or, in some cases where they were aware of it, distasteful to them. The common people, then, while not rejecting the official religion, became increasingly aware of needs in themselves which it left unsatisfied, and were increasingly attracted to various eastern cults.⁸⁾

The third phase of Roman religion to be considered here is that of Hellenization. It is mentioned for the sake of completeness, though it does not seem to have much relevance to our main problem. Within this phase of Hellenization various aspects can be distinguished. (1) In the earliest instances of the adoption of Hellenic deities the reason for adoption appears to be animistic. That is to say, Romans whose religious outlook was still predominantly animistic came to feel that there were gaps — which might be real or imaginary — in their worship and that some of the powers that dominated their lives were neglected; and so they took over some Greek deity to fill this gap. Thus they had no cult specially referring to medical skill, and took over the Greek cult of Apollo; but it is interesting to note that it was

7) Ibid. 26.

8) It may also be noted that the control of religion exercised by the *pontifices* or religious intellectuals of Rome was greater than that exercised by the ulema or religious intellectuals of Islam. The latter were bound by scriptures familiar to large numbers of people, whereas Roman religion had no published documents. There was, of course, public knowledge of the outward aspects of the ceremonies, but it seems doubtful if this public knowledge placed any appreciable limit on the control by the *pontifices*. The verbal formulas to be used and many of the details of the rites were secret lore known only to them. For the general attitude of the religious officials cf. F. R. Cowell, *Cicero and the Roman Republic*, Harmondsworth, 1956, 179-86. It should be noted, however, that this was not the whole of the story. E.g. a plebeian cult of Ceres, Liber and Libera was established in 496 outside the pomerium, and this was under plebeian aediles (Bailey, *Phases*, 123 f.).

in this single respect that they worshipped Apollo; the other sides of the Greek cult were neglected.⁹⁾ (2) At a somewhat later date Latin poets and writers began to identify Greek and Roman deities, and to attach to the Roman names the characteristics and the legends of the Greek gods and goddesses. Although Roman literature is dominated by this practice, it is probable that the old Latin attitudes to the powers on which man is dependent were little changed. For this literary aspect of Hellenization two reasons may be adduced. One is the growing admiration of the Romans for Greek culture, which they saw was in many ways superior to their own. The other reason was that, with the growth of their political system, they realized that their lives were becoming less exclusively dependent on natural forces, and that success and failure were at least in part the result of human organizing and administrative skill. The increasing importance of this human factor gave a certain appropriateness to the humanized Greek deities. (3) There was also an intellectual or philosophical aspect of Hellenization. Educated Romans found much to attract them in later Greek philosophy, especially Stoicism. Philosophers had thought about religion, and the philosophical problems it raised, and there is nothing to show that it was in essence impossible to work out a basis of philosophical theology for Roman religion; the Pontifex Maximus Q. Mucius Scaevola (consul in 95 B.C.) distinguished the mythical religion of the poets, the official state religion and the religion of the philosophers, and held that only the last was true, though the official religion was good for the masses.¹⁰⁾ This is not unlike views held in the Islamic West by men like Ibn-Tufayl and Averroes, and might have led to genuine theology. What prevented such a development was doubtless the general decline of Roman religion following on its failure to meet the personal religious needs of the urban masses.

After the phase of Hellenization but overlapping considerably came a fourth phase — the Augustan revival. This may be a continuation or resumption of the policy of earlier *pontifices*. It was an attempt to use religion to deepen men's loyalty to the state, both by reviving a feeling for the state religion among the Romans themselves, and by fostering religious sentiment towards Rome among the provincials. To a great

9) Latte, 23.

10) Ibid. 29.

extent it was acceptable to the inhabitants of the empire, while those who aided Augustus in bringing about the revival — men like Virgil and Horace — seem to have believed sincerely in what they proclaimed. The revival comprised encouragement to worship Dea Roma, the Genius of the emperor and his ancestors, and sometimes the emperor himself. In addition old rites and ceremonies were restored. Where possible, however, they were connected with events in the life of the emperor.¹¹⁾ Thus there was an exaltation of the position of the emperor as charismatic leader. Men realized that much of what made life pleasant or even possible came not merely from the corporate entity they referred to as Rome, but from the more-than-normal gifts of the individual man who had brought order out of chaos. It would seem, then, that there was a genuine core of religion in the Augustan revival — it was not concerned with mere political loyalty. It did not go far enough, however, for it failed to satisfy the growing demand for a personal religion.

We need not here follow the story of Roman religion further. It mainly consists of the decline of the official religion and the growth of various oriental religions, until at the beginning of the fourth century A.D. one of these — Christianity — became the dominant religion of the empire and gradually ousted the remnants of the old Roman cults. This growth of personal religion is parallel to the appearance of mysticism and the dervish orders in Islam, and suggests as a point for investigation whether membership of a vast empire, at least where it is highly urbanised, leads to new needs which have to be met by a new form of religion. Leaving aside such perspectives, however, let us turn to consider Roman religion under the four heads which have already been applied to Islam.

(1) *The social aspect.* Here corresponding to the Shari'ah is the vast structure of Roman law. In the earliest period the basic ideas of Roman law were closely linked with religion, but the development mostly took place autonomously.¹²⁾ *Ius*, the fundamental concept, had both religious and non-religious aspects, until in course of time *ius*

11) Ibid. 31 f.

12) Cf. Max Kaser, *Das römische Privatrecht*, Munich, 1955, i. 22 f.; also Bailey, *Phases*, 164. The conception of "autonomy" is further discussed in the second half of section 4.

divinum was distinguished from *ius civile*. The elaboration of Roman law came from experience and practice, for the Romans had a wonderful capacity for learning by trial and error. Guided by their general conceptions of justice and fairness they worked out a system which their subjects found thoroughly acceptable. This was undoubtedly a great source of strength to their empire.

It is worth noting that, in contrast to the religious cults, this social or legal aspect of Roman life was dependent on published texts. The Laws of the Twelve Tables are said to have been promulgated in 450 B.C., and each year, as a new praetor took office, he announced the principles on which he was going to administer justice, much of his statement being taken over from his predecessor. In addition to these documents there were *leges*, *senatus consulta*, *responsa juris prudentium*, and (in the Principate) *constitutiones principum*. Though the character of the documents differs, there is, in general, a resemblance in the functions of Roman law and of the Shari'ca, but the former is less obviously connected with religion.

(2) *The intellectual aspect.* Although Roman religion, like Islam, had to encounter Greek philosophy, the results of the encounter were very different in the two cases. As already suggested, this was due in part to the fact that Roman religion was already in decline when the encounter took place. There were other differences, too. In the early days the ideas underlying the Roman cults were probably not made fully explicit. The public fact was the external aspect of the cult. This must be regarded as resting on certain ideas, however, and it should have been theoretically possible, under the stimulus of philosophy, for these ideas to have become explicit. That they did not do so may be ascribed by some to the absence of a religious leader of sufficient depth and ability. But even if scholars are satisfied with this explanation, they have still to meet the further question whether this failure of a religious leader to appear is not itself due to an unpropitious climate of opinion — in other words, to a general decline of religion.

It must not be thought, however, that Roman religion completely failed at the intellectual level. Something was achieved by the philosophers' activity at Rome from the time of Panaetius (2nd century B.C.) onwards. A book like Cicero's *De Natura Deorum* shows that

the intellectual milieu existed, even if Cicero himself lacked genuine religious depth. Something further in this direction was perhaps achieved by the Augustan revival. In short, though Roman religion did not provide a homogeneous intellectual basis for the subjects of the empire, there were certain potentialities which might well have been realized had the religion been able to maintain itself in existence. Something was indeed achieved in the intellectual formulation of legal concepts.

(3) *The political aspect.* The great success of Rome was in producing a political and administrative structure which was capable of becoming the foundation of an empire.¹³⁾ This success is an example of the working of what is sometimes called "the practical genius of the Roman people". The structure was elaborated by a process of trial and error, though always within limits set by the values of Roman law.

No more here than in the later Islamic world was the political system the product of the religion. In both empires rather may be seen the proper autonomy of politics. Yet, just as in Islam the "tribe" concept dominant in the environment where the religion grew up played an important part in the later empire, so in Rome the early conception of the city-state continued to have some influence until the very end of the empire.¹⁴⁾ The nature of the unity of the city-state, however, leads on to the fourth aspect.

(4) *The aspect of corporate unity.* It has at once to be conceded that, whereas in Islam all party strife—even when it was what we should describe as essentially political—put on a religious dress, party strife at Rome was conceived in a secular way. This is an indication that the corporate unity of the Roman state was not normally thought of in religious terms, probably as the result of the autonomous development of law and politics. On the other hand, it might be due in part to the fact that one of the chief parties had gained almost ab-

13) This was developed from the distinctive Roman conception of inter-state relationships.

14) A witness to the continuing strength of the conception is possibly Saint Augustine's use of the phrase *civitas Dei* to describe the Church; but this may be influenced by *polis* and its derivatives in the New Testament.

solute control of religious affairs, with the result that anyone who tried to give a religious basis to a social or political movement could speedily be incontrovertibly refuted *at the religious level*. (This suggests that the religious form of political movements in Islam is not wholly due to the general religious climate, but also in part to the fact that a claim to something like prophethood was a convenient justification for such a movement, and one that could not easily be refuted.)

Careful examination does indeed show that the corporate unity of the Roman state had a religious basis. While the Islamic state was thought of as a larger tribe, the Roman state was thought of, or was unconsciously regarded, as a larger peasant household; and this had strong religious links. The honour shown to the temple of Vesta and the Vestal virgins is an indication of the depth of religious sentiment attached to the state as a greater household.¹⁵⁾ Moreover this religious way of thinking of the state was the complement of the secular way of thinking. One of the proudest and most famous memorials of Roman grandeur is the symbolic SPQR — “the Roman senate and people”. The political community was directed by the older men in much the same way as the household was directed by the *paterfamilias*. Indeed the senators were also known as *patres*.

When conquests of territory outside Italy became numerous, the unity of the state-household was maintained, but it acquired a greater complexity. Those who came within the ambit of Roman rule might stand in one of many different grades of relationship to the rulers. The material benefits of the *pax Romana*, and the realization of the high standards of justice and fairness generally attained by Roman administrations brought the great majority of the subject people to accept Roman rule willingly. Besides, there was always the possibility of attaining the highest status — that of full Roman citizen. The importance of this status and the way in which it was coveted are vividly illustrated by the well-known dialogue at Jerusalem between

15) Cf. C. Bailey, *Religion in Virgil*, Oxford, 1935, 116 f. Virgil accepts the identification of the old god Quirinus with the deified Romulus, and thus emphasises the city's divine origin. There was another divine link in the special relationship of Rome with Iuppiter (cf. Bailey, *Phases*, 169 ff.). A successful general rode in Iuppiter's chariot and had his face painted to resemble that of the god. “For the day the triumphant general was Iuppiter himself, and in his person was embodied the greatness of Rome” (ibid. 171).

Paul and the Roman centurion who had ordered him to be flogged.¹⁶⁾ While republican Rome had shown itself ready, at least after 90 B.C., to expand the privileged group of full citizens, the emperors made lavish grants of full citizenship and thereby accelerated the enlargement of the privileged group (with some consequent reduction in the value of the privileges). All this process bears some resemblance to what happened in the Islamic world. The Muslims were a privileged group in the earlier empire of the Umayyads, and the group was greatly enlarged in course of time by conversion.

Interesting light is thrown on the ideas governing the extension of full citizen rights by the treatment of the gods of the Latin cities. As the Latin cities became "allies" of Rome their gods were given temples there, but the Latins did not come to attend the feasts there. From this it is seen that the Romans did not think of themselves and the Latins as a single community whose cults had been amalgamated. The temples at Rome to the Latin gods are not an attempt to provide worship for a federation, but to strengthen the Roman state-household by the favour of powers it had not hitherto worshipped. Thus the conception of the Roman state as an enlarged household is seen to be central. Something of the religious associations of the conception must have persisted too, though doubtless these became weaker when citizen-rights became more widespread in imperial times. The continued use of the formula SPQR after the senate had ceased to have much real power—compare and contrast our own OHMS—is perhaps a sign of the unconscious religious significance which the Roman community had for its members.

One interesting point of difference between Rome and Islam may be mentioned here. The conception of the Roman state as a community with religious significance—which seems to be sufficient to justify the appellation of charismatic community—is parallel to the conception of the community in Sunnite Islam. In Islam, however, a cleavage appeared between those who looked for salvation to the charismatic community—the Sunnites—and those who looked to the charismatic leader—the Shi'ites. In Rome, on the other hand, a harmony was attained between the two conceptions. The ancient kings were a type of charismatic leader, and even under the republic some acknow-

16) *Acts*, 22, 23-29.

ledgement of charismatic leadership was made in the case of successful generals. This fact was taken advantage of by Augustus and his successors. The word *imperator* suggests an individual with charisma.¹⁷⁾ The worship of the Genius Augusti was the explicit recognition of the charisma. Despite all the prestige of the emperors, however, this belief in charismatic leadership did not conflict with belief in the charismatic community. On the contrary, harmony was established between the religious claims of the leader and the community.

It might be thought that while there was at Rome some acknowledgement of the community as a religious entity, this acknowledgement was in line with the immanence of the early Roman religion. That is to say, just as the Roman peasants recognized the power of natural forces in a this-worldly sense and without any thought of transcendence, so the Roman community was acknowledged as a power-bearing this-worldly entity, in some sense an end in itself, with no transcendent end as a criterion for judging its achievements. There is much in this argument, and the question of transcendence in the old peasant religion is too complex to be treated here. Undoubtedly there was a danger of treating Roman power as an end in itself and the interests of Rome as the supreme moral criterion. Yet this was not the whole truth. Wherever it came from—perhaps from the old conception of *ius*, probably in part from Stoicism—there was a sense of transcendence. Let it suffice here to refer to the well-known lines of Virgil:

“Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento
(hae tibi erunt artes), pacisque imponere morem,
parcere subiectis et debellare superbos.”¹⁸⁾

The sense of the special vocation of Rome expressed in these lines implies that the destiny of Rome was seen as part of something greater, and therefore that the worldly success of Rome was not the final end.

17) Cf. Wagenvoort, *Roman Dynamism*, 59-72.

18) *Aeneid*, vi. 851-3. Cyril Bailey, in discussing the special relation to Iuppiter mentioned in a previous note, expresses the view that the worship of Iuppiter might have developed into monotheism, but did not do so because Rome was so successful that she felt no need for divine help. He therefore doubts the existence of any conception of a transcendent end: “there never arose a conception that the divine purpose could be anything else than the prosperity of Rome itself” (*Phases*, 171); “in worshipping him (sc. Iuppiter) the Roman people saw but the reflected image of itself” (172); “in his place in the religion of the State he (sc. Iuppiter) had become little else than its own impersonation” (173). The words “little else” in the last question leave a slight loophole, however.

4. *Conclusions*

After this examination of the place of religion in the Roman state, an attempt must be made to formulate some conclusions. These may be arranged under two heads.

Firstly, the examination has shown that religion played a part in the Roman state not unlike that of Islam in the Islamic state-system. The extent of the parallels has indeed been surprising, especially in view of the current impression that religion counted for very little in Rome. Further reflection shows that this misleading impression can be accounted for. For one thing the old Roman religion was more primitive than Islam and much less intelligible to the modern mind. For another, because Roman religion had no "scriptures", the modern scholar fails to notice its existence; his most familiar source is the work of poets and other writers, and for these men religion was not altogether real—that at least is the impression they give. It has to be remembered, too, that Roman religion faded away, and that much of our material comes from the period of decline and decadence. Thus there are strong reasons why Roman religion should have the appearance of being uninfluential. Despite this appearance, however, the examination that has been made shows that the Roman empire is far from being a community in whose growth and unification religion played no part.

Secondly, the question must be considered of how precisely religion performs its integrative function in society. With this matter is connected the feature which I have described as the relative autonomy of the ethical-legal and political spheres, or, in other words, the appearance of ethical and political developments which were not derived from the central religious concepts.¹⁹⁾ This feature is more prominent in the Roman empire than in the Islamic. The development of Roman law was almost entirely independent of religion, and the Roman political system was built up from certain original conceptions by a process of trial and error, which is a non-religious criterion for the acceptance and rejection of practices and institutions. At Rome,

19) Cf. *Islam and the Integration of Society*, 178-83. Since the lecture was delivered I have noticed on re-reading Professor A. Macbeath's Gifford Lectures, *Experiments in Living*, London, 1952, pp. 291-350, that he insists on the autonomy of ethics, and regards promoting group solidarity as an important function of religious ritual and ceremonial (347; cf. 306, 311).

too, the religious intellectuals, owing to the absence of written scriptures, had less opportunity to control legal and political affairs; while as members of the privileged ruling class they already had a sufficient share of political power to make them uninterested in the dubious prospect of controlling the growth of institutions by the manipulation of religious ideas. All this is in strong contrast to what happened in the Islamic world, though reflection shows that there is actually more autonomy in the Islamic world than appears at first sight. For example, in so far as non-Qur'anic and non-Islamic material was incorporated in invented Traditions and these invented Traditions made the basis of legal and political ideas and practices, the latter had come into being autonomously (in the sense just explained). The autonomy, however, was, perhaps unconsciously, concealed by the outward form of the Traditions. At Rome, on the other hand, there was no such attempt at concealment, and the process of development therefore appears to be a "secular" one.

The various points that have emerged in the course of this study suggest, at least as a provisional hypothesis, a solution to the problem of the manner in which religion integrates society. It is clear that Roman religion had little influence on the details of law and politics. Yet that does not make it impossible that the legal and political developments took place within a framework of ideas—notably the idea of the Roman state-household as a community with religious significance—originally provided by religion and still possessing strong religious undertones. If this is the case—and some reasons have been given for thinking it is—then the function of religion in the integration of Roman civilization is similar to that in Islamic civilization. In Islam the most important integrative factor appears to be the conception of the Islamic community as a charismatic one. This essential closeness despite obvious differences justifies further careful study of the hypothesis, especially in view of its practical relevance. There are those who hope that our "one world" can attain genuine integration by secular means. The Roman experience, if the interpretation here given of it is correct, offers no encouragement to such a hope.

TANTRIC ELEMENTS IN ŚRĪ AUROBINDO¹

BY

KEES W. BOLLE

1. *The Setting of Our Problem*

Every student of India knows how difficult it is to trace the historical course of specific concepts and of specific religious imageries and symbolisms. Every student of Indian philosophy is intrigued, at least at some period in his study, by the common arsenal of concepts in diverse or even opposed schools of thought. Concepts emerge and re-emerge, sometimes with the same, sometimes with changed meanings. We may recall *karma*, *dharma*, *nirvāṇa*, and the multitude of problems concerning a “*proto-Sāṃkhya*”, pre-classical yoga, etc.

In many cases we can perceive a certain continuity. To cite a relatively simple example, the idea of causality seems sufficient to understand *karma*, from its primary significance of ritualistic act which could not be ineffective, to its Buddhist context in which it came to indicate the endless chain of causality to which existence is subject. Needless to add that our understanding cannot lead to an identification of structures, in this case of Vedic ritual and early Buddhism. In philosophy, as in religion proper, continuity means transformation. This denotes in general terms the heart of all the specific problems. For, as in our random example, it would be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to show step by step the transformation of a concept. Even if we had all the necessary documents for such a re-search, we should still have to realize that we could not have predicted this development on the basis of the earliest records. The historian's historiographical endeavours in following the course of specific concepts are as limited,

1) For a general orientation of Tantrism, see especially M. Eliade, *Yoga, Immortality and Freedom* (Bollingen Series LVI; New York: Pantheon, 1958), chap. vi “Yoga and Tantrism” and P. H. Pott, *Yoga en Yantra* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1946). Our topic has been dealt with by a devotee of Śrī Aurobindo, M. P. Pandit, in *Lights on the Tantras* (Madras: Ganesh and Co., 1957), in “Our Yoga and the Tantra”, *Journal of Sri Aurobindo Society*, No. XVI (Bombay, 1960) and in various other publications.

in fact, as modest as they are difficult. What finally matters is the recognition of those living structures, from which such concepts came and derived their life, and of those which they helped to establish.

Especially in regard to India, the historian of religions' work is like that of the historian of philosophy. His problems are no less, e.g., when dealing with the history of specific cults or when trying to determine the borderline between Buddhism and Hinduism. He too has to accept the existence of a common arsenal of elements, the prehistory of each of which is obscure. He sees at most the frames in which they are set, the lives in which they function, the structures in which they fit. He may see a continuation, a change here and there, when some religious re-transformer creates one. In his re-search too, there is modesty galore. However, there is also great delight in the recognition of a kinship in structures, even when such kinship cannot be proven by documentary "evidence", in other words, when no chronological sequence of causes is visible.

2. *Śrī Aurobindo within the History of Religions*

In this paper, we hope to show the continuation of some old Tantric symbolisms in Śrī Aurobindo's *yoga* system. In other words, we hope to convey something of the recognition of structures as we suggested. Our reasons for focusing on Aurobindo's integral *yoga* in particular may be summarized as follows.

In the first place, a religio-historical treatment of Aurobindo may contribute to an understanding of one of the most important religious figures of modern India. A religio-historical treatment means an approach which requires not only historical soundness but also an open eye for symbolic structures. Regardless of the question whether our small article will be a successful endeavour in that direction, such an approach to Aurobindo's system cannot be superfluous, next to already existing analyses. Too often the latter excel in quite unhistorical, deadly conceptualistic speculation or in a wild association of Aurobindo's thought with contemporary philosophies of an entirely different intent and scope ²⁾.

2) Of both, examples can be found in Haridas Chaudhuri and Frederic Spiegelberg (eds.), *The Integral Philosophy of Śrī Aurobindo* (Allen & Unwin, London, 1960).

Secondly, in dealing with Aurobindo, we may see the significance of what we have called a "common arsenal of elements". We may note that we have to take our refuge in a metaphor. What matters is that certain religious symbols "are there"; they are, as it were, "in the air", or, perhaps beter, they seem to be in a concealed reservoir; they come to our attention only when they are grasped or revealed by a religious transformer such as Aurobindo, who presents a new structure with his integral *yoga*.

In the third place — if any necessity for demonstration on this point is felt — the case of Aurobindo is curious in showing us that lack of documentary evidence is not restricted to religio-historical problems of great antiquity, while, at the same time, religious structures come to light, in spite of the apparent absence of causal links.

Finally, if we succeed in showing that crucial symbolisms in Aurobindo's system are of a Tantric character, we are at the same time dealing with Indian religion as a whole. For the "concealed reservoir" is not hidden in the sense that it is inaccessible. On the contrary, the symbolisms caught and recoinced by Aurobindo are for the most part quite accessible, like all symbolic elements in any significant religious renovation. On our part, we believe that Tantric elements are part of Hinduism, much more than is commonly assumed. It is certainly impossible to understand Aurobindo's integral philosophy ("*pūrṇād-vaita*") merely by comparison to the preceding great *vedānta*-systems (*advaita* and *viśiṣṭādvaita*).

3. *Concepts*

The life history of Aurobindo Ghose is well known. He was born in 1872 within a well to do Bengali family. His father admired England, and even as a little boy Aurobindo was educated in English. At the age of seven he was sent to England and returned to India only when he was twenty one years old. There is no doubt that he imbibed a great deal of Western learning. The question of possible Western influences on his thought will occupy us later.

In the beginning of our century, Aurobindo played a considerable role in the political turmoils which were to lead finally to India's independence. Apart from his biographers ³⁾, several authors in the last

3) R. R. Diwakar, *Mahayogi (Life, Sadhana and Teachings of Sri Aurobindo)*

few years have again drawn the attention to Aurobindo's short-lived political career and to his social and political ideas ⁴). Stephen N. Hay speaks of his "reknown as an Extremist leader second only to Tilak in nation wide popularity" ⁵).

However, Aurobindo's political influence is not our immediate concern at present. There is no doubt that the greatest fame, also beyond the borders of India, was won by Aurobindo as a spiritual leader, the *guru* of many *yogins*, the founder and head of the *āśram* in Pondicherry. While Aurobindo remained the center and the spiritual head of the *āśram*, he was greatly assisted in his leadership by "the Mother", a French lady whom he met in 1914 and who stayed with him permanently from 1920 on. She still governs the *āśram*, not only in practical, but also in spiritual matters. The devotees approach her as the principal *guru*.

The scheme of concepts, coined and applied constantly by Aurobindo, is relatively simple. Together with some of the exact and approximate synonyms which he uses, a bare outline of this scheme would look as follows, listing the supposed levels of reality from the top down:

1. Existence, Divine Existence, Pure Existent, Ultimate Reality, Absolute Spirit, Saccidānanda (unmanifest).
2. Consciousness, Force, Conscious Force, Shakti.
3. Bliss.
4. Supermind, Gnosis.
5. Mind.
6. Psyche, Soul.
7. Life.
8. Matter.

Aurobindo's philosophy presents a *yoga*-system. Hence — like the

(Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1953). A. B. Purani, *The Life of Sri Aurobindo* (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1958).

4) E.g. Prof. Haridas and Uma Mukerjee, "*Bande Mataram*" and *Indian Nationalism*, a collection of editorial articles of Sri Aurobindo and B.C. Pal (1906-08), Calcutta 1957 and *Sri Aurobindo's Political Thought* (1893-1908), Calcutta 1958; Wm. Theodore de Bary (ed.), *Sources of Indian Tradition* (New York, 1958), pp. 725 ff. (Introduction and selections from Aurobindo's writings, by Stephen N. Hay).

5) *Sources*, p. 725.

bulk of the traditional *darśanas* — it is not interested in “epistemology”. Not the method or foundation of our knowledge is central, but the transformation of life. His thought begins and ends with a vision that is to be followed, experienced, realized. Consequently, it is not strange that the scheme follows by and large the patterns of *sāṃkhya*, *yoga* and *tantra* expositions. Thus the scheme indicates the unfolding of reality, beginning with concepts of the Absolute which correspond to what in various systems went by the name *sat* or *Sadāśiva*, *Īśvara*, etc., down to all the animate and inanimate things (*carācāra*).

The schematic similarity with earlier systems does not mean identity. In the first place, Aurobindo shows in all his writings a tremendous urge for conceptualization, which, together with his longwinded style, makes for tedious reading. Disregarding his personal stylistic inclination, this urge for conceptualizing — often over-conceptualizing — is understandable. For obviously, he addressed a much wider audience than his predecessors. His audience included and includes many who are not familiar with the ideas which are generally accepted in India. Furthermore, he conceived and wrote his major works in English, a Western language which does not lend itself to the formation of Sanskrit-like *yoga* concepts without a struggle.

In the second place, more significantly, the emphasis in Aurobindo's *yoga* is novel. The opening sentence in S. K. Maitra's brilliant booklet on Aurobindo's system rightly summarizes his basic thought as follows: “The fundamental idea upon which the whole structure of Sri Aurobindo's philosophy rests is that Matter as well as Spirit is to be looked upon as real”⁶). For in the final analysis, Matter also, the lowest plane, is spiritual. This means a refusal of the old dichotomies of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, of *nirvāṇa* and *saṃsāra*, of a real and an illusory existence. Above all however, it means a new resumption of the old Tantric and Tantrified teachings.

According to the latter, *prakṛti* could be identified with the Supreme's *Śakti*. This identification is one of the fundamental points in the philosophy of the Hindu Tantras. We do not forget that cultically the Tantras showed many more peculiarities which seem rather remote from Aurobindo. We may recall that *prakṛti*/*Śakti* could be identified

6) S. K. Maitra, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo* (Benares: Benares Hindu University, 1945).

in the ritual with a particular woman or with an element in the *yogin's* subtle physiology (e.g., a *nāḍī*, a mystical vein or channel). It would be quite out of tune with Aurobindo's style to say that "every naked woman incarnates *prakṛti*" 7). However, Tantrism is not exhausted by certain sexual rites (the concrete enactment of *maithuna*) or certain statements in *vāmācāra* texts which have startled many readers. The final homologization of *nirvāṇa* (the "state of release") and *samsāra* (the endlessness of birth and death) is characteristic of the Tantric movement as a whole, both in Hinduism and Buddhism. Correspondingly, all Tantric texts stress the homologization of *mukti* (liberation) and *bhukti* (enjoyment). What is at stake here is much more than the doctrines of some small esoteric sects. These homologizations have permeated India's culture much more than is commonly realized. The voluptuous forms of Indian art displayed in temples (Khajurāho, Kōnārak, etc.) would be incomprehensible without this awareness. Aurobindo had the support of a long tradition when he made the spiritualization of all levels of reality his central theme.

To avoid misunderstanding, we should repeat that continuity means transformation. But what is new in Aurobindo cannot be explained as influences of Western idealistic or vitalistic philosophies without a great deal of further qualification. It is true that a major distinction between the integral *yoga* and earlier Indian systems is due to the widening horizon, geographically and also in terms of modern philosophical trends which entered India from outside; this certainly contributed to the urge for conceptualization which we noticed before; no Indian thinker before him posed the problem of "matter" and physical existence in such a straightforward way. Although Rāmānuja affirmed long ago the full reality of the world 8), over against Śaṅkara, one cannot entangle the *viśiṣṭādvaitin* more than by asking whether God in creating the world (*prapañca*) also created *samsāra*, and what the relationship is between the two. This sort of question did not arise with great urgency in classical India, where the idea of *samsāra* went without saying. The widening horizon was indeed of great importance to Aurobindo. Nevertheless, the direction of his thought remains In-

7) M. Eliade, *Yoga, Immortality and Freedom*, p. 259, with a reference to H. H. Wilson, *Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus*, p. 156.

8) *Vedārthasaṃgraha*, ed. and trans. J. A. B. van Buitenen (Deccan College Monograph Series, XVI; Poona, 1956), *passim*, especially p. 66.

dian, as a cursory glance at his scheme of concepts shows. The exposition of his *yoga* is a revitalization of traditional Indian ideas and symbols, in spite of his English education, in spite of the changed world in which he was living.

Expounding his *yoga*, quite naturally, his major problems arise in presenting the unfolding reality. For reality is not homogeneous in its spirituality; but everywhere it is related somehow to the Absolute, the unmanifest. The problem is to discuss in a convincing way the planes of reality in relation to each other. This is in structure analogous to what occupied the older systematicians of Kashmir Śaivism, of *Pāñcarātra*, etc. Old and new meet each other in Aurobindo; in fact, they revitalize each other.

As of old, the transition of the unmanifest to the manifest is crucial. It cannot be by chance that so many terms for the supreme principle are given by Aurobindo. Such transition cannot be proven by logic; it is ultimately only significant as part of the inheritance of ṛṣis "who knew" and, so doing, transformed, interiorized yet earlier cosmogonic symbolisms. Aurobindo is no exception; his conceptual urge does not change that.

For our purpose, some brief observations about the relationship of the various planes which are to be realized in the individual *yogin's* *sādhana* will suffice. The realization process, with the spiritualization of all levels as its ultimate goal, has its corresponding, dynamic reality in these relationships. The whole scheme of concepts has the traditional symbolic ambiguity of referring both to the unfolding of the world at large and the fundamental structure of man. The first three concepts, Pure Existence, Consciousness Force, and Bliss are identical with the better known words *sat*, *cit*, and *ānanda*. But the three are intimately connected and are also grouped together as "the supreme planes of Infinite Consciousness". On the one hand, as *Saccidānanda*, they are the Supreme in manifestation; while, on the other hand, the Supreme can be called the unmanifest *Saccidānanda*. Here, as in all traditional Indian philosophies, "unmanifestness" is not to be understood as a negative concept. On the contrary, it indicates the highest state of the supreme "principle" and hence the purest and comprehensive source of all things.

The Supermind represents, like the preceding concepts, a level of which the ordinary consciousness is not aware. It is the outgoing con-

sciousness of the Supreme, the creative power of *Saccidānanda*, the medium which relates the higher triad to a triad of a lower order. This reminds us naturally of the classical theory of the *gunas*, the “strands” or “qualities” which as such are not discernible in the world, but which precede the cosmogony, perfect in balance as they are only on the very highest level, and hence unmanifest.

Aurobindo often refers to the levels of Sat, Cit and Ānanda as “the three higher planes”. Contradistinct from these are “the three lower planes” of Mind, Life, and Matter, with which man is familiar. Since everything is to be interwoven dynamically, Aurobindo gives much attention to the “middle plane”, as hard to catch in words as the evolution from unmanifest to manifest.

The knot of the two, the higher and the lower hemisphere, is where mind and supermind meet with a veil between them. The rending of the veil is the condition of the divine life in humanity; for by that rending, by the illumining descent of the higher into the nature of the lower being and the forceful ascent of the lower being into the nature of the higher, mind can recover its divine light in the all-comprehending supermind, the soul realise its divine self in the all-possessing, all-blissful Ananda, life repossess its divine power in the play of omnipotent Conscious-Force and Matter open to its divine liberty as a form of the divine Existence”⁹).

It is possible to understand the transition from an unmanifest to a manifest state as a symbol in the most ancient mythological accounts of the creation. Here we are faced with the same symbolism in a new place, crucial in the technique of an indeed *gnostic realization*. Aurobindo introduces several concepts which all have the same general purpose of making the inner dynamics of the *yoga*-system at least as tangible as possible. Thus he introduces the idea of the *Overmind*, which, schematically, should be placed between the Supermind and the (human) Mind. Each of the related planes has again its interrelated subdivisions, as is visible also in the above quotation.

4. Symbols

Concepts and conceptual statements can easily mislead us in the study of *yoga*-systems. To avoid the danger of a conceptual reductionism, we emphasized the inner dynamics in what looks on paper

9) Sri Aurobindo, *The Life Divine* (Pondicherry: Aurobindo Ashram, 1955), p. 316.

like a mere skeleton of ideas. However, Aurobindo does not make it easy for us.

When Arthur Koestler, albeit too superficially, too "journalistically", presented his analysis of Indian *yoga*, he showed himself an exponent of our highly esteemed "common sense". For instance, he expressed his doubt as to the inconclusive tests designed to prove or disprove the supposed yogic capacity of stopping the respiration. The airtightness of the devices used would have been far from certain. He wondered why no easier and quite trustworthy instrument was ever used to test yogic claims. Could not a supposed levitation have been proven quite adequately by placing the yogin on a weighing machine? The loss of a single pound, even less than that, would have been quite convincing¹⁰).

There is something to Koestler's reasoning. It might even have been acceptable if he had also directed his journalistic enthusiasm toward the question how any yogin could lend himself confidently to respiration experiments without sharing, in all likelihood, Koestler's qualms about air-leaks in the devices used. Granted that this questioning would not have resulted in a scientific proof of mysterious forces, it would at least have suggested that people can *live* by ideas different from, but as trustworthy as, Koestler's common sense.

One might well wonder what would have happened if Koestler had taken to analyzing Aurobindo's *yoga*. It is true, in Aurobindo, as in Patañjali, the *siddhis* are not the central issue. But the transformation of life is no less a problem, as we saw. In *āśram*-circles today, Aurobindo is considered a fully "realized soul". So, by many, are some others, especially T. V. Kapali Sastry, probably the most gifted and certainly the most learned follower of Aurobindo. Realization is taken quite concretely. It is exactly at this point that our "common sense" stirs. In Aurobindo's words: "Yoga means union with the Divine — a union either transcendental (above the universe) or cosmic (universal) or individual or, as in our *yoga*, all three together"¹¹).

It is not necessary to talk ourselves into undergoing the reality of religious or magic experiences. This is neither the level nor the issue

10) Arthur Koestler, "Yoga Unexpurgated", *Encounter*, LXXXIII (August, 1960), pp. 7-26.

11) Sri Aurobindo, *Lights on Yoga* (Pondicherry: Aurobindo Ashram, 1953), p. 16.

of our discussion. The least thing we should realize, however, is that man's ideas and experiences are conditioned. Only a few centuries ago it was quite fashionable in certain aristocratic circles in the West to have heavenly visions before one's death; so everybody who was anybody had them. Aurobindo, also a child of his time and land, at one time suffered, with his friends in Pondicherry, from stone-throwing; stones hit the house without a visible hand throwing them; they even appeared from nowhere inside the house; this went on until the cause, residing in the enmity of a servant, who had hired a black magician, was neutralized¹²). It sounds incredible, and it probably is, but this mysterious power of throwing stones is such a common expression of enmity in India even today, that one could ask why it should not have happened to Aurobindo's abode too.

In the study of symbols we are shown that conditionings play a role; yet, symbolism follows its own course, no matter how slowly. Furthermore, symbols are not identical with fashions of thought or experience. Symbols are also affected by fashions, gradually, but it is of much more significance that in religious traditions the symbols remould the fashions. Thus, in Aurobindo's account of the stone-throwing event, due emphasis is given to the Mother's ability to recognize the magic for what it was worth and to control it.

It seems of great importance to us that we recognize in Aurobindo the same symbolic structure which we can describe in the Tantras as an urge for a "beyond beyond the beyond". Both the Buddhist and the Hindu Tantras know of a subtle physiology. Well known and rather generally accepted in the Hindu Tantric writings is the theory of the six *cakras*¹³), subtle centers in the body which are to be concentrated on and traversed by the *yogin*. The starting point is the *mūlādhāra*, located between the anus and the sexual organ, at the root of the spine. The *yogin* is to raise his *jīva* (his "individual soul") until he reaches perfect bliss in the highest *cakra*, located on top of the head. In each *cakra* which is reached, the *jīva* is in conjunction with its "chosen divinity" (*iṣṭadevatā*) which is as a rule a manifestation of the goddess. The goddess is already present at the starting point,

12) Purani, *Life*, pp. 208, 315 f.

13) "Śaṭcakraṇirūpaṇa", A. Avalon, *The Serpent Power* (6th ed.; Madras: Ganesh & Co., 1958).

the *mūlādhāra*, in the form of *Kuṇḍalinī*, “she who is coiled”, like a snake, around the *liṅga* whose opening is covered by her. She is said to be asleep, at least in the normal situation of the non-initiate. In her sleep she covers the opening of the *liṅga*. Only after being awakened by the *yogin*, the voyage upwards through the *cakras* begins. Most striking about the *cakras* is the fact that each one is perfect. In each one the divine is present and realized by the *yogin*. Each one, as it is described mathematically and symbolically (with circles, squares, triangles, with male and female elements in perfect conjunction, etc.) represents a supreme orientation, a totality. This is true even in the *mūlādhāra*, in which the closed *liṅga* and the sleeping goddess are a clear image of the “pre-creational” principle in its twofold aspect; twofold not only as male and female, but also as image of the cosmic principle and the individual yogin’s principle of enlightenment. The *cakras*, each with its perfection, seem rather repetitious to the Westerner. Furthermore, the number of *cakras*, although six are usually enumerated in the Hindu works, four in the Buddhist Tantras, is by no means fixed. There are centers of concentration between the others and some works make mention of *cakras* below the lowest and beyond the highest. In spite of the symbolic evidences to the contrary, no single *cakra* exhausts the Absolute. There is always a “more”, a “higher”.

The same urge for a “beyond beyond the beyond” makes Aurobindo’s scheme of concepts understandable, with its various levels and added transitional levels¹⁴). Each level, with its cosmological significance, corresponds to a stage in the *sādhaka*’s realization. The same urge is most clearly expressed in the repetitiousness of a “not yet” in the pile of letters in which Aurobindo answered the questions of his devotees¹⁵); there is the continuous danger of mistaking lower experiences for higher ones; the most sublime realization is still higher than the one just reached. All this may seem a groping in the dark, a building up of tall and unfulfilled claims; but the problem is first and foremost our own, because our traditions do not know much of the underlying idea of individuality in its simultaneously macro- and

14) For the coherence of *cakras* and “levels of reality” (*tattvas*) in the Tantras, see Pott, *op. cit.*, pp. 24 ff.

15) Collected in Sri Aurobindo, *On Yoga*, II, Tome 1 and 2 (Pondicherry: Aurobindo Ashram, 1958).

microcosmic dimension. The doubts of the devotees concern, almost without exception, the *sādhana* which is to be followed, not Sri Aurobindo's or the Mother's divine consciousness. As in the Tantras, no doubt is expressed in regard to the possibility of attaining to the highest levels. Aurobindo himself uses his whole arsenal of concepts to point to the "beyondest":

The integral Yoga, refusing to rely on the fragile stuff of mental and moral ideals, puts its whole emphasis in this field on three central dynamic processes — the development of the true soul or psychic being to take the place of the false soul of desire, the sublimation of human into divine love, the elevation of consciousness from its mental to its spiritual and supramental plane by whose power alone both the soul and the life-force can be utterly delivered from the veils and prevarications of the Ignorance¹⁶).

The urge is expressed in the very concept of the Integral Yoga. As Aurobindo formulates it in his major work devoted to it:

The principle of Yoga is the turning of one or of all powers of our human existence into a means of reaching the divine Being. In an ordinary Yoga one main power of being or one group of its powers is made the means, vehicle, path. In a synthetic Yoga all powers will be combined and included in the transmuting instrumentation¹⁷).

Thus his yoga is distinguished from *Hathayoga*, which makes the body and life its instrument, from *Rājayoga*, which chooses the mind as its vehicle, etc. The endeavour of integrating, as a continuing urge to incorporate everything, reaching out incessantly, cannot be easily separated from the Tantric teachings, especially those of the Śakti-tantras. Aurobindo realizes this quite well:

Tantric discipline is in its nature a synthesis. It has seized on the large universal truth that there are two poles of being whose essential unity is the secret of existence, Brahman and Shakti, Spirit and Nature, and that Nature is power of the spirit or rather is spirit as power ... it includes in its objects of Yoga not only liberation, which is the one all-mastering pre-occupation of the specific systems, but a cosmic enjoyment of the power of the spirit, which the others may take incidentally on the way, in part, casually, but avoid making a motive or object. It is a bolder and larger system¹⁸).

The synthetic yoga of Aurobindo is presented, above all, as an elaboration and specification of this "bolder and larger system". The goal is still higher than the unity of *mukti* and *bhukti*; it is "the perfect

16) Sri Aurobindo, *On Yoga*, I, "The Synthesis of Yoga" (Pondicherry: Aurobindo Ashram, 1957), p. 174.

17) *Idem*, p. 695.

18) *Idem*, p. 698.

outflowering of the Divine in Humanity" 19). Yet, the longer one tries to follow Aurobindo's systematic exposition of what is "more" in his *yoga*, the meaning of this "perfect outflowering", the harder it becomes to pin down the distinction from the Tantric symbolism. For in both, intrinsically, the urge for "more" and "higher" dominates. In both the significance of the cosmos is central. The only important difference seems an addition which can be understood in terms of India's widening horizon. It is visible wherever Aurobindo speaks not only of the significance of the cosmos, but of the significance for the cosmos in his *yoga*:

We regard the spirit in man not as solely an individual being travelling to a transcendent unity with the Divine, but as a universal being capable of oneness with the Divine in all souls and all Nature and we give this extended view *its entire practical consequence* 20).

The highest realization is to lead back to the earth in order to be complete.

Concern for the world as Western influence? We should rather say: Aurobindo faced a new world, a world quite different from the one in the time of the Tantras; but the main point is that he recognized it and structured what was revealed in it to him as *real*. The form of this recognition and structuring, also of directly "Western" concerns, displays a Tantric signature. We should bear in mind that also the Tantras arose in a time of cross-cultural contact. Their composers recognized, reinterpreted, transformed and incorporated many symbols and cultic practices of a much humbler nature or within a much humbler social setting than those of the major Buddhist and Hindu traditions. The all too popular description of Tantrism as "mere magic", often lanced as a reproach, has a tiny grain of truth in it. Historically, however, the Buddhist and Hindu transformation of these elements on the fringes of Buddhist and Hindu society was definitive.

Noteworthy is the same ambiguity which we found in the Tantras, stressing simultaneously the unimaginable, supreme goal and the easy, quick way of attaining it. For also Aurobindo is well aware of the almost unsurmountable difficulties, but says at the same time: "To arrive by the shortest way at the largest development of spiritual

19) *Idem*, p. 700.

20) *Ibid.*

power and being and divinise by it a liberated nature in the whole range of human living is our inspiring motive" 21).

It will be clear that Aurobindo's *sādhana* does not end up in pragmatic stratagems; e.g., for the social uplift of mankind. Not only are the principal concepts of his *yoga* symbolically loaded, but also visible, more tangible elements show that the "practical" interest finds symbolic expressions. He stresses the *gurunvāda*: he himself is the manifestation of the Divine for his devotees. Since his death (1950), his *samādhi* has been in the center of the *āśram*. The *āśram* itself is there to present the form of Aurobindo's vision, an anticipation of, as well as a preparation for the new world 22). Also the required celibacy of the inmates should be seen in this light. Since 1926, the 24th of November is celebrated as "the Day of Siddhi", the day of the descent of the Overmind; it was Aurobindo's realization, but as such significant to all 23). The symbol of the female principle is quite complex in Aurobindo's system; the Mother is related to the manifestation of the Divine and to the emanation of the world; she dominates the lower levels and quite concretely dominates the *āśram*. Aurobindo wrote a little work under the title *The Mother*; it is a treatise in philosophical terms, without any distinct reference to the person at the head of the *āśram*; but it is published by the *āśram* in the form of a devotional booklet and the Mother does indeed incorporate the divine Śakti for the devotees. The indefinability of the Mother does not make her less concrete. In a way, the reverse is true: the experience of the Mother varies, according to the level of the *sādhaka*'s realization.

Aurobindo accepts the Tantric subtle physiology 24). Yet, in his own *yoga*, he does not insist on the awakening of Kuṇḍalinī in the lowest center. It is in fact unnecessary, because:

Our synthesis takes man as a spirit in mind much more than a spirit in body and assumes in him the capacity to begin on that level, to spiritualise his being by the power of the soul in mind opening itself directly to a higher spiritual force and being and to perfect by that higher force so possessed and brought into action the whole of his nature 25).

What is at stake here is again not a split between the Tantras and

21) *Idem*, p. 699.

22) See Purani, *Life*, pp. 198-199.

23) *Idem*, pp. 240 f.

24) See e.g.: *On Yoga*, II, 2, pp. 938 f. Especially *Lights on Yoga*, pp. 17 f.

25) *On Yoga I: The Synthesis of Yoga*, p. 699.

Aurobindo, but rather a matter of “greater expediency”, “a more realistic approach”, in the *sādhana*.

There are several details in Aurobindo’s work which we can only hint at here. Aurobindo often stresses an inner psycho-spiritual experience²⁶⁾, or a psychic realization²⁷⁾ or the “mystic heart” as seat of the immanent Divine, the “hidden Purusha”²⁸⁾. This is reminiscent of the *cakra* which is known to Tāntrikas as the heart-lotus (*Ānandakandapadma*)²⁹⁾. The heart-lotus is described as the seat of the *jīvātman*, the individual ego, and a beloved abode of its *iṣṭadevatā*. In the circles of *vāmācārins* for whom the concrete, individual experience of the highest bliss counted more than anything else, the heart-lotus, being the *locus* of the “ego”, was exceedingly important. The similarity with Aurobindo suggests itself, not just because he too refers verbally to the heart, but because of the same location of the necessary individual experience. We hasten to add that we cannot ascribe to Aurobindo an extensive knowledge of Vāmācāra Tantra literature, which could “explain” the similarity. Here, as well as in other cases, immediate influence of the Tantras is quantitatively of secondary importance. As builder of the integral *yoga* system, Aurobindo remoulded and revitalized wide-spread notions. The amazing comparability to the Tantras is due to the structure of his system. As far as the “mystic heart” is concerned, this was for him of course not the level of the final experience. Final would be only the total transformation, “spiritualization”, of the world. Yet, also for the most “extreme” Tāntrika one could not say without the greatest reservation that the heart-lotus was the level of the final experience. All Tantric experience is embedded in a symbolism which is just as cosmological as it is “individual”. The various *cakras* as they are reached and realized by the perfect yogin according to *Vāmācāra* and *Vajrāyāna* texts, are expressive of a total mastery and transcendence. The voyage along the subtle “channels” from *cakra* to *cakra* is homologized in the symbolism with the unfolding of the cosmos, just like the *tattvas* of Sāṃkhya and related systems, including Aurobindo’s, refer both to the development of the “psyche” and of the world.

26) E.g. *On Yoga*, II, 1, pp. 91, 123.

27) E.g. *Idem*, p. 123.

28) *On Yoga I: The Synthesis of Yoga*, p. 170.

29) See description in Pott, *op. cit.*, pp. 16 ff.

THE CHRIST-LIFE AS MYTHIC AND PSYCHIC SYMBOL

BY

HUGH T. KERR

INTRODUCTION

Biblical and doctrinal apologists for Christianity tend to live and move within a prescribed *theological* circle. It is the purpose of this essay to plead with such apologists to widen their circle by recognizing the significance of *mythological* and *psychological* as well as theological approaches to Christian faith and life. It is *not* our purpose to advocate the substitution of mythic and psychic symbols for, let us say, the Gospel interpreted as *kerygma*. However else Christianity may and should be interpreted, it can and should *also* be interpreted mythologically and psychologically.

When it is possible and popular for literary critics to speak of "Christfigures" in contemporary drama and fiction, and when the U. S. Government sponsors Institutes on Religion and Mental Health, Biblical and doctrinal apologists impoverish rather than imperil their witness by ignoring what is going on around them. Exclusivist Christian claims need not be denied in expounding Christianity's share in universal mythic and psychic symbolism. Even the comparative anthropologists, sociologists, and symbolists—who have no stake in the Christian cause—do not dispute the Christian's right to absolutist assertions¹). To suggest that Christian faith-and-life, whatever its uniqueness, is *also* in—if not of—the world of universal symbolism may conceivably in our day be better evangelistic strategy than traditional exclusivist apologetics.

To get the matter before us, we will deal with what is here called the „Christ-Life" as: (a) paralleled in the *monomyth* or hero's pilgrimage and ordeal, and (b) internalized and interiorized as psychic history and experience. "Christ-Life" is a *portmanteau* catch-all to

1) Cf. the *Eranos Jahrbuch* series, 24 vols. since 1933, and similar publications of the Bollingen Foundation.

include: life of Christ, kerygma, religion-of-Jesus, Christ-of-faith, as well as the Christian's life in Christ, Christ-in-us, and Christ-for-us. "Symbol" is used to suggest—as distinct from the contrived "sign"—the multivalence and ambivalence (mystery *and* meaning) of mythic and psychic phenomena ²).

I. THE CHRIST-LIFE AND THE MONOMYTH

The "Monomyth", a term used by James Joyce and adopted, adapted, and anticipated by many others ³), is an endlessly variegated structure of fairly constant components. "A hero ventures forth from the world of common day into a region of supernatural wonder: fabulous forces are there encountered and a decisive victory is won: the hero comes back from this mysterious adventure with the power to bestow boons on his fellow man" ⁴).

The pattern of the monomyth is so universal, says Gerald Vann, that it may be taken as a paradigm of created reality. "You find it", he writes, "in nature, in the cycle of day and night, the sun dying and going back to his mother the sea to be reborn the next day at dawn; and in the cycle of the year, high summer followed by the 'fall' of autumn and the death of winter and then the rebirth of spring. You find it in myth and folklore and fairy tale and poetry; you find it in dreams; you find it in the teachings of the mystics, in

2) Myth is understood here as a dramatic narrative of interest for its own sake but also as an explanation of how beliefs, practices, human relations, cosmic realities originated and what they mean. Myth is not only a story but an imaginative way of thinking and communicating. Bultmann's definition: "...the other-worldly in terms of this world and the divine in terms of human life, the other side in terms of this side" (H. W. Bartsch, *Kerygma and Myth*, Macmillan, 1953, p. 10n) is too rationalist and reflective; myths are not deliberately created in order to do these things.

3) *Finnegan's Wake*, Viking Press, 1939, p. 581; cf. Joseph Campbell, *The Hero with a Thousand Faces*, Pantheon, 1949 (Meridian, 1956); Victor White, *Soul and Psyche*, Harper, 1960; Otto Rank, *Der Mythos von der Geburt des Helden*, Leipzig, 1909 (E.T., 1952); Lord Raglan, *The Hero: A Study in Tradition, Myth, and Drama*, London, 1936 (Knopf, 1956); Clyde Kluckhohn, "Recurrent Themes in Myths and Mythmaking", *Myth and Mythmaking*, ed. by Henry A. Murray, Braziller, 1960; Gerald Vann, *The Paradise Tree*, Sheed and Ward, 1959; Mircea Eliade, *Birth and Rebirth*, Harper, 1958; H. B. Alexander, *The World's Rim: Great Mysteries of North American Indians*, Univ. Nebraska, 1953, etc.

4) Joseph Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 30, cf. pp. 245 f.

ascetical theology, in the catholic doctrine of purgatory; you find it in the words of Christ when he speaks of the grain of wheat dying or tells Nicodemus that a man must be reborn of water and the Spirit and that if he would find life he must first lose it. Above all, you find it in the life of Christ himself: for the Word was made flesh and came to dwell among us that he might himself live out the pattern, that thenceforth the pattern should no longer be the expression of an unfulfilled yearning but something that men would be able to live out, effectively, in their turn" 5).

At one end of the monomyth, the hero leaves the security and comfort of home and sets out on a perilous journey into the dark unknown which is fraught with danger and death. So too the Word leaves the Eternal home, "being born in the likeness of men" (Phil. 2 : 7) in a stable, often represented in art as a dark cave. As the hero stands alone and apart from his fellows, so the Son of Man found no "place" in the Inn and had "nowhere to lay his head" (Luke 2 : 7; Matt. 8 : 20). The early growth of the hero is often marked by an ominous crisis at the adolescent age of twelve or thereabouts. At this time special wisdom and grace that will sustain his later ordeal and encounter with death become manifest. So the *puer aeternus*, naked, free, separated from the mother, meets us as Eros, Dionysus, Adonis, Attis, Tammuz, Tages, Renaissance cherubs and *putti*, and the anonymous youths on the Sistine ceiling 6). So too Jesus at the Temple in Jerusalem separates himself from his mother, and the Rabbis "were amazed at his understanding and his answers" (Luke 2 : 47).

At the other end of the monomyth, the death struggle of the hero and the rite of the dying god are paralleled by Christ's passion (his "agony" is significantly interior and no gory slaying of a dragon or monster) and his Crucifixion. As the Creed puts it: he "was crucified, dead, and buried; he descended into hell" 7).

5) Gerald Vann, *op. cit.*, pp. 18 f.

6) *Ibid.*, pp. 26-36. Not to separate from the mother results in neurotic infantilism.

7) "The daughters of Sion weep for him on his way to Calvary, much as their mothers had wept there centuries before for the dying Corn-God, Tammuz — to the horror of the prophet Ezekiel (Ezek. 8 : 14). There are many parallels in the literature of the 'dying god' to the opening of tombs and the raising of the dead which, we read in St. Matthew's Gospel (Matt. 27 : 51-53), accompanied

The mythic quality of the *central* event in the Christ-Life, namely the cross, has been explored by some interpreters with reference to Freud's Oedipus complex. The mythic domestic conflict between father-son-mother sets the stage on which the drama of life is enacted. For Freud, as for Sophocles, the outcome of the drama is unresolved tragedy compounded of murder, death, unrequited guilt, and self-immolation. In general terms, father and son are bound to each other in affection, yet they are at variance with each other as rivals⁸). In the New Testament, however, the cross of Christ is taken not as tragedy but as reconciliation. Erich Wellisch has suggested that the Hebrew psychology is more enlightening as a clue to the cross of Christ than Greek tragedy, and that Abraham-and-Isaac is a better mythic precedent than Oedipus⁹). Here tragedy or near-tragedy is

the Crucifixion. The subsequent 'descent into hades,' the underworld, of which we read ... is one of the more universal features of the 'pattern'. Very striking, too, is the Easter morning search of the women for the body of the dead Christ; and we notice that it is not Mary the Virgin but Mary the sinner ... who takes the lead. 'They have taken away my Lord, and I know not where they have laid him', she says (John 20 : 13). In her language the word for 'my lord' must have been *Adoni*; and only some inhibition of mistaken reverence can prevent us from being reminded of Aphrodite, seeking and weeping for Adonis ... the answer to the search of Aphrodite or Astarte or Isis or Mary Magdalene is the same. 'The King is dead; long live the King' is the constant motif of the mysteries of the dying god in all their varieties and guises, elevations and debasements". Victor White, *op. cit.*, pp. 219 f.

8) A more persuasive Freudian example would be the Old Testament rite of circumcision as an Oedipal symbol. Here the Father may be said to attempt the murder of his rival son as if to slay him by attacking the generative organ, the emblem of the conflict between father and son. This is accomplished, however, by a ritual operation in which blood is shed but no fatal injury inflicted. In this way the father's potential hatred is assuaged, and at the same time his love is manifested by receiving the son into the elect community. But from the New Testament perspective this is not very satisfactory since circumcision is superseded by the Sacrament of Baptism. That rite involves also a ritual death; the outcome, however, is restoration and rebirth. Rollo May has suggested that Freud and psychoanalysis in general have misread the Oedipus complex by stopping short with Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus* and neglecting to read the sequel, *Oedipus at Colonus*. In this later work a reintegrative and redemptive resolution of the original conflict is patent. *Sybolism in Religion and Literature*, Braziller, 1960, pp. 40 ff.

9) *Oedipus and Isaac*, London, 1954. "The Akedah Motif (cf. Gen. 22 : 1-19) is the Biblical aspect of the psychology of family relationships... It is the author's conviction that studies in Biblical psychology provide a necessary requirement for the development of psychiatry", pp. 113, 116.

averted by the providential intervention of God-the-Father himself, and the result is not death-all-around but reconciliation, restored fellowship, and renewal of life. The parallels between the Abrahamic episode and the Crucifixion have long been recognized not only by Biblical exegetes but also by artists ¹⁰). But in both instances the father-son relationship is not calculated to indicate the enmity but the love of the father for the son. In spite of some tendencies in traditional theology to put the Father against the Son in such a way as to make the death of Christ a sacrifice to appease the wrath of God, the New Testament interprets the redemptive initiative as coming from God himself. The reconciliation is not between the Father and the Son but between sinful mankind and a just but merciful God ¹¹).

To describe the cross as "the *central* event in the Christ-Life", as was done at the beginning of the previous paragraph, is to speak not only Biblically-historically-theologically but also symbolically. The cross in the New Testament is called the "tree" (Acts 5 : 30; 10 : 39; 13 : 29; Gal. 3 : 13; I Pet. 2 : 24), and the parallel between the paradise tree, which brought sin and death, and the Calvary tree, which brought forgiveness and new life, is coupled in Paul's discourse on

10) "Mount Moriah and Golgotha; Isaac bearing wood and Jesus carrying the cross; Isaac's hands and feet bound, Christ's hands and feet pierced; the knife and the spear; two young men and a donkey common to both narratives; the young men who remain behind and the disciples in Gethsemane; the ram and the passover lamb; the thicket and the crown of thorns". Gilbert Cope, *Symbolism in the Bible and the Church*, London, 1959, pp. 199 f. Artists without number have depicted the Abraham-Isaac story, e.g. Rembrandt, Chagall, the newly restored and much admired sculpture of Gislebertus, Cathedral of St. Lazarus, Autun, France.

11) "Whereas in Anselm's view (*Cur Deus Homo*) God is the Object of the Atonement (or reconciliation) — it is God who is reconciled, this is certainly *not* the teaching of the New Testament. Here it is *men* who are reconciled, not God; God alone is the Reconciler, the One who makes peace, who restores man to communion with Himself". Emil Brunner, *The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption*, Westminster, 1952, p. 290. "Christian faith always perceives God as the acting subject in reconciliation... But Christian faith can at the same time speak of God as being reconciled, that his wrath is "stayed", "is turned away", and so on. Such expressions are legitimate so long as they do not encroach upon, but are rather incorporated into, the fundamental Christian point of view, namely, that reconciliation is throughout a work of God. To Christian faith the matter appears thus, that God is reconciled in and through his reconciliation of the world unto himself". Gustaf Aulén, *The Faith of the Christian Church*, Muhlenberg, 1948, p. 229.

the First and Second Adam (I Cor. 15 : 20 ff.). This is portrayed in art by showing the Crucified's spilt blood trickling down upon Adam's skull at the foot of the cross. The tree is central, however, in another way. It is cruciform—the crossroads of reality where horizontal and vertical intersect¹²).

The possibilities for this kind of mythological and symbolic exegesis of the Christ-Life are virtually infinite, but enough has been said to indicate how it can and has been done. We may reflect, however, that the whole sequence of the Christ-Life as monomyth is itself commemorated and repeated in the ritual observance of the Christian and liturgical year. "The myth of the eternal return", as Eliade calls this type of temporal and cosmic repetition, has behind it: (a) a once-upon-a-time creative connotation (*in illo tempore, ab origine*, "in the beginning"); (b) creative time comes out of and is preceded by pre-formal chaos (Halloween, New Year's Eve, Shrove Tuesday, Walpurgis Night); (c) compulsive repetitive obsessions (ritual, dance, chant, music, prayer; neurotic behavior is endless repetition of meaningless patterns); (d) either the abolition of time and history (in most primitive, archaic, Eastern cultures) or their regeneration (as in the Judaeo-Christian view of revelation and incarnation in and through history).

Ritual repetition of the Christ-Life is not only a mechanical mnemonic device ("do this in remembrance—*anamnesis*—of me") but a re-

12) "The Tree is cruciform because the Cross is the 'shape of the world', since the earth has four directions or quarters, and the very universe itself — ringed by the Zodiac — has four fixed, four cardinal, and four mutable points. Christ with his Twelve Apostles is in clear correspondence with the Sun in its twelve zodiacal signs, and the crucifix is very frequently found with the four fixed signs Taurus, Leo, Scorpio (interchangeable with the phoenix-eagle), and Aquarius at its extremities, standing for the Four Evangelists who, with the Four Archangels, do duty in Christianity for the Four Regents of Hindu-Buddhist mythology — the caryatidal kings who support the dome of heaven". Alan Watts, *Myth and Ritual in Christianity*, London, 1954, p. 161; aware that some may find this "fanciful", Watts notes that "Christianity was not elaborated from the Scriptures by the rational and historical methods of its modern apologists". Cf. what Mircea Eliade calls "the symbolism of the center", in *Images and Symbols*, Sheed and Ward, 1961, pp. 41 ff. The cosmic center (*axis mundi*) is often marked by a tree (or mountain, temple, column, etc.) which is not only the highest point, and hence the ontological passageway between heaven and earth, but is thought of as growing out of the navel of the earth and being thus "at the center". So the birth, death, and regeneration of Adam take place on Golgotha's hill on which is raised Christ's cross.

generative process in which time and history are constantly being re-created out of chaos. "History (as chaos) can be abolished, and consequently renewed, a number of times, before the final *eschaton* is realized. Indeed, the Christian liturgical year is based upon a periodic and real repetition of the Nativity, Passion, Death, and Resurrection of Jesus, with all that this mystical drama implies for a Christian; that is, personal and cosmic regeneration through reactualization *in concreto* of the birth, death, and resurrection of the Saviour" ¹³).

There is, of course, another and a deeper sense in which the Christ-Life is repeated and that is in the experience, faith, and consciousness of the Christian. The Christian is Christ's man, and the Christ-Life reminds us not only of what God has done in Christ but what Christ does for and in us. This aspect of the Christ-Life leads to the second or psychic symbolization of our theme.

II. THE CHRIST-LIFE AS INNER LIFE

We may indicate by way of transition from the mythic to the psychic category that the Christian Sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper or Eucharist symbolize both the life-death-rebirth pattern of the monomyth *and* the Christian's participation in the Christ-Life. The mythic symbolization of Baptism reproduces the death-resurrection theme whether applied to the Christ-Life or to the Christian life (cf. Rom. 6 : 1-11). Mythically associated with water, which Jung regards as the commonest and most universal archetype of the unconscious, Baptism reminds us of Christ's descent into the water of the River Jordan and of his subsequent death and resurrection. As these are crucial episodes in the Christ-Life, so are they in the Christian's life-in-Christ (initiation, obedience, ordeal, death, rebirth). Baptism is a *rite de passage*, a ceremonial way of passing from one level of existence to another, from one ontological dimension to another, from childhood to maturity, from death to life ¹⁴). The pre-formal waters

13) Mircea Eliade, *Cosmos and History*, Harpers, 1959, p. 130.

14) "The road is arduous, fraught with perils, because it is, in fact, a rite of the passage from the profane to the sacred, from the ephemeral and illusory to reality and eternity, from death to life, from man to divinity. Attaining the center is equivalent to a consecration, an initiation; yesterday's profane and illusory existence gives place to a new, to a life that is real, enduring, and effective". *Ibid.*, p. 18.

of creation, the maternal womb waters, the water of cleansing, the thirst-slaking water, the boundaries divided by water, the teeming mysterious life within the waters, the dangerous engulfing waters (cf. I Pet. 3 : 18-22)—all these associations and many more can be found without number in Biblical and non-Biblical allusions, myths, and folklore.

Moving from the mythic to the psychic level, Baptism may be read not only as a ritual repetition of the Christ-Life and of the Christian life but also as *inner* life. Speaking of the water of Baptism, Dillistone says: "a descent into the water is normally a symbolic description of a new penetration into those deeper and more mysterious fecundities from which a true creativity can be derived. Other elements are associated with water in this dim realm of the unconscious—the void, darkness, death, silence, loneliness—but water is the symbol which gathers all these associations together in a comprehensive way"¹⁵). It may be that for modern man the interiorizing of water symbolism makes more sense and carries more meaning than either its mythic or sacramental celebrations if these are regarded as mainly external or objective. Eliade notes that "modern man no longer has any initiation of the traditional type . . . initiatory themes remain alive chiefly in modern man's unconscious"¹⁶). The relation between the cleansing waters and inward illumination is found, by the way, in Jesus' miraculous cure of the blind man who bathed in Siloam's waters ("Lord,

15) *Christianity and Symbolism*, Westminster, 1955, pp. 183 ff. Dillistone alludes to Day Lewis' *The Poetic Image* which speaks of "the sea of the unconscious" and approves of Maud Bodkin's interpretation of *The Ancient Mariner* in which she sees "the process by which the spirit withdraws into a state of accidie or one of impotent frustration, a doldrum state, as an initiation into new life, going through a period of introversion before turning outward again with new vigour, descending into hell that it may rise to heaven". Cf. C. G. Jung, *The Integration of Personality*, pp. 66-68; Erich Fromm, *The Forgotten Language*, pp. 154-5, where a patient's dream about crossing a river is interpreted as "an old and universally used symbol of an important decision, of starting a new form of existence — birth or death — of giving up one form of life for another". Part of the eschatological vision is: "And there was no more sea" (Rev. 21 : 1).

16) *Birth and Rebirth: The Religious Meaning of Initiation in Human Culture*, Harpers, 1958, pp. 132, 134. Elsewhere Eliade has observed that the psycho-analytic process and depth probing "still preserve the initiatory pattern. The patient is asked to descend deeply into himself . . . this dangerous operation resembles initiatory descents into hell, the realm of ghosts, and combats with monsters". *The Sacred and the Profane*, Harcourt, Brace, 1959, p. 208.

I believe", John 9 : 38). The contemporary obsession with swimming pools, tiled baths, stainless steel kitchens, automatic washers, and synthetic detergents may be de-sacralized symbols of the age-old wistful quest for cleansing, illumination, and rebirth.

The Lord's Supper or Eucharist may also be interpreted not only as mythic but as psychic symbol. In virtually every Christian tradition, the Sacrament of the Eucharist has been seen as dramatic action, re-presenting the salient events in the Christ-Life by word, prayer, gesture, and ritual. Whatever else happens or is done or is re-enacted through the liturgy, the Sacrament is the Christian equivalent of the monomyth, the ritual repetition of the hero's life-and-death story. This is apparent in all forms of Christian worship, as for example, in the Prayer of Consecration: "... Wherefore, having in remembrance His Incarnation and holy life, His Passion and precious death, His Resurrection and glorious Ascension, and His continual intercession, we Thy humble servants, pleading His eternal sacrifice, do set forth, with these Thy holy gifts, which we now offer unto Thee, the memorial Thy Son hath commanded us to make" 17).

The mythic dimension of the Eucharist has been so accented in, for example, the current liturgical revival that the psychic dimension has scarcely been seriously considered. In worship both the central and the corporate character of the Sacrament have been stressed in such a way as to reinforce not only Biblical but mythological notions of festal feeding, covenant interpersonal relations, oblatory sacrifices of grain, animals, first-born sons (Micah 6 : 7), and even money ("stewardship and promotion"). Not presuming to psychoanalyze all these kindred ceremonies, it is important nonetheless to ask what psychic urges are at work here and what psychic satisfactions the Eucharist bestows? Remembering the multivalence and even ambivalence of symbols, there is little prospect of discovering a single, simple answer. The main direction of what follows is in line with the monomythic principle of life through death.

17) *Book of Common Worship*, United Presbyterian Church, p. 162. The Eucharist has traditionally and ritually been more central than the Sacrament of Baptism as the vehicle of the monomyth mainly because it is repeatable while Baptism normally takes place only once and in infancy. It is a real question whether the death-life context of Baptism is in *any* sense dramatized in contemporary usage. There is no question, however, of missing the death-life pattern in the Eucharist.

Reference has already been made to the Oedipus complex, and it is sufficient here simply to reflect what a breakthrough Freud achieved on the psychic level with this bold if controversial mythic device. Apart from the father-son relationship (which is ambivalent in the sense of involving both antagonism and affection, guilt and reconciliation, death and life), the sacrificial animal (lamb) or food (bread and wine) may ritualistically provide psychic satisfaction as father-substitutes. If, as Freud would maintain, the death-wish or parricide instinct is in civilized society suppressed, it can still find substitute gratification symbolically (spiritual presence) or realistically (transubstantiation) in rituals such as the Eucharist.

A very different psychic interpretation has been developed by Jung who may be said to read sacrificial rites in general and the Eucharist in particular as symbolic actions in which psychic transformation from death to life is achieved. The Eucharist, in other words, would be one mythic way in which the person could come to psychic terms with death. From death to life, or more precisely through death to rebirth, is the colophon of psychic maturity and integrity. Since death-phobia is as strong as death-wish, sacrificial surrogates provide satisfaction and escape from the tragedy of existence. Hence the major motif of the Eucharist, regardless of exhortations to sing for joy rather than weep for sorrow, is on the passion and death of Christ, one reason why Christian worship seems to many so gloomy, lugubrious, and funereal. The other side of this is the new life, the rebirth, the resurrection promise. As psychic symbol the Christ-Life serves as a model for internalizing the monomyth, and beyond that, the transference between Father and Son as well as between the Christian and Christ is a recurrent and important feature¹⁸).

As water in Baptism has its psychic aspects, so too does bread-and-wine in the Eucharist. Leaving to one side the mythic forms of "eating the god" (Frazer) as well as the obvious and not so obvious associations with bread-grain and wine-blood, the "signs" or "elements" of the Eucharist involve oral ingestion. On the physiological level to

18) Cf. C. G. Jung, "Transformation Symbolism in the Mass", in *The Mysteries*, Eranos, Vol. 2, Pantheon, 1955. The principle of dying in order to live has been used by Arnold Toynbee as an important feature of his thesis in describing the rise and fall of civilizations, viz. "withdrawal and return".

eat and to drink, in other words to take nourishment, is essential for existence and well-being. Psychologically this physical fact is related to the mother-child situation which for the infant is one both of pleasure and dependence. This primal oral experience can be transferred to other levels. For example, eating and drinking *together* in social and religious, ritualistic and informal, ways, is a universal practice among all peoples. In the Eucharist much is made of the *corporate* character of the Lord's Supper, and restrictions are laid down so that it not be taken in private or apart from the congregation of the faithful. There are also social and ethical extensions of the oral experience—"I was hungry and you gave me food, I was thirsty and you gave me drink" (Matt. 25 : 35). The *meaning* of the various kinds of oral experience is the same—participation and union with the "other", symbolized by oral incorporation and identification.

The oral experience is not altogether pleasurable or unitive since the well-being and new life which the intake of food and drink assures first involve the symbolic "killing" of the grain, animal, fruit, grape, etc. To eat meat requires the slaying of animals; to drink wine, grapes must be plucked from the vine and crushed. The toothless infant at its mother's breast is capable of biting, and the threat of swallowing or of being swallowed has psychic as well as physical implications—whether we are talking about lactation, cannibalism, or the Eucharist¹⁹).

Taken together the two sides of the oral experience once again symbolize in yet another way the principle of life through death. In well-fed countries food symbols may become meaningless, though the threat of non-being, of being swallowed, may still plague the dreams of calorie-conscious man. Wine or alcohol drink is another matter. Whether fermented fruit of the vine or martini cocktail, the afflatus of mild intoxication is as well known today as ever, perhaps even more so²⁰). The negative or death side of drink is of course the desire to eliminate (to swallow) the past, the superego, the uncon-

19) This "threat" is seen in fairy tales about wicked witches who want to eat up innocent children; the revulsion yet fascination civilized man feels about cannibalism; when children fight, they must not bite; the disciples' response to Jesus' word about eating his flesh and drinking his blood as "a hard saying" (John 6 : 60).

20) *Mild* intoxication, for drunkenness is the opposite of a sense of well-being and consequently is described colloquially as being "stoned", "smashed", "blind", "under the table", and other terms suggesting loss of consciousness and vitality.

sconscious, the "other" with whom one may be all too much and too often united by force of circumstance (e.g. the boss, secretary, spouse, colleague, etc.).

What has been said of arbitrarily selected aspects of the Sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharist is meant only in illustration of how the Christ-Life may be interpreted as psychic symbol. The Sacraments make convenient and appropriate illustrations since they neatly combine theology, mythology, and psychology. But what is known in classical theology as Soteriology, the *ordo salutis*, the life of the Christian who lives *in* Christ because Christ lives *in* him (Gal. 2 : 20), in other words the appropriation by the Christian of the redemption wrought by Christ—this whole area is also susceptible of psychic analysis.

Of central importance for Christian faith, beyond all doctrine, creed, or code, is personal communion and union between Christ and the Christian. The Christian life is the Christ-Life, and Paul sums it up by saying, "living to me means simply 'Christ' " ²¹). As the typical salutation of the Prophet is "Thus saith the Lord", the Pauline signature is "in Christ" ²²). For the Apostle this is clearly something other than moral example, *imitatio Christi*, or eschatological promise, though to be "in Christ" may involve all these. In an extended passage (Rom. 6 : 1-11) which makes reference to Baptism, Paul associates in a vivid way the death and resurrection of Christ to the Christian's crucifixion, burial, and resurrection to newness of life. "We who died to sin . . . baptized into his death . . . we were buried . . . as Christ was raised . . . united with him in a resurrection like his . . . our old self was crucified with him . . . we have died with Christ . . . we shall also live with him . . . you also must consider yourselves dead to sin and alive to God in Christ Jesus".

Whether Paul's interiorizing of the "in Christ" phrase was an invention of his own, perhaps not unrelated to his own psychic history, subsequent Christian interpreters have reiterated the interpersonal

21) Phil. 1 : 21; cf. "Christ, the secret center of our lives", Col. 3 ; 4; "every day we experience something of the death of the Lord Jesus, so that we may also know the power of the life of Jesus in these bodies of ours", II Cor. 4 : 10; "the new spiritual principle of life 'in' Christ lifts me out of the old vicious circle of sin and death", Rom. 8 : 2. Phillips translation.

22) Deissmann's essay in 1892, *Die neutestamentliche Formel 'in Christo Jesu'*, noted that Paul used the phrase or its equivalent 164 times.

relation between the Christ-Life and the Christian's life. The medieval mystics aspired toward the *unio mystica* and often described this in marital, sensual, and sexual terms. Even scholastic theologians talked about the "beatific vision", and it is reported that when Thomas Aquinas was granted such an experience toward the close of his life, he forthwith abandoned the completing of the *Summa Theologica*. Luther interpreted Christ's nativity as an event not only in the past but in contemporary experience. Preaching to his congregation about the miserable plight of Mary in the manger, he imagines some of his hearers saying, "If only I had been there! How quick I would have been to help the Baby!" To which Luther replied: "Yes, you would! . . . Why don't you do it now? You have Christ in your neighbor. You ought to serve him, for what you do to your neighbor in need you do to the Lord Christ himself" ²³).

With two significant exceptions, this medieval and Reformation Christmysticism has been conspicuous by its absence in modern contemporary Christian thinking. Theological resistance against this internalizing of the Christ-Life has come from Barth, Brunner, and Niebuhr—none of whom has anything good to say for mysticism and all of whom are notably inarticulate in expounding the *ordo salutis*. The first exception referred to is in popular piety in which the personal equation between Christ and the believer is a trademark of "orthodoxy" or what is sometimes called "warm evangelicalism". "Billy" Graham's invitation is: "Accept Jesus Christ as your personal Lord and Savior". Curiously enough, while this formula is widely used in various forms by preachers, Biblical theologians, evangelists, missionaries, almost no serious theological attention has been given to the meaning of this formula. It is everywhere assumed by those

23) From Roland Bainton, *Here I Stand: A Life of Martin Luther*, Abingdon, 1950, p. 354. In the carol popularly ascribed to Luther, *Away in a Manger*, the second stanza abruptly moves from the nativity scene to "...I love Thee, Lord Jesus, Look down from the sky, And stay by my side until morning is nigh". Angelus Silesius (Johann Scheffler, 1624-1677) rhymes the same thought:

Were Christ a thousand times
reborn in Bethlehem's stall
And not in thee, thou still
art lost beyond recall.

From *Angelus Silesius: The Cherubic Wanderer*, ed. by Willard R. Trask, Pantheon, 1953, p. 20.

who speak this kind of religious, pietistic language that everyone intuitively understands what this means.

It has remained to existentialist theologians, such as Rudolf Bultmann and Paul Tillich to take up the internal dimension of the Christian life as the Christ-Life in a serious and responsible way, and this is the second exception alluded to above. Referring to the cross of Christ as the "event of redemption", Bultmann says: "To believe in the cross of Christ does not mean to concern ourselves with a mythical process wrought outside of us and our world, or with an objective event turned by God to our advantage, but rather to make the cross of Christ our own, to undergo crucifixion with him... The preaching of the cross as the event of redemption challenges all who hear it to appropriate this significance for themselves, to be willing to be crucified with Christ" ²⁴). Tillich in commenting on the "New Creation", ²⁵) says: "The New Being is not something that simply takes the place of the Old Being. But is a renewal of the Old which has been corrupted, distorted, split and almost destroyed. But not wholly destroyed. Salvation does not destroy creation; but it transforms the Old Creation into a New one. Therefore we can speak of the New in terms of a *re*-newal: The threefold '*re*', namely *re*-conciliation, *re*-union, *re*-surrection" ²⁶).

One reason why existentialism has been utilized by many contemporary theologians is simply because it posits everything on the *ambivalence* of existence (meaning *and* meaninglessness), and this theoretically at least allows for weighting the teeter-totter on the side of Christian faith, as Sartre and others would weight it on the side of brave, resolute atheism. Existentialism takes seriously the threat of non-being, and when Christian theology adopts an existential perspective, it can only preach renewal as coming out of rather than by-passing death, estrangement, non-being, and meaninglessness. Thus

24) "New Testament and Mythology", in *Kerygma and Myth*, ed. by H. W. Bartsch, Macmillan, 1953, pp. 36, 37.

25) Gal. 6 : 15; cf. II Cor. 5 : 17 — "If any one is in Christ, he is a new creation; the old has passed away, behold, the new has come".

26) *The New Being*, Scribner's, 1955, p. 20. Tillich interprets the threefold *re* in psychic rather than doctrinal terms. Cf. "it is the certainty of one's own victory over the death of existential estrangement which creates the certainty of the Resurrection of the Christ as event and symbol". *Systematic Theology*, Vol. II, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1957, p. 155.

life-through-death whether as monomyth, psychic symbol, or Christ-Life can and frequently does attach itself today to existential analyses. The level of this perspective is most likely psychic rather than mythic, more interiorized than externalized.

On the outside of contemporary man's world, the hero is as dead as Horatio Alger, and modern novelists, dramatists, artists in monotonous refrain repeat the drab, unexciting, and senseless patterns of existence. Inside, however, things are different. If the mythic level is for most intelligent persons today really unreal, if still quaint and intriguing, the inner world of personality ambivalence is all too real. Interestingly enough college students rightly or wrongly look to religion as personality-integration-potential, though they may bluntly deny that faith has anything to do with their daily moral decisions or with the big social and political issues of the day 27).

For many more who find the Christ-Life no help whatever, life-through-death may still be a conscious or unconscious goal. Violence, sex, drugs, jazz and alcohol may be the desperate mediators between an intolerable existence and a momentary vision or experience of something better. In such de-sacralized ways the monomyth and perhaps also the Christ-Life still reflect their universality and their potency 28).

27) Cf. *Changing Values in College*, by Philip E. Jacob, Harper, 1957; *What College Students Think*, ed. by Rose K. Goldsen and others, Van Nostrand, 1960; and numerous popular surveys, such as, "Youth: The Cool Generation", by George Gallup and Evan Hill, *Saturday Evening Post*, Dec. 30, 1961. The tendency to interiorize, to psychologize the mythological, may be due to the loss of "transcendental symbols" in our day. This is Rollo May's point when he observes: "The emergence of psychoanalysis and its widespread popularity in America reflects this breakdown. Psychoanalysis is an activity which occurs in a culture when such symbols disintegrate". *Symbolism in Religion and Literature*, Braziller, 1960, p. 33.

28) Interiorizing is not always pleasant. We may find, as Aldous Huxley observes, that "we also intensely dislike ourselves — we find ourselves unutterably boring" and thus seek "to escape from the prison of our individuality, an urge to self-transcendence. It is to this urge that we owe mystical theology, spiritual exercises and yoga — and to this, too, that we owe alcoholism and drug addiction". From "Drugs That Shape Men's Minds", in *Adventures of the Mind*, ed. by R. Thruelsen and J. Kobler, Knopf, 1959, p. 85. Cf. *Drugs and the Mind*, by Robert S. de Ropp, Grove Press, 1957. Cf. Reinhold Niebuhr's questions: "does the drunkard or the glutton merely press self-love to the limit and lose all control over himself...? Or is lack of moderation an effort to escape from the self?" *Nature and Destiny of Man*, Vol. I, Scribner's, 1941, p. 233.

CONCLUSION

It has been the purpose of this essay to suggest that *in addition to* the Biblical-doctrinal interpretation of the Christ-Life, it is also possible and desirable to interpret it as both mythic and psychic symbol. Neither displacement nor discrediting of one by the other is necessary. The general neglect of the mythic and psychic approach *among theologians* has been fostered by the false fear that the *kerygma* would be somehow endangered. But the Christ-Life's own integrity is not imperilled by observing its mythic-psychic parallels—unless it must be proclaimed as isolated rather than as related truth.

The testimony of the late Victor White may suggest the positive apologetic value of what this essay has maintained. "Fifty years or so ago", he wrote, "it seems to have been widely supposed that these discoveries of similarity between Christian and pagan mysteries . . . somehow made nonsense of Christianity . . . But I remember when, as a boy, I read one of those books published by the Rationalist Press, it had just the opposite effect on me to that intended. The Christian Scriptures and the Catholic rites to which I was accustomed, without losing their wonted sense, gained a quality and a sense of which my pastors and catechisms had told me nothing; a sense of solidarity with creation, with the processes of nature, with the cycles of the seasons . . . (and) a new sense of solidarity with humanity" ²⁹).

29) *God and the Unconscious*, Harvill Press, 1953, pp. 223 f. Cf. in this connection Jung's testimony: "The life of Christ is just what it had to be if it is the life of a god and a man at the same time. It is a *symbolum*, a bringing together of heterogeneous natures, rather as if Job and Yahweh were combined in a single personality. Yahweh's intention to become man, which resulted from his collision with Job, is fulfilled in Christ's life and suffering". *Answer to Job*, Pantheon, 1954, p. 96.

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THE MARTYR-MYSTIC HALLĀJ IN SINDHI FOLK-POETRY

NOTES ON A MYSTICAL SYMBOL

BY

ANNEMARIE SCHIMMEL

Ask the condition of love from the lovers —

If you don't believe me, ask from those who are like Mansur! ¹⁾

That was the refrain of a folksong which I heard in Garhīyāsīn (Upper Sind, Pakistan) in March 1961, and I was deeply impressed by the fact that everybody in the remotest corners of the Indus valley seemed to know the name of the great martyr mystic of Islam, Ḥusain ibn Maṣṣūr al-Ḥallāj, the "wool-carder", who had been put to death March 26, 922 in Bagdad, and whose extactic cry *anā'l-ḥaqq*, "I am the creative Truth", has become one of the most famous theopathic utterances (*shaḥḥ*) in the history of Islamic mysticism.

L. Massignon ²⁾ who has devoted almost his whole life to the study

1) Sindhi is the language of the Lower Indus Basin; the name "Sind" is used in the following pages as a geographical, not a political concept, the former Province of Sind being integrated in West-Pakistan in 1955. — The main sources are: *Shāh ʿAbdul Laṭīf, risālō*, ed. Kalyān Aḍuwānī, Bombay 1958; *Sachal Sarmast: risālō* (Sindhi), ed. by O. A. Anṣārī, Karachi 1958 (= S I), *Sachal Sarmast jō sirāikī kalām*, ed. Maulvī Ḥakīm Md. Šādiq Ranipūrī, Karachi 1959 (= S II, pp. 1-343 Siraiki, 345-377 Urdu), *Diwān-i Aṣḥikār*, ed. Makhdūm Amīr Aḥmad, Sachal Adabi Academy, Lahore 1957 (= S III, Persian, 228 p.); *Diwān-i Bēdil* ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥusain Shāh Mūsawī, Karachi 1954 (= B, p. 100-188 Sindhi, 189-340 Siraiki, 340-352 Urdu and Persian); H. I. Sadarangani, *Persian Poets of Sind*, Karachi 1956 (= PPS).

I have also to express my due thanks to Pīr Sayyid Hussamuddin Rashdi, Karachi who has provided me with additional material about Sindhi literature, to Prof. Dr. N. B. Baloch, University of Hyderabad and his colleague there, Dr. N. B. Qazi who kindly sent me some valuable informations.

2) *La Passion d'al-Ḥallāj, martyre mystique de l'Islam*, 1922; *Le Diwān d'al-Ḥallāj*, JA 1931, 1955², *Hallāj, kitāb at-tawāsīn*, 1914; *Recueil des textes inédits concernant l'histoire de la mystique en pays d'Islam*, 1929; *Akhbār al-Ḥallāj*, 1957³; *La légende de Ḥallācē Maṣṣūr en pays turcs*, et: *L'œuvre hallāgienne d'Attar*, REI 1941-46. Cf. the bibliographie given by J. D. J. Waardenburg, *L'Islam dans le miroir de l'occident*, 1961, p. 346 ff.

of this greatest exponent of early Sufism has shown that, according to the oldest extant sources, Ḥallāj (born in 858) has travelled from Gujerat through the Indus valley to northern regions in 905. Sind, which had been conquered in 711 by the Arabs, was already in that time a province famous for its scholars and religious people. A certain interest in mystical speculations is likely to have grown there rather early — a large part of the population were Hindu, and there was also a deeper layer of Buddhist elements; the ideas of Buddhism and — a quite unorthodox — Hinduism may have acted as a ferment in the development of religious thought in the country during the early Islamic period: one knows that the mystical teacher of Bāyezīd Bisṭāmī (d. 874) was a certain Abū ‘Alī as-Sindī³⁾ — and, strange enough, Indian Muslim mysticism has maintained until today this relation with the famous saint of Bisṭām: not only that his name, like that of Ḥallāj, has become in innumerable poems a mere cipher of the unitive experience (due to his word: *Subhānī*, Glory be to me!) but a sanctuary has been erected in his name in Chittagong, the most eastern point which Islam has reached in the subcontinent during the Middle Ages (a sanctuary which excels by the large number of enormous turtles in the holy tank, and which is comparable, in this respect, to the sanctuary of Shāh Jalāl in Sylhet, East Pakistan, with its holy fishes, or to Mangho Pīr near Karachi with the holy crocodiles).

At approximately the same time when Ḥallāj travelled through the Indus valley, the Carmathian propaganda, starting from Bahrain, reached Sind, and there are centres of activity of this extreme shiitic sect both in the old Islamic capital Manṣūra and in Multan — L. Massignon has shown that Ḥallāj was accused of being a missionary (*dā‘ī*) of the Carmathians, and that this accusation was one of the main reasons for the first process against him in 912. When the process was taken up again after he had spent nine years in prison he was accused of “publicity of miracles, usurpation of God’s power which threatened both the religious law and the state, and of the proclamation of the reality of love between man and God — this relation being declared impossible by the orthodoxy”⁴⁾.

3) H. Ritter, *Die Aussprüche des Bāyezīd Bisṭāmī*, (West-Östliche Abhandlungen, Festschrift R. Tschudi), Wiesbaden 1954, p. 231; R. C. Zaehner, *Mysticism, sacred and profane*, p. 161. But cf. L. Massignon, *Essai*³, about the place Sind near Nishapūr.

4) Anawati-Gardet, *La mystique musulmane*, 1961, p. 38; about the problem

It is a well-known development how the name of Ḥallāj — who had been despised and rejected not only by the official orthodox judges but even by most of his fellow-mystics — became in the course of time more and more venerated, and was frequently mentioned in mystical poetry, especially in Persian and in the literatures which came under Persian influence. Already the first great author of a mystical *mathnawī*, Sanāʿī (d. about 1131) mentions him in his *ḥadīqat al-ḥaqāʾiq* (p. 113) as reaching outwardly the impaling stake but inwardly the Beloved. His name is likewise referred to by Abū Saʿīd in his quatrains⁵); Rūzbihān Baqlī (d. 1206) has rendered the greatest service to his memory by his commentaries on his work and his quotations; for the great exponent of mystical love, ʿAin ul-Qudāt Hamadānī (who was, like him, executed, in 1132) Ḥallāj is already a model of suffering love. But it was in Farīdaddīn ʿAṭṭār (d. about 1220) that a real spiritual renaissance of Ḥallājīan ideas took place. As Sachal Āshikār, the great Sindhi poet (s.b.) says:

Manšūr has shouted "I am the Truth" and reached the gallows;
The sword of his love came suddenly to Shaikh ʿAṭṭār⁶).

probably alluding to ʿAṭṭār's own word:

The same fire which had fallen into Ḥallāj
Has also fallen into my life (No. 53)

Ḥallāj is for the Persian mystic "like the ringstone on the sealing of the mystic path" (No. 91), and H. Ritter has shown in several places how deeply ʿAṭṭār has been influenced by Ḥallāj to whom an important chapter in his biographical work, the *tadhkirat al-auliya*, is devoted, and how the figure of the martyr mystic has inspired his *Ḥailāj-nāme*, his *Ushturnāme*, as well as his lyrical poetry:

We have already said "I am the Truth" in the Bagdad of pre-eternity
Before that uproar and the subtle word of Manšūr were existent (No 291)⁷).

The expressions which ʿAṭṭār — partly relying on the *akhbār*

of mystical love cf. I. Goldziher, *Die Gottesliebe in der islamischen Theologie*, (Islam Bd. 9), H. Ritter, *Arabische und persische Schriften über die profane und mystische Liebe* (Philologika VII, Islam 21); id. *Das Meer der Seele*, Leiden 1955 (= Meer).

5) Massignon, Recueil 88; Bausani, *Storia della Letteratura Persiana* 356.

6) S III 181.

7) H. Ritter, *Das Meer der Seele*, 1955; id. *Philologika* 10 (Islam 24, 1939), *Philologika* 14-16 (Oriens XI ff.). — The *Diwan* of ʿAṭṭār was used in the edition of Saʿīd Nafīsī, 1339³, Teheran.

*al-Hallāj*⁸⁾ — uses, become standard types in the description of the Bagdadian martyr mystic. The influence which he has exerted upon Sindhi poetry can scarcely be overrated; Sachal who has been styled “the ‘Aṭṭār of Sind” has often imitated his way of writing. The refrain of ‘Aṭṭār’s *bēsarnāme* — *man khudāyam* ‘I am God’ will be alluded to or even echoed in Sachal’s verses⁹⁾; the *Bēsarnāme* itself has also inspired other poets of the Indus valley, just as the *Jumjuma-nāme* which is attributed to ‘Aṭṭār has been translated into Sindhi and is found in an 18th-century versified version¹⁰⁾, the story of Shaikh Ṣan‘ān from ‘Aṭṭār’s *Manṭiq uṭ-ṭair* (the saint who became a swine-herd because of his love of a Christian girl) is well-known all over India, up to Kashmir¹¹⁾.

The greatest mystical poet in Persian language, Maulānā Jalāluddīn Rūmī, consoled his friends shortly before his death with a hint at ‘Aṭṭār’s relation with Ḥallāj who had, 150 years after his death, reappeared in the Persian mystic’s spirit and become his spiritual guide¹²⁾, and Maulānā Rūmī himself has devoted in his *Mathnawī* a number of verses to the words “I am the Truth” in which he compares Ḥallāj’s state to that of iron in fire (M II 1347) — using thus one of the most common symbols of both Eastern and Western religions; he has also taken up at several occasions (M V 2675, VI 4062) the pathetic poem of Ḥallāj:

Killed me, o my friends,
for in my being killed is my life¹³⁾

not to mention the allusions to Ḥallāj’s fate in his lyrical poetry. Maulānā Rūmī’s son Sulṭān Walad (d. 1312) hold, in his *Rebābname*, like most of the later mystics that God Himself spoke the *anā’l-ḥaqq*¹⁴⁾ (just as Shabistarī compared Ḥallāj’s state to that of the Burning Bush)¹⁵⁾.

8) cf. Massignon, L’Oeuvre ḥallājienne d’Aṭṭār; Recueil p. 114, Ritter, Meer s.v. Hallaj.

9) Meer 590; cf. *Islam Ansiklopedisi* II 10. Lithographed Tabriz 1312.

10) cf. Ritter, Philologica X; Massignon in RMM 39 and in *La Cité des Morts* (Les Mardis de Dar el Salam V, 1955), p. 41; the Sindhi version British Museum Or. 6533, ff. 103-110.

11) Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, *Catalogues des mss. Indiennes* No. 878.

12) *Eflākī, manāqib al-‘arīfīn*, Turc. trans., Ankara 1954, p. 6; cf. H. M. Gurbakhshānī, *Lawāria jā lāl*, Karachi 1934, p. 182 (who makes it 300 years).

13) Diwan, Qaṣida No. X.

14) Meer 557.

15) Shabistarī (d. 1321), *Gulshan-i rāz*, one of the most frequently used textbooks of post-classical Sufism.

Thus Ḥallāj becomes a fixed symbol of unitive experience in the Maulawīya tradition. Another stream goes through Turkish mysticism where great poets like Yūnus Emre (d. 1321), the Ḥurūfī martyr Nesīmī (executed 1417) and the Shia missionary Pīr Sulṭān Abdāl (hanged about 1560) realized in their own experiences and sufferings once more the fate of Ḥallāj who made his ablution with blood¹⁶) and who was wounded not by the stones his enemies threw upon him but by the rose thrown by his friends¹⁷).

Only a few years back a dramatisation of the Story of Ḥallāj has been published by Šālīḥ Zekī Aktay (1944), and Aṣaf Ḥālet Çelebi (d. 1959) has written one of his finest lyrical poems on “Mansur”¹⁸).

The legendary story of Ḥallāj has been told and retold in different forms and in different languages. L. Massignon has given the Arabic text from a 13th century-version¹⁹) and has shown its way into Pashto and Bengali, into Persian and Urdu literature. A. R. Farhadi has, then, translated the highly interesting *majlis-e Ḥallāj* where the martyr mystic, his “spiritual child” Shams-i Tabrizī and Maulānā Rūmī who had been inspired by Shams, are woven into a strange pattern²⁰) — the relation or at least similarity between Ḥallāj and Shams-i Tabrizī whose tomb is shown not only in Konya but also in Multan²¹), and who is said to have been killed by jealous mollahs is a topic often recurring in later Sindhi poetry.

A *qīṣṣa-ye Manṣūr* in Urdu by a certain Shīvrājpurī (d. about 1750) from Lucknow-district has been discovered by L. Massignon²²). This story has been translated into Sindhi — partly literally partly in

16) Passion 453, cf. *ʿAṭṭār, tadhkīrat al-auliya*, ed. R. A. Nicholson, II 144; *Ilāhīnāme*, ed. H. Ritter, p. 107.

17) Passion 454, *Pir Sultan Abdal*, ed. A. Gölpınarlı, Istanbul 1953, p. 33. The expression also occurs in Indian sayings and as Turkish proverb.

18) Asaf Halet Çelebi, *Om mani padme hum*, Istanbul 1953.

19) Massignon, *qīṣṣat Husayn al-Ḥallāj*, Donum natalicum H. S. Nyberg, Stockholm 1954.

20) *REI* 1954 after Ms. Vat. Pers. Cerulli 721.

21) cf. Ivanow, *Shams Tabrīz of Multan*, *Armaghan Muhammad Shafi*, Lahore 1955, p. 109 who thinks it possible that the name of the famous Sufi was connected with that of the Ismaili leader Pir Shams; cf. Mehmet Önder, *Şems'in iki mezarı*, Çagri, Konya, Sept. 1960.

22) Recueil 168, printed *Cawnpore* 1851. I am grateful to Professor Massignon that he has kindly sent me the book for examining its relation with the Sindhi text.

abridged form — by Imāmbakhsh Khādim (1861-1918), a traditional poet of Shikārpūr who was well versed in translations from Urdu and has also composed books on Persian²³). He belonged to the Qādirīya order in which the Ḥallājīan tradition has always flourished. Khādim has, in his adaption, maintained the original meter (the same in which Rūmī's *Mathnawī* had been written); after comparing the real lover to Ḥallāj, he starts telling:

They write that there was a pure man called Manṣūr ...
All the divines of his time
Were surely satisfied by his goodness.
But after a while he became mad from love
And turned a moth of love in the candle of Light ...

In the end the Sindhi poet takes over the famous formulation of ʿAṭṭār:

He had made his ablution with his heartblood,
He became for ever *surkh-rū* (red-faced) among the lovers²⁴).

Ḥallāj, thus runs the story, his hands being cut off, rubbed the bleeding stumps over his bleakening face: thus he became *surkh-rū* which means both red-faced and honoured.

Whereas Khādim's little poem (7 pages) leaves the most dramatical scenes of the Urdu model untranslated and does not rise to a higher level of poetry nor of mysticism, we find in a short Persian poem of Sachal a more dramatical version of the lover's death in which the sufferings of Ḥallāj, when "the ocean of blood brought out a wave" are described with glowing intensity and all the traditional stories — that the drops of his blood formed the word Allah "as if a calligrapher had written it", that his head cried "I am the Truth", and that from the river in which his ashes were thrown again the word "I am the Truth" became visible — all these stories are condensed in this fine Persian poem²⁵). Sachal has composed short poems in which the whole story is retold in his Siraiki poetry (II 245, 247); here, as in most of the popular versions, Junaid is one of the acting persons.

The country through which Ḥallāj had wandered once has received his message gladly in later times; his name is used here, as everywhere, as a symbol of suffering love and self-sacrifice at the one, of a measure-

23) *Kulliyāt-i Khādim*, ed. Luṭfullāh Badawī, Karachi 1956, p. 207-214.

24) *Passion* 453, Meer 528; ʿAṭṭār, *tadhkirat* II 143; also *Manṭiq ut-ṭair* 25/4.

25) S III 222 f.

less pantheistic feeling on the other hand. *Ḥaqq*, Creative Truth, becomes in monistic Sufism often simply synonymous with “God”, hence *anāʾl-Ḥaqq* is mostly interpreted as “I am God”. This should be taken into consideration.

Already in the first poetical works of mystics living in the present West-Pakistan areas the Bagdadian mystic is praised and seen as the model of loving surrender: a Persian poem is attributed to ‘Othmān Marwandī, known as Lāl Shabbāz (d. 1256, one of the four great saints of Sind in the 13th century) around whose shrine at Sehwan (the old Siwistan, a Shiwa-sanctuary) large numbers of darweshes used to gather — a poem which ends with the verse:

I am ‘Othmān Marwandī, the friend of Master Manṣūr —
People blame me, and I dance upon the gallows ²⁶⁾.

— a hint at the fact that Ḥallāj went dancing towards the place of execution. A mystic like Fakhraddīn ‘Irāqī (d. 1274) who spent most of his life in the spiritual environment of the head of the Suhrawardīya order, Bahāʾaddīn Zakariya of Multan, may have helped to strengthen the traditions about Ḥallāj — it was him who has described in his *Dīwān* those

who have taken the ball in the polo-ground of love...:
In the very moment when they have said I am the Truth from selflessness,
In that very moment they have not been themselves ... ²⁷⁾

and later mystics of Sind have understood ‘Irāqī’s famous poems about the wine and the transparent goblet —

as if there is only wine and no goblet,
as if there is only goblet and no wine

as appropriate symbol of “that state in which Ḥallāj without his own will shouted: I am the Truth” ²⁸⁾.

It seems, however, that it was in first line the Qādirīya order which became firmly rooted in the subcontinent in the late 13th and early 14th centuries which underlined the importance of Ḥallāj. (That the borders between the orders were, then, still not very strictly defined can be understood from the fact that many mystics belonged to two or more orders; the famous saintly family of Ūch, the Bukhārīs, are a good example: Jalāl Ḥusain Bukhārī, known as Makhdūm Jahāniyān

26) *Mīr ‘Alī Shīr Qānī*, *maqālāt ash-shu‘arā*, ed. H. Rashdi, Karachi 1957, p. 434, PPS 8.

27) *Dīwān* p. 112.

28) U. Daudpota, *Kalām-i Girhōrī*, Hyderabad 1956, p. 58.

(d. 1384) belonged to both Suhrawardīya and Qādirīya, and Massignon has quoted a saying about his ideas on Ḥallāj) 29).

The founder of this first Islamic order, ʿAbdulqādir Gīlānī (d. 1166), has often talked about his “brother Ḥallāj” but had still regarded him as “a stumbler whose hand nobody in his time had taken for leading him” 30) — in this connection one may mention that Muhammad Iqbal, the great Indo-Muslim modernist philosopher-poet — essentially affiliated to the Qādirīya — has used exactly the same expression in connection with Nietzsche whom he calls “the Ḥallāj without gibbet” 31).

The legend of Ḥallāj has been recited in the Qādirīya order during the *samāʿ*-meetings 32). Some branches of the order became, in course of time, more prone to monistic ideas, and in India members of this very group came into closer contact with Hindu philosophy. The most outstanding example of these relations is prince Dārā Shikōh, the heir apparent of the Moghul Empire at the time of its greatest splendour in the first half of the 17th century 33). Leaving aside the tradition of Moghul emperors who were connected with the Chishtīya order since nearly a century, Dārā became a disciple of Miān Mīr, a Qādirī saint of Lahore originating from Upper Sind 34), and of his successor Molla Shāh about whom his enemies complained that “he was beginning to imitate Ḥallāj” 35). Dārā himself deals with Ḥallāj in his *safinat al-auliyā*, the biographies of saints, and in a special chapter of the *ḥasanāt al-ʿarīfīn* where he quotes nine theopathic utterances of Ḥallāj 36). His monistic ideas led Dārā to a deep study of Vedānta philosophy,

29) Recueil 145. Ūch was first a centre of the Suhrawardīya order and became later on the nucleus of Qādirī activities in the Indus valley and farther East.

30) Passion 413; cf. W. Braune, *Die futūh al-ghaib des ʿAbdulqādir al-Gīlānī*, Berlin 1933, p. 41.

31) Sir Muhammad Iqbal, *Jāwādnāme*, German transl. by A. Schimmel, „*Buch der Ewigkeit*”, p. 128 f.

32) Passion 416.

33) cf. the remark of Qanungo, *Dara Shikoh*, p. 104: Abdulqadir Gilani who was for closing the very gates of Hell and opening those of Paradise to the kafir no less than to the faithful, attracted Dara. — Cf. Massignon, *Les entretiens de Lahore*, JA CCIX 1926, and *Un essai de bloc islamo-hindou au XVII^e siècle; L'humanisme du prince Dara*, RMM LXIII.

34) cf. Qānī^c, *maqālāt*, p. 500 ff.

35) Field, *Mystics and saints of Islam*, p. 178.

36) Recueil 157 ff.

and thanks to his personal efforts the famous Persian translation of the Upanishads was completed; like his great-grandfather Akbar, he tried to form a mystical religion which should comprise Islam as well as Hinduism — ideas which led, eventually, to his execution at the hand of his more orthodox brother Aurangzēb (1659).

Dārā's friend Sarmad belonged to the same strain of thought — he, a Persian Jew who had fallen in love with a Hindu boy in the town of Thatta in Lower Sind, had embraced Islam and become one of the boldest quatrain writers in Persian language. This remarkable man who was executed shortly after his imperial friend in 1661 has compared himself in one of his last verses to Ḥallāj —

It is a life long that the voice of Maṣṣūr became old —
I'll give anew the manifestation of gallows and rope! ³⁷⁾

And he has in later literature indeed become a symbol of the suffering of real lovers, being quoted together with Ḥallāj in some poems. Besides this Qādirīya stream which culminated in Dārā Shikōh and his friends in the 17th century in India and was carried on in Sind in the following centuries when Sachal and his disciples "raised the standard of Ḥallāj on the castle" ³⁸⁾ another chain of tradition reached the Indus valley in the early 16th century: together with the Timurid invasion in the North-West where Babur founded the Moghul Empire smaller groups of Turkish origin went down southwards and founded independent little kingdoms in the lower Indus valley. The rulers from the houses of the Arghūns (1526-1556) and Ṭarkhāns (1556-1592) and the Beglars were accompanied by poets who hailed from Persia and Afghanistan and were well versed in classical Persian poetry — the works of ʿAṭṭār had been often copied for the Timurid princes during the 15th century ³⁹⁾. There seems to be little doubt that the literary tradition in which the personality of Ḥallāj played already a rôle, has reinforced the importance of the Ḥallāj-symbol in Sindhi poetry, and the acquaintance with the works of Jāmī (d. 1492) whose poetry has been translated and commented in the Indus valley over and over again, strengthened the already existing monistic ideas.

37) cf. B. A. Hashmi in *Islamic Culture* 1933, 1934; Y. Husain, *La mystique musulmane dans l'Inde*, Paris 1929, p. 192; Qānī^c, *maqālāt*, p. 300 ff. Y. Husain, p. 141, mentions that there were other heretical Sufis, like Mahrū of Gujrat who said like Ḥallāj "I am the Truth".

38) S III 77, 17, and others.

39) cf. Ritter, *Oriens* XI.

The first proof of the new influence is seen in the poem *maẓhar al-āthār* by Jihāngīr Hāshimī of Bhakkar (d. 1539) who was related from paternal side to the Persian mystic Qāsim al-Anwār (d. 1433), from maternal side to the famous pantheistic mystic Shāh Niʿmatullāh Kirmānī (d. 1431) ⁴⁰). His little Persian *mathnawī* which is thought to be an answer to Niẓāmī's *makhzan al-asrār*, Amir Khosrau's *maṭlaʿ al-anwār*, and Jami's *tuhfat al-aḥrār* was written for Ḥasan Arghūn, the then ruler of Sind. Being based on traditional mystical stories (f.i. also from Rūmī's *Mathnawī*) the booklet contains in its 9th sermon, after an exhortation about the importance of silence "The Story of Ḥusain ibn Manṣūr Ḥallāj who from the boiling of the wine of love became enraptured, rent the curtain of secret and became exalted". (p. 98 f, 19 verses):

The annihilated one from pre-eternity, the lover of transitory nature,
 The discoverer of Divine Unity, Ḥusain Ḥallāj ...
 From Truth so much emotion fell into his heart,
 That the sphere started shouting from his hand.
 Just as the dawn he put cotton on fire
 And put the stigma of distress on his unhappy heart;
 He burnt the scoring-stick of good and bad,
 He burnt all things of the shop.
 Like an *alif* he became isolated from everything,
 He went directly on the street of Divine Unity ...
 He became annihilated and rent the cloak of the soul,
 He became empty of himself and full of God.
 When love went through the country of his soul,
 The word I am the Truth came upon his tongue ...
 Whosoever makes the secret of God openly known,
 The decision of law makes him stoned to death.
 When Truth found the way into the heart of Ḥallāj,
 Gallows and rope found the rank of ascension.
 When Truth fromout absolute Being gives a sound —
 Who is it but Truth who says "I am the Truth!"

It is a poem in which many of the common symbols occur: f.i. the word-play with Ḥallāj's name "wool-carder" and the cotton, and the comparison of the gallows tree to the highest exaltion (s. p. 197).

At the same time that Jihāngīr Hāshimī composed this poem a group of Sindhi mystics, suffering under the difficult political situation and the continuing wars in that part of the country migrated to Burhanpur in Central India ⁴¹). In their poetical work many allusions to Ḥallāj

40) *Maẓhar ul-āthār*, ed. H. Rashdi, Karachi 1957.

41) M. M. Rāshid Burhānpūrī, *Burhānpūr kē Sindhī Auliya*, Karachi 1957.

are found, and some of them did freely quote sentences attributed to "the venerated Maṣṣūr Ḥallāj", for example:

Look upon infidelity and Islam as a single thing —
For each of them is a chapter from His book!

Thus says Burhānaddīn Rāzi Ilāhī (d. 1672)⁴²), and already an earlier mystic of this special branch of the Qādiriya order had maintained the absolute Unity of being which is one of the main themes of later Sindhi poetry:

It is He and He and He,
when He sentences and when He goes to the gallows⁴³).

And again in the same period we meet — though far from the Indus valley — the great mystic ʿAbdul Quddūs Gangōhī who has been quoted by Iqbal in his *Lectures* as the typical representative of the "mystical" way of life as contrasted to the prophetic type⁴⁴). He has, in his poetry, repeated the idea of the last quoted verse again and again, and sings that

The friend says I am the Truth, not me —! ⁴⁵

And in his jubilant mood he once said during the *samāʿ* "These silly people have made Ḥallāj on the gibbet and killed him; if I had been there then, they would never have killed him"; however his host, a more orthodox Sufi, started telling the story of Maṣṣūr's blood writing "Allah" whereupon the famous Qadi Abū Yūsuf threw on the floor his inkpot the ink of which had been used for signing the sentence against the mystic — and lo, every drop of ink wrote also "Allah"⁴⁶): a story which shows the typical tendency of legends to combine famous persons of different times; Abū Yūsuf had died more

42) id. p. 285.

43) id. p. 24 (Sulaimān, d. 1596), cf. p. 150.

44) *Six Lectures on the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, ch. V, p. 124; cf. *I ʿġāzul Ḥaq Quddūsī*, ʿAbdul Quddūs Gangōhī, Karachi 1960. The grandson of this mystic was the famous ʿAbdun-Nabī who "offended Akbar by disregarding his wishes in dealing with a Brahmin who had wounded Muslim sentiment..." (I. H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent*, 1962, p. 140) which shows how closely strands of orthodoxy and monism were woven together in the orders. It is of interest that K. A. Nizāmī in his *Taʿrīkh-i mashāʿikh-i Chisht* (Dehli 1935) has not mentioned at all the name of Ḥallāj and his rôle in the spiritual history of the order.

45) Quddūsī, l.c. p. 405, cf. 404.

46) ibd. 322 ff. Cf. the verdict of the grim adversary of Sufism, Ibn al-Jauzī who denied the possibility of Ḥallāj's blood writing God's name because (ritually) impure blood cannot write the most Pure Name (Massignon, Akhbār p. 178).

then hundred years before Ḥallāj, just as Junaid, his mystical teacher, who died ten years before his pupil, is shown alive in most of the versions of the story of Ḥallāj.

The Chishtīya and the Qādirīya have, in their later development, partly welcomed Ḥallāj and praised him. Quite different is the attitude of the Naqshibandīya towards the martyr mystic. Poets affiliated to that order have — not only in Sind — shown less interest in his personality. That holds true for India especially after the great reformer Aḥmad Sirhindī (d. 1624), the *mujaddid-i alf-i thānī*, had used the order (which had been founded in its present form by Bahāʾaddīn Naqshband, d. 1389, in Turkestan, basing on older mystical movements) against the pantheistic tendencies which were visible at the Moghul court since Akbar's time. The Naqshibandīya regarded Ḥallāj as a prototype of both incarnationism and that monistic theology which was considered highly dangerous for the Islamic system of thought because it might lead to an undesirable integration of the different religions of India on the basis of all-embracing mystical unity. Besides this antimonistic trend which makes Ḥallāj rather unpopular already in very early Naqshibandīya literature there exists the idea that Ḥallāj has reached only a certain stage of mystical experience which has to pass over ⁴⁷⁾ — an idea which a living Turkish mystic who claims to be the true follower of the old Turkestani tradition has expressed in the words “*anāʾl-haqq is no taṣawwuf*” (that means it is the error of the pantheists and emerges from those who have not yet reached true annihilation and realization) ⁴⁸⁾.

This idea is met with now and then in verses of more sober Sindhi poets: Māʾil Naqshī says:

I am not Maṣnūʾ that I say ‘I am the Truth’; I am inclining (*māʾil*) towards
Reality,
Whosoever says the word of Truth goes to the gallows, o God! ⁴⁹⁾

Even the mystics of the Suhrawardīya have sometimes expressed the feeling that “there is no loud cry “I am the Truth” in the castle of selflessness” because only as long as the kettle is boiling sounds are

⁴⁷⁾ cf. for this question the fine article of M. Molé in *REI* 27 which shows an unusual understanding of the problems of Islamic orders and esp. of the Naqshibandīya.

⁴⁸⁾ Hasan Lotfi Şuşud, *Fakir sözleri*, İstanbul 1958.

⁴⁹⁾ PPS 188.

admitted whereas real selflessness admits of no sounds. The poet who said so — Mir Jānullāh Riḍwī of Rohri (d. 1754) claims to have reached a station where

the fire which has melted the bottle of Maṣṣūr
gives waves from our nighty cup⁵⁰).

The great leader of the Naqshibandīya in Sind, Muḥammad Zamān of Lanwārī (1713-1774) about whom the historians write that he used to study only three books: the Qurʾān, Rūmī's Mathnawī, and Ḥāfiz' poems, has expressed similar views about Maṣṣūr Ḥallāj: when he was asked about the mystical state of Lāl Shahbāz (whose Ḥallājīan poem has already been quoted) who had not performed the ritual prayer in the prescribed forms, he answered:

That time there were not such men of God who could have made him pass from this state; if a single child of Khoja ʿAbdul Laṭīf (i.e. he himself) had been living at that time, Maṣṣūr would not have given his head to the gallows because one would have led him forward from the state of "I am the Truth" and have brought him beyond that⁵¹!

Yet even this saint could not help expressing the feeling of unity in a symbol taken from Ḥallāj:

O friends, the duality as between cotton and yarn (i.e. God and his Universe)
brought about the death of Maṣṣūr.
When this artificiality vanishes the sole truth of all-pervading oneness
emerges⁵²).

One of the most interesting figures in the history of Sindhi mysticism in the 18th century is Shāh ʿInāyat whose surname *shahīd*, the martyr, shows a spiritual relation to Ḥallāj. This mystic was affiliated, again, to the Qādirīya; he settled after long journeys which brought him even to South India, in Jhōk, and attracted soon so many followers that the other spiritual leaders of the country became jealous of him. One of his recent admirers writes that "this martyr Shāh has, in Sind, watered the Ḥallājīan pantheism (*hama ōst*, All is He) with his own blood, and it is convenient therefore to call him the Maṣṣūr of Sind, since his end was also like that of Ḥallāj"⁵³), and the same author

50) PPS 111.

51) Gurbakhshānī, lawārīa jā lāl p. 97.

52) thus Dr. Daudpota in an article about Monism in the work of Shāh ʿAbdul Laṭīf in *Mihrān jā Mōti*, Karachi 1959, p.

53) H. A. Chinah, *Shāh Shahīd Ṣūfī*, in *Mihrān jā Mōti* 399 ff.; cf. the more sober analysis of H. Rashdī, *Shah ʿInāyat shahīd jē sawānīh jā maʿkhaḍh* (id. p. 220 ff.).

tries to trace back the “Ḥallājīan philosophy” which means for him sheer monism, to ʿAṭṭār and Shamsi Tabrizī.

A reliable story of Shāh Ināyat’s struggle has not yet been written since the sources are scarce and tinged by personal sympathies and antipathies; it can only be understood that the Sayyids of Bulri were afraid of losing their disciples, and it seems that not only mystical but also some sociopolitical problems have played a rôle in the case as so often in the history of Islam (cf. for the Turkish area the case of Badraddīn of Simawna). It was just the time of the sudden decline of the Mughal Empire; after Aurangzeb’s death in 1707 four emperors had succeeded each other in a short period; in Sind the Kalhora family had risen to power, and it was a member of this clan, Mīān Yār Muḥammad who sieged Jhōk, the stronghold of Shāh ʿInāyat, for four months; the mystic leader was eventually treacherously murdered (January 1718) by the Nawāb Aʿzam Khān of Thatta, the agent of the Moghul Empire. It is told (Bēdil in his *Mathnawī-ye Dilkushā*) that “Shāh Ināyat’s head was transported to the court in Delhi and started reciting poetry on the way” which was collected as *bēsarnāme* — a clear reference to ʿAṭṭār’s *bēsarnāme* ⁵⁴).

The emperor rose in order to put down the candle of the Existence of Truth — Neglecting the fact that light increases when the head (of the wick) is cut, says Mīr Jānullāh about this event ⁵⁵). Shāh ʿInāyat seems to have felt that he belonged to the great line of martyrs which started with Ḥallāj: like him he, too, prayed for those who killed him because they were rescuing him from the evil of existence ⁵⁶). A Hindu poet of Sind, Mīr Bhai Dalpatrām (1769-1841) has composed a *mathnawī* about his martyrdom ⁵⁷), and later poets like Sachal and Bēdil have classified him as one of those lovers who, like Ḥallāj, have been killed because of their exceeding love.

Just in the period of Shāh ʿInāyat the Martyr (who himself wrote in the court language of India, in Persian) we can find the first greater poems in Sindhi language. Some small verses and fragments in the local language have been preserved in the accounts of the earlier saints — like Shāh Karīm (d. 1623); they are most difficult because

54) id. p. 347.

55) PPS 103.

56) Moti 236.

57) PPS 204.

of the density of the grammatical structure⁵⁸). A large bulk of folk-poetry and legends is likely to have existed in Sindhi already in remote periods, for the poetry of the 18th century is based upon folkstories which must have been commonly known and which are made by the religious leaders subject to mystical interpretation.

Shāh ʿAbdul Laṭīf of Bhit (1689-1752) has, in his great *risālō*, introduced for the first time on a large scale this way of spiritualizing the traditional stories⁵⁹), and his work, written in pure and very concise Sindhi verses, is still the great storehouse of Sindhi poetry — not only for the Muslims but as well for the Hindus who have rendered great service to Shāh Laṭīf's work by commenting and reediting it so that an Indian Muslim could even call the *risālō* "the holy book of the Hindus of Sindh". Written in a peculiar way of versification, every chapter ends with a *kāfī*, a monorhyme poem which is interrupted by a refrain — these *kāfīs* have, later on, developed on their own and form a special poetical mode. Shāh Laṭīf has hidden his mystical ideas often under a cover of symbols; references to the great tradition of Sufism, f.i. to Maulānā Rūmī's work, are perceptible to the careful reader. The story runs in the country that he, when meeting the child ʿAbdulwahhāb, later known as Sachal Sarmast or Ashikār (1739-1828), made the remark that "this boy will lift the cover from the pot which we have kept closed". Indeed has Sachal not without reason adopted in his Persian poetry the nom-de-plume "Ashikār" "Open"⁶⁰). It has been said that "some of his utterances breathe the spirit of the Sufi martyr Maṣṣūr"⁶¹), and he has called himself often "the Maṣṣūr of this last time who utters the cry I am the Truth openly (*āshikār*)"

58) cf. H. Rashdi, *Sindhī Adab*, Karachi s.d. (1954); A. Bausani, *Storia delle letterature dell'Pakistan*, 1957; R. Burton, *Sind and the races that inhabit the Indus valley*, and the other studies of the same author on Sind; E. Trumpp, *Sindhi Grammar*, London 1871.

59) The first printed edition of the *risālō* was arranged by E. Trumpp, Leipzig 1866 (cf. A. Schimmel, *Ernst Trumpp, An account of his Life and work*, Karachi 1962) later on many editions followed; the comparison shows varieties of expressions which are due to the different transmitters. A critical edition is still lacking. Cf. H. T. Sorley, *Shāh ʿAbdul Laṭīf of Bhit*, Oxford 1940.

60) Sachal's works are not yet available in trustworthy editions; the editions mentioned in note 1 are comparatively reliable but oral tradition again differs in some places; other poems of his are not yet published in a satisfactory way.

61) PPS 170.

and has lifted the flag of Maṣṣūr, that will say the flag of love ⁶²). Others have called Sachal the “‘Aṭṭār of Sind”, and held that, just as Ḥallāj’s spirit had worked upon ‘Aṭṭār, ‘Aṭṭār’s intoxicated spirit worked upon Sachal ⁶³). It is indeed easy to find many allusions to the great Persian poet, to the claim of *khudā’i* from his *Bēṣarnāme*, or even translations from ‘Aṭṭār’s verses, in Sachal’s poetry; the anaphora which is so typical of ‘Aṭṭār’s work is also a frequently used artistic form in the *kāfīs* of the Sindhi mystic.

Sachal has composed poetry not only in classical Sindhi but also in the Northern dialect, Siraiki, which is very close to Multani (southern Panjabi) and differs grammatically remarkably from pure Sindhi; he has as well composed Urdu and Persian verses, and his followers have mostly displayed the same linguistic versatility. The beauty of Sachal’s powerful and melodious verses can enrapture even those who may disagree with the contents of his poetry: the bold assertion of the essential unity of Being.

In Sindhi literature we find the poetical renderings of mystically interpreted folktales in which the heroine — and it is always a heroine, never a hero, just as in Indian mystical literature the soul is seen under the symbol of the woman, the bride, the loving wife — suffers and longs for her Divine Beloved, and where simple scenes from rural life form the immediate background of the mystical heights of poetical imagination; besides the form of *sī-harfīs*, Golden Alphabets, is very popular (also in Panjabi poetry). The *ghazal* which was the common form in Persian and Urdu poetry has been introduced into Sindhi only in the 19th century and preserves a highly Persianizing character.

Sachal has profusely quoted references to Ḥallāj in all parts of his work, and so did his followers such as Yūsuf (d. 1853) and Bēdil of Rohri (d. 1872) from whose poetry — in the same languages as that of Sachal — many of our examples are taken ⁶⁴). “Other prominent

62) S III 77, cf. 171, 135, 208, cf. also 53, 131; p. 17 read *‘alam* (flag) instead of *‘ilm*, science, knowledge.

63) In a little pamphlet published by the Khairpur Manager, West Pakistan Government Press, p. 9.

64) Bēdil wrote a great deal of books on Sufism in Arabic, Persian, Sindhi, has composed Arabic sermons interspersed with Persian verses, and a work in which he has put together respectively one verse from the Qurʾān, a ḥadīth, a verse from Maulānā Rūmī’s *Mathnawī*, one of Shāh Laṭīf’s *risālō*, and a Persian story. Bēdil is perhaps the most outspoken representative of monistic Islam, though

kāfi-gū poets who have alluded to Maṣṣūr are Moḥammad Ḥasan Bēkas (d. 1882), Khair Muḥammad Hisbānī (d. 1877), Daryā Khān (d. 1843), Mōhan (d. 1905), Makhḍūm Amīn Muḥammad (d. 1886), Ḥasan Baksh (d. 1900), Miṣrīshāh (d. 1904) Manthar (d. 1938), Walī Muḥammad Laghārī (d. 1932), Muḥammad Khatīān (d. 1940) and Rakhiāl Shāh (d. 1940)" 65), and both in the fragments of the classical writers, like Ṣāhibḍenō (d. 1784) as in the modern folk-poetry Ḥallāj is an unchangeable symbol of love and union through suffering.

Though L. Massignon has shown that Ḥallāj's mysticism was far from pantheism his word 'I am the Truth' has been interpreted pantheistically already in early times, and most of the writers on religious life in Sind are of the opinion that he is the true representative of the philosophy of *hama ōst* "All is He" which is, according to them, the prevalent trend in the Indus valley since time immemorial. "There is nothing more remarkable in Sind — writes Richard Burton — than the number of holy men which it has produced and the extent to which that modification of pantheism ... is spread among the body of the people" 66). And a contemporary Sindhi author thinks that "it is clear that the Sindhi naturell has accepted the influence of Sufism to such an extent that in the whole Oriental world no other country can be compared to Sind. Those who had the knowledge of looking at the creatures of the Lord of the Worlds with the eye of unity, have left with one turning of the pen the differences between faithful and infidel, or between Muslim and Hindu... 67)". From this point of view one can easily understand that the numerous Hindu scholars who have specialized in the history of Sufism in the Indus valley have focussed the monistic interpretation of Sufism, thus underlining the common basis of Hinduism (which meant, for them, Vedānta-speculation) and Islam. "Bāyezīd has planted the plant of pantheism, Maṣṣūr Ḥallāj has watered it with his own blood and made it a big tree" writes a prominent Hindu author 68).

he does not reach the poetical heights of Sachal. His modest tomb in Rohri is still visited by people.

65) Letter of Dr. N. B. Baloch 16.6.1962.

66) Burton, Sind p. 198.

67) Introduction to S I, p. 9.

68) Gurbakhshānī, Lal p. 11; cf. *Līlārām Prēmchand and Jethmal Pasrām, Ṣūfi sagūrā*, Hyderabad 1921, p. 22, p. 11, and the latter's *Sind and its Sufis*, Madras 1924.

But H. T. Sorley is surely right when he criticizes this author's way of explaining Shāh Latīf's *risālō*: "His understanding is... tinged with the ideas of the Hindu Vedanta and a kind of theosophical universalism which is quite unlike the Islamic mysticism of the *risālō* itself" ⁶⁹) — a similar verdict on the Hindu interpretation of Panjabi Sufi poetry has been given by J. W. Fück some twenty years back ⁷⁰).

That monism pervades more or less outspokenly the mystical poetry of Sind cannot be doubted; but it is based on Islamic foundations, and though references to the practices of the Yogis are found, all ideas are traced back to the Qurʾān and the tradition. In the Sindhi poems we find a strong tendency to accumulate a large number of Qurʾānic quotations and prophetic traditions, to use them as a starting point for developing mystical ideas, and to add to them some of the famous theopathic utterances of great Sufis, from Bāyezīd's *subḥānī* to Ḥallāj's I am the Truth. Already in ʿAṭṭār's poems similar collections of mystically interpreted sayings are found ⁷¹).

There exist, of course, only a rather small number of Qurʾānic verses which are apt to be used in defending the pantheistic or incarnationist view which f.i. Sachal and his followers held: Sūra 50/16 "closer than the jugular vein" is frequently quoted, and besides Sūra 51/21: "And in yourselves (in your souls) — dont you see", Sūra 2/247 "And He is wherever you turn" is taken as a proof of God's overwhelming presence in everything and everywhere. It is astonishing that Sura 5/59 which meant for the classical Sufis the proof of the mutual love between God and man, is nearly never mentioned.

Among the traditions there are a great number which have been common stock in mysticism: starting from the famous word that God created man *ʿalā šūratihī*, "in His form" which had, once, played an important rôle in the formation of Ḥallāj's doctrine of the *Huwa Huwa* ⁷²), to "Man is My secret, and I am his secret" and the *ḥadīth qudsī* "I am Aḥmad without m" (i.e. Aḥmad = Muḥammad without the letter m which makes *aḥad*, One) which hints at the essential unity of man and God and shows, according to mystics like Jīlī that between

69) Sorley, l.c. p. 259.

70) J. W. Fück, OLZ 1940/1 über L. Rama Krishna, *Panjabi Sufi Poets AD 1460-1900*, London 1938.

71) *Dīwān*, *Qaṣīda* 16, p. 49 ff.

72) Ḥallāj, *kitāb aṭ-ṭawāsīn* 129 ff.

man and Divine Oneness exist 40 stages — the numerical value of m being 40 — 73). The old sayings “Who knows himself knows his Lord”, or “I knew my Lord through my Lord” or, very often “He created things, and He is their essence” (or “themselves”) belong to the standard traditions. The Ḥallājīan “I am the Truth” is always quoted inmidst of these Qurʾānic and traditional sayings, thus placing the martyr mystic in the spiritual galaxy of those who have, according to the mystical interpretation realized the unity of all Being like the Prophet.

In Shāh ʿAbdul Latīf’s mystical thought prevails the idea of suffering. Having realized, just as the Sufis of yore, the purifying power of suffering he makes his heroines examples of the soul on her difficult way through the deserts of this world or through the ocean of affliction towards the union with the Divine Beloved. Shāh Latīf is in this respect very close to the original Ḥallājīan mysticism which is condensed in ʿAṭṭār’s story:

The asked Ḥallāj: What is love? He answered: You will see it to-day and tomorrow and day after tomorrow! — That day they cut his hands and feet, the next day they hanged him, and the third day they gave his ashes into the wind 74).

In the first chapters of his *risālō* Shāh Latīf has praised eloquently the afflictions of the true lovers, and the impaling stake becomes, now, the symbol of love’s union:

The gibbet is first the ornament of the lovers ... the resolution to be killed is essential for loving people ... the very gibbet becomes the nuptial bed for the lovers ... (Kalyān II 3-9).

A similar comparison had also been used by Kabīr who sings that the gallows has become to him a bed of rest 75).

In *Yaman Kalyān* (VI 15 ff.) Shāh Latīf again takes up the motif of the gallows — to sacrifice the head on the gibbet in the arena of love means to find health — a verse like “Soul upon the friend (*yār*), body upon the gallows (*dār*)” is already quoted by ʿAin ul-Qudāt 76).

The same mystic relates the saying of Ḥallāj that the lust of the lover reaches its culmination when he sees the executioner swinging the sword and says: “How beautiful he looks when swinging the

73) ʿAbdul Karīm Jīlī, *Das Buch der 40 Stufen*, ed. E. Bannerth, Wien 1956, cf. S II 269, 324, 305, 165.

74) *tadhkirat ul-auliyaʾ* II 142.

75) Ch. Vaudeville, *Kabir Granthavali (Doha)*, Pondichéry 1957, p. 16.

76) *Larwāʾih*, ed. Farmānesh, Teheran 1958, p. 108.

sword!" 77) It is wellknown that the cruelty of the Beloved forms a frequently elaborated theme in Oriental mystical poetry, and Shāh Laṭīf has not hesitated to sing in ecstatic verses the happiness of the lover who is tortured by his Friend:

Let thy knife be blunt so that I may feel it longer on my neck!
just as Sachal says:

Uttering the word I am the Truth ...

I make myself killed thinking of the hands of my friend. (II 359)

Shāh Laṭīf has again taken up the gallows-motif in *Sur Maʿdhūrī* VII 11 when poor Sasui in search of her Beloved roves through the wilderness:

Thou wilt climb upon the trees, becoming food for the vultures —

Sasui has mounted on the gallows-tree —

that will say that she has, at last, achieved union through death. For the gibbet is the condition for becoming Maṣṣūr i.e. "victorious" — a word play which is used not only by Sindhi poets but also by the Panjabi contemporary of Shāh Laṭīf, Bullhē Shāh 78).

Early Islamic piety had been overshadowed by the intense fear of death and Judgment, and in the last chapter of Imām Ghazzālī's *ihyā ʿulūm addīn* the different attitudes of pious Muslims towards the problem of death are excellently reflected. In the classics of Sufism the development from the natural fear to the longing for death because it is "a bridge which leads the lover towards the Beloved" can be seen with perfect lucidity, a development which culminates in the verses of Ḥallāj

Killed me, o my friends, for in my being killed is my life 79),
a *ghazal* which Maulānā Rūmī has paraphrased several times and which is taken up again by Sachal:

Lover, accept martyrdom, think also of annihilation (*fanā*)

Listen to the indication "Indeed in my being killed", oh sincere one! (S II 239)
who sings in his Persian dīwān:

Whosoever comes in the dress of Ḥallāj,

Has found eternal life from "my being killed" (S III 191)

To die in the contemplation of God's eternal beauty is the goal of all the great lovers during the centuries —

77) id. p. 100, cf. Meer 399.

78) *Bullhē Shāh, Kulliyāt*, ed. Faqīr Md. Faqīr, Lahore 1960, p. 48.

79) *Dīwān*, qaṣīda No. X.

That death which the world fears so much is my happiness,
When shall I die and when shall I contemplate Him who is highest bliss? ⁸⁰⁾
asks Kabīr, and the Sindhi poets have used the motif — specialized as death on the gibbet — innumerable times. For “the rank of the lover is on the gibbet”, says Sachal (III 28, cf. 63), and the worldly minded are asked:

Thou hast not yet passed away from self,
Hast not mounted on the gallows-tree,
Hast not died before dying —
How canst thou be called lover,
How canst thou say I am the Truth? (S II 267)

Every hour are the lovers inclined towards the gibbet (B 239) because it is this flame — the flame of love — that has made Manṣūr ride on the gallows (B 217). These are the strange mysteries of love, says Budal Faqīr, that the true lover has to mount on the gibbet — ⁸¹⁾

who are given the name of lovers
turn around the gibbet, weeping day and night ... (S II 302)
and intoxicated by the cup of love they are dragged towards the execution place (S II 300) ⁸²⁾.

Sometimes it is the assertion ‘I am the Truth’ which is given as reason for the lovers being crucified — one of the accusations against Ḥallāj was the *ifshā as-sirr*, the divulcation of the secret which should have remained veiled from the rank and file: death is the result of speaking too openly of the mystery of love and union.

I have said I am the Truth, the body has become hundred pieces,
I have read all the mysteries of Truth, I have sacrificed life and soul
(S II 341)

The poets have never become tired of retelling that the way of Man-ṣūrdom is difficult, and that man has to prepare himself for death (B 275) — yet the gallows become also a symbol of the “high threshold of love”. (B 280) Indeed is this gibbet not a temporal station but

since the day of the preeternal covenant the lovers are riding on the gallows
(S I 72)

Thus it can be called the proper place for loving people —

Give the head to the gibbet,
runs the refrain of a *ghazal* of Sachal (S III 185), and not without reason the gallows-tree is confronted with the pulpit where preachers

80) Vaudeville l.c. 66.

81) S II 351, 245; S III 48; B 145.

82) cf. S II 228, 294, 304, S I 184; B 208, 172, 213, 293, 311; Bullhē Shāh 149.

and scholars teach people morality and the orthodox way of life, crucifying the lovers from tyranny and ignorance (S II 96) — a confrontation popular in Islamic literature at least since Maulānā Rūmī's time, and wellknown in India in Ghālīb's verse which has become proverbial: "You can say it on the gallows, but not from the pulpit".

Closely connected with the gibbet-motif is the *bēsarī*, the "being without head"; the relation to ʿAṭṭār's *bēšarnāme* is obvious, and in Sind the name of Shāh ʿInāyat Shahīd will also be remembered in this connection.

O friend, when thou hast given the head, then thou wilt become a lover :

When Maṣṣūr had given his head he became, I swear, Haqq (Divine Truth, God) (S II 357)

To become headless means also to loose one's self, to give up this worldly being in order to gain highest experience. Therefore Bēdil can say :

'I am the Truth' is the state of headlessness⁸³)

and only

those who walk like Maṣṣūr without head and feet

have found the secret of Truth under the form of metaphors (B 202)

The most famous example of this offering the head in the way of love is found in Shāh Laṭīf's *Sur Sōrathī* when the king is induced by the sweet song of the minstrel to sacrifice gladly his head — 84)

Those who are from Maṣṣūr, those necks were cut (S I 82, cf. 68, 83)

Sachal has even connected the well-known motif of Persian lyrics — that the head of the lover is the polo-ball in the polostick of the curls of the Beloved — with the Ḥallājīan tradition: those who have uttered the cry of Divinity have made their heads balls in the arena (S III 129).

It is recorded that after the death of Ḥallāj his friend Shiblī asked God why and until when he would kill His lovers⁸⁵). The answer was: "Those whom I kill their bloodmoney is upon me and I (or "My Beauty") am their bloodmoney" — a tradition which was obviously well known among the Sindhi mystics (it was, indeed, widely spread in

83) cf. S III 97, 98; B 145, 164.

84) The chapter was edited for the first time by Trumpp, *Eine Sindhi-Sprachprobe*, ZDMG 17/1861, with many critical remarks about the cruelty of the content and the nuisable influence of mysticism.

85) Receuil 78, 98; cf. Furūzanfar, *aḥādīth-i Mathnawī*, Teheran 1334, No. 407. Quoted also by ʿAinul Quḍāt and ʿAṭṭār.

Sufi circles). Thus the leading Naqshibandi mystic of the 18th century, Muḥammad Zamān, recited the verse

Those who have died from love they will never die,
 "Whom I have killed I am their bloodmoney", being very precious...⁸⁶⁾

when ʿAbdur Raḥīm Gīrhōrī (d. 1778) asked him how to reach the *haqīqa Muḥammadiya*; Gīrhōrī has realized this verse, later on, in a different way: he was killed when he destroyed a Shiwa-idol in a near-by village: that was *his* way of love.

Shāh Laṭīf has used this word twice in the story of Sasui; once (Sur Ḥusainī IX 20 ff.) when Sasui decides to die so that the Beloved may become her blood-money, and intends to mount on the gallows-tree; in the second place the allusion to Ḥallāj is as transparent (Sur Sasui XI 6):

Dagger and killing-place in the courtyard of the prince of Ari,
 Bloodmoney is the Beloved for those who have died on the road —

the first line probably pointing to Ḥallāj's quatrain *naḍīmī* ...

...and when the cup went round, he called for the sword and the sheet of
 leather used for the execution ...⁸⁷⁾

a verse which has often been echoed in Sindhi poetry.

In Shāh Laṭīf's work Ḥallāj is not only the suffering lover but also the symbol of the Divine truth which is contained in everything created:

Water earth stream: one cry! Tree bush one call: I am the Truth!
 All things have become worthy of pain.
 All are thousands of Maṣṣūrs — whom of them wilt thou put on the gallows?
 (Suhni IX 1)

And the *risālō* continues:

Everywhere the word of the friend, everywhere the presence of the Beloved —
 The whole country abounds in Maṣṣūrs — how many of them wouldst thou
 put to death?

a verse the authorship of which is, however, not indubitable; it has also been attributed to Muḥammad Zamān or is called work of unknown origin; its second half is, however, still in use as a proverb⁸⁸⁾. It is one of the finest poetical expressions of the feeling that a Divine spark is hidden everywhere and craves to make itself visible; the veil of creation becomes transparent for the mystic but for the law-bound

86) Kalām-i Gīrhōrī p. 14 note 1.

87) Dīwān section I b No. 37.

88) Rashdi, Sindhi Adab p. 54.

judge there is only the blasphemy of the one whose cry 'I am the Truth' human ears have heard.

Again, Shāh Laṭīf takes up a very famous verse which was attributed to Ḥallāj himself and has been paraphrased in Persian too, a verse, which was primarily written about the sad fate of Satan who was helpless between Divine order and Divine will when the question arose whether or not to bow down before the newly created Adam (cf. Sūra 7/28)

God cast him into the sea, with his arms tied behind his neck

And said to him: Take care take care lest thou be wetted by the water!

a verse of which Ibn Khallikān, the historian (d. 1282)⁸⁹) thinks that it would be fitting for describing Ḥallāj's own fate. Shāh Laṭīf has quoted it in *Sur Asā* IV 38 f. in a Sindhi translation. He has also, in a single short sentence (*Yaman Kalyān* V 24) pointed to the fact that "Satan is the true lover" which had been discussed so often in Sufism.

It may be that the symbol of the sea into which the poor lover is being cast has influenced to a certain extent an expression which Sindhi Sufis use frequently — that of the "wave of Maṣṣūr". Of course, the prevalent idea is that of pantheistic mysticism which is fond of symbolizing the all-embracing and all-containing Divine Being as the bottomless ocean from which the individual souls emerge like foam or like waves, and in which they are again lost⁹⁰).

From amidst the Ocean of Unity thou too go like a wave ...

...make hear the sound I am the Truth,

Do not think that thou art a drop, thou canst be called the ocean!

sings Sachal in the *vaḥdatnāme* (S I 53)⁹¹), the Book of Oneness, and Bēdil continues:

Continuously from the Ocean of Unity rise the Maṣṣūrī-waves (B 178)

It is this "Maṣṣūrī-wave" which swells up and makes go the imagination of duality (B 165, cf. 145 refrain). Yea, Ḥallāj's state is indeed "an ocean without borders" (B 177): he is the wave that dared speak of Unity. That is why the martyr mystic who had delivered himself to the call of Divine love without reserve becomes the longer the more the perfect model of the lover in all his spiritual states.

⁸⁹) *Vafayat*, ed. de Slane, p. 227; cf. *Dīwān*, p. 122.

⁹⁰) cf. Schimmel, *Die Bildersprache Dschelaladdin Rumis*, 1949, for some examples from mystical poetry.

⁹¹) cf. verse 16, 46, *kāfi* 14; cf. also S III 92 and B 301, 148.

The Maṣṣūrī-way is the real Path,
everything else is rough imagination (B 238)

Man should realize that he is intoxicated, like Maṣṣūr, by the wine of love since preeternity (B 302 refrain):

Maṣṣūr has mounted on the gibbet, saying I am the Truth —
Since that time I am in search of that intoxication (S II 348) ⁹²)

He becomes also the prototype of the lover in his strife against purely scientific knowledge and against theological argumentation; the never ending struggle between immediate religious experience (prophetical or mystical) and bookish traditionalism which is one of the favorite subjects of Islamic mystical literature, is condensed here in the figures of Ḥallāj and the Mufti, or the molla.

In the assembly of happiness the men of knowledge are excelling,
In the court of love Maṣṣūr's word is expected (B 341).

The longing love of Ḥallāj is contrasted with the arrogance of the mollas who are interested only in reading and commenting the *Kanz* and the *Qudūrī*, the traditional theological books which were taught in the schools and which have been ridiculised by the mystics of Sindh at least since the 16th century ⁹³):

From the wine of this Maṣṣūrdom came intoxication,
Kanz and Qudūrī became annihilated. (S I 53)

The seeker is admonished to

Forget whatever thou hast read: the word I am the Truth!
Becoming one with the Reality leave grammar and syntax... (B 115) ⁹⁴)

But looked at from the angle of Unity even the strife between Ḥallāj and the molla will become annihilated in Oneness (B 162), and by the fragrance of Unity the mollas, too, are eventually turned into Maṣṣūr (B 147). However, the rank of Maṣṣūr, "the Victorious One" is not easily to be obtained — suffering and sacrifice are required, and therefore the name of Maṣṣūr is often used for designating the *mard*, the man of God (as the *majlīs-i Maṣṣūr* says: To mount on the gallows is the sake of the man of God). He is the hero and fighter (*ghāzī*, the conqueror who fights against the unbelievers) who, in the arena of

⁹²) cf. B 256

⁹³) *Qudūrī*, d. 1037, is the author of an often and widely used handbook of Ḥanafī *fiqh* (cf. GAL I 175, S I 295); a new edition of the mukhtasar was printed Karachi 1960, by Maulānā Ghulām Muṣṭafā Qāsimī.

⁹⁴) cf. B 277, 306; S II 232.

love willingly offers his head on the gibbet (S II 279) after having quaffed the wine of Unity ⁹⁵) —

With high ambition a man can go the way of Truth (God),
I am the Truth, shouted Maṣṣūr on the gallows,

says an early profane Persian poet of Sind ⁹⁶).

ʿAṭṭār relates that somebody saw Ḥallāj after his death in his dream: without head but holding a goblet in his hand — the King would give the wine only after having taken the head ⁹⁷). This “wine of Maṣṣūr” has become a standing formula in Persian and Sindhi poetry ⁹⁸). When ʿAṭṭār sings:

If everybody had drunk from that wine which Ḥallāj drank,
Hundreds of thousands of young and old people would have been on the gibbet
(No. 695)

Sachal can take up this idea, exclaiming that

I am intoxicated since preternity,
I see the influence of the wine of Maṣṣūr in my head (S III 135)

This very “special intoxication” ⁹⁹) — a favorite expression of Sachal — makes man utter the cry ‘I am the Truth’, and poetry has never failed to describe in burning words

that intoxication of the wine of love which mixes colour and colourlessness
(B 197)

It may be even called “water of life” which Love offers and which grants the lover the Maṣṣūr-like intoxication (B 215), hinting at the fact that the water of life is found in the darkness and is obtained only through hard suffering. From this intoxication the lovers start dancing, shouting “I am the Truth”, sings Sachal (S III 7) in an allusion to the story that Maṣṣūr went dancing towards the execution; for this “goblet of love” leads the lovers surely towards the impaling stake (S II 231, cf. 316) on which they ascend with pleasure (id. 349).

It is mostly the influence of Love which is compared to the intoxicating power of wine; comparatively rarely Beauty is accused of making drink the martyr mystic the wine of Oneness — it is Bēdil,

⁹⁵) cf. S I 72, 73, B 171, 192, 227, Refrain 264. S III 191 uses the expression *pehlawānī*.

⁹⁶) Sharar Muhammad Arshad, *Qānīʿ*, maqālāt 332.

⁹⁷) Meer 533.

⁹⁸) very typical examples are S II 248, 306, B 143, 315, PPS 174; the maṣṣūrī-cup B 156, 193, 276.

⁹⁹) *khāṣṣ khumār*, S II 300 in a Golden Alphabet, letter kh.

(B 243) the adorer of Beauty in every form, be it a Hindu lad or a Qadi, who has limelighted this rôle of Beauty. The poets would also speak of the wine of longing (B 288) which makes mankind reach the rank of Maṣṣūr, and the most correct expression would be wine of unity (S III 103), goblet of Oneness (B 199) or cup of union.

Bēdil, thou hast drunk the goblet of union from the taverns of love,
Intoxicated, be called Maṣṣūr. (B 251).

But it is also the "little goblet of suffering" as Bēdil has put it (B 275), the diminutive expressing here, as so often in Sindhi that something is dear to the speaker; and it is, now again in the true Hallājian trend, the goblet of martyrdom from the winestore of Not-Being (B 215) which the lover is asked to drink.

The symbol of intoxication for the highest bliss of unitive experience is widely spread in almost all religions, and the motif of wine — "wine, drinker and cupbearer are one" goes, in Islamic mysticism, at least as far back as Bāyezīd Bisṭāmī and has been popular in all branches of mystical poetry, to mention only Ibn al-Fāriḍ's (d. 1235) famous *khamrīya* in Arabic, the innumerable wine-verses of Persian poets. In the context of the Ḥallāj-theme the reason for its use is given on the one hand by this traditional symbol of mystical drunkenness,, i.e. selflessness, "headlessness", on the other hand it is probably connected with the abovementioned story and, through that, again with the famous quatrain *nadīmī*: the cruel friend making his lover drunk and killing him. ʿAṭṭār himself writes:

So selfless they became from Self that in the valley of Unity
One of them became intoxicated by I am the Truth, and the other one
drowned in the *Subhānī* (Gas. 26).

The connection with the *bēkhūdī*, the losing of one's proper existence and the acquainting of a new superhuman consciousness is given —

Drink from the goblet of Maṣṣūrdom, and then come without Self into the
meeting of the drunkards
says Bēdil (B 10, cf. 250) who also holds that those who acknowledge Maṣṣūr's state have become empty from selfishness resp. selfhood (B 300) ¹⁰⁰. Understanding this secret, they become leaders (*sardār*) of the community and wander towards the gibbet (*sar-i dār*) (B 296), for

¹⁰⁰) cf. S II 286.

He as well as Bēdil have reiterated this word which they sometimes simply call word of *maulāʿī*, Lordship or *dam-i khudāʿī*, word of Divinity (S III 129) or word of the Divine Essence (B 254).

Or, in a more poetical mood they and their followers have described the *anāʿl-ḥaqq* as the “song which the lovers sing since preeternity” (Budal Faqīr of Shikarpur) ¹⁰³).

Not without reason has the famous word of Hallaj been likened to the sound of the great kettle-drum: proclaiming by kettle-drum means “to announce publicly”, and it was just Ḥallāj’s greatest disadvantage in the eyes of his fellow-mystics that he had disclosed the highest secret of loving unity. That is why Sachal sings:

I beat the drum of Maṣṣūr in the world —

If the head goes, all the better — one must give it away!

The poet whose repeated prayer formula is *anāʿl-ḥaqq* boasts in beating the drum of kingdom (S III 125) or even the drum of Divinity (B 199, 303) — it is significant of the uniformity of symbolism in Sufism that the modern Turkish poet Aṣaf Ḥālet Chelebi has used the same expression:

... I need no colour nor colourlessness ...

Beat the great drum ...

all the sounds melt into one ... Mansur, Mansuuuur ...

the expression of the colourlessness for the unitive state also being frequently used by the Sindhi mystics ¹⁰⁴).

Sometimes it is the biggest drum, the *naqqāra* (*naghāra*) which proclaims the word of Unity, and from here it is only a short way to the expression of *naubat anaʿl-ḥaqq*, *naubat* being the musical parade at the door of the princes and kings and sometimes simply the big kettledrum: Ḥallāj’s cry is the music in which Love proclaims the unification of lover and Beloved ¹⁰⁵).

The *bēkhūdī*, the state of selflessness, of passing away from, and, in monistic interpretation, the negation of one’s own existence is, for the mystic, the preliminary stage of the *ithbāt*, the positive acknowledgment of God: the fact that the formula of the Muslim creed starts with the negation *lā ilāh* “There is no God” and leads towards the affirmation *illā Allāh* “but God” has been an inexhaustible source of

¹⁰³) cf. B 331, 209, cf. 287.

¹⁰⁴) Asaf Hālet Çelebi, l.c. Cf. B 281.

¹⁰⁵) cf. S II 243, 360, 236, 293; S III 76.

inspiration to Muslim theologians and mystics likewise who have tried to interpret this simple sentence in different ways. Pondering on the mysteries of *tauhīd* was one of the specific trends in the Bagdadian school of early Sufism. For the mystics of monistic tendencies the negation meant negation of everything but God, and thus the highest goal of the mystic was to understand that no real existence belongs to him, the only existent one being God —

Take the dagger of *lā*, beat it on the mule (i.e. thy self)
says Shāh Laṭīf ¹⁰⁶). Orthodoxy has always protested against this interpretation, stressing the fact that the formula runs “there is no God but God”, not “There is no existent but God”, as mysticism interpreted it.

Mystics and poets have meditated upon the dialectic tension between the Not and the But —

Inmidst of being astray there is guidance, white light in blackness,
Turn the negation, o Sachal, into affirmation (S II 227)

For Sachal and his disciples the ‘I am the Truth’ becomes the affirmation par excellence:

Shout: I am the Truth! thus affirming the essence of Truth
sings Bēdil as refrain of one of his Siraiki poems (B 214) ¹⁰⁷). Thus the *anā’l-ḥaqq* is interpreted as the very expression of true muslimhood:

Affirm the But God, as Ḥallāj has done,
Affirm the But God, leave the doubt of him who associates something with
God,

From “I am the Truth” accomplish thou Muslimhood!
admonishes Bēdil the listeners in his “Duties of the Sufis” in which poem he has composed a rather long sequence of verses with this meaning (B 125, v. 19 ff.).

It goes without saying that the Sindhi poets, just as their predecessors in Persia and elsewhere, have often tried to find examples in Islamic history of the lovers who had spoken out of their unitive experience. It has already been mentioned how they selected a certain stock of Qurʾānic and traditional sayings in order to prove their monistic ideas. When referring to Ḥallāj and his word *anā’l-ḥaqq* they

¹⁰⁶) *Maʿdhūrī* II 7, 9! Cf. the explanation given by Rūzbihān Baqlī, Ḥallāj’s great commentator: Lorsque tu en arrives là après la double phase de l’effacement et de la conscience recouvrée, ton exister proclame par chaque atome *anā’l-ḥaqq* (Corbin, *Eranos-Jahrbuch* 27/157).

¹⁰⁷) cf. also B 332, 335.

often connect him with other Sufis of yore, mostly with Bāyezīd and his *subhānī*, Glory be to me — these two are linked together already in early Arabic hagiography and classical Persian poetry ¹⁰⁸). Sindhī poets very often add to this pair ʿAṭṭār himself who had written “I am God” in the *Bēṣarnāme* and had been killed, according to a legendary account, during the sack of Nishapur in 1220, and also Shams-i Tabrizī, Maulānā Rūmī’s spiritual friend and preceptor to whom the theopathic word *ʾusjudūnī*, Prostrate before me, is ascribed; a sentence several times quoted in this connection is *qum bi-idhnī*, Rise with my permission, the source of which is given differently ¹⁰⁹). Besides these almost invariably used figures now and then Ḥallāj’s mystical teacher, Junaid, is quoted because of his alleged word “There is nothing but God”, or Shiblī, the friend of the martyr mystic.

These lovers who have proclaimed the mystery of Unity which love made profess them, and have seen the manifestation of Divine beauty in every atom are also those who have suffered most. Shāh Laṭīf has dramatically painted the pains and pangs of the true lovers; Sachal, then, has in innumerable verses described those who have become a sacrifice, who have been killed or wounded in the field of spiritual war by people who did not understand that love which made them attest that there is nothing existent but God ¹¹⁰). “Who has recognized the mystery of love must perform the ritual ablution with his blood” had Ḥallāj himself said ¹¹¹), and tradition, reminiscent of this word, now enumerates those who have realized true love by suffering. Sachal has, in a grand poem beginning.

Those whom Thy Beauty has killed and who are ready for the gallows
praised in enrapturing verses those riders on the gallows who utter
everywhere, in pains beyond sufferance the intoxicated cry I am the
Truth.(S I 80 ff.) ¹¹²).

¹⁰⁸) Receuil 71, the two are mentioned together in Qannād’s (d. 935) work, and often in ʿAṭṭār’s poetry.

¹⁰⁹) Daudpota, Moti 9, ascribes the word to ʿAṭṭār, another Indian tradition traces it back to ʿAbdul Qādir Gīlānī (information supplied by Prof. Dr. M. Hamidullah).

¹¹⁰) similar chains of lovers f.i. S II 242, 248, 269, 275, 330, 341, 72; B 260, 287, 294; 168, 179, 205, 291, 295, 285 (that shows that the form seems to be more common in Siraiki poems).

¹¹¹) *tadhkirat al-auliya* II 144, *Ilāhīnāme* 107.

¹¹²) cf. already ʿAṭṭār *Diwān* No. 254; B has nearly the same refrain in Siraiki p. 220, cf. 224.

Since a well-known prophetic tradition says that the prophets are those who suffer most, then the saints, and then the other people it becomes a common feature to start the enumeration of the martyrs by the great figures of the Qurʾān, by Mūsa who asked God "Let me behold Thee" but was rebuked by the Lord's "Thou shalt not behold Me!" (Sura 7/139), and by Ibrāhīm who was thrown into the pyre, Noah in the flood etc. And Sachal asks boldly — just as Shibli had asked God after the execution of Hallaj "How long wilt Thou kill thy lovers":

Welcome, welcome Thou art — to which place wilt Thou bring me!
 Thou wilt cut again a head!
 Giving a kick to Sarmad Thou hast killed him, Thou hast brought
 Maṣṣūr to the gallows, cut off Shaikh ʿAṭṭār's head —
 Now Thou art asking the way here.
 Thou hast split Zakariya with a saw, thrown Joseph into the well,
 Thou hast made kill Shams by the hand of the mallas, Thou usest to
 afflict the lover.
 Thou hast made Saṇʿān bind the brahman's thread, Thou hast made
 slaughter Bullhē Shāh, Jaʿfar drawn in the sea ...
 In misfortune hast Thou pressed Bilāwal, hast killed ʿInāyat in
 the fighting-arena, hast sentenced Karmal ...¹¹³).

Shāh ʿInāyat Shahīd (v. p. 173) becomes an example of God's cruelty who makes his lovers drunk and kill them (S II 282)¹¹⁴; a certain Muḥammad ʿĀqil who called himself by the Hindu name Ēkidās, 'slave of the One' and is said to have uttered similar claims as Hallāj¹¹⁵), occurs as well in Sachal's enumerations as Sarmad, the executed quatrain-writer (v. p. 169).

Mansur, Sarmad, Shams have become in thy street all broken sacrifices
 (S II 354).

A name which is frequently mentioned together with that of Hallāj, is that of Shaikh Saṇʿān, whom love turned into a swine-herd:

When longing makes a night-attack,
 Saṇʿān binds the infidel's girdle,
 Maṣṣūr mounts on the gallows,

¹¹³) According to the sources, Bullhē Shah was not killed.

¹¹⁴) cf. B 213, 275.

¹¹⁵) S II 39, Introduction, a poem by Sachal on this Ēkidās is mentioned, the information is, however, according to Dr. N. B. Baloch, not reliable — It is interesting, that in these chains of martyred lovers two names are never mentioned though they must have been wellknown in India too: that of Suhrawardi Maqtūl (d. 1191) and of ʿAinul Quḍāt Hamadānī (d. 1132) whose work was widely read in the country.

sings Bēdil (B 286). This type of poetry has been very popular among the mystics elsewhere, and in the subcontinent the Panjabi mystic Bullhē Shāh has excelled in pathetic poems in which he accuses God of his tendency of shedding the blood of the lovers, and in which he includes, besides those mentioned by Sachal, also the poor heroines of the Indian folktales, like Hir, Sasui who died wandering in the deserts and Suhni, who drowned in the waters of the Indus (Dīwān 30.36.65. 90.92); others, again, have included the classical couples Yūsuf and Zulaikha, Majnūn and Lailā (Aysar Faqīr). In all those poems, Ḥallāj's fate is invariably mentioned and his name forms a kind of cornerstone.

The punishment of the lovers is due to the fact that they have pro-claimed openly the secret of Unity —

Give me Ḥallāj's state, Lord God,
Let Sachal understand, let him hear the whole secret! (S I 407)

The question remains how Sindhi mystical poets have interpreted the cry 'I am the Truth' which had been explained, during the centuries, in different ways according to the personal inclinations of the mystics.

On the one hand it is, as was already referred to, the affirmation of God's Unity after having given up one's own self (cf. S II 251) —

You must not love yourself if you want to say I am the Truth,
admonishes Ghulām Ḥaydar the disciples. It may be the cry of over-whelming ecstasy in which lover and Beloved are no longer separated, and our poets have often hinted at the mystery that it is not the single lover who affirms "I am the Truth" but it is Love itself ¹¹⁶) — for "Love is God" (B 248): not in the Christian meaning but in the Ḥallājian interpretation according to which the inmost essence of God, the moving and active principle in Him is *‘ashq*, ardent love ¹¹⁷) (even among Turkish mystics I happened to hear the variation of the creed in the words *lā ilāha illā'l-‘ashq*, There is no God but Love), and this love manifests itself in the great lovers of and professes through their mouth "I am Divine Truth".

¹¹⁶) B 280, 169 refrain; S III 40; also Ghulām Ḥaydar: "Love says serenely I am the Truth".

¹¹⁷) L. Massignon, *Interférences philosophiques et percées métaphysiques dans la mystique hallagienne: Notion de L'Essentiel Désir* (Mélanges Maréchal), T II, 1950).

It is, however, possible to explain the famous words otherwise: it may emerge from the experience of the real Self which is hidden under human forms — Sachal who has sung so many verses in praise of complete selflessness teaches in a Persian verse:

If thou gettest information of the secret of thy Self,
Thou utterest the cry I am the Truth without danger (S III 73)

that would mean that — according to the traditional saying “Who knows himself knows his Lord” — this entering into the deepest layer of the human heart, this recognizing of the sweet host of the soul would make man Maṣṣūr-like (S III 75): the just quoted tradition is being followed, in many a Sindhi poem, by another alleged prophetic saying “I knew my Lord through my Lord”. Taking this into consideration one understands why the Hindu scholars have seen in the *anā'l-ḥaqq* nothing but the counterpart of the *aham brahmāsmi* of the Upanishads, an interpretation which is not uncommon even in the older European literature ¹¹⁸).

Sachal has, in a sweet and tender poem, (S I 72) said:

The Friend is sweet in the mind, the Beloved is sweet in the mind
Uselessly thou wanderest through the market, the nightingale is in thy
body's garden ...

and continues:

The lovers in hundred states confess I am the Truth ...

After realizing the identity of lover and Beloved the word *anā'l-ḥaqq* means for the mystic “to remain single” (B 326), and “Maṣṣūr is gone in between” (S II 300). Sachal address God in a grand poem:

Thou shoutest I am the Truth, all the world became amazed,
Thy own secret Thou makest manifest; Maṣṣūr's name, o dear Friend —
Why hast Thou made it famous (S II 248)

God spoke through Ḥallāj as well as He once spoke through the Burning Bush, and already ʿAṭṭār had hold that

He Himself called I am the Truth from the lip of Maṣṣūr,
He Himself mounted on the gibbet ... (Div. 345)

an idea which is the starting point of a certain kind of poetical expression that has always been popular with the mystics who have tried to describe God by using long chains of anaphora for drawing near to the inexpressable mystery or by contrasting His numberless attributes for showing Him as the *coincidentia oppositorum*.

¹¹⁸) Premchand and Parsmal, l.c. p. 22.

The absolute Unity is hidden under colourful forms and becomes in course of time Aḥmad (i.e. Muḥammad) and Shams and ʿAṭṭār (B 216), but the eye of the mystic “sees the formless Beloved in every manifestation” (S II 342) — when Sarmad was lead to the execution he recognized an appearance of the Beloved even in the executioner. For God is visible both in the judge and in the prisoner:

Master Maṣṣūr had his foot in chains,
People had gathered for that spectacle.
Maṣṣūn (sic!) had gone and given the order: Killed the crying!
The crying one was He, hear, oh muftis!
Quickly they pulled on the gibbet this proofstone of the lovers,
The Qadis threw stones on his head.
Where are Qadi and mufti — everywhere is God Himself —
The thing He made Himself, on the mollahs was false accusation!

says Sachal (III 155) and has repeated this idea in hundreds of verses, using the formulas “now ... then”, or “here ... there” or “whence ... whence” etc. 119)

Sometimes Thou becomest Qadi, sitting down and giving unjust sentence,
Maṣṣūr on the gibbet!
And again Thou becomest Maṣṣūr ...
The very cry I am the Truth is Thy secret which Thou makest visible
on earth... (S II)

Like waves fromout the borderless ocean emerges the Friend in hundred forms (S III 191) and is the single source of “Moses and Pharaoh — Maṣṣūr and mollah — Aḥmad without m (i.e. *aḥad*, One) and Hanuman...” (S I 60). Bēdil who sings, like his fellow mystics in the Indus valley,

He brings forth the religious book and makes people see sin and recompense,
and again He lifts the curtain of duality, saying I am the Truth

(B 279) has composed a small “*ṣuhūr-nāme* (book of manifestation) in Sufism in the melody of *anāʿl-ḥaqq*” (B356) in 22 Persian verses where he shows how God manifests Himself in every form.

Once the unity of all being maintained the mystic feels himself both Maṣṣūr and mollah (B 266), both Muslim and unbeliever, for “the state of Pharaoh and Maṣṣūr are one” as Sachal proclaims (S II 219), no

119) Typical examples of this kind of poetry (all containing allusions to Ḥallāj) are S II 226, 270, 227, 278, 291, 355, 222, 221, 224, 247, 251, 273, 277, 282 etc. etc. The same form is found f.i. also with the wellknown Khoja Farīd Multānī (cf. *Mah-i Nau*, Karachi, July 1962, p. 22), and in Turkish Bektashi poetry since Yunus Emre. One may call it the characteristic expression of pantheistic feeling.

doubt referring to the famous scene in the *kitāb at-tawāsīn* where Ḥallāj confronts himself with Pharaoh and with Satan, each of them not willing to abstain from their claim of superiority, be it Ḥallāj's *anā'l-ḥaqq*, Pharaoh's claim of Divinity, or Satan refusal to bow before Adam. Maulānā Rūmī had, once, contrasted the 'I' of Mansur and that of Pharaoh in a famous passage of the *Mathnawī* (M II 305) — Sachal and his followers unite them, because there is no longer any difference between religion and infidelity in the "valley of Unity".

Leave rosary and prayer-place—
The maṣṣūrī dignity has a high aim!

says Bēdil (B 318) who has, in long sequences of his *vaḥdatnāme* (B 102) reiterated the idea:

Those who (have realized) the state of Ḥallāj, the mystery of Lordship
(*rubūbiya*)

Reality, symbol—have become one in Oneness.

Love, sings Aḥsan, does not know dignity or religious law and does not accept limitations between religions or nations; the lover, confessing 'I am the Truth' and ready to mount on the gallows, is *lā kūfī*, i.e. without religious ties.

Hindu and Muslim are one in the dogma of the believers in Unity runs the refrain of one of Bēdil's poems (B 234), and this unity showed itself in Sind in the fact that a large number of Hindus were faithful followers of Sufi Pirs and have written mystical poetry on the same lines as the Muslims did, including hymnical praises of the Prophet Muḥammad.

Ḥallāj's word I am the Truth becomes for all those mystics the jubilant cry of *Vergottung* —

sometimes I shout I am the Truth,
sometimes there is much complaining (S II 233).

It is the state of highest bliss, the moment when "man has become the Merciful" (S III 92).

But since this daring utterance is immediately followed by death sentence Sufism has already early found the ingenious way of interpreting the gallows tree in a very similar way as Christianity has done with the Cross: the ascension to the gibbet is "the ascension towards Heaven", and only rarely the martyr mystic is called by his own name Husain; instead his father's name, Maṣṣūr, the Victorious, has, prob-

ably for the same reason, become popular throughout the world of Islam.

Jihāngīr Hāshimī (v. p. 170) has taken up this idea perhaps for the first time in Sindh—

Since Truth found the way into the heart of Ḥallāj,
Gibbet and rope found the rank of ascension (p. 99)

mi^crāj, the ascension to Heaven of the Prophet, had been considered since approximately the 9th century the prototype of mystical experience which leads man into the immediate presence of God. The tempting rhyme *Ḥallāj-mi^crāj* occurs also, in the same connection, with Sachal (S III 40). Ḥallāj's story is explained as ascension towards the affirmation of Divine Unity by giving up one's own self (cf. S. II 368). As well Bullhē Shāh in Panjab (p. 114) as Sachal's spiritual disciple Bēdil know this expression (cf. B. 101 f.), and the latter writes in his *vaḥdatnāme* (verse 16-20) that the gibbet is the *naurūz* of love — a reference to the fact that Ḥallāj's execution took place in the days of the Persian New Years Day. The ascension-symbol is likewise used by Bēdil in his "Duties of the Sufis" (B 125) where the seeker is admonished to affirm the But God in the way of Manṣūr and reach thus the possibility of ascension; he will, then, by his utterance and by his suffering on the gibbet, reach the Beatific Vision (S II 356).

In the moment that Ḥallāj gives his head to the impaling stake he realizes the highest mystery of the ascension, that of the prophetic ḥadīth *lī ma'a Allāh* . . . "I have a time with God" (B 177) which points to the immediate nearness of man and God where not even Gabriel can interfere, and has been one of the key-words of Sufism through the ages.

It is wellknown that the allusions to Manṣūr Ḥallāj and his fate are not at all restricted to mystical literature; Turkish and Persian lay poetry is full of hidden references to the martyr mystic. We may, only for a single example, mention the great poet of the Mughal court, Ṣā'ib (d. 1677) who has quoted the name Ḥallāj several times, and to whom we owe the ingenious verse:

Just as the rose comes on the top of the branch
With its own foot, thus the head of the lover comes to the gibbet.

And Mirzā Bēdil has as well known the "secret wine which broke the

vessel of Ḥallāj's existence", who "gave his own goblet off his hand like the rose" 120).

Mīr ʿAlī Shīr Qānī^c, the great polyhistor and poet of the 18th century in Sind has often alluded to Maṣṣūr in his profane Persian poetry and thinks "the word of the gibbet may be sandal-wood for our headache" 121); the musician plays, according to him, this melody in order to rent the veil of doubt 122). And the profanisation has gone so far that even the curls of the beloved could be compared to the rope of the gibbet ...

Even this very small section of a certain amount of mystical poems in a comparatively narrow area like the former province of Sind can give at least an impression — and be it only in mere terms of statistics — of the importance of the Ḥallāj-symbol in later mysticism. And it would be wrong to assume that mystical poetry of this kind is found only in the lower parts of the Indus valley: Panjabi folk-poetry and mystical literature contains outstanding examples which mention Ḥallāj and his fate, and poetical references to his death on the gibbet trace in this area at least as far back as Kabīr (d. 1495). Already Hujwīrī (d. after 1073), one of the first mystics who settled in Lahore, has composed, besides his famous *kashf al-maḥjūb*, a separate book on Ḥallāj so that the continuity of the tradition in this part of the sub-continent is given. In Pashto literature the name of Ḥallāj is also popular; Field quotes — unfortunately without source — a saying of ʿAbdurrahmān who underlines the fruitful results of mystical death:

Everyone who is crucified like Mansur,
After death his cross becomes a fruitful tree 123).

Muslim Bengali poetry will surely contain numerous verses on the martyr mystic — a "magnifique éloge" on Ḥallāj under the name *Maharshi Maṣṣūr* has been signalized by L. Massignon.

120) Bausani, *Storia della Letteratura Persiana* p. 281, *Persia Religiosa* p. 334; cf. Massignon, *Akhbar* 178 note 7.

121) Qānī^c, *maqālāt* 391, cf. id. 595.

122) Qānī^c, *Maklīmāme*, ed. H. Rashdi, 1956, p. 194. cf. the poem of *Khalīl, takmilāt maqālāt ash-shuʿarā*, ed. H. Rashdi, Karachi 1958, p. 408; *Munshī, nāme-yi ʿashq*, Lahore 1958 p. 21. There exist several taʾrikhs about Ḥallāj's death; the *mukhbīr al-wāṣilīn* (quoted in Qānī's *maqālāt* p. 333) forms the date of Ḥallāj's death from the words *maqbul-i pāk-i Haq* "the pure who was accepted by the Truth", whereas Bēdil simply says "ninth year and 300".

123) Field, l.c. p. 78.

Yet, due to the monistic interpretation of Ḥallāj's word I am the Truth his name has been considered in orthodox, and also in moderate *sūfi*, circles a symbol of all dangerous tendencies which jeopardise the simple and stern Islamic faith. It may be of some interest to see how a modern Chishti Pir — ʿAbdurrashīd Gangōhī, from the house of ʿAbdulquddūs Gangōhī (v. p. 171) ¹²⁴) judges the theopathic utterances of the Maṣṣūr-like intoxication “which does no longer recognize and respect the borders between Lord and slave” and which says with Ḥallāj “Killed me, oh my friends!” After having shown that the spiritual situation of Ḥallāj in the moment of this utterance was a *ḥāl*, i.e. a passing and instable state of mind, not a *maqām*, a real firm stage in the spiritual path (which includes that his experience of Unity was only due to a momentaneous enrapture, and did not express the objective reality: view of the *shuhūdī*-mystics since Aḥmad Sirhindī!) he continues:

The Maṣṣūrī word “I am the Truth” has formed a frightful and dark chapter in the history of Sufism. Silly peoply have thought it to be perfection and have applied it on external things and could not turn to the real mystical state;... when understanding people understood the real situation, they have separated it from the “mystical station” (i.e. have explained it correctly as *ḥāl*) and have regarded it as excusable. If it be a perfection and a real firm station then the prophets and the companions (of Muḥammad) would also have proclaimed “I am the Truth”, and the Unity of Being would be, openly or by indication, established by the sacred texts; even more, this term ‘unity’ and the negation of plurality would be a clear part of Qurʾan and sunna... The author therefore thinks “that it is better not to divulge such theopathic utterance among the people and that one, according to Shāh Waliullāh (d. 1762) should not make public what belongs to the privacy, as Akbar Allāhābādī (d. 1921) has said:

If Maṣṣūr mounted on the gibbet, the way was already wrong,

Having become Ḥaqq it was necessary to conceal himself ¹²⁵)

(i.e. to behave like God and not to show himself), for God Himself has called Himself the Coverer”.

That shows how deeply the story of Ḥallāj — in its different interpretations — has impregnated Indo-Muslim thinking: it should not been forgotten that Muḥammad Iqbal, too, has taken up the Ḥallāj-motif, interpreting it in a quite original manner; he, who had depicted the martyr mystic in his thesis as the typical exponent of the *aham*

¹²⁴) Quddūsī, l.c. 312 ff.

¹²⁵) Another verse of the same satirical poet runs: Maṣṣūr said: I am God. Darwin said: I am a monkey — A friend of mine remarked laughingly (with the Persian proverb): — Everybody's imagination is according to his bravery.

brahmāsmi, has seen him the longer the more as the exponent of personal relationship between man and God, as a living witness of God's power and lover, which is quite in tune with the original Ḥallājīan idea ¹²⁶).

For the historian of religions certain coincidences of the story of the martyr mystic and his being hanged — or crucified — with very old mythical patterns like that of the Hanged God, and also similarities with the crucifixion of Christ are of interest. In Islam which has no proper mythology, Ḥallāj becomes a nearly mythical figure and is interpreted as the prototype of the great human spiritual passions: the search for God Whose mystery must never be divulged, and the overwhelming love which seeks and finds death and realizes on the gallows tree that union which one is not allowed to realize in life.

We do not know which spiritual results for Ḥallāj himself the journey to India in general und through the Indus-valley in particular has yielded more than thousand years back — to follow the spiritual journey which his name and fame have made after his execution in that very country is, no doubt, one of the exciting adventures in the realm of Islamic thought ¹²⁷).

Manṣūr Ḥallāj has sacrificed himself in the way of love,
And until now is this story of his everywhere and everywhere ... (S III 29)

¹²⁶) cf. Schimmel, *Iqbal and Ḥallāj* (in: Muhammad Iqbal, ed. by German-Pak Forum, Karachi, 1959) and the discussion of the problem in the forthcoming book: *Gabriel's Wing. A study into Iqbal's religious ideas*.

¹²⁷) The allusions to Ḥallāj and his fate in Sindhi poetry are by far not exhausted by the above-mentioned article; I quote for references S II 48, cf. 360, 347, 313, S III 65 (all about *anā'l-ḥaqq*), B 197, 201, 224, 300; S I 319, 381, 372, S II 335, 299. The number could be increased but the main motifs are always reiterated and only somewhere new and beautiful settings of words or phrases (which do not come properly into translation) will be found.

ZUR IDEE DER ERLÖSUNG BEI LEBZEITEN

IM BUDDHISMUS

VON

JOACHIM-FRIEDRICH SPROCKHOFF

Eine der bemerkenswertesten Vorstellungen im Bereiche der indischen Religionsgeschichte ist die von einer Erlösung bei Lebzeiten, von einer Aufhebung der Gebundenheit an die Vergeltungskausalität der Taten früherer Existenzen und der Befreiung von Nichtwissen, Leid und Leidenschaft noch in diesem irdischen Dasein. Man hat diese Idee als eine „allgemein-indische“ bezeichnet ¹⁾, doch würde eine Analyse der indischen Systeme besonders der Vaiṣṇavas und Śaivas ergeben, daß jene Idee bei nicht wenigen entweder gänzlich unbekannt, d.h. genauer, ihren uns überlieferten Texten nicht zu entnehmen ist, oder aufs schärfste abgelehnt wird ²⁾. Wenn weithin im allgemeinen Bewußtsein der Yoga in seinen mannigfaltigsten Ausprägungen und der Vedānta, speziell der monistische, der Advaita-Vedānta der Schule Śaṅkaras als die einzig legitimierte Kündler indischer Religiosität gelten, so mag dieser Umstand bewußt oder unbewußt dazu beigetragen haben, daß die Gestalt des Lebenderlöstes als eine typisch indische, als eine „ur-indische“ angesehen wird. Denn es ist unbestreitbar, daß die Erlösung bei Lebzeiten ohne Zuhilfenahme von Elementen der Yoga-Technik — vom Yoga-System soll hier nicht die Rede sein — nicht erlangt werden kann; dies hat jüngst M. Eliade mit einer Fülle von Zeugnissen belegt ³⁾. Und was den Hinduismus betrifft, so ist hier

1) R. Garbe, *Die Sāṃkhya-Philosophie*, 2. Aufl., Leipzig 1917, pp. 232, 242 ff.; L. de la Vallée Poussin in Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. VII (1914), col. 563b.

2) Es seien von den Gegnern hier nur Bhāskara, Nimbārka und seine Schule, Rāmānujas Schüler Veṅkaṭanātha (Vedāntadeśika?) sowie die śivaitischen Pāśupatasūtras mit ihrem Kommentator Kaundinya genannt. Die Haltung der Jainas ist sehr unklar und bedarf einer gesonderten Analyse.

3) Yoga, (deutsche Ausgabe) Zürich und Stuttgart 1960, bes. p. 103, Anm. 45, und p. 325.

die Vorstellung von der Erlösung bei Lebzeiten recht eigentlich im monistischen Vedānta beheimatet. Der für das Verständnis dieser Vorstellung unentbehrliche Leitfaden liegt uns im *Jīvan-mukti-viveka*, d.i. „Untersuchung der Erlösung bei Lebzeiten“, vor⁴⁾, der um 1350 abgefaßt worden zu sein scheint. Sein Autor, Vidyāraṇya, gehört zur Schule Śāṅkaras. Er beansprucht für sich, mit einem gewissen Recht, die orthodoxe Auffassung dieser Idee zu vertreten und darzustellen, und wenn im Nachstehenden Vergleiche zu Auffassungen des Vedānta angestellt werden, so beziehen sie sich, sofern nicht anders vermerkt, ausschließlich auf seine Schrift und die in ihr so überaus zahlreich angeführten Zitate der hinduistischen Śruti und Smṛti. Der Akzent liegt dabei nicht auf der historischen Entwicklung, sondern auf den spezifisch buddhistischen Ausgestaltungen der Vorstellung von der Erlösung bei Lebzeiten.

Zur Erklärung dieser Idee sei vorab Folgendes bemerkt⁵⁾. Die Bezeichnungen, die das Sanskrit für die „Erlösung“ kennt — z.B. *mukti*, *mokṣa*, *vimokṣa*, *apavarga* —, stellen durchweg in der Regel negative Bestimmungen als eine „Befreiung“ von der Wandelwelt des Saṃsāra und vom Gesetz des Karman dar. Andererseits sind physisches Leben als der Vollzug des in früherer Existenz geschaffenen Karman und leiblicher Tod denselben Gesetzen von Karman und Saṃsāra unterworfen. Zwischen beiden Polen, zugleich seinem Wesen nach an beiden voll und ganz teilhabend, steht der Lebenderlöste, der *Jīvanmukta*, als einer, der sowohl das Grenzenlos-Ewige, das Absolute, als ein „Erlöster“ in sich trägt wie auch als „Lebender“ durch seine Körperlichkeit und individuelle Gestalt die Gesetze der Wandelwelt vollzieht. Diese aus der Analyse des hinduistischen Fachausdruckes *jīvan-mukti* gewonnene Umschreibung seines Wesens findet im Bereich des Buddhismus eine gewisse Entsprechung in der Rede von einem „sichtbaren Erlöschen“ (Pāli: *saṃdiṭṭhikaṃ nibbānam*). Denn wenn die Buddhisten annehmen, daß das Nirvāṇa als das „Absolute“ (*asaṃskṛta*) „sichtbar“ werden, sich offenbaren kann, so ist damit ein allgemein wesentlicher Gesichtspunkt einer Vorstellung von der Erlösung bei Lebzeiten ge-

4) Abgekürzt J und zitiert nach der Jubiläumsausgabe des Theosophical Publishing House, Adyar, Madras 1935, mit Seiten- und Zeilenangabe.

5) Ausführlicher in meinem Aufsatz: Die Vorbereitung der Vorstellung von der Erlösung bei Lebzeiten in den Upaniṣads, in: Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens und Archiv für Indische Philosophie, Band VI (1962).

geben: das Eintauchen des Ewigen in das Reich irdischer Vergänglichkeit.

Es liegt darum nahe, daß man fragt, wo oder in wem sich eine solche Begegnung von Absolutem und Bedingtem realisiert, wie sie zu erreichen ist und unter welchen Formen das eigentliche Ziel vorgestellt wird. Das heißt konkret, die nachstehenden, auf das Doxologische beschränkten Ausführungen sollen sich befassen I. mit der Gestalt und dem Wesen des oder eines Buddha, der Stiftergestalt dieser Religion und des wegweisenden Lehrers, II. mit einigen Grundzügen des Erlösungsweges, die mit einer „Erlösung bei Lebzeiten“ in Zusammenhang stehen, und III. mit dem Nirvāṇa ⁶⁾.

Die zentrale Gestalt des Buddhismus, in der die Erlösung Wirklichkeit geworden ist, ist nach dem übereinstimmenden Zeugnis der Texte des Hinayāna wie des Mahāyāna der Buddha, dem die höchste Erleuchtung zuteilgeworden ist und der sie den Menschen verkündet hat. Er hat die Heilslehre nicht erfunden ⁷⁾, sondern weiß sich als ihr Verkünder, so daß er selbst hinter ihr zurücktritt. Das Mahāvagga (I, 6, 8) überliefert uns ein Zeugnis seines unerschütterlichen Erlösungsbewußtseins, seiner Einzigartigkeit und Unvergleichlichkeit, durch die sich der Buddha vor Göttern und Menschen ausgezeichnet weiß: „Der Allüberwinder, der Allwissende bin ich, unbefleckt von allem, was ist. Alles habe ich verlassen, ohne Begehren bin ich, ein Erlöster. Aus eigener Kraft besitze ich die Erkenntnis; wen sollte ich meinen Meister nennen? Ich habe keinen Lehrer, niemand ist mir zu vergleichen. In der Welt samt den Göttern ist niemand, der mir gleich sei. Ich bin der Heilige in der Welt; ich bin der höchste Meister. Ich allein bin der vollendete Buddha; die Flammen sind in mir erloschen; ich habe das Nirvāṇa erreicht.“ Er ist ein Mensch, der doch zugleich alle menschlichen Begriffe übersteigt (Aṅguttara-Nikāya 4, 36, 3 vol. II, p. 38),

6) Zum Folgenden vgl. vor allem H. Oldenberg, Buddha, 13. Aufl., Stuttgart 1959; E. Frauwallner, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, Band I, Salzburg 1953; H. v. Glasenapp, Buddhismus und Gottesidee, Akad. der Wiss. und der Lit. zu Mainz, Abh. der Geistes- und Sozialwiss. Kl. 1954, Nr. 8; E. J. Thomas, The History of Buddhist Thought, London 1933. Die kanonischen Texte werden, soweit nicht anders vermerkt, nach den Ausgaben der Pāli Text Society zitiert.

7) Samyutta-Nikāya 12, 65, 19 vol. II, p. 105; Majjhima-Nikāya Nr. 107; Milindapañha (ed. V. Trenckner) p. 218; Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra (Trad. par É. Lamotte, 1944), vol. I, p. 157; vgl. L. de la Vallée Poussin, in Hastings' Encyclopaedia, vol. VIII, p. 145.

er steht über den Göttern, denen er seine Lehre verkündet, und ihm werden zahlreiche Wunderkräfte zugeschrieben. Doch steht ihm nicht die Allmacht an, das karmische Gesetz aus freien Stücken aufzuheben (Kathāvatthu 21, 4); er schafft nicht die Welt, regiert sie nicht und erhält sie nicht. Dies hat er mit dem Jīvanmukta der Advaitavedāntins gemein.

Allein, eines zeichnet ihn vor diesem aus: Der bei Lebzeiten erlöste Brahman-Kenner steht jenseits von Gut und Böse; auf Grund dessen hat er die Möglichkeit, sittlich gut zu handeln. Es gehört dies aber keineswegs zum unabdingbaren Wesen des Jīvanmukta, sondern ist nur der Ausfluß des Absoluten in seiner Gestalt, gleichsam eine Nebenerscheinung. Der Buddha hingegen erreichte die Allwissenheit nicht nur, weil er alles Unheilsame (*akusala*) in sich getötet hat (Milindapañha, p. 134); vielmehr kann ein vollendeter heiliger Wandel und ein Erlösungsbewußtsein in ihm überhaupt nur dann Platz greifen, wenn er das „Aufhören des Begehrens“, d.h. der Hauptursache der Weltenwanderung vollzogen hat und seine Pflicht getan hat (Mahāvagga 1, 6). Eine moralische Vollkommenheit ist ein notwendiges Epitheton der Erlösung; sie läßt es nicht nur nicht zu, daß der Buddha böse Gedanken und häßliche Absichten hegt, sondern verlangt geradezu, daß er Mitleid übt, zum Heile führt⁸⁾ und seine „überweltlichen“ (*loketara*) Tugenden erstrahlen läßt, auch wenn er — wie ein Jīvanmukta — „dem Brauch der Welt entsprechend“ (*lokānuvartanā*) seine alltäglichen Verrichtungen ausführt (Mahāvastu, vol. I, pp. 168 f.). Und so „erscheint er in der Welt zum Heil für viel Volk, zur Freude für viel Volk, aus Erbarmen für die Welt, zum Segen, zum Heil, zur Freude für Götter und Menschen.“ (Aṅg., vol. I, p. 22).

Dieses Bild von Buddha, wie er sich selbst sah und wie er von seinen Anhängern gesehen und empfunden wurde, ist mit mehr oder weniger starken Abweichungen in frühen wie in späten Zeiten die Grundlage seiner Autorität gewesen und geblieben. Es konnte jedoch nicht ausbleiben, daß seine überragende Persönlichkeit der menschlichen Neigung, sie zu vergöttlichen und in übermenschliche Sphären zu entrücken, Antrieb gab⁹⁾. Ansatzpunkte dafür finden sich bereits in Buddhas Lebensgeschichte.

8) Milindap. pp. 164, 186; Abhidharmakośa (Trad. par L. de la Vallée Poussin) 4, 12c vol. III, p. 41; 7, 33 vol. V, pp. 77 f.

9) Die psychologischen Gründe für die Entwicklung der zahlreichen Legenden

Buddha selbst hätte nicht wirken können, wenn sein Eingang in das Nirvāṇa erst mit dem physischen Tode, mit dem Zerfall der seine Individualität bildenden Daseinsfaktoren sich vollzogen hätte. Diese Konsequenz wird allerdings erst im Mahāyāna vollzogen, dem der Gedanke eigentümlich ist, daß ein Buddha sein Mitleid über alle Wesen ausbreitet und, dem „göttlichen Auftrag“, Māras Versuchung zu widerstehen, folgend, dem sofortigen Eingang in das Nirvāṇa¹⁰⁾ um der Verkündung seines erlösenden Wissens willen entsagte. Diese Schlußfolgerung des Großen Fahrzeugs zog jedoch weitere Kreise mit der Lehre von einer überirdischen Erscheinung, die der im Nirvāṇa erloschene Buddha auf Erden zurückgelassen hat, um die Ausbreitung der Lehrverkündigung und ihre heilbringende Bestimmung sicherzustellen, schließlich aber auch mit der Vorstellung vom Gotte Buddha Amitābha, der seine Verehrer in seinem Paradiese Sukhāvātī zum Nirvāṇa heranreifen und diesen damit eine Art der Erlösung nach dem Tode zuteilwerden läßt¹¹⁾.

Eine weitere Frage ergibt sich aus Buddhas Überzeugung, daß er die erlösende Lehre zwar aus eigener Kraft, doch nicht als erster gefunden, sondern die „alte Lehre neu entdeckt“ hat, und daß auch schon vor ihm Buddhas aufgetreten sind. Es verhält sich damit ähnlich wie mit den Tīrthāṅkaras der Jainas, und es scheint dies eine für indische Verhältnisse bezeichnende Haltung zu sein¹²⁾. Wie aber die Jainas dafür die besondere Lehre ausgebildet haben, daß der Sayogikevalin in einer früheren Existenz das „Tīrthāṅkara-Karman gebunden“ haben muß, um als Erneuerer des Jinismus wie ein Pārśva oder Mahāvīra aufzutreten, so stellt sich der buddhistischen Philosophie die gleiche Forderung nach einer Erklärung für die Seltenheit von Buddhas und ihre wesenhafte Gleichartigkeit sowie für ihr Verhältnis zu denen, die, auf dem von ihnen gelehrten Pfade zur Erlösung voranschreitend, das Heil gefunden haben. Dabei handelt es sich also auch um die weitere

und mythologischen Umkleidungen dürfen hier, so interessant sie sein mögen, unberücksichtigt bleiben; ausführlich darüber: H. v. Glasenapp, Buddhismus und Gottesidee, pp. 454 ff (60 ff).

10) wie dieser Suttanipāṭa 1074 zur Ausdruck kommt, Erlösungsvorstellungen der Upaniṣads (*nāma-rūpād vimuktāḥ*) vergleichbar.

11) Von anderen Konsequenzen wird im letzten Teile unserer Ausführungen zu sprechen sein.

12) Vgl. E. Frauwallner, Gesch. der ind. Phil. I, p. 244; H. Oldenberg, Buddha, pp. 342 ff.

Frage, ob der Buddhismus zwei wesensmäßig verschiedene Arten von Lebenderlöstern kennt, den Tathāgata einerseits und den Jünger, der das Ziel erreicht hat, andererseits, oder ob diese beiden nur Grade innerhalb des „Jīvanmukta“-Standes einnehmen, die auf einer größeren oder geringeren Wirksamkeit und Wesensentfaltung beruhen.

Die erste der Alternativen scheint keinerlei Zustimmung zu finden, wenn Buddha sich selbst nur als das „älteste unter den Wesen“, d.h. unter denen, die die Hülle des Nichtwissens zerbrochen haben, bezeichnet¹³⁾. Umso mehr hat die zweite Alternative für sich. Sie wird keinesfalls den Graden innerhalb der Jīvanmukti gleichzusetzen sein, wie sie dem Yogavāsīṣṭharāmāyaṇa eigentümlich und, nach ihm, von Vidyāraṇya in ein System gebracht worden sind, insofern als dort die steigende Abkehr vom Irdisch-Weltlichen mit der wachsenden Hinwendung zum Absoluten, der Einswerdung, Hand in Hand geht, während hier — wie man annehmen muß, gerade auf Grund des obwaltenden ethischen Prinzips vom Standpunkt des Mahāyāna — die „Erlösung bei Lebzeiten“ als höherwertig gilt, wenn und in welchem Maße der erlöste Heilige in der Zuwendung zu der leidenden Mitwelt seine erlösende Kraft zu betätigen und kundzutun in der Lage ist¹⁴⁾.

Während in der vedāntistischen Stufenfolge die Videhamukti, die „Erlösung nach dem Hingang des Leibes“, am Ende der höchsten Form der Erlösung bei Lebzeiten steht, vollzieht sich die Bewegung in der buddhistischen Vorstellung — worüber unten noch zu handeln sein wird — gewissermaßen rückläufig. Denn wie die Geschichte von Gautama Buddhas Versuchung durch Māra zeigt, liegt der Eingang in das Nirvāṇa hart am Rande der körperlosen Erlösung; die höchste Form gewinnt die Buddha-Würde erst mit der Überwindung der im Tode sich vollziehenden Weltabkehr (und durch eine Umdeutung des Nirvāṇa-Begriffs).

Sollte sich das, was hier vorerst nur als eine Annahme vorgetragen

13) Suttavibhaṅga, Pārājika I, 1, 4; s. dazu H. Oldenberg, a.a.O., pp. 341 f und Anm. 111 auf pp. 445 f.

14) Die in Rede stehenden Stufen tragen im Yogavāsīṣṭha (III, 118, 6 ff) und bei Vidyāraṇya (J 127, 6 ff) folgende Bezeichnungen: das „Nicht-Anhaften“ (*a-samsakti*), das „Nicht-Vorstellen von Objekten“ (*padārthābhāvanā*) und das „Eingegangensein in den Vierten“ (d.h. den Zustand objektloser Versenkung) (*turyagā*); sie bringen die Vollendung der Versenkung in die zweieitlose Welt und das Hinschwinden und Erlöschen irdisch-weltlicher Aktivität aufs deutlichste zum Ausdruck.

worden ist, im weiteren Verlaufe unserer Untersuchungen bestätigen lassen, so ergäben sich daraus in der Tat bedeutsame Verschiedenheiten in der Ausformung und Wertung der Idee von einer Erlösung bei Lebzeiten.

Daß eine zweifache Art der „Jīvanmukti“-Vorstellung, wie sie durch das Verhältnis von lehrendem Wegweiser und folgendem, nacherkennendem Jünger (Majjhima-Nikāya, vol. III, p. 8) ermöglicht wird, im Bereiche des Advaitavedānta keine Parallele aufzuweisen hat, bedarf keiner näheren Erläuterung und Bekräftigung.

In der Lehre vom Weg zur Erlösung tritt der Buddha weitgehend zurück (Majjh., vol. I, p. 265); möglicherweise liegt dies auf derselben Ebene wie seine Überzeugung von ihrer Zeitlosigkeit; wahrscheinlicher aber findet es in seiner Leugnung eines beharrenden Selbstes (*ātman*) in der Welt des Werdens und Vergehens eine Begründung, die, streng genommen, einen Dienst an dem Verkünder ausschließt, die Aufmerksamkeit von seiner „Person“ ab- und auf die Lehre hinlenkt. Ehe mit einer Betrachtung des Erlösungsweges begonnen werden kann, muß hier noch eine Ansicht vom Wesen des Buddha berücksichtigt werden, die dem Großen Fahrzeug eigentümlich ist und die zur Erhellung des Verständnisses der möglichen Formen beiträgt, unter denen eine Vorstellung von der Erlösung bei Lebzeiten im Bereiche des Buddhismus auftreten kann.

Die Theorie von den sogenannten „drei Körpern“ (*trikāya*), die die verschiedenen Aspekte des Buddha als eines irdischen Menschen, als eines himmlischen Herrschers und als eines metaphysischen Begriffes miteinander in Einklang zu bringen sucht¹⁵), wird möglicherweise auch, ausgesprochen oder unausgesprochen, von dem, was das „Paradoxon in der Jīvanmukti-Vorstellung“ zu nennen ist, ihren Antrieb erfahren haben. Mit dieser Konstruktion verhält es sich folgendermaßen¹⁶). Der auf Erden wandelnde, menschlich erscheinende Buddha gilt als magische Umwandlung (*nirmāṇa*), als begrenzter Reflex des

15) H. v. Glasenapp, Buddhismus und Gottesidee, p. 472 (78).

16) H. v. Glasenapp, a.a.O., pp. 472 ff (78 ff) mit Stellenangaben. Vgl. ferner ergänzend bes.: L. de la Vallée Poussin, The Three Bodies of a Buddha, in: Journ. of the Royal Asiatic Society 1906, p. 943; P. Masson-Oursel, in: Journ. Asiatique 1919, p. 581; N. Dutt, Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism, London 1930, pp. 98 ff.; E. J. Thomas, The History of Buddhist Thought, London 1933, pp. 242 ff.; N. Söderblom, Vater, Sohn und Geist unter den heiligen Dreiheiten, Tübingen 1909, pp. 1-41, passim.

überirdischen Buddha. Seinem physischen Leibe kommt mithin keine Realität zu, sondern nur der Charakter eines Instrumentes, dessen sich der Buddha um der Verkündigung der Heilslehre willen bedient, während er seiner wahren Gestalt nach in der übersinnlichen Welt, mit einem verklärten Leibe, einem „Genuß-Leibe“ (*sambhoga-kāya*) versehen, die Lehre predigt. Diesen hat er sich durch seine in früheren Existenzen erworbenen religiösen Verdienste geschaffen; nach der späteren Theorie ist er sowohl der Leib des Genusses für den Buddha selbst wie das Objekt der Schau für die in Konzentration versunkenen Bodhisattvas.

Der wesentliche (*svabhāvika*) Leib des Buddha ist der Dharmakāya. Buddha hat sich selbst schon mit dem Dharma identifiziert (*yo dhammaṃ passati so maṃ passati, yo maṃ passati so dhammaṃ passati*, Samy. 22, 87, 13 vol. III, p. 120; vgl. Itivuttaka, p. 91); der Dharmakāya war darum im alten (Pāli-) Buddhismus nur der „Leib der Lehre“ (*dhamma*), der, nach Buddhas Abschiedsworten, den Jüngern der Meister bleiben werde (*Dīgha-Nikāya* 16, 6, 1 vol. II, p. 154); sein Leib existiert daher im gesprochenen Wort weiter¹⁷⁾ — ein Gedanke, der durchaus auch im Mahāyāna lebendig geblieben ist¹⁸⁾.

Wie ein gewisser Zug der „Vedāntisierung“ in den zahlreichen Theorien, die das Mahāyāna über den Dharmakāya ausgebildet hat, spürbar wird und von den alten Anschauungen des Hīnayāna sich abhebt, hat H. von Glasenapp im Anschluß an Stellen aus dem Abhidharmakośa deutlich gemacht, wenn er schreibt: „In den beiden Vorstellungen, daß der Buddha nach seiner Erleuchtung einen von allen irdischen Trieben freien Leib hatte und daß seine Heilsverkündigung nach seinem Dahinscheiden unvergänglich bleibt, dürften zwei Wurzeln der Lehre vom Dharmakāya liegen, ihre Weiterbildung zu der Idee eines metaphysischen Leibes des Buddha konnte freilich erst erfolgen, als im Mahāyāna die Anschauung entstanden war, daß alles, was zur vergänglichen Welt gehört, keine wahre Wirklichkeit besitzt, und man nach einem monistischen Prinzip suchte, das die Essenz des in allen Tathāgatas wirkenden Transzendenten in sich begriff“¹⁹⁾.

17) Vgl. T. W. Rhys Davids, *Milinda Questions* I, Oxford 1890, p. 18.

18) *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā* (ed. Bibliotheca Indica), p. 94.

19) a.a.O., p. 474 (80).

Die absolut ruhige „Leerheit“ (*śūnyatā*), die „Soheit“ (*tathatā*) ebenso wie die „Erleuchtung“ (*bodhi*) und das „Verlöschen“ (*nirvāṇa*) werden mit dem Dharmakāya identifiziert, der wiederum — und hier drängt sich der Vergleich mit der Ansicht vom Ātman-Brahman im Advaita-Vedānta auf — „als die erlösende Kraft im Weltall vorgestellt“ wird, „als der keimhaft in jedem Wesen enthaltene ‚Buddha-Kern‘ (*tathāgata-garbha*), der entwickelt zur vollen Erleuchtung und zur Buddhaschaft wird,“ wie H. v. Glasenapp formuliert.

Wenn sich von daher die Würde eines Buddha als die Realisierung des Heilsprinzips, des Absoluten, darstellt, die sich in der Welt vollzieht, so zeigt sich, daß das Große Fahrzeug in der Gestalt des Erleuchteten die eines Lebenderlöstens sieht, der genauso wie der Jīvanmukta der Vedāntins letztlich der Vorstellungskraft der Sterblichen entzogen ist.

Die Erlösung ist ein Besitz der Wissenden; der Weg zu ihr ist bestimmt von einem sittlichen Verhalten und von der Versenkung. So läßt sich der Bereich, in dem sich die folgenden Betrachtungen zum Erlösungsweg bewegen, abgrenzen.

Was den Buddha zum „Buddha“ machte, war die Erkenntnis der vier heiligen Wahrheiten vom Leiden, von seinem Wesen, von seiner Entstehung, von seiner Aufhebung und vom Wege, der zur Aufhebung des Leidens führt²⁰). Leiden (*duḥkha*) ist alles, was vergänglich ist, worin kein Frieden ist; und weil es nichts gibt, das nicht hinfällig, nicht dem Gesetz von Vergehen und Werden, der Unrast des Saṃsāra unterworfen ist, ist alles Irdische, alles Bedingte „Leiden“. Und so gibt es kein Ende des Leidens ohne ein Ende der Welt (Samy., vol. I, p. 69; II, p. 86); wo aber die Welt ein Ende hat, da breitet sich die Wonne der Erleuchtung (*sambodha-sukha*), das Glück der Erlösung (*vimutti-sukha*) aus (Aṅg. 9, 34, 1-3 vol. IV, pp. 414 f.; vgl. vol. II, p. 206), über die das Gesetz der Kausalität keine Macht hat.

Nicht die Nichtigkeit des Lebens dominiert, sondern die Betonung liegt auf der Gewißheit, daß es etwas gibt, das, der Vergänglichkeit entrückt, dem Menschen als eine Erlösung erreichbar ist.

Die Quelle des Leidens ist der „Durst“ (*tṛṣṇā*; *taṇhā*), denn er ruft, wie seine dreifache Gliederung als „Sinnendurst“, „Werdedurst“

20) Samy., vol. V, p. 438; Dīgha., vol. I, p. 83; über hinduistische Parallelen s. H. Oldenberg, Buddha, p. 425, Anm. 2.

und „Vergänglichkeitsdurst“ besagt, die Wiedergeburt hervor; er schafft vor allem neues Karman und ist, wie die „Begierde“ (*kāma*) der Upaniṣads, stark vom Geschlechtstrieb her bestimmt; seine Entstehung verdankt er vornehmlich der „Berührung“ (*sparsā; phassa*) der Sinnesorgane mit den Sinnesobjekten und der daraus hervorgehenden „Empfindung“ (*vedanā*). Außerdem aber beruht er auf der falschen Vorstellung von einem bleibenden Ich, dem ein Wert beigelegt wird und dem irgendwelche egoistische Interessen entsteigen; im „Ergreifen“ (*upādāna*) der Sinnenwelt wird er intensiviert, schafft er neue Bindungen, die zu neuem „Werden“ (*bhava*) führen. Schon aus diesen Gliedern einer Ursachenkette ergibt sich die Folgerung, daß die Aufhebung des Durstes von der Lösung der Verstrickung in die Sinnenwelt abhängig ist. Daß hierbei der Yoga als das zielsichere Mittel zur Erlösung angesehen wird, liegt auf der Hand.

Während die vier heiligen Wahrheiten vom Leiden nur den Durst als Leidensentstehung nennen, bezeichnet der Lehrsatz vom „Entstehen in Abhängigkeit“ (*pratītyasamutpāda; paṭiccasamuppāda*) das „Nichtwissen“ (*avidyā; avijjā*) als die letzte Ursache der Bindung an die Vergänglichkeit des Daseins und der Wiedergeburt²¹). Dieses Nichtwissen hat erst im späteren Buddhismus eine überpersönliche kosmische Potenz und wird dort mit dem Nichtsein gleichgesetzt²²); in alter Zeit ist es begrifflich durchaus klar gefaßt und meint nichts anderes als die Unkenntnis der erlösenden Wahrheit vom Leiden²³).

Das Nichtwissen steht am Anfang des Lehrsatzes vom abhängigen Entstehen; wenn es als die Ursache des Leidens gilt — mit der Einschränkung, daß es nicht als letzte Ursache anzusehen ist, die man in sittlichen Defekten zu suchen hat —, so steht doch jedenfalls fest, daß sein natürliches Gegenteil, das Wissen, dem Leiden ein Ende zu bereiten und die Erlösung herbeizuführen vermag. Hierin zeigt sich der positive Charakter des Lehrsatzes vom abhängigen Entstehen; denn wie er Antwort auf die letzten Wurzeln des Weltleidens gibt, weist er auch auf das Endziel als dessen Aufhebung.

21) Samy., vol. II, pp. 17 f; er tritt Aṅg., vol. III, p. 61 (Zeilen 11 f) an die Stelle der 2. und 3. Wahrheit vom Leiden.

22) s. E. Burnouf, Introduction à l'histoire du Bouddhisme indien, Paris 1844, pp. 473 f, 478; vgl. H. Jacobi, ZDMG 52 (1898), p. 7; P. Deußen, Das System des Vedānta, Leipzig 1920, pp. 326 f.

23) Majjh., vol. I, p. 54; Samy., vol. II, pp. 162, 171, 172 f; Mahāvagga 6, 29; Mahāvastu (éd. É. Sénart), tome II, p. 307, 12.

Das zweite Glied in der Kausalkette sind die „karmangestaltenden Triebkräfte“ oder „Gestaltungen“ (*saṃskāra*; *saṅkhāra*), ein Begriff, der, ähnlich dem Karman, ein Doppeltes zum Inhalt hat: sowohl eine Kraft wie das, was durch diese hervorgebracht worden ist. Als Kräfte schaffen sie die Prädispositionen für das Schicksal einer neuen Existenz. Da aber die einzelnen Glieder der Kausalkette weitertreibende neue Faktoren darstellen, die mit dem Hervorbringen eines neuen Dharmas ihre Wirksamkeit nicht erschöpft haben, bleiben die „Triebkräfte“ auch in der neuen Existenz erhalten als die durch sie geschaffene „bedingte Daseinsform“, für die ebenfalls der Begriff *saṃskāra* verwandt wird. So wird es möglich, daß man alle Erscheinungen der vergänglichen Wirklichkeit als *saṃskāra* oder *saṃskṛta* („bedingt entstanden“) bezeichnet und ihnen gegenüber das Nirvāṇa als das „nicht bedingt-entstandene“, d.h. „Absolute“ (*a-saṃskṛta*) abhebt ²⁴).

Es mag kurz darauf hingewiesen werden, daß bei Vidyāraṇya neben dem „Nichtwissen“ (*avidyā*), das durch die „Erkenntnis“ (*jñāna*) aufgehoben wird, die „Sinneseindrücke“, „*vāsanāḥ*“, stehen, die auch „*saṃskārāḥ*“ genannt werden ²⁵). Ein kausales Verhältnis wie in der buddhistischen Ursachenkette, in der das Nichtwissen die Triebkräfte bedingt, kennt er jedoch nicht. Vidyāraṇya spricht vielmehr von einer „wechselseitigen Ursächlichkeit“ (*anyonya-kāraṇatva*) nicht der bindenden Faktoren, sondern nur der diese beseitigenden Mittel: „Erkenntnis der Wahrheit oder des Prinzips“ (*tattva-jñāna*) als die Erkenntnis von der Ātman-Brahman-Einheit, die das Nichtwissen zerstört, und „Schwinden der Sinneseindrücke“ (*vāsanā-kṣaya*) bedingen und stärken einander wechselseitig (J 36, 9 - 38, 12), wobei jene allein die Erlösung nach dem Tode (*videhamukti*), dieses aber zusammen mit der „Außerstandsetzung des Denkorgans“ (*mano-nāśa*), also mit der

24) Anders: R. O. Franke, *Dīghanikāya*, Göttingen und Leipzig 1913, pp. 307 ff., bes. pp. 317 f.

25) Vgl. *deha-vāsanā* und *śāstra-vāsanā* bei Vidyāraṇya (J 28, 1 f; 53, 18; 54, 18; 56, 18; 57, 1. 15; 59, 3. 12. 15 f; 63, 18; 66, 7; 94, 3), dazu die bei H. Oldenberg, *Buddha*, p. 435, Anm. 48 und 49 gegebenen Belege, denen *Ang.*, vol. V, p. 88, und *Samy.*, vol. II, p. 82, hinzuzufügen sind. Zu einer Wechselwirkung von Erkenntnis und Befreiung von den *saṃskāras* vgl. *Samy.*, vol. V, pp. 499 f, und *Majjh.*, vol. I, pp. 389 f; für die Verhältnisse im *Sāṃkhya* gibt Oldenberg p. 436 (Anm. 50) Belege und Literatur.

Gesamtheit der Mittel des Yoga die Jīvanmukti zur Folge hat²⁶⁾. Dem buddhistischen Lehrsatz ist jedoch klar zu entnehmen — sofern man nicht eine Wirkung des Saṃskāra über alle folgenden zehn Glieder der Ursachenkette auf das Nichtwissen zu konstruieren hat —, daß die Beseitigung des Nichtwissens die Befreiung von allen leidenvollen Früchten, die nach dem Gesetz der Kausalität in den folgenden elf Gliedern aus ihr erwachsen müssen, zur Folge hat²⁷⁾, die in der Gestalt des Arhat ihre Verwirklichung findet (Aṅg. 10, 13 vol. V, p. 17). Von anderen Gliedern der Ursachenkette, der (6) Berührung, der (7) Empfindung, dem (9) Ergreifen, dem (10) Werden ist oben im Zusammenhang mit dem (8) Durst die Rede gewesen; dieser und das Nichtwissen²⁸⁾ bestimmen hauptsächlich die Verstrickung in den Wesenskreislauf, ihre Aufhebung (*nirodha*) bringt die Erlösung.

Den Weg zur Erlösung hat der Vollendete selbst gelebt und gewiesen; er muß erkannt werden, und er muß begangen werden. Die Lehre ist nur eine Hilfe, die dem Heilssucher an die Hand gegeben wird; der Sieg wird ihm aus eigener Kraftanstrengung zuteil (Dhammapada 276). Wer sich nicht für fähig hält, der Welt als ein Mönch zu entsagen und den schweren Pfad zu beschreiten, mag sich das Ziel setzen, sein Wesen durch die Hingabe an die Buddha-Verehrung so sehr zu läutern, daß er auf Grund eines damit gewonnenen besseren Karman in einer späteren Existenz die Erlösung gewinnen kann (Milindap., pp. 80, 96 f.), die nur dem Mönch, dem eine Buddha-Verehrung nur von geringem Wert ist (ebenda, p. 177), zuteilwerden kann. Die allgemeine Überzeugung scheint sogar dahin zu gehen, daß auch der mönchische Asket nur deshalb der Erlösung teilhaftig wird, weil er in einer früheren Existenz die an den Laien gerichteten Forderungen nach einer sittlichen Lebensführung, nach der Wohltätigkeit und Opferbereitschaft gegenüber dem auf dem Erlösungswege schon vorangeschrittenen Jünger erfüllt hat²⁹⁾. Das gläubige Vertrauen (*śraddhā*)

26) Auf die ausführlichere Darstellung der äußerst komplizierten Gedankengänge bei Vidyāraṇya (J 38, 12 - 63, 6), die zu dem hier kurz skizzierten Ergebnis leiten, kann hier verzichtet werden; sie soll an anderer Stelle gegeben werden.

27) H. Oldenberg, a.a.O., p. 279; H. v. Glasenapp, bei Oldenberg, p. 493; E. Frauwallner, Gesch. der ind. Phil. I, pp. 200, 208 f.

28) Zu der Bedeutsamkeit und gleichen Richtung dieser beiden vgl. E. Frauwallner, a.a.O., pp. 195 ff; H. v. Glasenapp, Die Religionen Indiens, Stuttgart 1955, p. 229.

29) In dieser Determination dürften die jainistische Bestimmung von „erlösungs-

auf die vom Erhabenen verkündete Lehre bleibt auch dem Mönch die Voraussetzung für das Begehen des „edlen achtgliedrigen Pfades“ (*āryāṣṭāṅgamārga*), den man als die Zusammenfassung methodischen Erlösungsstrebens bezeichnen kann ³⁰). Seine Glieder sind die folgenden:

- 1.) „Rechte Anschauung“ (*sammāditṭhi*); das Wissen der vier heiligen Wahrheiten vom Leiden und die Kenntnis dessen, was zum Ziele führt, sind der Ausgangspunkt, dem leidverursachenden Nichtwissen entsprechend entgegengesetzt.
- 2.) „Rechte Gesinnung“ (*sammāsāṅkappa*), eine von unreinen und böswilligen Gedanken freie Geisteshaltung, wird durch die
- 3.) „rechte Rede“ (*sammāvācā*) kundgetan; diese ist durch ein wahres, freundliches, nützliches und zur rechten Zeit (*Aṅg.* 10, 44, 9) geäußertes Wort gekennzeichnet; ihr folgt
- 4.) „rechtes Handeln“ (*sammākammanta*), das in der Unterlassung von bösem und im Tun von gutem Werk die beiden vorausgehenden Glieder bestätigt, denn das rechte Wort ist nichtig ohne die rechte Tat (*Dhammapada* 1 f., 19 f.); aus ihr ergibt sich
- 5.) „rechtes Leben“ (*sammājīva*), ein den Grundsätzen der buddhistischen Lehre, namentlich den fünf Geboten entsprechend erworbener Lebensunterhalt. Nunmehr beginnt eine stärker auf die Erlösung gerichtete Zügelung des inneren Lebens:
- 6.) „Rechtes Streben“ (*sammāvāyāma*) ist das geistige Bemühen um die Abwehr und Unterdrückung schlechter Gemütsregungen (*dhamma*) und die durch innere Beherrschung und Versenkung geübte Hervorbringung, Wahrung und Förderung guter Gemütsregungen.

fähigen“ (*bhavya*) und „nicht-erlösungsfähigen“ (*abhavya*) Seelen sowie die Lehre der Bhagavadgītā von den zu „göttlichem Geschick“ bestimmten Menschen (XVI, 1-5) in doxologischer Hinsicht eine Parallele darstellen. — Über die Erlösung des Laien im Buddhismus s. Literatur bei L. de la Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa*, vol. IV, p. 29, Anm.; bes.: B. C. Law, *Nirvāṇa and Buddhist Laymen*, in: *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Inst.*, vol. 14, Poona 1933, p. 80. — Nach *Dīgha*, vol. III, p. 180, steht nicht die Frage nach dem „Laien“ im Vordergrund, sondern es entscheidet, ob die sittlichen Bedingungen für die Erlösung erfüllt sind oder nicht; vgl. jedoch *Aṅg.* 6, 120 vol. III, p. 451; *Samy.*, vol. V, p. 410; *Mahāvagga* 1, 7.

30) Dazu vor allem *Dīgha*, vol. II, pp. 311 f.

- 7.) „Rechtes Überdenken“ (*sammāsaṭi*) ist die vertiefende Betrachtung des Körpers, der Empfindungen, des Denkens und der Denkbjekte; auf sie folgt endlich
- 8.) „rechtes Sichversenken“ (*sammāsamādhi*) in der Form der „Einspitzigkeit“ (*ekāgratā; ekaggatā*) der Denktätigkeit.

Bemerkenswert ist hier vor allem, welchen breiten Raum das sittliche Verhalten (*śīla; sīla*) in diesem Pfade einnimmt, sowohl im Hinblick auf eine äußere Pflichterfüllung als auch, entscheidend, in der Läuterung des Innern und der Selbstreinigung (Dhammapada 239). Der Mönch ist barmherzig, mitleidsvoll und trachtet nach dem Wohl der Mitwelt; er stiftet Eintracht und hat daran seine Freude. Ein Grundzug, der von Vidyāraṇya immer wieder hervorgehoben wird, daß nämlich die Qualität der Erlösungsmittel (*sādhana*) den Erlösten keineswegs verläßt³¹⁾, sondern als integraler Bestandteil der Erlösung bei Lebzeiten angesehen werden muß, findet sich, mit entsprechend anderen Vorzeichen, in einem Höchstmaß an sittlicher Bestimmung auch im buddhistischen Erlösungspfad. Sie ist die Grundlage, erhält aber ihre höchste Vollendung erst von dem Ziel, von der Vollkommenheit des frommen Strebens, der Versenkung (*samādhi*) und der Erkenntnis (*prajñā*)³²⁾.

Einige Glieder dieses Pfades bedürfen noch einer näheren Betrachtung in anderen Lichte³³⁾. Die „Beherrschung der Sinnesorgane“ (*indriya-saṃvara*) hat, wie dies das Ziel des Yoga ist³⁴⁾, die Loslösung der Sinnesorgane von den Objekten, doch auch die Zügelung der Begierden zur Folge; die dadurch gewonnene lautere Freude und innere Entbindung von dem äußeren Geschehen macht den Weg frei für die Übungen der „Achtsamkeit“ (*smṛti; sati*) und „Aufmerksamkeit“ (*samprajanya; sampajanna*), die, auf der 7. Stufe des achtgliedrigen Pfades, der Versenkung vorangehen.

31) J 23, 17 ff; 24, 20 ff; 38, 16 — 46, 20 passim.

32) Dīgha., vol. I, p. 124.

33) Ich folge hier der Darstellung Dīgha., vol. II, pp. 3 ff, und E. Frauwallners Interpretation, a.a.O., I, pp. 162 ff; vgl. H. Oldenberg, a.a.O., pp. 320 ff.

34) Über Yoga und Buddhismus vgl. auch H. Oldenberg, Lehre der Upanishaden, Göttingen 1915, pp. 319 ff; F. Heiler, Die buddhistische Versenkung, München 1922, pp. 12 ff, 47 ff; É. Sénart, Bouddhisme et Yoga, in: Revue de l'histoire des religions, vol. 42 (1900), pp. 345-363; M. Eliade, Yoga, bes. pp. 171-208, 405 f; ferner: T. W. and C. A. F. Rhys Davids, Dialogues of the Buddha, vol. I (Oxford 1899), p. 51, Anm. 1.

Die letzte Stufe gliedert sich in die Vorbereitung zur Meditation, die Überwindung der fünf „Hindernisse“ (*nīvaraṇa*) und schließlich die Erlangung der vier Versenkungsstufen. Zur Vorbereitung gehören die halb körperlichen, halb geistigen Übungen einer bewußten Atemregelung, die an einem geeigneten Orte und in einer geeigneten Körperhaltung zu vollziehen sind; sie vertreiben das Böse, das sich im Menschen erhebt³⁵), und bereiten den Boden zur geistigen Überwindung der fünf Hindernisse — Gier, Bosheit, Starrheit, reuevolle Erregung und Zweifel —, die den fünf „Befleckungen“ (*kleśa*) der Vedāntins und des Sāṃkhya vergleichbar sind.

Ist er von diesen Befleckungen und den unheilsamen Gemütsregungen (*dhamma*) befreit, so gelangt der Meditierende durch Nachdenken und Erwägen in die erste Versenkungsstufe; hat er diese beiden Mittel überwunden, gewinnt er eine innere Beruhigung und geistige Konzentration, die ihm eine Befriedigung gewähren. Diese weicht in der dritten Versenkungsstufe dem Gleichmut und den schon in den vorbereitenden Übungen bedeutsamen Merkmalen der Wachsamkeit und Bewußtheit, sowie dem Empfinden eines körperlichen Wohlbehagens; schließlich aber schwindet auch dieses in der vierten Stufe und macht der höchsten Reinheit des Gleichmuts und der Wachsamkeit Platz.

Die erst durch die moralischen Vorübungen³⁶) ethisierte Versenkung stellt somit nicht die überintellektuelle Vereinigung mit dem Meditationsgegenstand selbst dar, sondern ist nur ein Mittel zur Gewinnung einer bestimmten höheren Erkenntnis (*prajñā*), indem sie das Denken in einen höheren Grad der Anpassungsfähigkeit versetzt, als ihm von Natur aus eigen ist, um ihm schließlich eine zur Erlösung notwendige unmittelbare Wahrnehmung der Tatbestände zu ermöglichen. Zu diesen gehört zunächst und vor allem das Zusammengesetztsein des Leibes, dem nichts Beharrendes innewohnt. Und ein mit wunderbaren Fähigkeiten ausgestatteter, geistartiger Leib gewährt ihm die Entfaltung seines dreifachen Wissens (*vidyā*), das sich auf die Erkenntnis (*jñāna*) seiner früheren Existenzen, des Vergehens und Werdens der Wesen und auf die Erkenntnis vom Schwinden der drei „Einflüsse“ (*āsrava*; *āsava*) richtet.

35) Vinaya Piṭaka (ed. Oldenberg), vol. III, pp. 70 f; die vollständigste Liste findet sich Aṅg., vol. I, p. 38, fast gleichlautend: Mahāvvyutpatti (ed. J. P. Minaev und N. D. Mironov, St. Petersburg 1911) 67 ff.

36) Vgl. Digha., vol. I, pp. 63 ff und 172; Mahāvvyutpatti 36.

Die drei Einflüsse sind die Sinnenlust (*kāma*), die „Werdelust“ (*bhava*) als die Hauptbestandteile des Durstes ³⁷⁾ und das Nichtwissen, denen später noch als vierter die falsche Anschauung (*mithyādr̥ṣṭi*) hinzugefügt worden ist; ihr Wesen, ihre Ursache, ihre Überwindung und der Weg, der zu ihrer Überwindung führt, werden hier erkannt, und mit der Erkenntnis schwinden diese „Einflüsse“ dahin. Mit der Vernichtung des Nichtwissens aber ist der Mensch befreit (*vimutta*).

Zugleich damit entsteht in ihm das Wissen von seinem Erlöstsein ³⁸⁾. Wenn er mit der Reihe der früheren Geburten sein eigenes Los und mit dem Vergehen und Werden der Wesen das Weltgesetz in seiner Gesamtheit erkannt hat, so ist das nichts weiter Neues; der Akzent liegt vielmehr darauf, daß diese Erkenntnis in der Versenkung zur unumstößlichen Gewißheit für ihn selbst geworden ist, und mit der Vernichtung der Gesamtheit aller Leidensursachen, des Durstes und des Nichtwissens oder der drei „Einflüsse“, ist das Leiden aufgehoben (Majjh., vol. I, p. 482), wird der Heilssucher zum Arhat, zum Heiligen, und findet das Nirvāṇa.

Auf die Darstellung der zahlreichen verschiedenen Meditations- und Versenkungsarten, die der buddhistische Yoga ausgebildet oder übernommen hat, muß hier verzichtet werden ³⁹⁾. Wichtig ist noch zu bemerken, daß die höchste Erkenntnis (*prajñā*; *paññā*) und die Versenkung (*dhyāna*; *jhāna*) zueinander aufs engste in Beziehung stehen und sich gegenseitig bedingen; in wem beides vereint ist, der ist „dem Nirvāṇa nahe“, denn die Weisen sind es, die „versenkten Geistes das Nirvāṇa erreichen“ (*phusanti*, „berühren“; Dhammapada 372; 23).

Ehe einige Besonderheiten des Großen Fahrzeugs berücksichtigt werden, muß hier noch auf eine Theorie von vier Rangklassen eingegangen werden (Dīgha. 16, 2, 7 vol. II, p. 92). Diese sind, ähnlich den jainistischen Guṇasthānas, nach dem Gesichtspunkt des zunehmenden Fortgeschrittenseins auf dem Wege zur Erlösung angeordnet:

- 1.) Der „in den Strom (der Erlösung) Eingetretene“ (*sotāpanna*) hat nur noch sieben Wiedergeburten zu erwarten, sei es als

37) s.o. S. 209 f.; vgl. E. Frauwallner, a.a.O., pp. 214 ff.

38) s. L. de la Vallée Poussin, Le dogme et la philosophie du bouddhisme, Paris 1930, p. 185 (mit weiterer Literatur); vgl. H. W. Schomerus, Indische und christliche Enderwartung und Erlösungshoffnung, Gütersloh 1941, p. 256.

39) Vgl. Majjh., vol. I, p. 333; s.o. Anm. 34 und E. Frauwallner, a.a.O. I, pp. 173-181.

Mensch, sei es als Gott in der Sinnenwelt, nicht aber als Tier oder böser Geist; der äußerlich unsichtbare „Stromeintritt“ (*sotāpatti*) nach der Aufhebung der drei „Fesseln“ (*sanyojana*) — des Glaubens an ein unvergängliches individuelles Ich, der Zweifelsucht und des Hanges zur Überbewertung der Sittengebote und Zeremonien — gibt ihm die Gewißheit dieser künftigen Erlösung.

- 2.) Der „Einmalwiederkehrer“ (*sakadāgāmin*) weilt bis zu seiner einmaligen, menschlichen Wiedergeburt in der Himmelswelt; die Haupthemmnisse Haß, Gier und Wahn sind bei ihm nur noch in geringem Maße vorhanden.
- 3.) Der „Nichtwiederkehrer“ (*anāgāmin*) wird von der Götterwelt, der Sphäre der reinen Formen (*rūpavacara*), aus das Nirvāṇa erreichen.
- 4.) Der Heilige, der „Anspruch hat (auf Verehrung und fromme Gaben)“ (*arahat*), ist aller Fesseln ledig (vgl. Äng. 10, 13 vol. V, p. 17) ⁴⁰).

In welchem Verhältnis der Arhat zu dem steht, der „für sich allein die Erleuchtung gewonnen hat“ (*pratyeka-buddha*; *pacceka-buddha*), ist weitgehend in Dunkel gehüllt; er wird zwar auf der einen Seite gegen die „Universalbuddhas“ (*sammāsambuddha*) insofern abgegrenzt, als seine Kraft zur Verkündung der Heilslehre nicht hinreicht; und er unterscheidet sich vom Arhat auf der anderen Seite darin, daß er aus völlig eigener Kraft, d.h. nicht als folgender Jünger, sondern als auffindender Weiser die Erlösung erreicht. Über einen im Wesen begründeten Unterschied sagt dieses nichts aus.

Stil, Sprache und Wortschatz der zahlreichen Lobpreisungen des Weisen, der die Vollendung erreicht hat, sind bei den Vedāntins die gleichen wie bei den Buddhisten: „Die mir Schmerz zufügen und die mir Freude bereiten, gegen alle bin ich gleich; Zuneigung und Haß kenne ich nicht. In Freude und Leid bleibe ich unbewegt, in Ehren und Unehren; überall bin ich gleich. Das ist die Vollendung meines Gleichmuts“ ⁴¹). In solchem Sinne läßt er die Kraft seiner „Freundschaft“

40) Die Parallelisierung dieser vier Klassen mit den brahmanischen *āśramas* ist irreführend.

41) *Cariyā Piṭaka* III, 15 (bei H. Oldenberg, *Buddha*, p. 313); vgl. die Ausführungen *Vidyāranyas* insbesondere zum *Guṇātīta* der *Bhagavadgītā* (J 25 f)

(*maitrī*) über alle Himmelsgegenden und -richtungen sich ausbreiten⁴²), durch sie besänftigt er die Tierwelt⁴³) und bekehrt seine Mitmenschen zum wahren Glauben⁴⁴); seine Lauterkeit macht es ihm unmöglich, irgend etwas Böses zu tun⁴⁵), denn er hat den Tod (*mṛtyu*), das Böse (*māra*) überwunden, das ihn an das Dasein ketete⁴⁶). So wenig wie er am Bösen haftet, so wenig vermag ihm das Gute etwas zu erschaffen (Dhammapada 412), da es nichts mehr gibt, wonach er verlangen kann.

So, sollte man meinen, ist der subjektiven Erlösungsgewißheit in seinem Wirken ein objektiver Maßstab beigegeben. Wie weit man diesen darin sehen kann, daß betont worden ist, daß der Leib des Vollendeten auch nach seiner Erleuchtung fortbesteht, also von Göttern und Menschen gesehen werden kann und sich nur darin von den Leibern der anderen Sterblichen unterscheidet, daß in ihm die Gewalt, die zu neuem Dasein führt, kraftlos geworden ist (Dīgha., vol. I, p. 46), muß dahin stehen. Wenn der Heilige den Lohn der bösen Taten, der sonst erst in einer späteren Existenz zur Wirkung käme, noch in seinem jetzigen Erdenleben tilgen kann und muß⁴⁷), so wird man nach allem H. Oldenberg zustimmen müssen, wenn er sagt, daß „man nicht auf das Eingehen des sterbenden Vollendeten in das Reich des Ewigen hinzusehen“ hat, „will man den Punkt genau bezeichnen, wo für den Buddhisten das Ziel erreicht ist, ... sondern auf den Augenblick seines irdischen Lebens, wo er den Stand der Sündlosigkeit und Leidlosigkeit erreicht hat: dies ist das wahre Nirvāṇa“⁴⁸), das erlösende Endziel.

und seinen Kommentar zur Paramahansa-Upaniṣad IV (J 156 ff; ferner J 29; 56; 142).

42) Aṅg., vol. III, p. 63, 3; vgl. vol. I, p. 186; vol. III, p. 225.

43) Cariyā Piṭaka III, 13; Cullavagga 7, 3, 12.

44) Mahāvagga 6, 36, 4.

45) Dīgha., vol. III, p. 235; vgl. vol. I, p. 63; nach Kathāvatthu 1, 2 kann der Arhat von der Höhe seiner Heiligkeit herabfallen, doch ist dies nur vorübergehend möglich.

46) Samy., vol. IV, pp. 38 f; vgl. p. 178.

47) Majjh., Nr. 86; vgl. Nr. 112; Milindap. pp. 188 f. Dasselbe gilt auch für die im gegenwärtigen Leben des Heiligen sich auswirkenden karmischen Kräfte; sie müssen erst vertilgt werden, ehe das endgültige Verlöschen statthaben kann; vgl. Kathāvatthu 17, 2; E. W. Burlingame, Buddhist Legends, vol. II, p. 304, und die Einleitung zu Jātaka 522. Die Erzählung von dem Selbstmord des Godhika (Samy., vol. I, p. 120) hat keine allgemeingültige Bedeutung.

48) Buddha, p. 281.

Nach dem, was oben vom Arhat zu sagen war, hat man in ihm diesen Zustand als erreicht zu denken ⁴⁹⁾.

Während der alte Buddhismus in diesem das religiöse und sittliche Ideal sieht, dem der Mensch als frommer Jünger Buddhas zuzustreben hat, geht der Umdeutung des Buddha-Begriffes im späteren Buddhismus eine Erweiterung des Aufgabenbereiches des Heiligen parallel. Er soll sich nicht mit der Erlangung eines subjektiven Erlösungsbewußtseins, nicht mit einer heiligen Passivität oder erhabenen Neutralität begnügen, wie sie den Jīvanmukta des Advaita-Vedānta auszeichnet ⁵⁰⁾; vielmehr soll er, dem großen Vorbild Buddha entsprechend, als einer, „dessen Wesen Erleuchtung ist“ (*bodhi-sattva*), in größter Selbstverleugnung den leidenden Wesen, ob Mensch, ob Tier, dienen. Seine höchste Tugend ist das Mitleid, das ihn auch um anderer willen Böses tun läßt; er ist der Lehrer und Prediger der Lehre. Doch ist er kein Buddha, der ihn um ein Vielfaches an Erleuchtungskraft überragt.

Gegenüber der im alten Buddhismus vorherrschenden Tendenz lehrt das Große Fahrzeug, daß jeder, der sich darum bemüht, ein Bodhisattva werden kann; sein Weg kann durch eine unendliche Vielzahl von Wiedergeburten führen, bis er die Bodhisattvaschaft in ihrer höchsten Vollkommenheit (*pāramitā*) erreicht, die sich durch den Besitz übernatürlicher Kräfte und einer all-umfassenden Erkenntnis auszeichnet.

Es wird hier aber bereits deutlich, wie sehr die Menschengestalt unter der Umkleidung solcher „göttlich“ zu nennenden Attribute in einer Sphäre entschwindet, die, wie der Zustand des Erlösten überhaupt, dem menschlichen Denken unfäßbar und unausdrückbar ist. Ein Kult wird möglich, und mit ihm gewinnt die Gelegenheit neuen Raum, der Erlösung durch gläubige Hingabe, die einen entscheidenden Platz im Heilspfad einnimmt, teilhaftig zu werden. Die Vorstellung von einer Erlösung bei Lebzeiten, so möchte man annehmen, führt zwangsläufig zu einer „Vergöttlichung“ des Lebenderlösten ⁵¹⁾. Wenn auch im Mahāyāna eine Folge von Stufen angenommen wird, in der ein Arhat unter dem Pratyekabuddha, dieser unter dem Bodhisattva steht

49) Vgl. Majjh., vol. I, p. 69; Mahāvīyutpatti 7.

50) Es kann hier nicht von einem „Egoismus“ gesprochen werden, weil die Auslöschung des Ich-Bewußtseins ein besonders hervorstechendes Merkmal des Lebenderlösten ist.

51) In diesem Sinne ist M. Eliades Bezeichnung des Jīvanmukta als eines „Gottmenschen“ (Yoga, pp. 104, 112; vgl. pp. 107, 244) durchaus zutreffend.

und der Buddha ⁵²⁾ als die höchste gleicherweise menschlichem wie göttlichem Dasein enthobene Gestalt gepriesen wird, so tut sich damit der besonders im Großen Fahrzeug ausgeprägte Hang zur Systematik und Klassifizierung kund. Blickt man jedoch auf den Maßstab, der ihr zugrunde gelegt wird, so ergibt sich, im Vergleich mit der bei Vidyāraṇya anzutreffenden Rangfolge, ein kardinaler Unterschied: die zunehmende Vervollkommenung sittlicher Reinheit geht mit der zunehmenden Entfaltung einer Wirksamkeit im Dienste an der vom Leiden geprägten Welt parallel (vgl. oben S. 206 f.); seine Göttlichkeit ist nicht, wie in der Sicht Vidyāraṇyas, eine kosmische, sondern eine *e t h i s c h e* Potenz.

Alle buddhistischen Schulen sowohl des Kleinen wie des Großen Fahrzeugs stimmen darin überein, das Nirvāṇa als ein Absolutes, d.h. als ein von nichts anderem in seiner Entstehung Abhängiges und also Unvergängliches anzusehen ⁵³⁾. Es hat damit manche wesentliche Ähnlichkeit mit dem Brahman der Upaniṣads ⁵⁴⁾, das allerdings auch mit dem Dharma verglichen worden ist ⁵⁵⁾; wie jedoch die Vergleiche gezeigt haben, entspricht das Nirvāṇa weder diesem noch jenem genau.

Es läßt sich zunächst bestimmen als ein allem phänomenalen Werden diametral entgegengesetztes, zeit-erhabenes Nicht-Nichts (Milindap. p. 268); es ist ohne festen Halt, ohne Anfang, weder geboren noch geworden noch gemacht, ein ruhendes Sein, eine Realität *sui generis*, deren begriffliche Erfäßbarkeit nur möglich wird in der Konfrontation mit dem Saṃsāra, sei dieser vornehmlich die Welt des Leidens und der vergänglichen Formen ⁵⁶⁾, sei dieser, wie in manchen Mahāyāna-Schulen, die Welt des Scheins. Nur in dieser antinomen Ausdrucksweise ist eine Umschreibung möglich ⁵⁷⁾.

52) Mahāvvyutpatti 50; das sind die letzten vier von zehn Stufen (*bhūmi*); vgl. N. Dutt, Aspects, pp. 286 ff.

53) Zum Folgenden vgl. vor allem L. de la Vallée Poussin, Nirvāṇa, Études sur l'histoire des religions 5, Paris 1925; O. Rosenberg, Probleme der buddhistischen Philosophie, Heidelberg 1924; A. Bareau, L'Absolu en philosophie bouddhique, Diss., Paris 1951; H. v. Glasenapp, Buddhismus und Gottesidee, bes. pp. 493 ff (99 ff); anders R. O. Franke, Dīghanikāya, pp. 317 ff.

54) J. Dahlmann, Nirvāṇa, Berlin 1896, pp. 11 ff, 23 f; H. Oldenberg, Buddha, pp. 299 ff, und: Lehre der Upanishaden, pp. 312 f, 318; H. v. Glasenapp, a.a.O., p. 511 (117), und: Vedānta und Buddhismus, Akad. der Wiss. und der Lit. zu Mainz, Abh. der Geistes- und Sozialwiss. Kl., 1950, Nr. 11, p. 1025 (15).

55) H. v. Glasenapp, Buddhismus und Gottesidee, p. 443 (49).

56) Udāna 8, 1 ff; vgl. Vinaya Piṭaka, vol. V, p. 86.

57) Vgl. E. Frauwallner, Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, Berlin 1956, pp. 174 f.

Ein Notbehelf bleibt darum auch die negative Beschreibung⁵⁸⁾, sofern sie sich ebenfalls rückbezieht auf das empirisch Faßbare, namentlich auf die fünf Gruppen (*skandha*) von Daseinsfaktoren, die eine Persönlichkeit ausmachen. Es heißt nämlich von einem ins Nirvāṇa eingegangenen Menschen, daß die Körperlichkeit (*rūpa*), die Empfindungen (*vedanā*), das Unterscheidungsbewußtsein (*saṃjñā*), die Triebkräfte (*saṃskāra*) und das Bewußtsein (*viññāṇa*) restlos entwurzelt sind, daß sie daher unmöglich neu zu entstehen vermögen (Samy. 44, 1, 30 vol. IV, pp. 378 f., vgl. p. 374), wodurch das Nirvāṇa zum einen als die Aufhebung von allem, das die weltliche Existenz begründet, zum anderen aber als eine dem Menschen zuteilwerdende Zuständlichkeit bezeichnet wird. Dies kommt vor allem darin zum Ausdruck, wenn es heißt, daß die restlose Vernichtung der drei Grundübel Haß, Gier und Wahn das Nirvāṇa-Kennzeichen darstellt (Samy. 43, 1, 2 vol. IV, pp. 359 ff., vgl. p. 251). Die Zuständlichkeit ist jedoch nur eine *cum grano salis* insofern, als das Nirvāṇa durchaus als etwas Dingliches aufgefaßt werden kann, das man „berührt“ (*phusanti*, s.o.). Diese „Berührung“ wiederum ist keine, für die ein „Empfinden“ (*vedanā*) notwendig ist, die nur dem irdisch-leibhaften Wesen und dem leidhaften Kreislauf eigentümlich ist; die Berührung mit dem Nirvāṇa kennzeichnet vielmehr eine durch sich selbst wirkende Wonne (Aṅg., vol. IV, pp. 414 f), die erfahrbar wird in einer bewußt vollzogenen Tilgung aller Leidenschaften und in der „Aufhebung“ der Verbindung mit verunreinigenden Faktoren⁵⁹⁾. Dem Hervorbringen der „Bewußtheit“ (*pratisamkhyā*) als einer bestimmten Form der Erkenntnis (*prajñā*) der vier heiligen Wahrheiten vom Leiden diene die Versenkungsübung, von der oben die Rede war; die „bewußt vollzogene Tilgung“ (*pratisamkhyā-nirodha*) gilt darum im Hīnayāna oft auch als Bezeichnung für das Nirvāṇa, das „Erlöschen“ der Leiden. Es liegt kein Grund zum Zweifel vor, daß diese Wonne dem Überwinder der drei „Einflüsse“ schon auf Erden zuteilwird (Dhammapada 89. 414); denn nur auf das „Erlöschen“ (*nirvāṇa*) der Grundübel, des Leidens, des Ichbewußtseins kommt es an; dies ist das Ziel, dem der Pfad zur Erlösung zustrebt.

58) Vgl. jedoch Madhyamakavṛtti 25, bei Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, Leningrad 1927, pp. 76 ff, und bei E. Frauwallner, a.a.O., pp. 194 ff, 205 f.

59) Abhidharmakośa, vol. I, p. 8; vgl. E. Frauwallner, a.a.O., pp. 129 ff.

Die Wurzeln sind vernichtet; so kann — nach dem Grundsatz, den Hindus wie Jainas befolgen — dem Stamm keine neue Nahrung zuströmen, und er geht zugrunde, wenn die Zeit dafür reif ist, im natürlichen Tode ⁶⁰⁾. Zuweilen fällt, um im Bilde zu bleiben, die Entwurzelung mit der völligen Vernichtung des Stammes zusammen; die Überwindung aller Triebregungen und das Lebensende treten zu gleicher Zeit auf, „beide Häupter“, d.h. Enden, „sind gleich“ (*samasīnin*) ⁶¹⁾.

So wird der Begriff, unter dem das Absolute gefaßt wird, Menschen beigelegt, die noch auf Erden wandeln, noch „sichtbar“ sind. Der alte Buddhismus hat dafür die Bezeichnung eines „sichtbaren Erlöschens“ (*saṃdiṭṭhikaṃ nibbānaṃ*) ⁶²⁾, das von dem endgültigen „Verlöschen“ (*parinibbāna*) geschieden wird.

Vom Buddha kennt man ⁶³⁾ drei Arten des Nirvāṇa: a) das „völlige Verlöschen der Grundübel“ (*kilesa-parinibbāna*) ⁶⁴⁾ mit dem Eintritt der Erleuchtung; b) das „völlige Erlöschen der Gruppen“ (*khandha-parinibbāna*) ⁶⁵⁾ der Daseinsfaktoren mit Buddhas Tod; c) das „völlige Erlöschen der Elemente“ (*dhātu-parinibbāna*), d.h. der Buddha-Reliquien und der Lehre. Von diesen dreien erfordern die beiden ersten eine besondere Aufmerksamkeit.

Es werden im alten Buddhismus ganz allgemein und nicht mit einem erkennbaren Bezug auf die Stiftergestalt zwei Arten des Nirvāṇa genannt ⁶⁶⁾: 1.) ein Nirvāṇa „mit einem Rest von Beilegungen“ (*saupādisesa-*) ⁶⁷⁾ und 2.) ein solches „ohne einen Rest von Beilegungen“

60) Milindap. p. 45; nahezu wörtlich = Manusmṛti VI, 45; Theragāthā 1002 f; vgl. oben Anm. 47 und ferner: Samy., vol. I, p. 109; Abhidharmakośa, vol. V, p. 58; Mahāvvyutpatti 46.

61) Aṅg. 7, 16, 3 vol. IV, p. 13; Puggalapaññatti 19.

62) Aṅg., vol. III, p. 55; vgl. R. O. Franke, Dīghanikāya, pp. 38 ff; zum Worte s. ebenda, p. 179, Anm. 2, und p. 196, Anm. 3.

63) s. G. P. Malalasekera, Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names II (London 1938), p. 303 und Anm.

64) Vgl. Dhammapada 414.

65) Vgl. Dhammapada 202 f, 238.

66) am deutlichsten: Itivuttaka 44; Kathāvatthu 2, 11; vgl. L. de la Vallée Poussin, Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, vol. I (Paris 1928), pp. 410 f; vol. II (1929), pp. 438 f, 508, 671 ff, 703.

67) Vgl. T. W. Rhys Davids and W. Stede, The Pāli Text Society's Pāli-English Dictionary, s.v. *parinibbāna*; Aṅg. 7, 53 vol. IV, p. 77. — *soṇadhiśeṣa*, Abhidharmakośa 2, 55 vol. I, p. 284 (zur Form(!) s. R. C. Childers, A Dictionary of the Pāli Language, p. 526, s.v. *upadisesa*); vgl. H. O. Lovcejoy, The Buddhist

(*anupādisesa-parinibbāna*)⁶⁸). Die „Beilegungen“ (*upādhi*; *upādi*) sind nichts anderes als die oben genannten „Gruppen“ von Daseinsfaktoren, die eine Persönlichkeit bilden; da aber hier die Triebregungen überwunden sind, kann ein neues Karman nicht mehr hervorgebracht werden. Somit tritt das Nirvāṇa als die Erlösung schon bei Lebzeiten ein (*ditth' eva dhamme*)⁶⁹). Während R. Pischel feststellte, daß das „sichtbare Nirvāṇa“ (*saṃditthikaṃ nibbānaṃ*) der Jīvanmukti „genau entspricht“, „deren Gedanke allen philosophischen Systemen Indiens gemeinsam ist“, schließt H. von Glasenapp mit bemerkenswerten Einschränkungen: „Das ‚Nirvāṇa mit Beilegungen‘ entspricht etwa der Jīvanmukti, ‚der Erlösung bei Lebzeiten‘, die von vielen Hindus angenommen wird“⁷⁰).

Es ergibt sich also die Feststellung, daß Buddha in der Versuchungsgeschichte auf den Eingang in das „Nirvāṇa ohne Beilegungen“ verzichtet hat, weil er das „völlige Erlöschen der Grundübel“ (*kilesa-parinibbāna*) bereits vollzogen hatte, zugleich damit bekräftigend, daß das einmal gewonnene Nirvāṇa unverlierbar ist, die Erlösung auch nicht durch Māras Versuchungen zunichte gemacht werden kann⁷¹).

Bevor die Anschauungen des Mahāyāna untersucht werden, sind hier noch einige Bemerkungen vonnöten. Der Hingang zum Nirvāṇa verleitet dazu, dieses als einen Ort⁷²) vorzustellen; darin haben wir eine

technical terms *upādāna* and *upādisesa*, in: Journ. of the American Oriental Soc., 1898, pt. II, p. 126; F. O. Schrader, On the Problem of Nirvāṇa, Journ. of the Pāli Text Society, 1905, pp. 157-170.

68) Vgl. Rhys Davids and Stede, a.a.O., s.v. *parinibbāna*; R. O. Franke, Dīghanikāya, pp. 25, 179 (Anm. 2) und p. 209 (Anm. 2). — Aṅg., vol. II, p. 120; vol. IV, pp. 202, 313; Milindap. p. 175; Cullavagga 9, 1, 4; Udāna 5, 5; vgl. Dhammapada 368, 372, 383.

69) Samy., vol. IV, p. 102; Majjh., vol. III, p. 242; vgl. Aṅg., vol. III, p. 41 = Vin. Piṭ., vol. II, pp. 148, 164; Aṅg., vol. IV, p. 98; Itivuttaka 93; Dīgha., vol. II, p. 68; R. O. Franke, a.a.O., p. 285.

70) R. Pischel, Leben und Lehre des Buddha, Leipzig und Berlin 1906 (und später), pp. 74 f.; vgl. jedoch H. Kern, Der Buddhismus und seine Geschichte in Indien II, Leipzig 1884, p. 494 (Anm.). — H. v. Glasenapp, Buddhismus und Gottesidee, p. 499 (105). Solche Einschränkungen müssen hier nachdrücklich betont werden; Übereinstimmungen in der Erscheinungsform müssen nicht notwendig Wesensgleichheit bedeuten; s. jedoch H. W. Schomerus, Enderwartung, pp. 151, 244; H. v. Glasenapp, Die Philosophie der Inder, Stuttgart 1949, p. 421; M. Eliade, Yoga, p. 175.

71) Dīgha., vol. II, pp. 112 f.

72) s. H. Oldenberg, Buddha, pp. 279 und 437, Anm. 59; Oldenberg setzt sich hier mit Childers auseinander; E. J. Thomas, The History of Buddhist Thought,

erneute Parallele zum Brahman ⁷³). Während die Anschauung vom Brahman als von einem Ort jedoch ausschließlich die körperlose Erlösung gestattet ⁷⁴), steht hier die Lebenderlösung durchaus als möglich offen. Ferner hat die Einheit des Nirvāṇa-Begriffes eine Modifikation erlitten, die ein zeitliches Auseinanderrücken von zwei Erlösungsformen gestattet oder ermöglicht; in die Zwischenzeit fällt die gesamte Lehrtätigkeit des Erhabenen.

Während das Hinayāna nur diese beiden Typen der Erlösung, des Nirvāṇa kennt, begegnen im Mahāyāna noch zwei weitere Formen. Das erste dieser beiden, das eine Fortführung jener anderen, dem Kleinen Fahrzeug bekannten, Formen darzustellen scheint, wird als „Nirvāṇa ohne festen Stand“ (*apraṭiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa*) bezeichnet ⁷⁵) und ist charakteristisch für das Bodhisattva-Ideal des Mahāyāna. Höchste Weisheit (*mahāprajñā*) und höchstes Mitleid (*mahākaruṇā*) mit allen Wesen kommen hier zur vollen Entfaltung, ohne die wesenhafte innere Ruhe zu beeinträchtigen. Dem Nirvāṇa ohne einen Rest von Beilegungen (*an- oder nir-upādhiseṣa-nirvāṇa*), das ein völliges Verlöschen aller Aktivität naturgemäß zur Folge hat oder in sich enthält, ist das *apraṭiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa* insofern unvergleichlich überlegen, als es dem Erlösten in einer totalen Autonomie, wie sie nur in einem Zustand des Weltenthobenseins ⁷⁶) möglich ist, eine ununterbrochene heilbringende Tätigkeit gestattet.

p. 121, Anm., bringt keinerlei Argumente, die nicht von Oldenberg entkräftet worden sind; vgl. *Dīgha*., vol. II, p. 136, und R. O. Franks Bemerkungen, a.a.O., p. 209, Anm. 2 und 3, die Thomas nicht berücksichtigt.

73) H. Oldenberg, a.a.O., pp. 290 und 440, Anm. 80.

74) wie ich in meinem oben, Anm. 5, genannten Aufsatz gezeigt habe.

75) L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, vol. II, pp. 671 ff, 683, 776 ff, 809 f; vgl. J. Masuda, *Der Idealismus der Yogācāra-Schule*, Heidelberg 1926, pp. 52 ff; Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, p. 235, Index 7, s.v.

76) Vgl. Vidyāranayas Interpretation (J 25, 1 — 26, 7) des „über die Guṇas Erhabenen“ (*guṇātīta*) der Bhagavadgītā (XIV, 19-27); er sieht in diesem nicht nur eine Erscheinungsform des *jīvanmukta*, sondern betrachtet das „*guṇātīta*“ geradezu als ein Charakteristikum der Erlösung bei Lebzeiten überhaupt: *trayo guṇāḥ sattva-rajas-tamāṃsi; teṣāṃ parināma-viśeṣāt sarvaḥ saṃsāraḥ pravartate; ato guṇātīta-tvam a-saṃsāri-tvam; jīvan-mukta-tvam iti yāvat* (J 25, 4 f; „Die drei Guṇas sind ‚Güte‘, ‚Leidenschaft‘ und ‚Finsternis‘; aus ihrer unterschiedlichen Entfaltung entsteht (ja, besteht) dieser ganze Weltenlauf; also ist der Zustand dessen, der die Guṇas überwunden hat, das Befreitsein vom Weltenlauf; das erklären wir als den Zustand des bei Lebzeiten Erlösten“).

Es ist nicht ein „statisches“, wie das des Kleinen Fahrzeugs, sondern ein „dynamisches“ Nirvāṇa. Wenn es als solches zu einem selbst durch den leiblichen Tod nicht abtrennbaren Bestandteil des Erlösten — für den das Kräftespiel der Dharmas ohnehin sein Gesetz verloren hat — gehört, so wird man annehmen dürfen, daß der Erlöste des ewigen Lebens, frei von allen karmisch bedingten und bedingenden Faktoren, teilhaftig wird, womit der Begriff des „Lebens“ und mit ihm der einer „Erlösung bei Lebzeiten“ über den Zerfall der fünf „Gruppen“ hinaus erweitert wird ⁷⁷). Einem solchen Gedanken kommen manche Ansichten des Hīnayāna insofern entgegen, als sie das Nirvāṇa nicht als ein Verlöschen, sondern als die Vollendung des Daseins betrachten ⁷⁸).

Auch die Nur-Bewußtseins-Lehre (*vijñāna-vāda*) des Aśaṅga und des Vasubandhu, die einzig dem Bewußtsein Realität zuerkennt und die Außenwelt als eine fälschliche, „eingebildete“ (*parikalpita*) Projektion des Denkens und mit ihr das Subjekt-Objekt-Verhältnis in den Bereich der Illusion verweist, lehrt, daß die Yoga-Versenkung die Persönlichkeit unwandelt und erleuchtet; die erlangte Weisheit eines Buddha läßt den Menschen frei von allen Begrenzungen werden und in einem *apratīṣṭhita-nirvāṇa* sich dem Heil der Mitwelt weihen.

Man kann sich jedoch andererseits des Eindrucks nicht erwehren, daß hier im Großen Fahrzeug die religiösen Forderungen nach einer alles durchdringenden sittlichen Vervollkommenung den Bereich der philosophischen Folgerichtigkeit außer acht lassen; es entzieht sich vollends den empirischen Denkmöglichkeiten, wenn ein im „statischen Nirvāṇa“ erloschener Arhat zu neuer Tätigkeit erweckt werden kann, um im „dynamischen Nirvāṇa“ eine heilbringende Aktivität zu entfalten ⁷⁹).

Das zweite, nur dem Mahāyāna eigentümliche Nirvāṇa wird das

⁷⁷) H. v. Glasenapp, Buddhismus und Gottesidee, p. 500 (106), bemerkt dazu: „Es ist dies gewissermaßen eine ewige *jīvanmukti*, die über den Tod hinaus fortbesteht.“ Es muß, wenn man von einer „ewigen *jīvanmukti*“ spricht, jedoch berücksichtigt werden, daß es sich dabei nicht um eine von Ewigkeit her bestehende Erlösung handelt, die nur ins Bewußtsein gehoben zu werden braucht, wie sie P. Deußen, Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie I, 2 (Leipzig 1920), p. 310 (s. meine Kritik im oben, Anm. 5, genannten Aufsatz) für die „wahre“ Upaniṣadlehre erklärt hat, sondern um eine in der Zeit gewordene und bis ins Unendliche andauernde.

⁷⁸) Vgl. H. Oldenberg, Buddha, pp. 283 ff und 438, Anm. 64.

⁷⁹) Vgl. das oben S. 205 f Gesagte.

„seit anfangloser Zeit durch sich selbst reine Nirvāṇa“ (*anādi-kālika-prakṛti-śuddha-nirvāṇa*) genannt. Unter seinen Bestimmungen⁸⁰⁾ ist vor allem die von Bedeutung, nach der es weder mit den Dharmas identisch, noch von diesen verschieden ist. Sie basiert auf der auch dem Vedānta bekannten Überzeugung, daß dem Weltgeschehen keine wahre Wirklichkeit zukommt. Wie auch dort das Nichtwissen dem Bereiche des Scheines, der Māyā, zugewiesen wird, so ergibt sich hier notwendig, daß ein den Wesenskreislauf als letzte Ursache heraufführendes Nichtwissen diesen zwangsläufig illusorisch macht. Die Vielheit und das leidvolle Dasein sind ein Trug; die Erlösung kann darum nicht erst erworben oder verwirklicht werden müssen, sondern ist seit anfangloser Zeit in jedem Wesen vorhanden und wird im Innern, in der Versenkung nur emporgehoben. Die alte buddhistische Gegenüberstellung vom Saṃsāra und Nirvāṇa wird hier nichtig; hinter allem Schein ist das Nirvāṇa das alleinige Absolute.

In diesen Gedankengängen des Mahāyāna klingt schon eine gewisse Kritik an. Man war sich dessen bewußt, daß ein Absolutes mit Worten, deren Ausdrucksmöglichkeiten an die zeit- und raum-bedingte Welt gebunden sind, schlechterdings nicht beschreibbar ist, daß ferner die Absolutheit unteilbar ist, es mithin nicht mehrere „*asaṃskṛtas*“ geben kann⁸¹⁾.

Für eine Beurteilung der Vorstellung von der Erlösung bei Lebzeiten im Buddhismus früher und später Zeit ist es darum vonnöten einzusehen, daß auch er sie nicht hat ausbilden können, ohne das „Absolute“, sei es das Nirvāṇa, sei es das Endziel des Erlösungsweges, durch Attribute „in seiner Absolutheit einzuengen“ — gemäß der in der Jīvanmukti liegenden Paradoxie. Schon das Hīnayāna versah den Nirvāṇa-Begriff mit De-finitionen, bezog es als das Endziel menschlichen Strebens ein in die Erlebniswelt des Inneren. Nur so war es ihm möglich, eine Erlösung anzunehmen, die schon bei Lebzeiten eintritt.

Es bestätigt dies die generelle philosophische Grundvoraussetzung für die Idee von der Erlösung bei Lebzeiten, die Anlaß gegeben hat, von einer „Inkonsequenz in der Jīvanmukti-Vorstellung“ zu sprechen⁸²⁾.

80) L. de la Vallée Poussin, a.a.O., pp. 670 f, zählt deren zehn auf.

81) Vgl. H. v. Glasenapp, a.a.O., p. 496 (102).

82) An diesem Punkte setzt auch die buddhistische Kritik selbst ein; vgl. Laṅkāvatārasūtra, ed. B. Nanjio, Kyoto 1923, pp. 182-186, engl. Übersetzung

Blickt man jedoch auf die Gestalten, die für den Buddhismus die Verkörperungen dieser Idee sind, auf die vornehmste unter ihnen, den Buddha in seiner Erhabenheit und sittlichen Reinheit, berücksichtigt man ferner die Überzeugung seiner Anhänger, daß, gemessen an den Zeiträumen von unendlich vielen Jahren, der Eingang in das Nirvāṇa eine Seltenheit ist (*Aṅg.*, vol. I, p. 27; *Abhidharmakośa* vol. II, p. 198), so zeugt dies schließlich für die hohe Vorstellung von der Größe eines Lebenderlöst, die, wie alles „Große, in der Welt nur einmalig ist“ (*Milindap.* p. 239).

von D. T. Suzuki, London 1932, pp. 157-161; s. H. v. Glasenapp, a.a.O., p. 510 (116). — Wenn Buddha selbst an der „Jīvanmukti“-Vorstellung „gewisser Mönche und Brahmanen“, die in der Freude an den Sinnesgenüssen oder in einer der vier Stufen der Versenkung (s.o. S. 214 f) „das wahre Nirvāṇa einer seienden Seele im sichtbaren Dasein“ sehen, Kritik übt (*Dīgha.*, vol. I, pp. 36 f), so leugnet er nicht die Möglichkeit der Erlösung bei Lebzeiten als solche, sondern verwahrt sich gegen die Anmaßung, über das Wesen des Lebenderlöst etwas Genaues aussagen zu wollen oder zu sollen.

THE JAPANESE NEW RELIGIONS

BY

H. VAN STRAELEN S.V.D.

Even for long time residents in Japan, it is by no means easy to get accustomed to the religious scene as it shows itself in so many divergent streams and in hundreds of religious associations. The peaceful coexistence of several religions, completely different in origin and tenets, is an extremely rare phenomenon, at least in non-Asiatic countries. Such things have never occurred in the West where, during the last nineteen centuries, Christianity has always been the common foundation for cultural development. The main reason why the Japanese cultural scene is so extremely entangled, is to be found in totally different religions and hundreds of religious sects each of which has added some colours to the Japanese landscape.

Therefore when we try to make a study of present-day Japanese religious life, we have by no means covered the subject when we have made some research into what has always constituted the three principal religions of Japan : Buddhism, Shintoism and Confucianism. Many other movements have sprung up which cannot be brought under these three main divisions. Especially during the last fifty years New Religions have mushroomed all over Japan.

The phenomena of the New Religions is something that no treatment of present day Japan which makes any claims to a semblance of completeness can ignore. They are one of the most vital aspects of modern Japanese life. Their vitality has been especially evident in the postwar period during which many religions have arisen, temporarily flourished, and quickly died. Others have led a precarious existence with many vicissitudes, having periods of strength and weakness, but struggling or parading on. Not a few have already given birth to a number of religious offspring in the course of their short existence. Most of the New Religions which are most prominent today had also a prewar existence and merely experienced a new burst of vitality since the war.

As soon as mention is made of the New Religions, the problem of terminology or delimitation arises. The Japanese term, *Shinkō Shūkyō*,

literally means "Newly Arisen Religions". Although it is a term in common use in Japan today, and although its signification is quite generally understood, its exact delimitation is not always made clear. The problem centers around two questions relating to the meaning of "new", which is a very relative term. In terms of time, how new is new? At what point does the new become old? In terms of content, at what point does a body of doctrine or an organization become a *new* religion rather than another sect within a larger religious tradition? The Western world faces a similar problem of terminology in regard to its "New Religions", "Cults", or "Sects". In what precise classification do Mormons, Christian Science, New Thought, Swedenborgainism, Jehovah's Witnesses, Unity, Unitarianism, etc. belong? Are they to be included within Christianity? Are they sects within Protestantism? ¹⁾ Are they to be regarded as New Religions? Precise demarcation is always difficult.

Japanese scholars are divided as to how much is to be included with the *Shinkō Shūkyō* classification, or whether, indeed, it is correct to speak of "New Religions" at all ²⁾. Some apply it to religious organizations as old as Tenrikyō (founded in 1838) and Konkōkyō (founded in 1859). Others prefer to limit the term *Shinkō Shūkyō* to that crop of religions which mushroomed immediately before and since the last war. Popular usage seems to side with the former.

Professor Hiroo Takagi, a recognized scholar in this field, indicates three particular periods in which New Religions were established or made great advances: (1) around the beginning of the Meiji era (1868),

1) In a study: "Visage des Sectes et Motifs de Dissidence", H. Ch. Chéry writes "Certains spécialistes, comme M. Jean Séguy veulent réserver le nom de sectes aux dissidences du protestantisme. En foi de quoi ils nous reprochent de compter comme secte par exemple l'*Antoinisme*, si connu des Belges... J'avoue ne pas très bien distinguer les motifs pour lesquels une dissidence créée par un catholique d'origine ne pourrait être qualifiée de secte.

Par contre, l'usage du parler courant réserve sans aucune hésitation le nom de secte à ceux qui se sont détachés d'une communion religieuse principale, à laquelle ils appartenaient précédemment. Cette définition n'est pas appelée par l'étymologie, car le mot "secte" vient du latin *sequor*, qui signifie "suivre": d'après l'étymologie, on pourrait qualifier de secte tout groupement de gens qui suivent une certaine doctrine. Mais l'usage a prévalu, chez les tenants d'une religion donnée, de traiter de sectes les groupements qui se sont séparés d'elle." (*Devant les Sectes Non-Chrétiennes*, Rapports de la XXXIe Semaine de Mis-siologie Louvain 1961, p. 29).

(2) around the beginning of the Shōwa era (1926), and (3) after the end of the Second World War (1945)³). Each of these periods were times of change, uncertainty, discontent. Men were looking for a faith which would provide answers to their physical, mental, and spiritual needs. At such times of stress, conditions were ripe for the arising of new expressions of religious feeling⁴).

For many, the formal, standardized, traditional religions failed to provide answers to the problems of modern existence. New answers were sought. More vital religion with greater relevance to the predicament in which man finds himself here and now was desired. A dissatisfaction with the incongruities and seeming irrelevance to much of modern life which characterized the established religions helped pave the way for the popularity of the New Religions.

The greatest boost given to the firm establishment of the New Religions on a major scale was the religious freedom granted the Japanese people for the first time at the close of the war⁵). Until that time all religions were severely curbed and regulated by the government. Religious freedom in the true sense was unknown. When the law proclaim-

2) Cf. the discussion of this term in *Contemporary Religions in Japan*, I (June, 1960), pp. 70-71.

3) Hiroo Takagi, *Shinkō Shūkyō* (Tōkyō: Dainihon Yūbenkai Kōdansha, 1958), p. 36.

4) Cf. Akio Saki and Iichi Ōguchi, *Sōka Gakkai* (Tōkyō: Aoki Shōten, 1957), p. 28.

5) It is often said that religious freedom was first granted by the Meiji Constitution, promulgated in 1889. Art. 28 reads indeed:

"Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief."

However, a text thus worded, lent itself to much arbitrary interpretation. "Once it was decided that peace and order had been disturbed or that the duties of subjects had been obstructed, it was possible to suppress or restrict religions not only by the law but, when laws were lacking, even by ordinances, e.g. Article 2 of Police Regulations Ordinance No. 16, 1908, of Ministry of Home Affairs read: "Anyone who has led another astray by predicting good or ill fortune, by making a prayer or charm, or giving a sort of talisman without reason," and "one who has obstructed medical treatment by making a charm, prayer, or giving an amulet or divine water, etc. ... shall be punished with not more than 30 days' detention or with a fine of not more than 20 yen. (Approximately \$ 10.00 at the prevailing rate of exchange.) This is one example of control. There were not a few prefectural police regulations which concerned the control of religions." (Dr. Jiro Tanaka: "The Meiji and present constitutions compared" *International Institute for the Study of Religions*, Tōkyō, 1959, pp. 66-67). The New Constitution is more outspoken.

ing religious freedom was promulgated, New Religions erupted with an explosive force resulting from the decades of religious suppression. Some of the New Religions had already existed for years within the protective fold of some other recognized religion, but it was only in the years since the proclamation of the Religious Persons Law (1946) that they received official recognition as independent religions.

Characteristics

The wide variety of thought which is included under the general term "New Religions" makes it all but impossible to indicate characteristics which are true of all of them. Nevertheless, there are various distinctive elements which are true of the large majority of them. Making explicit mention of some of these common elements will help to become orientated in this area of study.

It is characteristic of the New Religions to consider their particular teaching, emphases, ceremonies, and sacred writings to have been divinely revealed to the founder or foundress. Rather than being the creation of man, there is considered to be a divine source of the religion. It may be that some god possessed the founder and spoke or wrote through him, or that a dream or vision was given, indicating the divine will, or merely that the mind of the founder was divinely inspired to perceive and enunciate the divine truth. In any case, the truth of the religion is considered to have come by divine revelation, which ensures its validity. The typical founder of a New Religion is a person of great self-confidence. He or she often spent an unhappy youth in poverty and disease. At times he or she was a victim of paranoia with its concomitant megalomania, delusions and hallucinations. Then a divine being or beings took possession of the founder or foundress and entrusted them with a saving mission.

This seems to be almost a traditional phenomenon in the history of the Japanese religions. Kannon appeared to Shinran when he was 20 years old. Nichiren was a Visionary, the foundress of *Tenrikyō* received constantly heavenly visits, the foundress of the *Dai Hizenkyō*, Mrs. Orimo Nami claims that the highest deity of the Universe had descended upon her, the founder of the *Sei Kyōkai*, Kiyomi Miyake experienced twice a divine descension upon him, the two deities *Konjin* and *Ame no Minakanushi no Kami* took possession of Itoko Unigame, the foundress of the *Shintō Shūkyō*, the founder of the *Nembō Shin-*

kyō, Ogura Reigen claims that Amida Bosatsu spoke to him directly and ordered him to start a new religion, Mrs. Sayo Kitamura of the Dancing Religion extended hospitality to a male and a female deity, Kakushin Baba, the founder of the *Issai Shū*, received directly from Buddha the necessary directions and so on. To prove their divine mission, they received prophetic knowledge and especially they possess great healing powers. Faith healing is certainly the most important characteristic of the newly arisen religions.

The founders of the New Religions do not particularly excel in humility. Some refer to themselves as Saviors of the present time or they equate themselves with Moses, Christ, Buddha, Confucius or certain Japanese emperors. Mrs. Sayo Kitamura calls herself *ogamisama*, the Great God. *Ikigami*, the living God is the epithet applied to the leader of *Konkōkyō*. One of the founders of *Ōmoto-kyō* called himself the Savior of Mankind. "The Godman whom the world is so earnestly seeking for", can be found in the person of Mr. Terumi Fujita, the founder of the *Shinshū Kai*. *Tsuki-Hi's Yashiro*, the Shrine of God and Mediatrix between God and men is to be found in the person of Miki Nakayama, the foundress of *Tenrikyō*, Mr. Kōji of Okayama refers to himself as *Dai Tenshu*, the Great Lord of Heaven. *Ikibotoke*, the living Buddha is the term given to another foundress. The *miga-wari*, the Physical Substitute of God is the appellation given to Mr. Okada of the *Sekai Kyūseikyō*. "Their deportment is folksy, their speech is direct and even uncouth in its carefully nurtured dialectal brogue. At all times they keep close to the common man whose ailments they transfer upon themselves, whose hidden aspirations they voice, whose yearning for safety and deliverance they incarnate. They travel much; they preach relentlessly; they live luxuriously. They bask in adulation and even anthropolatry. Several of them claim to be theophanies, unerringly led by divine inspiration. Others, more modest, are satisfied with the role of prophet or medium. All are proficient in spiritual science. Mystical experiences are common with them. For they commune with gods, demons and ancestral spirits.

"Although some ride in Packards and Cadillacs, they don a primitive ceremonial dress. Their incantations remind one of a shamanistic conjurer, and the purposeful touch of their hand of an Indian medicine man.

"Many of them claim miraculous powers of healing. They can trans-

mit those powers to the sick whether it be by having devotees drink the carefully bottled water of their bath (as did Deguchi Onisaburō) or by writing a character on a piece of paper (as did Okada Mokichi).

"They shroud their 'revelations', in suggestive onomatopoeias and an air of ponderous mystery. Their primitive mind is steeped in the animistic folklore of Japan. They prove most everything they say by clever allusions and the deft juggling of *kanji* alliterations.

"One cannot write off these religious founders by some remark about their infantile power of reasoning. For they would lose no time in answering that thousands of people follow them not for reason of their teaching but for reason of their personality and that it matters little whether they are right or wrong as such contradictory notions are left behind in the world of faith. Should you doubt their healing power, they will look painfully shocked and invite you to come and see for yourself.

"The fact is that these men and women are masters of human psychology and possess remarkable talents of suggestion reinforced by auto-suggestion on the part of the masses. The ordinary man, in turn, downtrodden by the unrelenting struggle for life, is fascinated by the primitive and occult power which they exude. He feels secure in an atmosphere of community worship near a god tailored to his size.

"The candidness and earthly manners of these founders never stand in the way of a sound business sense and more than ordinary organizational talent. They are quick to learn from one another and keep an ear to the ground so as to remain in tune with the latest religious fads. They will try every means to attract public attention and spend huge sums of money on equipment and buildings in proof of their religious success. For they are convinced that poverty is an evil which it behoves them to eradicate from their own lives. They know that their poor followers demand from them such a vicarious display of wealth and power as from a model of perfection which is now within everybody's reach.

"As it must happen to all men, sickness and death also come to the founders. The former irritates them, but they call it 'purification'. The latter is a complete frustration. As Okada Mokichi told his entourage a few months before his death on Febr. 10, 1955: 'A great disaster is about to occur. I fear the worst'.

"Indeed, the trial of strength for all New Religions is bound to

come at the death of the founder. After Deguchi and Okada their movements soon declined" 6).

However this is not always the case, especially so when the new religions can evoke a mystical atmosphere 7). They nourish a constant thirst for mystery and mysticism and are fond of secret teachings. In connection with this trend, it may perhaps be noteworthy that *Tenrikyō*, one of the largest and certainly the most firmly established of all Japanese New Religions, performs every month a highly mystical dance, the *Kanrodai Zutome*, which nobody is allowed to witness 8).

The majority of the New Religions seem to be syncretistic to a greater or lesser degree. Teachings and practices from various other religions or philosophical systems are freely incorporated into their scheme. During their whole history the Japanese show a pronounced undogmatic tendency together with a great flexibility and adaptability of mind. They have the art of bridging the most contrary views, which the author time and again experienced during his conversations with the leaders of the New Religions. This characteristic goes together with their distaste for absolutes. They can easily worship at Buddhist temples and at the same time at Shintō shrines or Christian churches. "After all", so they say, "there are many roads that lead to the Fuji San. No religion should make any claim of uniqueness. They are more or less the same. Strip away the ceremonies and doctrines, and the

6) Joseph J. Spae: in *Missionary Bulletin*, March 1958, pp. 127-129.

7) "Le Japonais aime le mystère. Ces croyances et ces rites s'appuient sur des abstractions infiniment compliquées, où le symbolisme et le jeu de mots ont souvent une grande part; mais l'initié a l'impression de tenir l'explication des phénomènes tout en ne comprenant pas comment cela se passe. Sa soif de mystère reste ainsi insatisfaite et toujours brûlante, mais il est tranquille et soulagé, parce qu'il a communiqué avec une foule et ne sent plus seul. Ces rites, joints aux grandioses promesses qui sont supposées se réaliser dans un proche avenir, aident la foule à supporter ses malheurs et ses misères. L'influence du christianisme eschatologique, associé souvent au marxisme et en tout cas à tout ce que la tradition japonaise a de plus débridé". (P. Delbos in *Nouveaux Mélanges japonais*, janvier, 1955, p. 10).

8) The ceremony takes place at the foot of the *kanrodai* (a sacred pillar) in a kind of open square-shaped basement, situated some feet below the temple surface. This basement, invisible to the faithful, is strewn with grey white gravestone. The ten performers of this *kanrodai Zutome*, this very mystical dance arise, and descend by four different staircases to the basement. Only the shuffling of their feet over the gravestones can be heard. The number of the performers is always ten, in conformity with the ten appearances, instruments or organs of *Tenri-O-no-mikoto*.

ethical substance which is left is the law of truth and honesty and love. And thus we can freely borrow from each other" 9). One may find the names of Christ, Buddha, Confucius, Mohammed and the founders of the particular religion in one breath. From many diverse religions points of doctrine are quoted without the slightest effort to avoid internal contradictions or to respect their original meaning. Even the Christian Bible is for several New Religions a frequent source of inspiration. A new believer is not obliged to give up his former religion or to break relations with the religion to which his family belongs by tradition. Some New Religions take care of their followers only during their lifetime; when they are dead, they leave them to some Buddhist sect for burial. Only *Sōka Gakkai* is an exception to this attitude of mind.

Doctrinally and ceremonially the New Religions tend to be quite simple — almost superficial. Many have little concrete doctrine of their own. Their doctrinal basis is often found in a Buddhistic or Shintoistic setting with certain peculiar emphases. Simplicity of doctrine is one of their obvious reasons for popularity among the masses. In so far as their moral theology is concerned, they are perfectly satisfied with a few precepts which have been kept as general as possible and they refrain from burdening their followers with any commandments which would be difficult to observe.

Related to doctrinal simplicity is the primary emphasis upon "this-worldly" benefits. The New Religions are more concerned with meeting man's physical, material needs in the present than giving hope for the future or engaging in speculative reasoning about the nature of another world. As a part of this "this-worldly" emphasis, physical

9) Prof. H. Neill McFarland compares the New Religions with the messianic cults of primitive societies such as the Ghost-Dance Religion of the American Indians and the Cargo Cults of New Guinea. "These cults are examples of a socio-religious phenomenon which, for over a half century, has been reasonably well understood by anthropologists. Among such cults, wherever they have been discovered, there is discernible a remarkably standard pattern of development in which at least five factors are recurrent: (1) social crisis intensified by an intrusive culture, (2) a charismatic leader, (3) apocalyptic signs and wonders, (4) ecstatic behavior, and (5) syncretic doctrine. The milieu from which they arise, described in the words of anthropologist Margaret Mead, is the ferment of half-abandoned old and half-understood new". (*Contemporary Religions in Japan*, Dec. 1960, p. 60).

healing plays an important and almost indispensable part. Although it is frequently stated by religious leaders that the aim of the religion is not the granting of such physical or material benefits, in the eyes of the common believers this seems of primary importance. They provide in their ceremonies and they stress for the most part some kind of relief for people who have been unlucky in life or who have become ill. In their exhortations we find considerable stress on *genseteki rieki*, advantages in this world in whatever form it may be. Their final goal and the highest objective of their apostolic endeavors, is generally something purely natural. They are in the full sense Diesseitsreligionen, religions of this world and for this world. They are not interested in the far-away happiness of an unseen Heaven, but rather want to provide instant alleviation of all worry and burdensome obstacles to success in this very world wherein we live.

"A special feature of the new religions, which draws many people to them, is that their leaders give a kind of personal guidance to the believers. At their meetings it is always possible to ask advice about personal problems from someone appointed for that purpose. Usually such advice is based on personal experience and common sense, and although it does not contain anything extraordinary, it greatly comforts those who ask for it. There are also religions like the *Seishōdō Kyōdan* where the person who is asked for advice enters a kind of trance during which he receives a revelation in answer to the problem put before him. In such cases the revelation is explained to the person who seeks advice. In order to understand the importance of this guidance, one has to listen to the stories told by believers who by following the direction of their leaders actually found peace and happiness" ¹⁰).

The enthusiasm and individualism of the New Religions in contrast with the established faiths may also be considered characteristic. Upon individual faith, rather than upon a family or geographical basis, one enters the New Religion. Having become a believer, it is normal for one to become an enthusiastic proponent of his faith.

As a movement among the masses, the New Religions are usually tainted to a greater or lesser degree with various superstitions. There

10) Baiyū Watanabe: Modern Japanese Religions, *Monumenta Nipponica* vol. 13, (1957), p. 162.

are shamanistic features which are prominent in many ¹¹⁾. The reason why according to Oguchi many New Religions show shamanistic tendencies, is the fact that ancestor-worship played a prominent rôle in their foundation. To take only one example: In the *Reiyūkai* the shamanistic element is very prominent and it takes the form of a greatly developed ancestor-worship built on the Saddharmapundarika Sutra. The believers are convinced that our present-day troubles are only necessary consequences of our bad deeds in the past. Therefore we should communicate with the souls of the deceased, become their friends and ask their council in order to avoid future unhappiness. "They try to hear the voices of the divine spirit, the human souls and the spirits of the deceased. They look for information about life after death and about persons who are far away. They address themselves to a medium more or less in the following way: The medium, after having been chained so that it cannot move, is locked in a dark room. In this attitude the world of the spirits reveals itself to him. The slightest corporal movement which the chained medium performs, is interpreted as a presence of a spirit" ¹²⁾.

A further shamanistic aspect shows itself in the founding of many religions by women. This obviously new respect for women is seen both in the number of women founders and the large proportion of women preachers, teachers and believers.

Furthermore, the organizational characteristics of the New Religions needs mentioning ¹³⁾. Many of the New Religions have rejected the

11) "The weakness of the critical spirit of the Japanese, allowed the continuance of old ideologies that should have been abolished or modified by radical social changes. Yet there persist, or occasionally crop out anew the most primitive ways of living and thinking, of which Shamanism is one. Before the introduction of cultures from the continent, mediums occupied the central position in the Japanese religious world. Since the mediums were always descendants of powerful gods, they could, as was generally believed, exorcise evil spirits by themselves, because they had inherited divine powers. Hence these mediums were revered by the community. They belonged to a special, honorable class, and common people managed their affairs in accordance with oracles, or the advice of the mediums. In connection with this, we may suppose that charms and divinations, or something of the sort, were popular among the Japanese from time immemorial". (H. Nakamura: *The Way of Thinking of Orientals*. pp. 515-516).

12) Oguchi.

pp. 123-129.

13) In a study on the New Religions of Japan this characteristic has been emphasized by R. P. Uyttendaele: "Les fondateurs font montre d'un puissant talent d'organisation. De toutes les façons — et plus elles sont modernes, mieux

traditional hierarchy which distinguishes between ministers and believers¹⁴), and most of the believers are entitled to perform sacred functions. This lay character, it would seem, stimulates missionary activities among the members. But the lack of a priesthood does not mean the lack of organization. Great care is taken to assure liaison with headquarters. This is done not only by correspondence but above all by having all officials and even a large number of followers repair to headquarters for regular indoctrination courses. At such times physical labor is often performed in building and earth-moving projects as a special work of merit. Yet control from the center has often been unable to prevent splinter movements even in the most flourishing religions such as *Tenrikyō*, *Reiyūkai* and *Ōmotokyō*.

Moreover most of the New Religions have a strong eschatological character. They point to a bright and cheerful life some time in the future in this world. Whether they call it *yōkigurashi*, or *Yonaoshi*, or otherwise, when the messianic time has approached a kind of heaven on earth or a peaceful and happy, ever so happy welfare state will come into existence.

Finally the most outstanding of all the characteristics, nay often even the *raison d'être* of the New Religions is faith-healing, *shinkō-chiryō*. It is also one of the main reasons why people join the New Religions. "Primitive man's belief that there is some strange connection between disease and sin, between the physician, *homo medicans*, and the magician, *homo divinans*, has not completely receded before the advance of empiric science. The main reason for this stubborn persistence of what scientists would deride as superstition is that, with the necessary qualifications, this belief holds a good deal of truth.

cela vaut — ils s'efforcent de capter l'attention de la masse. L'architecture esthétique de leurs constructions, qui a bien valu aux religions nouvelles le nom de *tatemono-shūkyō* — religion de bâtiments — se propose de même but. La conception ultra-moderne de ces édifices et leur beauté inspirent de la fierté aux adeptes et ces bâtisses apparaissent comme la véritable et première réalisation du ciel promis sur terre. (Devant les Sectes non-chrétiennes: Rapports de la XXXIe semaine de Missiologie Louvain 1961, p. 199).

14) "This does not prevent officials from being called 'Reverend', etc. But their duties do not presuppose a 'vocation', nor are they necessarily for life. They think of themselves rather as board members and feel free to change their calling whenever it pleases them". (Joseph J. Spae: "Religions of Japan", *Missionary Bulletin*, 1956, p. 277).

"A recent inquiry sponsored by the Ministry of Education shows that at times of sickness 17.4% of all Japanese rely on superstitious practices rather than on the doctor. Surprisingly enough, this proportion hardly varies in the city (14.2%) and in farming (19.4%) or fishing (18.4%) communities. Nor does age and sex make much difference. Only the level of education is a decisive factor, the report indicates. Among high school and university graduates: only 8% take recourse to superstition. As education decreases, superstition increases: 14.8% for middle school graduates, 19.9% for primary school graduates and 25.5% for people without regular education 15).

"It is precisely among the less educated classes that the New Religions recruit their followers. Their apologists stress the beneficiary role which faith healing plays in border cases unrecognized or neglected by organized medicine. In this respect Japan's New Religions ride the crest of an international wave of scepticism about a materialistic concept of man which either negates the soul or at least misinterprets the fundamental unity of the human personality" 16).

Despite pretensions on the part of some to be world-wide, the New Religions are definitely Japanese faiths. They are rooted in Japan and make their appeal to Japanese. Their "newness" is found in certain emphases or enthusiasm and vitality rather than in major doctrinal differences from traditional Japanese thought.

Importance

Although in recent years the term *Shinkō Shūkyō* has tended to be an expression of contempt or scorn referring to low-class religions run by charlatans seeking to deceive the gullible, the nation-wide importance of these New Religions can no longer be denied or ignored. There are few households in Japan where these New Religions have not made their influence felt in one way or another. Present day membership in the New Religions is conservatively said to equal 10% of Japan's population 17). Others would set the figure at twice that number 18), but actual membership probably amounts to about 15 per

15) *Meishin-chōsa-kyōgikai* ed., *Meishin no jittai*, Tōkyō, 1952, vol. 1, p. 91.

16) Joseph J. Spae: *op. cit.* p. 518.

17) Takagi, *Shinkō Shūkyō*, p. 7.

18) Harry Thomsen, "Numerical Strength of the New Religions," *Japanese Religions*, I (January, 1960), p. 3.

cent of the population — although the figures necessarily depend upon the definition given to the term: “New Religion”.

The political significance of the New Religions has been emphasized in recent years due to the activity of *Sōka Gakkai* in particular. In the town assemblies elections throughout Japan on April 30, 1959, all 76 *Sōka Gakkai* candidates were elected in Tōkyō, and only 26 of their 287 candidates failed in other parts of the country. In the national elections of June 2, 1959, all six of its candidates for the House of Councillors were elected. It is no wonder that both the Education Minister and the Prime Minister of Japan attended the funeral and paid tribute to the late *Sōka Gakkai* leader, Josei Toda, on April 20, 1956. Newspaper reports indicated that, although they were not believers, “they bowed to some two million votes behind the altar”¹⁹).

Although other religions have not exerted their strength politically to the extent of *Sōka Gakkai*, the existence of such strength, in certain areas at least, is undeniable. Economically also, the New Religions are able to exert influence. In many areas of the country, the religious affiliation of a shop owner can mean the difference between prosperity and adversity.

The increasing power, undeniable vitality, and continued expansion of the New Religions is causing a new appraisal of them to be made. Outgrowing some of their early excesses may also be a reason for a more unbiased consideration on the part of scholars and common folk alike. Their importance in the life of the nation at the present, and their probable influence in the future is no longer a matter of speculation. It is an obvious fact to be reckoned with.

19) Kazuo Kuroda, “Religion of Purgation”, *The Japan Times*, May 23, 1959, p. 8.